Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 11

The Battle of Châteauguay

by Victor J. H. Suthren

Opening Moves Toward Battle

Major General Hampton's first move was to transfer his force in a 10-day operation across Lake Champlain to Plattsburg, commencing in the first week of September. This undertaking was completed without molestation from the small British lake squadron at Ile-aux-Noix, whose officers were hesitant to engage the escorting naval force that consisted at that time of five gun sloops, two row galleys and a small steamboat. The operation was completed by 18 September, when Colonel Robert Purdy assumed command of the 4th U.S. Infantry at the stopover point of Cumberland Head, New York.¹

This westward transfer across the lake led Sir George Prevost, who from Montreal had watched for a northward thrust from the Burlington base, to conclude that a joint Wilkinson-Hampton attack on Kingston was contemplated, and he accordingly moved there to prepare for it. On the Champlain frontier, however, Hampton prepared for his second move, and on 19 September put his army on the march for Chazy and Champlain, New York.²

Simultaneously, Sir Roger Sheaffe in Montreal determined that these movements indicated a probable invasion in the direction of Montreal; accordingly, as Hampton got under way to the north, Sheaffe gave orders for the obstruction of all roads in the vicinity of Odelltown, as well as blockade of the cart road leading from there to the St. Lawrence basin at L'Acadie, and the destruction of the Lacolle River bridge. These orders were carried out quickly and ably by temporary levies of local militia under the overall supervision of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Fremont, formerly commander of the Saint-Vallier division of militia and at this point a deputy quartermaster general of militia.³

In Purdy's account of the next few days:

The army got under weigh, preceded by the light corps, and flanked on the left by the navy, and arrived at Chesy at 12 o'clock at night, lay on their arms, embarked again soon after sunrise the next morning, proceeded down the lake as far as Champlain, and up Champlain river the distance of four miles, where we landed, and immediately marched to Odletown. The light corps who preceded the other troops some hours, surprised and defeated a guard at that place. We remained at Odletown until the middle of the next day, during which time a want of system in the management of the army was readily discovered by every military man, that led to apprehensions for the safety of the troops, should the enemy oppose with any considerable force. The army returned to Champlain on the 21st, the 22nd to Chesy, and the day following commenced the route to Châteauguay.⁴

The arrival at "Odletown" was not uncontested, however. Although the American advance troops dispersed the first picket and captured four men, they did not effectively close with harrassing units that lurked around the American camp. These units were a detachment of the Frontier Light Infantry, Indians, two successive reinforcements from two companies of the 4th Battalion, Select Embodied Militia, and two companies of Voltigeurs under de Salaberry.⁵

Hampton was forced to retreat from this position not because of the annoying though slight resistance his pickets faced, but rather a lack of water supplies. Local brooks, and possibly the Lacolle River as well as swampy areas, were dry and provided no fresh water for either troops or horses, so the horses were returned to Lake Champlain.⁶

Purdy's criticism of the "want of system in the management of the army" may have referred to the expediency to which Hampton resorted in facing this water problem, a council of war which recommended a retreat and selection of an alternate route north, while conveniently reducing the commanding general's onus of responsibility for this decision. The decision was to recommend use of the road flanking the Châteauguay River, which lay some 70 miles to the west but which they hoped was neither blockaded nor dry.⁷

The march west did not improve either the logistics of the army or its morale, as inadequacies in the commissariat preparations, ostensibly Hampton's responsibility, were not well handled.⁸ Purdy's account, though succinct, allowed him yet another opportunity to criticise his commander.

The whole of this march, a distance of more than seventy miles, was very disagreeable; the officers were not permitted to take with them the necessaries, much less the conveniences of life, and were compelled to abandon clothing and other things essentially necessary to preserve the body in health. We forbore complaint, enduring every privation, presuming the commanding officer had sufficient reasons for his conduct, and concluding it was pro bono publico. The scene has passed, and time sufficient to have discovered those reasons, had they existed. None have been found, on the contrary, circumstances have demonstrated that it was a useless and unnecessary sacrifice of both public and private property. The army remained at Châteauguay 26 days, and on the 21st October commenced an excursion into the enemy's country.⁹

Arriving at Châteauguay Four Corners on about 25 September. Hampton set about "training his troops, in cutting and improving a more direct road to Plattsburg, and in bringing forward his artillery and provisions for two months."¹⁰ Meanwhile, he awaited further news and orders from Wilkinson or Armstrong.

If Sellar's description is accurate, the camp at Four Corners was far from conducive to regenerating Hampton's already fatigued, peevish army.

Tents were pitched on the clearings south and west of where the railway station of Châteauguay, N.Y., now [1913] stands...Hampton and his staff found shelter in the one tavern. His haughty air repulsed the simple backwoodsmen, who, for the first time, saw a Southern planter and the general of no mean army. Of the thousand slaves he was reputed to have in the Carolinas a number waited on him as servants. Little blockhouses were put together as shelter for the outposts, of which there was need, for Indians lurked in the woods and cut off stragglers. [A Canadian attack of 1 October] had a bad effect on the morale of the army, the soldiers contracting an absurd dread of a foe, who, though despicable in numbers, was unseen and unsleeping. The men shrank from sentry duty and not a night passed without dropping shots from the woods. To this natural fear was added discomfort. No new clothing was issued, and the cotton uniforms for summer wear, now threadbare and ragged, were poor protection against the white frosts and rains of the fall. Food had to be hauled from Plattsburg, keeping 400 wagons, drawn by 1,000 oxen, constantly on the road, so that the supply was subject to the weather and often short.¹¹

Following the contact at Odelltown, de Salaberry. as the officer responsible for both the Châteauguay and Lacolle pickets, retired along the L'Acadie road but kept informed, through scouts, of Hampton's movement. Learning that Hampton had established his camp at Four Corners, de Salaberry proceeded to carry out a reconnaisance and attack on this camp. Marching with two companies of Voltigeurs, the Light Company of the Canadian Fencibles (Ferguson's) and about 100 Indians, de Salaberry arrived at the edge of the American camp late in the afternoon of 1 October. Their presence revealed by one of the Indians' untimely firing of a musket, de Salaberry led one company of Voltigeurs and the Indians in a rush on the outer edge of the sprawling American camp. The Americans responded quickly, however, and, in danger from several flanking American companies, de Salaberry retreated to the camp perimeter, where he became separated from both the Indians and all but a few of the Voltigeurs. These men stayed with de Salaberry as he skirmished with American units until dusk.¹²

Losses on both sides were light, American casualties being listed as one private and a Lieutenant Nash of the 34th United States Infantry Regiment.¹³ It was during his retirement along the cart road which flanked the Châteauguay River (and which he obstructed as he retired) that de Salaberry noted that the land and cover near the present Allans Corners, Quebec, offered a possible site to meet Hampton's force should it move north.¹⁴ De Salaberry was aware that Hampton faced the alternatives of moving west to the St. Lawrence or north toward Montreal; in the latter event, the Canadian knew where he would make his stand, should the choice be his.

Hampton's sole attempt at a diversionary tactic, made in the hope of drawing off some of Montreal's defenders, was to send a small force to carry out an unnecessary raid on the small Canadian settlement at Missisquoi Bay.¹⁵ The ruse, however, was unsuccessful, as Sheaffe, while taking note of the raid, nonetheless authorized no move against the enemy "except under circumstances that shall afford the most decided prospect of success, and threaten but little risk."¹⁶ Hampton did not attempt further to divert British attention.

With the receipt of Armstrong's letter of 16 October ordering him to approach the mouth of the Châteauguay, Hampton was able to begin his march northward. His first units crossed the border into Canada on the morning of 21 October 1813. The road conditions were so poor that several days were occupied in getting the whole force under way. Left behind, 1,500 militia who flatly refused to cross were used to guard the stores and the Plattsburg route.¹⁷

The British command to the north had kept aware of events at Four Corners through the use of patrols and lone agents. The movement undertaken by Hampton, however, was not immediately brought under harrassment.¹⁸

De Salaberry had done his job well, and the initial problem facing Hampton was that of moving effectively along the skillfully blockaded cart road beside the Châteauguay,

An extensive wood of eleven or twelve miles in front, blocked up with felled timber, and covered by the Indians and light troops of the enemy, was a serious impediment to the arduous task of opening a road for the artillery and stores. Brigadier General Izard with light troops and one regiment of the line, was detached early in the morning to turn these impediments in flank, and to seize on the more open country below, while the army, preceded by a strong working party, advanced on a more circuitous but practicable route for a road. The measures completely succeeded, and the main body of the army reached the advanced position on the evening of the 22nd. The 23rd and 24th were employed in completing the road and getting up the artillery and stores.¹⁹

The "advanced position" was a settlement clearing in the woods near the junction of the Outardes and Châteauguay rivers, owned by a man named Spears.²⁰

Izard's men suddenly attacked the small picket at Spears' at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of 21 October, as a squad of local sedentary militia and about 10 Indians prepared dinner outside their small blockhouse. One defender was killed in the brief skirmish and an escapee probably carried the word of Izard's surprise arrival to authorities further downstream. Occupying the site, Izard set about the preparation of a camp which Hampton's main force subsequently occupied.²¹

From this position, through information provided by his informants ("guides") and patrols of his dragoons, Hampton was able to evaluate over several days the nature of the defensive position the Canadians were establishing facing him. He knew, it would appear, of their initial lines of breastworks and of the ford to the rear which invited a flanking movement or encirclement.²² By 25 October, he decided:

An effort was judged necessary to dislodge them; and if it succeeded, we should be in possession of a position which we could hold as long as any doubts remained of what was passing above, and of the real part to be assigned to us.²³

Knowing of the ford or fords in the rear, Hampton determined that to attempt to flank the apparently well-entrenched position before him presented the best possibility for success without undue casualties.

Colonel Purdy with the light corps, and a strong body of infantry of the line, was detached at an early hour of the night of the 25th, to gain this ford by the morning, and to commence his attack in the rear, and that was to be the signal for the army to fall on in front, and it was believed the pass might be carried before the enemy's distant troops could be brought forward to its support.²⁴

On the Canadian front, the arrival of Izard's force at Spears' and the report of that action had engendered quick response. The officer responsible for the picket, Major Henry of the Beauharnois Sedentary Militia, sent the message from his post to de Salaberry, who in turn informed de Watteville.²⁵ Meanwhile, Henry ordered a party composed of the left and right flank companies of the 5th Battalion Select Embodied Militia under Captains Levesque and Debartzch and 200 of the Beauharnois Sedentary Militia to proceed up the Châteauguay River road some six miles to the edge of the woods where lay the ground de Salaberry had chosen for defensive positions. This location was some three miles from the ravines making up those positions.²⁶

An overnight camp was made here, and the next morning Lieutenant Colonel de Salaberry arrived with two companies of the Voltigeurs and Ferguson's Light Company of the Canadian Fencibles. De Watteville had ordered de Salaberry and the Voltigeurs to move at once to the advance post at La Fourche, and on arrival there, de Salaberry pressed on to the camp of the troops Henry had sent on in the interim. With de Salaberry's arrival, the whole body marched swiftly along the cart track through the dense hardwood bush until it reached the position de Salaberry had determined upon. Here they began almost immediately to organize a defensive position as de Watteville hurriedly arranged for the collection of more troops to move upriver as well.²⁷ The spade and axe work of completing the positions took added impetus from the sighting, almost as the Canadians arrived at their position, of American patrols nearby. On 24 October de Salaberry undertook improvements to his position: drawing rotating working parties from the Sedentary Militia, and providing them with a covering picket of Voltigeurs and some of the Fencibles, de Salaberry set about the construction of an abatis, or log entanglement, some distance in front of the breastworks. As well, a small log blockhouse was built slightly to the rear of the abatis, on a position which gave a reasonably "long" view of the river. The ground before these positions was cleared of cover as far as was practical. This clearing then adjoined the beginnings of more or less cleared land stretching to Spears', excluding the heavily-wooded opposite river bank, thereby giving the abatis defenders a long view of fire. It was against these positions that Hampton moved on Tuesday, 26 October.²⁸

6 Scenes at La Prairie, 1812-13, by unknown artists. A gruesome little ink sketch showing the execution of condemned military personnel. Of interest are the hints at uniform styles, the graphically portrayed fear of the prisoners, and the benign smile an the religious figure at the right. Contemporary with the locale at the time of the Battle of Châteauguay. (Public Archives of Canada.)