Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 20

The History of Fort Langley, 1827-96

by Mary K. Cullen

Development of Farm and Fishery

The contract concluded between the Hudson's Bay Company and the Russian American Company in 1839 destroyed the American market for supplies and gave the Hudson's Bay Company the monopoly of the coastal trade it had sought for almost two decades. By the provisions of the agreement, the Russians leased to the British fur traders for ten years, from 1 June 1840, the coastal strip on the mainland north to Cape Spencer for an annual rent of 2,000 seasoned land otter. The Hudson's Bay Company agreed to transport from England British manufactured goods desired by the Russian colonies, to sell the Russians additional land otter and to provide supplies of foodstuffs including wheat, peas, barley, butter, beef and ham. To ensure the production of the required supplies as well as to enforce British claims to Oregon by extending agriculture, the Hudson's Bay Company formed the Puget's Sound Agricultural Company as a satellite enterprise. Throughout the term of the contract, however, the Puget's Sound Agricultural Company farms at Fort Nisqually and the Cowlitz portage relied on assistance in agricultural production for Russia from its parent Company's farms at Forts Vancouver and Langley.¹

This role of Fort Langley farm was partially forecast in Simpson's letter to Yale dated 20 June 1839.

The success that has attended our exertions on the Coast north of the Columbia, both ashore and afloat, says much for all that have been engaged therein, and no sooner were we enabled to direct our attention to the operations of the Russians by driving the Americans from the Field, than we have carried our point with the former, likewise by a commercial treaty... By that treaty we are bound to deliver a considerable quantity of Country produce annually: the only part of it we are likely to have difficulty in fulfilling in reference to the article of Butter, but you must lay your willing hand to the Churn, and see if you cannot render yourself as conspicuous in that way as in the production of Pork, the curing of Salmon, and the other ... duties in which you have been from time to time engaged.²

As soon as he returned to the Pacific late in 1839, McLoughlin took steps to promote dairying and other farming activities at Fort Langley. During a personal visit to the new fort the first week in December the doctor issued detailed instructions for stock raising and cultivation the following year. He brought with him on board the Beaver 29 milk cows to augment the Fort Langley herd and an English family to take charge of one of two dairies to be established immediately.³ Two ploughs were to be kept constantly at work breaking new land, oats were to be sown in February, spring wheat at the end of April, peas in mid-May and barley by the first of June. About 20 acres were to be put down in timothy and fenced against cattle, as many potatoes sown as possible and ground prepared for clover. Finally, additional farm buildings would have to be erected, specifically a stable 50 by 30 feet, sheds in the fields for grain and a shed for ploughs and carts.⁴

Already taxed with provisioning coastal vessels and forts, Yale was slightly vexed with this work order and confided his annoyance to Simpson, writing,

Chief Factor McLoughlin favored us with a visit last month on board the steamer, and brought 29 Wild California Cows with which he seemed to think we would be able to make 40 Cwt Butter. I wish we may but doubt it very much and had a mind to ask what quantity was salted at Fort Vancouver in 1827/28 when he made us eat our cakes without butter. I do not believe it exceeded 10 cwt. I shall not presume to express my humble opinion in regard to the Treaty with the Russians but judging of their consequence only from the quantity of Butter they require one would certainly believe them to be very formidable.

In regard to cultivation, Yale pointed out the variable Fort Langley climate and suggested that on this account McLoughlin had formed "too favorable an opinion with respect to the facility of Farming at Fraser's River."⁵

As it turned out, the greatest threat to agricultural production at Fort Langley in 1840 was not the weather, but the total destruction of the fort by fire on the night of 11 April. The fire broke out in the blacksmith's shop and, assisted by the wind, spread to the whole range of buildings on that side shortly after it was observed. As the flames advanced to the remaining sides an effort was made to save the Big House but in vain. In minutes Fort Langley — houses, utensils, furniture, seasoned barrel staves — lay a waste, "reduced to a heap of smoking ruins." The calamity was caused by the carelessness of a new hand called Brulé who, until he finished a house for himself (the last house required to complete the fort), was permitted to cook his meals in the blacksmith's shop and sleep in one of the bastions. He had forgotten to quench the fire before retiring to his sleeping place. By this disaster the Company lost furs to the amount of £958 and provisions and goods to the amount of £404, besides all the unvalued property and the loss caused by the disruption of business.⁶

The fire illustrated in a particularly vital fashion the importance which Langley Farm was now assuming to the effective operation of the Hudson's Bay Company's Pacific enterprise. In accordance with article 1 of the agreement with Russia, the Company intended during the summer of 1840 to take over the Russian American Company fort at the entrance of the Stikine River and to establish a trading post on the Taku River.⁷ Langley was to supply these posts with salmon, pork, beef and butter. Thus when Douglas, on his way north to Stikine at the end of April, learned of the Langley fire, he expressed grave apprehension whether the Company plans could fully be carried out. He noted,

In a series of dependent and connected operations, when an important link is broken, harassing delays, difficulties and absolute disappointment are generally speaking the too certain results... we were for instance depending on Fort Langley for salt provisions, which cannot now be furnished... therefore, unless some fortunate accident throws provisions in our way we must be compelled to defer the occupation of Taako [sic] to another year.

Douglas also concluded that "the vessels on the coast will be extreme sufferers, as without a complete revolution in our plans no efficient aid can be afforded until June 1841, and there is no chance of their provisions holding out until then."⁸

Fortunately, by 1 May, when Douglas arrived at Fort Langley, Yale had managed to neutralize the worst effects of the Langley disaster. A small stockade measuring 108 by 70 feet had already been erected for the security of the Langley personnel and during the course of Douglas's stay a bastion was finished and the wall pieces, sills and beams squared for a new building 48 by 24 feet.⁹ Yale made just two requests of Douglas — that he would supply him with six good axes and be off out of his way as quickly as possible.¹⁰ Fort Langley's officer in charge was determined to conduct business as if nothing had happened. In July he was able to report to McLoughlin that despite the fire, nearly everything that could be done in the way of farming was accomplished. Besides the barley, peas and oats sown before the fire, over 304 bushels of wheat and 500 bushels of potatoes had been planted.¹¹ The fort supplied enough provisions to enable Douglas to establish Taku and, from the case of the Company steamer, the vessels on the coast seem hardly to have suffered. For outfit 1840 Langley provided the Beaver with 30 barrels salt pork (each 200 pounds), 1,451 pounds of fresh pork, 225 bushels of potatoes, two kegs of salt butter (125 pounds each) and a host of other sundries such as salmon, venison, ducks, peas and barley.¹²

Yale's determination to keep up the Fort Langley services may have been motivated by his belief in a management conspiracy to lower the importance of his post. This conviction, first manifested in his condemnation of the Beaver for interference in the Langley fur trade, now received another expression in his attitude toward livestock. In the year since McLoughlin's visit in December 1839, the Langley herd had increased to "4 bulls, 17 cows, 19 cows calved, 10 oxen, 3 steers (2 years), 7 steers (one year), one heifer (one year) and 30 calves 1840 (only 10 weaned)."¹³ After the fire, McLoughlin concluded Fort Langley could not support "more cattle than those required for the two dairies and the work of the place" and he therefore ordered Douglas to remove as many of the young cattle as the steamer would take.¹⁴ Yale vigorously protested, maintaining he had feed enough for three times that number, but Douglas recorded, "his wishes were not to be consulted."¹⁵ Eleven cattle, the only young that could safely be dispensed with, were removed in September and several heifers in December.¹⁶

Langley dairies established in 1840 showed a steady increase in production, providing from one-fifth to one-half the volume of butter required by the Russian contract. The Hudson's Bay Company originally contracted to provide 160 hundredweight annually, but the poor quality of milk cows on the Pacific Coast and the difficulty anticipated in immediately supplying this amount had led to a modified agreement for 30 hundredweight until the quantity could be conveniently increased.¹⁷ Langley made 1,120 pounds of the 5,448 pounds of salt butter sent to the Russian American Company in 1843 and 8-1/2 hundredweight out of 41 hundred weight in 1844.¹⁸ In 1847 its export of 31 kegs of salt butter (each 56 pounds or circa 1/2 hundredweight) amounted to half the total export to the Russians.¹⁹

Not all the cattle on Fort Langley farm were dairy cattle. Although the Puget's Sound Agricultural Company's farms at Fort Nisqually and Cowlitz were developed as the principal source of beef for Russia, Fort Langley raised beef on a limited scale for the supply of the fort and the shipping.²⁰ For several years Fort Langley also kept between 16 and 22 oxen for the work of the farm; after 1845 this number increased nearly five times. Clearly, dairying, beef farming and the "work of the place" required more than the 53 cattle of 1840. In their 1845 report on the Pacific, Lieutenants Warre and Vavasour recorded a total of 195 neat cattle at Fort Langley.²¹ The total inventory in 1848 was 366.

The most consistently large stock at Fort Langley throughout the decade was pigs. Inventories for the years 1840 to 1848 indicate 200 to 250 as the usual number. The hogs, fresh or salted and packed in barrels containing about 200 pounds each, provisioned the coastal vessels. A typical annual supply was that for outfit 1841 which provided the steamer Beaver with 15 barrels of salt pork and 350 pounds of fresh pork and the schooner Cadboro with 4 tierces of pork and 200 pounds of fresh pork.²² While Langley pork was an essential item of sustenance for Company crews, McLoughlin considered it unfit for sale to settlers near the Columbia River.²³

Extending cultivation was an important corollary of large-scale dairy farming, beef and hog raising and was also intended to produce a portion of the wheat for the Russian contract. McLoughlin's instructions of December 1839 posited as a goal of expansion, "every year as much additional ground... be laid down for meadow, so as ultimately to cover the whole plain with foreign grasses."²⁴ Besides the usual grains (such as timothy, wheat and barley), seed for mangel, mustard, red clover and "cow grass" were forwarded from Fort Vancouver. The other major crops were peas and potatoes.²⁵ Most of the ground sown was located on the plain or prairie one mile behind and south of the fort although there were 60 acres of "rich alluvial soil" at the fort²⁶ and it is probable that about 30 to 40 acres were planted there. According to Yale, by 1844 Fort Langley had "more cultivated ground than we are able to till in the course of a season."²⁷ Warre and Vavasour's report of the following year recorded a total of 240 acres under cultivation.²⁸

This venture in planting proved to be only moderately successful. Yale considered the returns of the first year's effort "very poor"²⁹ and a summary of the Fort Langley crop, recorded by Douglas on 22 September 1840, seemed to confirm this opinion:³⁰

The degree of improvement after 1840 varied by crop. Winter wheat was almost a total failure every year.³¹ The 1844 harvest of 500 bushels of barley, 760 bushels of peas and 800 bushels of oats³² indicated yields in these products just slightly higher than 1840. Potatoes and spring wheat alone were rated as "tolerable." Upwards of 4,000 bushels of potatoes were produced in 1844 and from 1843 to 1847 a consistent yield of over 1,000 bushels of spring wheat was secured annually.³³

Unlike dairying and hog raising, cultivation at Fort Langley remained marginal to Company agricultural expansion on the Pacific Coast. True enough, in at least three years Fort Langley spring wheat was exported to Russian America — 1,575 bushels or 829-29/126 fanegas (66-1 /2 pounds each) in 1844, 1,000 bushels in 1845 and nearly 800 bushels in 1846.³⁴ Yet McLoughlin estimated in 1843 that the Columbia Department required 15,300 bushels of wheat to meet its own needs and satisfy export requirements. Of this Fort Vancouver produced 3,000 bushels and Cowlitz 5,000.³⁵ Surplus peas, barley and potatoes from Langley were shipped for provisions and seed to the Puget's Sound Agricultural Company farms at Nisqually and Cowlitz and to the Hudson's Bay Company farm at Fort Victoria, established on Vancouver Island in 1843.³⁶ Successful cultivation at these places in turn accented the disadvantages of crop raising at Langley. Eventually, a harassing climate and a desire to promote the fishery prompted Company abandonment of all cultivation unnecessary for stock raising or staff rations.

Rain in the spring and fall was the principal climatic factor inhibiting cultivation. During the growing season sunshine and moderate precipitation acted in concert with the rich and fertile soil of Fort Langley prairie to create fields of "grand appearance." Unfortunately, rains inundating the low-lying fields made spring planting exceedingly uncertain and at harvest time repeatedly left grain rotting on the ground before it had been cut or taken in. Yale thought that better farmers and more equipment would provide a partial cure for the problem. He wrote to Simpson in 1842,

the fit Season here for ploughing, sowing and harvest is very short and to surmount these disadvantages as much as possible, we would require an extra number of Horses, and a few expert Hands, men possessing more knowledge of farming, at least sense enough to acquire it in a short time ... in exchange for a few more here.³⁷

In 1844 Yale (recently promoted to chief trader) noted Fort Langley still continued "to be ill provided with means to obviate these local obstacles... which with a few extra Horses might have been in some degree counteracted."³⁸

By 1845 the hope Langley's officer in charge entertained of improving cultivation by various means had given way to simple condemnation of the Fort Langley climate, a view echoed by his supervisors. During the summer of 1845 nearly two-thirds of all the Company produce at the farm was either damaged or totally lost by incessant rain throughout the month of August.³⁹ When the crops suffered the following year from the same reason, Chief Factors Ogden and Douglas concluded, "The climate of Fort Langley is not well adapted for Agricultural purposes, the wet season setting in early, and there being always more or less difficulty in securing the Crops, in consequence of variable weather in harvest."⁴⁰

The Company decision to enlarge the salmon curing business effectively ended Fort Langley's first foray into large-scale agriculture. Since harvest time and the salmon run coincided in August and the early part of September, a choice had to be made for the allocation of manpower resources. Douglas and Ogden concluded that the Langley establishment of 18 men had "so many other duties to attend to, that beyond raising their own food, the farm is not considered an object of much importance."⁴¹ This decision was recapitulated in Yale's letter to Simpson on 25 November 1847.

The business of Farming at Frasers River being exceedingly precarious and disadvantageous, has been by the advice of Mr. Chief Factor Douglas, in a great degree superseded, with a view to the further prosecution of the Salmon trade, which commences with the harvest, and it is quite impossible to attend fully to both at the same time.⁴²

Agricultural difficulties were also experienced at Fort Vancouver and Cowlitz and, two years later, a renewal of the contract with Russia suspended the provision which had given a special impetus to agricultural expansion at Langley.⁴³

Throughout the 1830s the production of cured salmon at Fort Langley was limited to the provisioning of Company posts and ships and secondarily oriented to market. When the new fort was rebuilt in 1840, furs still outvalued salmon as an article of trade, the annual returns on furs amounted to about £2,500 and in salted salmon for market, 400 barrels, to about £800.⁴⁴ In the early 1840s, however, the Company directed its efforts toward marketing a larger volume of Columbia district produce in the Hawaiian Islands and the particular success of Langley salmon focused attention on the development of an export market industry from the Fraser. By 1848, salmon had surpassed furs on the positive side of the Fort Langley ledger and the post launched into a career as the single largest exporter of salmon on the Pacific Coast.

The mastery of the coastal trade which the Hudson's Bay Company achieved by the Russian contract of 1839 not only provided security for the inland fur trade, but also greater freedom to develop a wide carrying trade throughout the Pacific. The contract itself guaranteed a market for several agricultural products and it seemed logical that the shipping employed for their transport might be profitably used to carry a variety of Columbia produce for sale elsewhere. The nearest port of call and traditional market for timber, salmon and other Columbia produce was the Hawaiian Islands. After investigating the prospects of trade in this quarter during a visit in 1841-42, Simpson recommended that the Company agency at Oahu should conduct an enlarged business.⁴⁵ He viewed the potential of this market in glowing terms.

The business of this place is increasing from year to year, principally dependent on the whalers & other vessels that rendezvous here, which may be estimated at about 120 sail per annum. These shipping require supplies of various kinds which affords a market to a considerable extent; & as many of the natives are employed in Whaling, Pearl Fishing, in California & the Columbia, bringing the produce of their labors home, which finds circulation throughout the Islands, they afford a further market. This port is moreover becoming an entrepôt for a portion of the South American, California, Manilla and China markets.⁴⁶

Simpson was anxious to promote trade in a variety of articles such as lumber, flour, wool and leather, but it was salmon which he singled out for particular emphasis. Before his departure for the islands, he was informed by Douglas that the 1841 salmon fishery at Fort Langley was beyond all precedent, producing 540 barrels.⁴⁷ At Oahu he learned that salmon sold well at $10 to $12 per barrel of 180 pounds.⁴⁸ This information and the knowledge that salmon had long been a staple of Indians and fur traders on the Pacific Slope shaped Simpson's conclusion that "the Salmon Fisheries of this Coast are highly deserving of attention as a growing and almost inexhaustible source of trade."⁴⁹

In 1842 and 1843 Company sale of Fraser and Columbia River salmon in the Hawaiian Islands was adversely affected by other importations. Two American vessels visited the Columbia River in 1842 and collected salmon from their fellow nationals settled in the area. Their consignment of 760 barrels glutted the Oahu market, bringing down the price of the Hudson's Bay Company's product.⁵⁰ As more settlers poured into the area in 1843 and the prospect of opposition increased, the Hudson's Bay Company attempted to find supplementary markets for its salmon. The result was discouraging. Experimental shipments to the Boston and Canton markets in 1843 averaged only four dollars and three dollars a barrel, presenting little inducement for future consignments.⁵¹

Fortunately, the Hawaiian Islands market took a favourable turn in 1844. On 30 March Pelly and Allan, the Company's agents at Oahu, informed McLoughlin that there was a growing demand for Fraser River salmon among the natives.⁵² Fort Langley was called upon to feed this market. In August 1844 Yale and his staff salted 890 barrels of salmon, 600 in four days.⁵³ The Cadboro shipped 325 barrels to Fort Victoria in September and these were taken by the barque Columbia to Oahu in November.⁵⁴ Another 357 barrels were shipped in June 1845. The average return of the 1844 fishery was a satisfactory nine dollars a barrel.⁵⁵

When Douglas visited Fort Langley in December 1845, a second production of nearly 800 barrels of salmon was ready for shipment. The steamer Beaver with the Cadboro in tow was unable to ship all the salmon and arrangements were made to send back both vessels to take away the remainder.⁵⁶ The first consignment of 490 barrels shipped to Honolulu sold almost immediately after landing.⁵⁷ It was clear that from long use Fort Langley salmon was becoming a positive necessity of life to the natives of the islands who purchased it faster than the Company could supply the market. Instructions were issued for the Fraser River post to cure 2,000 barrels of salmon in 1846.⁵⁸ Yale was impressed. Here was a potential source of additional revenue to bolster the sagging profits of the Langley fur trade. To Simpson he wrote, "This activity of doing business quite a novelty here, and the agreeable news of the Islanders having taken a great relish for our most available article of trade, will I trust stimulate our exertions a little."⁵⁹

A good run of salmon and extra attention paid to curing made the Fort Langley fishery of 1846 "uncommonly productive." The seasonal yield was increased to a total of 1,530 barrels which was exported in its entirety in December.⁶⁰ From the islands on 26 December, Pelly and Allan reported that this cargo of salmon was "the largest importation that has yet made its appearance here at one time of that article."⁶¹ Notwithstanding the quantity, 270 barrels sold in the course of one month at ten dollars a barrel. Three months later prices were remaining firm at ten dollars.⁶²

It was this sustained success of the Fort Langley fishery which strongly influenced the 1847 policy decision to abandon farming at the post and to develop the curing business to its fullest potential. "We are now devoting our utmost attention to the valuable fisheries in Fraser's River," noted Company officials in March. "We intend to increase our exports from year to year until prices show a disposition to fall, and ... we have thus ascertained the actual wants of the market."⁶³ As the 1847 season approached, Yale was urged to greater performance. Simpson diplomatically requested Yale "to improve, if possible, upon the last year's very handsome returns."⁶⁴ Douglas's letter of 26 June was more insistent.

The Langley Salmon are all sold and have cleared about Ten Dollars a barrel. Our Agents are now calling for another supply, and think they could have sold double the quantity. With such encouragement, you may go on salting Salmon to the greatest possible extent. Remember, Yale, it must be two thousand barrels this year! I will not take a barrel less from you.⁶⁵

The 1847 season forcefully reminded Company officials of other requisites to a successful fishery besides exertion. A scarce salmon run in the river near the fort yielded just 365 barrels. It was only by sending a curing party with a stock of barrels and salt to an Indian fishing station 35 miles up-river that 1,020 additional barrels were cured, making a respectable total of 1,385.⁶⁶ These sold well in the islands for ten dollars a barrel until an importation of salmon from Sitka slowed sales, forcing a reduction to nine dollars for the remaining stock. With about 600 barrels of Fort Langley salmon still unsold in May 1848, Yale was assigned a maximum quota of 1,600 for the 1848 season.⁶⁷

Within two years of the decision to expand the Fort Langley fishery, the limits of the Hawaiian Islands market were ascertained. In August 1848 Fort Langley produced 1,703 barrels of salmon and these, according to future practice, were withheld from sale until previous stock was worked off.⁶⁸ The highest exportation in the history of the fort was made in 1849. That year 2,610 barrels of Fort Langley salmon were shipped to the islands and sold at $12 and $14 a barrel.⁶⁹ Over the next decade, on the two occasions when exports again reached 2,000, the quality of the Fort Langley product deteriorated and prices dropped from those received for smaller shipments.⁷⁰

Fort Langley's curing enterprise reached full development against the turbulent background of the Oregon boundary issue. The 1846 boundary settlement necessitated changes in Company organization and renewed the whole question of inland transportation. If, contrary to past experience, the Fraser valley were discovered to be a suitable highway to the northern interior, then the Hudson's Bay Company could be assured of an all-British supply line free from possible American encroachment. From 1846 Fort Langley's development of the salmon-curing industry was parallelled by an intimate involvement in the resolution of the communication problem.