Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 11

The Battle of Châteauguay

by Victor J. H. Suthren

Behind the Victory

Major General Hampton's hesitancy or unwillingness to engage his troops fully and quickly must stand as the primary reason for the Canadian victory at Châteauguay. The numerical odds were overwhelmingly in his favour, even had the Canadians been prepared to contest the issue to the last man. Whether Hampton had no intention of completing his part of the campaign remains open to speculation. Purdy's receipt of the withdrawal order at the comparatively early hour of 2:00 P.M. indicates, at the very least that Hampton was unwilling to undertake any action that did not guarantee absolute certainty of success, and perhaps, if other observers are correct, not even that. Hampton appears to claim that the order which he received for shelters dashed his hopes of receiving any real support, and thus quashed his desire to continue. It may have gone deeper than that, into a desire to avoid any trying situation which might benefit his political and personal rival, Wilkinson.

On the other hand, a sound plan, even if poorly executed, can sometimes succeed; de Salaberry's choice of ground and defences did much to prevent this happening. His fortified position lay at the end of a "funnel" of open territory, flanked by the river and swampy woods and ending at the comparatively narrow front of the abatis. The tree cover prevented any useful application of artillery. The abatis entanglement prevented the employment of cavalry such as Harrison used on the Thames and, as well, presented a narrow front to a mass of regular troops trained for linear and open engagements. Even the weakest points at the fords in the rear were shielded by the same heavy bush, which increased the effectiveness of the entrenched positions.

The defensive tactics which were employed by de Salaberry and Macdonell were most successful, The ruse de guerre of bugling, shouts and war whoops was a clever stroke by imaginative leaders which apparently actually did deceive the attackers and hasten the decision to retreat. The concentration of fire from prepared positions was well used by de Salaberry, notably in the enfilading fire which broke up the river bank rush of Purdy's men. In general de Salaberry displayed sound tactical judgement and a willingness to seize the initiative from the enemy.

By adopting a flexible "defence in depth" policy rather than a single frontal position, the Canadians were prepared to the best of their ability to counter a penetration of the initial line of defence and any flanking movement such as Purdy attempted. As well, the dispositions of the forward troops made economical use of manpower resources in relation to the terrain: in this case the most apparent example is the use on the abatis right flank of 22 Indians who were aided by the swampy terrain in preventing a flanking attempt.

Of importance is the motivation of the defenders, both at the abatis and on the opposite shore. In no case, by and large, did the defending forces break and run from the action. The exception was Brugière's company of Chasseurs which encountered Purdy's two lead companies. Yet in this case the unseasoned militiamen rallied almost immediately, and it should be noted that the American regulars they faced had broken to the rear as well. The dogged assault on Purdy's column of Captain Charles Daly and his company was the stuff of heroism and should be recognized as such.