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Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 11
by Victor J. H. Suthren The Battle Scene"Témoin Oculaire" has been identified as Michael O'Sullivan, serving at the time of the battle as a lieutenant with the 2nd Battalion Beauharnois Sedentary Militia.1 His description of the position occupied by de Salaberry is as follows:
O'Sullivan had sent a copy of this account to de Salaberry, and inquired his opinion of its accuracy in relating the setting and events; de Salaberry left very little doubt that he considered O'Sullivan's account to be as true a picture as was possible, and he endorsed it heartily.3 De Salaberry himself had mentioned in an earlier official letter "three advanced positions," the abatis, "situated two miles in front of the above stated positions, to which I marched on the 26th," and the able support of "Lieut.-Colonel McDonell, of the Glengarry Fencibles, who had taken up a ford position two days before the action."4 Charles Pinguet's diary provides little in the way of description of the breastwork lines, but does mention the abatis.
The map of the battle prepared by Colonel Joseph Bouchette for inclusion in his topographical atlas of 1815 was an attempt to picture accurately the four defence lines, the abatis, and the ford to the rear.6 Visible in the map is the first point of contention in histories of the battle, the fact that two fords actually existed in the rear. The difficulty lies in determining which of the two, the upstream or Grant's Ford, or the downstream or Morrison's Ford, was the principal ford mentioned in both American and British accounts. The ford at Morrison's indicated as "barracks" in Bouchette's map is described by an eyewitness to the battle as having "quite an entrenchment thrown up between our house and the river to cover the ford; there was no fortification on the other side or at Grant's."7 If Morrison's account were true, this would suggest that "Morrison's" ford was the one at which Macdonell commanded, while not ruling out the possibility of movements across Grant's Ford, nor of American intentions to attack the latter. The most authoritative plan of the battle, that prepared by Colonel Hertel de Rouville,8 supports the possibility that Grant's Ford, to the "side" of the British position, was used for the crossing of Daly's company. On the other hand, de Rouville indicated breastworks or abatis on the far bank which O'Sullivan does not mention, and which Morrison flatly rejects. As most other plans used in secondary accounts are versions of either Bouchette's or Benjamin Sulte's (which appears as a combination of Bouchette's and de Rouville's), the only plan which seriously contends with Bouchette for accuracy is de Rouville's, on the basis of the latter's presence at the battle area, if not the firing lines. On the other hand, de Rouville's indication of a far-shore abatis contradicts other sources, one of which was written by a man who lived permanently in the battle area afterward.
De Rouville's most specific departure from the O'Sullivan account, Bouchette's map and de Salaberry's comments, is the picturing of no less than seven fortified lines behind the abatis as opposed to four. Six lines are proposed by Sellar.
De Watteville's actual position, and those of any artillery, may have been at La Fourche, the junction of the English River with the Châteauguay some miles downstream where, Morrison relates, "De Watteville was in command, having his headquarters at Baker's (the old place at the mouth of the English River)...The camp had a breastwork of logs and earth so as to command the English River, for they thought it possible the Americans might come that way." With the distance from Morrison's to the Allans Corners site being some two to three miles, the commencement of firing from the latter shortly after 10:00 A.M. should have been communicated, even by the noise, to de Watteville as it was to the other breastwork lines, and given him an opportunity, were he actually at the sixth line, to perceive the situation well before heavy firing began after 2:00 P.M. Indeed, Hampton's advance units on the left bank of the river were visible for a period of more than three hours. Action on the right bank, specifically involving the rear positions, occurred for a substantial period before and after noon. Yet, as de Salaberry notes, "no officer of superior rank came up until the action was over, which would put the time as somewhere approaching 3:00 P.M.10 This might indicate that de Watteville was in fact aware of developments and directing movements from his "sixth line;" however, de Watteville later blamed de Salaberry, it would seem, for not informing him of the drama unfolding to the front.
As it is unlikely that an active general officer of de Watteville's stature would sit about in the presence of gunfire awaiting official confirmation without undertaking some action, it would appear reasonable that de Watteville's actual position was to the rear, at La Fourche, and that although he visited de Salaberry's positions prior to 26 October, he did not appear at the site until the afternoon of that day, riding in from La Fourche. De Watteville may have had proper grounds for annoyance: de Salaberry, in a manner to be repeated by Canadians serving under British officers, may well have consciously "neglected" to send word to La Fourche, where the news arrived with a message from Macdonell and the wounded being brought in by canoe.12 The abatis across the river indicated by de Rouville are, as has been noted, not mentioned in O'Sullivan's account, a point de Salaberry conceivably would have mentioned to the former had he been aware of them. More concretely, eyewitness Morrison indicates there were, in fact, no fortifications on the far shore. Thus it would appear that the large breastworks and abatis were to be found on the left, or de Salaberry's shore. The militia picket for the ford may have put up some defence, but the later skirmishes among the trees on that side of the river indicate that any such works which may have existed were not greatly important. Although neither de Rouville nor O'Sullivan mentions a blockhouse, Bouchette's map indicates one near the river bank. Morrison pinpoints it as a rude blockhouse at Robert Bryson's stables," and this spot coincides with the location given by a present-day area resident, Wilfred Bryson of Allans Corners, on the basis of family tradition. No other descriptions are available as to the design or size of the probably modest log structure, other than general texts of the period on blockhouse construction.13 The question of the de Rouville map and its seven fortified lines remains unanswered. Establishing the bounds of the Canadian position as the abatis and Morrison's ford, the positioning of four, or possibly five, breastwork lines is possible; yet O'Sullivan's insistence on the four lines leads one to conclude that de Salaberry's initial force prepared the four breastwork lines. After his inspection tour prior to 26 October, de Watteville may have dispatched additional troops from La Fourche who may have been required by their numbers to put up makeshift defences as they arrived, increasing the original lines by possibly two or three. There seems little reason to doubt de Rouville's "order of battle" for the companies involved; if this number, and the possibility of the later defensive works, are accepted (barring simple inaccuracy on de Rouville's part), then a defensive position incorporating the abatis, the four principal breastwork lines, the defences at Morrison's ford, and the possibility of later additional entrenchments thrown up by the reinforcements can reasonably be pictured. Where precisely the reserve companies stood is not clear, with de Rouville providing very little geographical reference. It is apparent that the right bank of the river was heavily wooded and contained swampy areas; that the defensive positions themselves lay in a wooded area of some density, and that their forward point, the abatis, lay at the edge of a relatively cleared area beside the cart track, which extended back to Spears' and Hampton's camp, and that to the west of the abatis lay swampy land. The question of what comprised the forest cover is answered partly by Bouchette, who mentions the seigneuries of Sault Saint-Louis, La Salle, Châteauguay and Beauharnois as being "abundantly watered, rising in general from the front in gradual swells, clothed with hard timber, to the province line, bounding that tract in the rear." Morrison relates that the wood "below" the blockhouse by the river bank was pine with hemlock "above." He also mentions the presence of elm.14 The site at present is incorporated into a well-designed rural farm system, in which natural erosion in the intervening years has no doubt reduced the clarity of natural features. For purposes of identification, the position of de Salaberry's abatis lies approximately in a shallow semi-circle running from the river edge across the road, passing a short distance downstream of the present marker, and angling in toward a wide gully on the edge of which the marker is situated. The location of the blockhouse was some 50 feet upriver from a log building now on the larger piece of crown property, and on the edge of the river slope. Comparison of Bouchette's map of 1815 with present maps indicate a likelihood that the present road lies on the path of the original cart track.15
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