Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 11

The Battle of Châteauguay

by Victor J. H. Suthren

The Meaning of Châteauguay for Canada

Wilkinson seized upon Hampton's reversal to defend his own hesitant views,

After what has passed between us, you can perhaps conceive my amazement and chagrin at the conduct of Major General Hampton. The game was in view, and, had he performed the junction directed, would have been ours in eight or ten days. But he chose to recede, in order to cooperate and my dawning hopes, and the hopes and honour of the army were blasted.

The hopes and honour of the army were blasted, it would appear, as much by Wilkinson's attempt to set up an escape route from a campaign with which he was increasingly disenchanted. At the beginning of November, Hampton's defeat notwithstanding, Wilkinson still had an intact army which could have carried Montreal on its own. But Wilkinson appeared to have other ideas; ideas which he put into form when, on 6 November, he wrote to Hampton and cooly ordered him to march to meet the St. Lawrence army at St. Regis on 9 or 10 November, bringing with him the incredible amount of two or three months' supplies for Wilkinson's army.¹

Hampton, writing very carefully, politely declined the junction at St. Regis (although suggesting some other point might be suitable) and stated his men could only carry what they could on their backs, and no more. He hoped, however, "to be able to prevent your starving."

27 Drawing showing the uniforms of the 2nd U.S. Light Dragoons, 1812-14. (The Company of Military Historians. Drawing by Hugh Charles McBarron.)

28 Reproduction of a pen sketch showing an officer in the 1813 uniform of the Canadian voltigeurs. (Baby Collection, Université de Montreal.)

Wilkinson's reply conveniently overlooked the battle at Crysler's Farm, and landed the blame squarely on Hampton for the excuse Wilkinson sought.

Headquarters, near Cornwall (U. C.)
November 12th, 1813

Sir.

I had this day the honour to receive your letter of the 8th instant, by Colonel Atkinson, and want language to express my sorrow for your determination not to join the division under your command with the troops under my immediate orders.

As such resolution defeats the grand objects of the campaign in this quarter, which, before the receipt of your letter, were thought to be completely within our power, no suspicion being entertained that you would decline the junction directed, it will oblige us to take post at French Mills, on Salmon River, or in their vicinity, for the winter.

I have the honour to be, &c.
Jas. Wilkinson²

Wilkinson lost no time in publishing a general order on the following day which announced Hampton's culpability in the strongest and most obvious terms. A. T. Mahan sums up this situation as placing blame on both Hampton and Wilkinson, but with the results mentioned.

There can be no doubt that [Hamptons] action was precipitate, unnecessary, contrary to orders, and therefore militarily culpable. It gave Wilkinson the excuse, probably much desired, for abruptly closing a campaign which had been ludicrously inefficient from the first, and under his leadership might well have ended in a manner even more mortifying.

Some time before Wilkinson's decision was known in Canada, de Salaberry had written to O'Sullivan to say, among other things, "Hampton's retreat is a most fortunate circumstance for this province. I think t'would have been difficult to have managed both armies." Little did de Salaberry realize that he had, in fact, quite probably handled them both,³ for his sturdy defence along the Châteauguay had not only caused Hampton to retire but provided Wilkinson with the excuse to do so as well.

To Canadians there were very distinct feelings generated by the victory at Châteauguay, beside the immediate ones of escape from the peril of invasion.

The affair near the lines, at the River Châteauguay, is the first in which any considerable number of the natives of this Province have been engaged with the Americans since the war. In this case, the whole of our force, with a very few exceptions, from the commander downwards, were Canadians. The General Order issued on the subject, shew that the result has been such as was expected from the former character of the people, and the zeal which they have repeatedly shewn for the defence of their country. We are informed, upon authority which we deem unexceptionable, that the enemy lost about 100 men killed in this affair while we lost only 5. This, together with the repulse of the enemy, is incontestable proof of good officers and good soldiers. A few experiments of this kind, will probably convince the Americans that their project of conquering this Province is premature.

Clearly Châteauguay is a very real success in the protection of the country by an essentially Canadian defence force against a threatening army several times its size. The engagement earned de Salaberry's succinct comment that "This is certainly a most extraordinary affair."⁴

For the American public, which was ending the second year of lacklustre military efforts against Canada, the Wilkinson and Hampton failures paraded through the pages of unbelieving and finally cynical newspapers and periodicals, which carried the painful details of the recriminatory correspondence that seemed to lay blame on Armstrong's, Wilkinson's, and Hampton's heads in turn. The public careers of all three men were effectively finished, although Armstrong lasted until the burning of Washington. Thus, in the long run, the path was cleared for men of ability as opposed to men of influence in the American military structure. American military competence on the battlefield in 1814 would give these newer men the role and position they deserved far earlier.

In official American circles, new lessons had been learned. The British assault on Washington brought James Monroe to the secretary of war office. Monroe carefully considered the problem of the Canadian frontier, and, in concert with Major General Jacob Brown, determined in the spring of 1815 that any future campaign against Canada must come as a decisive, severing blow to the St. Lawrence artery.

If we secure the landing of a great force and beat them completely in the field at any point between Kingston and Montreal, or wherever we select, we shall be able to drive them into Quebec.

In effect, it had taken three years and the sobering effects of the Wilkinson-Hampton debacle to clearly etch a tactical policy which should have carried the day in American planning circles from the outset. Late as it was, the Monroe-Brown plan stood every chance of winning where Wilkinson and Hampton had lost. The Treaty of Ghent halted any such plans, but

Had the war continued it was the intention of the American government to have interrupted our Transport Communications by the St. Lawrence to the Lower Province in the event of which an attempt at inland conveyance must have been made, or we must have endeavoured to dislodge the enemy from the South Shore of the River by transferring one seat of War thither. The American general Brown, thinking secrecy no longer necessary, explained to me all that had been in contemplation for the ensuing campaign, which in my opinion would have answered their expectations.⁵

That those expectations had not been placed within the American grasp in 1813 had been due in no small way to the gallant defence on the Châteauguay River, Lower Canada, on Tuesday, 26 October 1813.