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Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 20
by Mary K. Cullen The Coastal TradeHudson's Bay Company participation in the Pacific coastal trade was motivated by nothing less than a desire to eliminate both Russian and American competition from the Pacific Slope. For many years Russian trade with Indian middlemen had steadily eaten away at the Hudson's Bay Company's northern interior trade. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 28 February 1825 provided scope for continental expansion of the British fur trade, confining the Russians to the Alexander Archipelago and a narrow strip of the mainland from 54° 40 north latitude along the coastal range to the 141st meridian and by that degree to the Arctic Ocean. An additional clause in the convention provided an open invitation to undercut the Russian coastal trade by conceding to British subjects the permanent right of free navigation of rivers flowing through its coastal strip and free trade on the coast for ten years.1 Company coastal expansion in the next decade aimed to utilize this invitation although it was against the American coasters who posed the most immediate threat to the British fur trade that the Hudson's Bay Company directed the first thrust of its maritime effort. The American sea captains with whom the Hudson's Bay Company had to contend were primarily engaged in trading land furs with coastal Indians who traded with the natives of the interior. Unlike their Russian and British rivals, the Americans represented no one company and operated solely from ships. Their capital was limited and only an elaborate commercial cycle dependent on commerce in supplies enabled them to stay in business. The cycle usually commenced in the fall when coasters from New England and New York were outfitted for a three-year cruise. Rounding the Horn in December, they called at the Hawaiian Islands, took on fresh provisions and left behind what was not required for the trade of the first season. They arrived on the Northwest Coast in March, traded furs at various locations and usually visited the Russian American Company's establishment at Norfolk Sound where they exchanged provisions for sea otter pelts. In September they either cruised southward to the Spanish settlements to pick up additional supplies and sometimes a cargo of timber or salmon, or returned directly to the Hawaiian Islands. Winter was spent in the islands or on a voyage to Canton to sell the furs. The process was repeated a second year and the third the coaster proceeded to China and thence to the eastern sea-board of the United States laden with Chinese produce.2
The Hudson's Bay Company coastal strategy discussed at Fort Vancouver in 1828 aimed to exploit two principal weaknesses in this system; (1) dependence on sales to China and Russia, and (2) lack of capital. The London committee ultimately rejected Simpson's 1824 recommendation to sell furs in China for, like the Nor'Westers, they had to deal through the agency of the East India Company and their China experience proved to be just as unprofitable. Fortunately, by 1828 the Chinese market posed less of a threat since its price for pelts was declining.3 Simpson and McLoughlin hoped to destroy the other American market by effecting an agreement with the Russians to supply manufactured articles and provisions at prices the Americans could not afford to match. While negotiations were proceeding on this front, a combination of Company trading forts and ships would undertake an intensive campaign to spoil American profits by reducing prices of goods to the coastal Indians below the American cost of supply.4 Fort Langley, situated near the coast and assigned jurisdiction over Juan de Fuca Strait and the inland of Vancouver Island, was the first link in the chain of posts intended to eliminate American competition. The limited experience of the Fraser River post in the Pacific fur trade had already indicated the futility of maintaining a fixed tariff in the face of American competition. As long as opposition coasters were in the region, McMillan was forced to trade at American prices.5 The object of monopolizing the trade required more drastic reductions in the Company tariff. Even though the price paid on the coast for skins had reached 50 per cent of the London market value, "in order to strike at the root of the opposition" the Company proposed to increase prices another 25 per cent. "The Americans," Simpson glibly reported, "cannot afford to give such prices and must consequently withdraw."6 From October 1828, application of the price policy at Fort Langley was the responsibility of Chief Trader Archibald McDonald. A native of Glencoe Appin, Scotland, McDonald was now about 43 years old. Before entering the service of the Hudson's Bay Company in 1820, he had studied the rudiments of medicine and acted as agent for Lord Selkirk at Red River. He was sent to Fort George on the Columbia as accountant in September 1821. In 1826 he assumed charge of the Thompson River District and undertook explorations of the Thompson and Fraser rivers in the attempt to find a practicable route to the interior. In the opinion of Simpson he was a jovial fellow, "full of laugh and small talk" a complete contrast to the austere McMillan; "the former is all jaw and no work the latter all work and no jaw."7 Still, McDonald was considered to be well informed and, being fairly articulate, his jaw ran to the benefit of the historian. His daily record of the 1828 journey from York Factory8 was followed up by detailed correspondence from Fort Langley providing an illuminating account of its struggle to oust the American coasters. McDonald was to attempt to buy the furs of the Indians before the arrival of opposition and to offer prices sufficiently attractive to dissuade the Indians from retaining their furs for the Americans. Usually the natives were encouraged to trade at the fort itself, but in times of greater opposition Company trading parties were dispatched with supplies throughout the region. Either process presupposed amicable relations with the Indians on the one hand and an abundance of the right trading goods on the other. During his four-year tenure at Fort Langley McDonald was to experience difficulties with both. Like his predecessor, McDonald found his central problem with the local Indians was less their threat to the fort than their abiding fear of the Yulcultas which rendered them almost useless to the fur trade. With every alarm of the fearful tribe from Vancouver Island, Langley's neighboring Quantlans moved within the shadow of the fort for protection. At such times there was "not the appearance of a Beaver" and McDonald recorded, I see hunting [furs] themselves is perfectly out of the question. Their dread of the enemy is incredible — they even desist from Appearing in the water in any manner at the risk of Starvation with the Yewkaltas are reported to be near, & — that is not Seldom.9 McMillan had concluded that some order might be instilled in business affairs should the fur traders actually defend their neighbours. It was on this basis that McDonald hoped for a material improvement of returns in the spring of 1829. The one and only battle between the whites of Fort Langley and the West-Coast Indians took place at the mouth of the Fraser on 21 March 1829. Yale, Annance and a party of ten men were returning from the Cowlitz portage where they had entrusted an Indian runner with a packet of letters and accounts for Fort Vancouver. As they entered the southern channel of the Fraser delta, they were met by nine canoes, each with an average of 25 to 30 men, evidently prepared to stop them. The subsequent encounter was dramatically described by McDonald: By this time everything being made snug on board and a resolution formed to rush thro' with the Flag up and a cheerful song, the Gentlemen kept their eyes upon them. Finding there was no chance of decoying them or passing down with safety they instantly put about and stemmed the current...: no shot was fired until our people were fairly within the point and right in front of the Canoes.., as they commenced the firing they began to approach gradually — the Boat now getting out of slack water had to contend with a brisk current along side of a steep bank, of which the Savages took immediate advantage, and the very two Canoes that first reconoitred made for the shore — a battle now becoming inevitable, the Boat also dropped to shore but from some neglect amongst themselves all were thrown into an alarming dilemma for a moment by allowing it to shear out again when but seven men had landed. These however kept the Indians below at sufficient distance until the two Gentlemen with the other men hook or by crook got ashore with the ammunition, and rendered the position taken so formidable to the blood thirsty villains, that in about 15 minutes the whole brigade of not an Indian under 240 was completely repulsed, and down the main branch into the open Gulph.10 The bravery of the Fort Langley men lost nothing in the telling. It was the kind of tale McDonald relished and to the governor, chief factors and chief traders he proudly announced that "all the Indians within the River have come to congratulate us on the wonderful triumph over the invincible Yewkeltas and are most desirous to become our Allies when 'tis their turn."11 Ultimately Fort Langley's gloriously won alliances proved only as economically sound as its prices. In March 1829 the American coasters Owhyhee and Convoy arrived in Columbia with the announced intention of making a prolonged stand against the Hudson's Bay Company. Owned by Josiah Marshall and Dixey Wildes of Boston, these vessels at once began trading at a lower tariff than that of the Company.12 Since the Quantlans and Musquams of the Fraser valley were less inclined to hunt than to act as middlemen for such Puget Sound tribes as the Klallams, the effect of this American competition was quickly felt at Fort Langley. McDonald promptly reduced the old tariff from four and five skins to two, two-and-one-half and three skins per two-and-one-half-point blanket.13 On one occasion when a Sinnahome chief from the Cowlitz portage came to trade, McDonald noted in the Fort Langley journal that their stock of blankets was greater than he "ever knew before going out of a Fort for the same quantity of Furs." For 35 beaver and 10 otter he had traded 11 blankets, a pound of brass collar wire, a pound of fine beads and a number of smaller presents.14 Competition in prices was parallelled, if not equalled, by competition in types of goods. Besides the popular stout white blanket,15 that article in greatest demand at Langley was the gun. Extended destructive campaigns by the better-armed Yulcultas had created a desire for guns among the rival coastal tribes. As McDonald argued, if Fort Langley did not accommodate the Indians, the American vessels would.16 Thus, though the Company theoretically admitted the impropriety of giving arms and ammunition in trade and while it usually kept the price of guns high (20 beaver skins) during the maritime contest, Indian trading guns were a major trade item for price reduction at Fort Langley and other coastal establishments. American rivalry made the delayed appearance of the 1829 outfit a matter of acute anxiety at the Fraser River post. By June 1829 the schooner expected in March had still not arrived. The Langley Indians, hoping to see the vessel at any moment "with a vast quantity of goods," were reluctant to part with their furs.17 McDonald managed to persuade some Quantlans to trade their beaver, but he was not sanguine that Fort Langley could draw more furs in trade to the south. To undersell the opposition the sacrifice in trade goods had to be considerable. On 17 June the chief trader recorded, "force of property alone will now secure furs in this quarter — an Indian was here a few days ago with a Blanket which costs them on board the [American] Vessel but 2 Beaver, & did not appear an inferior one neither."18 When the schooner Cadboro at length arrived in mid-July, it was found that instead of increasing the order to meet the opposition, even the original requisition was incomplete. The cause for the deficiency and delay was the wreck of the Hudson's Bay Company's annual supply ship. While entering the Columbia River on 10 March 1829, the William and Ann ran aground on the south bar, its crew and cargo totally lost. The Ganymede, which had set out from London in consort with the William and Ann, arrived safely in early May, but its cargo was extensively damaged.19 With no reserve of goods on hand, the two small ships, Vancouver and Cadboro, and the two forts, Langley and Vancouver, were left almost completely vulnerable in the face of the American coasters.20 For the remainder of outfit 1829, Fort Langley valiantly covered the deficiency in trade goods, slightly increasing its fur returns. The Cadboro had delivered only 50 blankets, but with the help of a few woollens taken across the Cowlitz portage from the Columbia in the fall and by keeping up the tariff to two and three skins per blanket, the post managed to pick up 1,600 beaver.21 "We could not of course think of underselling our rivals," noted McDonald, "nor indeed would it have been good policy in us, while we had not the where-withal to satisfy them to invite here Indians that received a Blanket at home for a Beaver."22 In November 1829 McDonald spent 12 days at Fort Vancouver conferring with McLoughlin on the Fort Langley arrangements for the following year. Two topics predominated in the discussions — the salmon fishery and the coastal fur trade. While building Fort Langley in 1827 McMillan had forseen the possibilities of large-scale salmon curing. McDonald traded and cured over 7,000 salmon in August 1829 and hoped to be assigned enough coopers to develop salmon packing to 500 barrels yearly. His enthusiasm for the project was shared by McLoughlin who saw trade in timber, salmon and other articles as a supplementary source of profit which would greatly strengthen the hand of the Company against its competitors. Unfortunately, a shortage of manpower in the Columbia Department necessitated a reduction of the Langley staff from 15 to 12 and concentrated the full attention of the remaining complement on the coastal fur trade. Besides sending out trapping and trading parties, Fort Langley would supplement the personnel and direct the operations of a vessel.23 A convoy of three ships, the Isabella, Dryad and Eagle, was soon expected from England; the first two were to remain for service on the coast. When they arrived, the schooner Vancouver, now plying near the Columbia River, was to be attached to Fort Langley for trade about Puget Sound and Juan de Fuca Strait.24 The wreck of another supply ship, the Isabella, on the bar of the Columbia in May 1830, almost destroyed the Company's coastal offensive for a second year. Although the cargo was salvaged, there was now only one extra vessel for the coast, which made it impossible either to build a new coastal fort at Nass Harbour or to assign a ship solely for the use of Fort Langley. Nass was postponed and in July the Eagle, Cadboro and Vancouver were dispatched on a trading expedition northward. At the mouth of the Fraser, McDonald had the Vancouver detached from the squadron to bring the "abundant" outfit up to Fort Langley and then to make a short trip toward Admiralty Inlet, New Dungeness and other places for the purposes of trade. The schooner spent a month in the Puget Sound area with Langley trader Annance radically underselling Captain Dominus of the Owhyhee. The proceeds of the voyage amounted to a scant 130 skins at a phenomenal cost — 30 skins left in credit, 55 given in clothing and gratuities and 45 in arms. The object, as McDonald noted, was not Company gain. Dominus had been challenged and his trade rendered that much less profitable.25 During outfit 1831 the Company was able to make its first vigorous advance against the American coasters. Fort Simpson, established at Nass Harbour in May, became the centre of coastal opposition under the direction of Peter Skene Ogden. Ogden kept as many as three Company vessels on the heels of the American coastal traders, paying two and three times more than the opposition. In the course of the year he traded 3,000 beaver at a total loss of £1,600.26 Further south, word was received that the Owhyhee and Convoy had retired and Forts Langley and Vancouver were able to restore their tariff. The price of a blanket was raised to two made beaver and guns to the old cost of 20 skins.27 The annual returns of Fort Langley rose from 1,400 and 2,500 beaver, prompting one Columbia officer to comment, "Archy has been doing wonders at Fort Langley... and is not a little vain of his feat."28 The pause in competition left McDonald free to devote more time to salmon curing. Langley post had managed to put up 220 barrels of salmon in 1830 in casks so bad that practically all the pickle was lost and nine barrels sent for trial in Monterey found no purchasers.29 Still, McDonald was encouraged to go on salting, if only for home consumption. About 300 barrels were produced in 1831, 100 of which sold at ten dollars a barrel to a Hawaiian Islands wholesaler for resale in Lima.30 In 1831-32, Duncan Finlayson reported from Oahu that Columbia River salmon were most popular in the island market, but the Fraser River fish would probably command a better price. In August 1832 he forwarded 380 bushels of salt to McDonald to cure 300 barrels of salmon for exportation.31 While Fort Langley was thus commencing a promising salmon curing enterprise and earning a sound record in the coastal fur trade, discussions were taking place on new arrangements for the Pacific trade which threatened the abandonment of the post. In 1830 and 1831 a fever epidemic broke out in the lower valley of the Columbia which decimated the Indian population and laid up many of McLoughlin's men. This unhealthy state of Fort Vancouver, combined with the difficulties of the Columbia bar, prompted discussion on the relocation of the Columbia depot at the 1832 meeting of the council at York Factory. Though the ultimate decision was left to McLoughlin, Simpson had a definite scheme in mind. His 1829 travels in the Columbia Department suggested Puget Sound had many eligible locations for the principal depot, with excellent harbours, fine timber and, above all, fertile soil where provisions required for the coastal trade could be raised. An additional advantage to be gained by removing to Puget Sound, Simpson considered, was the saving of the expense of Fort Langley since "a large proportion of the returns of that Establishment are drawn from thence, so that if we were settled at Puget's Sound the post of Fort Langley might be abandoned without affecting the trade."32 In accordance with instructions from Simpson, McLoughlin had McDonald examine the country between Puget Sound and Nisqually River in November 1832, "the first object.., to observe if the Soil is suitable for cultivation, and the raising of cattle; the next, the convenience the situation affords for Shipping."33 McDonald's report on the land and harbours was so favourable that building operations commenced as soon as March 1833.34 The same month McDonald left Fort Langley for reposting in the Columbia Department and the Fraser River fort was left in the charge of Yale.35 McLoughlin reported to Simpson that Yale and 13 men would continue business until a vessel could be spared from the coastal trade to remove the property and people to the new establishment, called Nisqually.36 Some months later, McLoughlin began to waver in his belief that Fort Nisqually could actually replace Langley. During July the Cadboro was authorized to transport some part of the Langley property, but final abandonment of the fort was postponed for an other year. McLoughlin wrote on 2 July, The people now at Fort Langley can carry on the Fishery but enough of Trading Articles must be left at Fort Langley to carry on the Indian trade till next spring, as we cannot yet say whether we ought to abandon or not, and when our harvest is in and the Brigade come from the other side, we will have I hope means to keep it up till next spring and carry on all our operations.37 McLoughlin's reluctance to abandon Fort Langley was influenced by his growing conviction of the importance of trading posts to the coastal trade. Although the superintendent of the Columbia Department had initially promoted an expansion of shipping, even once suggesting the use of steamers on the coast,38 he had early concluded that the trade could be conducted with fewer ships and more posts. In October 1832 he instructed Ogden to select sites for new posts, an important object — as a land Establishment can be maintained at much less expense; & the Company is never in want of a Gentleman to take charge of a Land Establishment, but it is extremely difficult to find Naval Officers to manage the coasting Trade.39 Fort McLoughlin was established at Milbanke Sound in 1833 and another fort was planned for the Stikine River the following year. Four coastal posts, Langley, Nisqually, McLoughlin and Simpson, McLoughlin factually demonstrated, could "be kept up at less expense than one Vessel."40 Further, "as a proof of the influence acquired by establishing posts," McLoughlin pointed out to the governor and committee in 1834, "we have only to observe that it required the protection of a vessel and forty men to erect Fort Langley and at present a clerk and ten men to do the business of the place."41
Both Simpson and the London committee were in agreement with McLoughlin on the importance of posts to the coastal trade, but they also placed an equal value on shipping. Late in 1833 the governor and committee purchased the Nereide, a large brig of 240 tons, in the belief that she would prove "well adapted for the Coastal trade."42 In February 1834 McLoughlin was informed that the committee had accepted Simpson's recommendation to employ a steam vessel for navigating the various channels, inlets and rivers on the coast. Although they anticipated that the steamer might eventually do the work of four sailing vessels, in the meantime at least five ships would ply the coast — the Nereide, Dryad or Ganymede, Eagle, Lama and Cadboro. Efficient use of this heavy complement of vessels required a more accessible depot than Fort Vancouver. On this account the committee observed that Fort Vancouver should be maintained simply as a trading post, farm and depot for the inland establishments of the Columbia and that the principal depot and headquarters for the area west of the Rockies should be resituated at the new establishment on Puget Sound. They contended, like Simpson, that the change of depot would render it unnecessary to maintain Fort Langley.43 Facilities for agriculture as well as shipping influenced this decision to relocate the depot at Nisqually. The governor and committee were anxious to get into large-scale farming and, encouraged by McDonald's favourable report on Nisqually soil,44 felt a depot there would provide protection for such an enterprise. When a contrary assessment of the land was subsequently received from Chief Trader Francis Heron, Simpson recommended that both Nisqually and Langley be abandoned in favour of a new site combining the advantages of agriculture and shipping. In July 1834 he piloted a resolution through council at York Factory That a post be established at or in the neighbourhood of Whitby's Island to be called Fort Langley, which is intended to answer the purposes of the Posts now occupied in Frazers River and Puget's Sound, which, on the establishment of that post are to be abandoned.45 This resolution was followed up by a letter from the governor and committee to McLoughlin instructing him to appoint "some Person capable of judging soils" to examine Whidbey Island and the head of Puget Sound.46 Being manoeuvred into a position requiring the abandonment of Fort Langley, McLoughlin reasserted his own view of coastal strategy, which minimized shipping and highlighted posts. Shortly after the Nereide arrived in the Pacific in April 1834, he returned the ship as unsuitable for use on the coast.47 He also objected to the abandonment of Forts Langley and Nisqually on the ground that a depot at Whidbey Island would lack the proven advantages of fishery and trade demonstrated by these posts. Writing to Simpson on 3 March 1835 he pleaded, there is no place on the coast where Salmon is so abundant or got so cheap as at Fort Langley; and it we find a sale for Salmon, it would alone more than pay the expense of keeping up that place: Nisqually is the best situation for Trade in Puget sound, and though Whitby's Island is said to be as fine a situation for a Farm as could be desired, yet it is not conveniently situated for Trade. Thus he concluded, "I beg to suggest that these two places be allowed to remain separate until we see how our opponents will act and how the Salmon sells."48 This argument did not impress the governor and committee, who immediately censured McLoughlin following the return of the Nereide to England. They wrote McLoughlin in August 1835, Your individual opinion with respect to an energetic opposition to the Americans trading on the Coast, and the means of carrying it into effect is not in accordance with that of Governor Simpson and the Northern Council as assented to by us.49 Four months later they followed up this rebuke by a sharp reminder of the depot question. We have again to draw your attention to the object of removing your Principal Depot from the Columbia River to the Coast, say to Whitby's Island, Puget's Sound, or some other eligible situation, easy of access, as we consider the danger of crossing the Columbia Bar too great a risk to be run by the Annual Ships from and to England, with the Outfits and returns.50 The receipt of this last letter in March 1836 by the two new coastal ships, the barque Columbia and the steamer Beaver, was such a dramatic reassertion of London policy that the abandonment of Fort Langley seemed imminent. McLoughlin, however, stood firm. While he instructed Chief Factor Duncan Finlayson to examine Port Townsend, Port Discovery and Whidbey Island, he was determined that the depot question should not affect the existence of Forts Langley and Nisqually. His reply of 15 November suggested the existing system was "the most economical and efficient" for two main reasons. In the first place, the dangers of the Columbia bar were exaggerated and, since Fort Vancouver was to be retained as the interior depot, ships would still have to cross the bar with the supplies and returns of the inland posts. Secondly, a Whidbey Island depot would be incurring unnecessary expense because the greater part of the Indians who traded at Nisqually and Fort Langley could not go there, while the expense of keeping up the establishment at Fort Langley was in general paid by the salmon trade which could not be carried on elsewhere.51
Finlayson's report on Whidbey Island confirmed McLoughlin's view of its disadvantages and ultimately convinced London that the existing arrangement would have to be maintained until a more suitable depot location could be found.52 The search for a new site was extended to the southern end of Vancouver Island in the summer of 1837,53 but the idea of relinquishing Fort Langley was no longer considered. The ongoing need for provisioning the large coastal establishment of seven vessels and four posts54 accented the importance of the Fort Langley fishery and farm. Increasingly, activities at the Fraser River post were orientated to Finlayson's suggestion "that everything the coast requires in the shape of provisions not only for the land but for the naval establishments be supplied and transported by the steamer from Fort Langley and Nusqually [sic]."55 Yale, who had assumed responsibility for Langley on the eve of its abandonment four years earlier, would be officer in charge directing Fort Langley's new role in the fur trade. At the age of 39, Yale had already served 22 years with the Hudson's Bay Company, 16 years west of the Rocky Mountains. He had helped in the exploration of the Fraser River between 1826 and 1828, and as a servant at Fort Langley since 1828 had examined the country around the lower Fraser and Harrison rivers. Although he was deficient in education, he was known to have "a good deal of and dress & Management with Indians." Simpson described Yale as "a sharp active well conducted very little man but full of fire with the courage of a Lion."56 A strong sense of duty and persistence through difficulties would characterize his administration of Fort Langley during the next 22 years. Salmon curing, cultivation and stock raising had steadily expanded under Yale's management of Fort Langley since 1833. About 200 barrels of salmon were cured yearly. The large prairie, seven miles from the fort, was sown for the first time in 183457 and in 1835 visiting trader John Work reported 45 acres enclosed there, sown with 80 bushels of potatoes, 10 bushels of wheat, 45 bushels of peas, 8 bushels of barley and the same quantity of oats and Indian corn. At the same fort, 30 acres were cultivated with similar crops. Stock consisted of 60 pigs and 20 head of cattle.58 The first tierces of Langley pork were received at Fort Vancouver in May 1834.59 This product, along with spare wheat, peas and salt salmon, helped provision the ships and supplement the supplies of Forts Nisqually and Vancouver.60 From 1834 Yale and McLoughlin discussed the idea of relocating Fort Langley on a site maximizing the benefits of fishery, farm and shipping. Lulu Island at the mouth of the Fraser and the vicinity of Birch Bay were both considered but found unsuitable for farming.61 Finlayson examined and proposed a site on the Salmon River in 183662 and McLoughlin accordingly instructed Yale on 16 November 1837 "to move Fort Langley to the place on the Little River as soon as your business will admit."63 Yale protested that this situation would have an injurious influence on the salmon and fur trades. Since the 1837 fishery yielded 350 barrels of salmon besides the quantity required for fort use, relocation was subsequently postponed until further orders.64 Fort Langley fur returns steadily declined after 1833. In one sense this reduction resulted from the success which the Hudson's Bay Company achieved in the coastal contest. By 1838 the Company had practically stopped the Americans and extended its trade to "almost every accessible portion of the Coast as far as the Russian line of demarcation." As one officer noted, "Owing to this connected occupation, by our Various establishments, and shipping, we are straitened for room, and we cannot greatly extend the business of one Post without producing, at some other, a corresponding depression."65 Yale blamed the low returns of outfit 1837 on the interference of the steamer Beaver. The Beaver traded guns and ammunition to the Coquilts of the Queen Charlotte Islands who, in turn, peddled these articles to the Indians of Fort Langley, underselling the tariff of the post. To prevent further decline in returns, trading parties were sent out from Fort Langley and the sale of ammunition and firearms was suspended in the vicinity.66 The Company insisted that "Furs constitute the grand desideration,"67 but it was clear that the survival of Fort Langley had been predicated on its supply function and that the coastal trade must become increasingly diversified in character. By 1838 the Company policy of underselling had successfully broken the hold which the American trading ships had secured over the coastal Indians, but it had not placed the Company in its desired monopoly position. As anticipated, the eradication of competition required entry into the supply trade which made it profitable for the American vessels to visit the coast. The importance of foreign commerce as a supplementary source of profit was recognized by the Company's establishment of a branch agency in the Hawaiian Islands in 1833.68 Yet exports to the Russian settlements principally sustained the Americans. From 1828 the Hudson's Bay Company plied the Russians with offers to supply British manufactured goods and Columbia provisions such as grain, beef and pork. The Russian American Company saw the English company as the chief threat to its trade and for nearly a decade resisted these overtures. At length in 1838 mutual interest in excluding the Americans and the problem of uncertain supplies prompted the Russians to consider an agreement.69 With the prospects of a commercial treaty "more than probable," McLoughlin was summoned to London to assist in planning the future direction of the Columbia Department.70
When McLoughlin left Fort Vancouver in March 1838, plans were being made at Langley to increase its fishery and "to pay every attention to the breeding and rearing of swine" for the production of salt pork.71 The question of new facilities for these activities was reopened by James Douglas, the officer appointed to superintend the Columbia Department in McLoughlin's absence. Proceeding on the premise that "in a few years Fort Langley will supply all the salt provisions required for the coast," Douglas wrote to Yale on 21 November 1838 that the new fort site must be "alike convenient for the fur and Salmon trade, combined with facilities for the farm and shipping." Ultimately the fishery was the principal criterion used for relocation. A prognosis of Langley's future development was presented in Douglas's conclusion that "the Salmon trade must not be sacrificed as it will always yield a more valuable return at less trouble and expense than the farm."72 In the spring of 1839 a new Fort Langley was constructed on the south side of the Fraser two and one-half miles upstream from the original post. Removal from the old fort was completed by 25 June73 and the change was reported in a letter from Douglas to the governor and committee on 14 October 1839 which stated, We have abandoned the old Langley establishment which was in a delapidated state, as well as inconvenient in some respects for the business, and removed all effects, into a new fort built a few miles higher up on the banks of Fraser's River, the stockades of which, four block houses, and nearly all the necessary buildings are now erected. It is fully as convenient for the fur and Salmon trade, as the former site and, moreover, possesses the important and desireable advantage of being much nearer the farm.74 New Fort Langley, justified by its fishery and farm, marked a turning point in the Hudson's Bay Company's Pacific venture, ending the competitive phase in which the Company created posts strictly for their value in fur returns. In the new era of monopoly, crop raising and fish processing were not only seen as support functions of the fur trade, but also as valid commercial enterprises in their own right. Posts accessible to shipping were especially valued and soon Fort Langley wheat, butter, salmon and other products became important elements of a highly diversified Company commerce extending throughout the Pacific coast.
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