Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 11

The Battle of Châteauguay

by Victor J. H. Suthren

Canadian Defensive Preparations

If military leaders in the United States found it difficult to define their tactical goals, no such problem was present in the mind of Sir George Prevost, governor of the Canadas, as war approached. Several key observations were made by him from the outset,

Montreal is the principal commercial city in the Canadas, and in the event of War, would become the first object of Attack: — It is situated on an extensive Island, and does not possess any means of defence: — Its security depends upon our being able to maintain an impenetrable line on the South Shore, extending from La Prairie to Chambly, with a sufficient Flotilla to command the Rivers St. Lawrence and the Richelieu.¹

Prevost, however, had few British regulars to hold this "impenetrable line"; the militia available in the Montreal area, some 12,000 men, and indeed in all Lower Canada (60,000) did not inspire Prevost's military confidence.²

To the immediate south of the city, two points on the vital Richelieu artery resented very typical problems of undermanning and easy access to an invading force. Saint-Jean commanded the river but could "be turned by following the new Roads leading from the United States to Montreal," and its small garrison, composed of one company each from the 10th Foot Royal Veterans and the 49th Foot, was insufficient to hold the town. Its back up, Fort Chambly, which served as a storage depot and assembly point for the militia, was defended by a small detachment of Royal Artillery and some 300 of the newly formed Canadian regular unit, the Canadian Voltigeurs. The latter had taken up their post at Chambly shortly before Prevost's observations were made.³

2 Lieutenant Colonel Charles M. de Salaberry. A contemporary portrait showing de Salaberry in the uniform of the Canadian Voltigeurs. (Château de Ramezay.)

Critics of Prevost suggest that his appreciation of his position was, under the circumstances, unnecessarily defensive. On the surface, his basic premise seems to have been little changed from that of previous successful defenders of the St. Lawrence artery, particularly in 1775-76. "I have considered the preservation of Quebec as the first object, and to which all others must be subordinate."⁴ It was in the degree to which Prevost was prepared to subordinate "all others" that criticism would centre; for the moment, however, consideration of his meagre numerical resources with the potential manpower of the United States made his position comprehensible.

In July, 1812, the total number organized and disciplined rank and file available in Lower Canada, were as follows:⁵

Of these, distribution of the rank and file along Prevost's "impenetrable line" earlier that month presented a picture of painfully few numbers totalling 1,481 over a large area.⁶

With such shallow resources, reliance on the "mere posse" of the militia for support was a matter of necessity, and orders for the mobilization of certain portions of the armed citizenry were promulgated in the same month.⁷

Prevost's appreciation of the militia was probably correct at that point; their potential for being a reliable force, even if only in appearance, would appear in the future, to the great comfort of the authorities who shared William Dunlop's observation.

We came up with several regiments of militia on their line of march. They had all a serviceable effective appearance — had been pretty well drilled, and their arms being direct from the tower, were in perfectly good order, nor had they the mobbish appearance that such a levy in any other country would have had. Their capots and trowsers of home-spun stuff, and their blue tuques (night caps) were all of the same cut and color, which gave them an air of uniformity that added much to their military look, for I have always remarked that a body of men's appearance in battalion, depends much less on the fashion of their individual dress and appointments, than on the whole being in strict uniformity.

They marched merrily along to the music of their voyageur songs, and as they perceived our uniform as we came up, they set up the Indian War-whoop, followed by a shout of Vive le Roi along the whole line. Such a body of men in such a temper, and with so perfect a use of their arms as all of them possessed, if posted on such ground as would preclude the possibility of regular troops out-manoeuvering them, (and such positions are not hard to find in Canada) must have been rather a formidable body to have attacked.⁸

3 Lieutenant Colonel Charles M. de Salaberry. 1752-1825, by A. S. Scott. An inaccurate but interesting portrayal, done apparently as a patriotic work during World War II. (Public Archives of Canada.)

The decisions of the American strategists to undertake attack in the west in a general four-pronged thrust required that whatever Canadian regular units were available be moved to Kingston and points west as conditions permitted. Sparsely populated Upper Canada needed their services more than the lower province which had its substantial militia reserve. This dispersal westward in the first year of the war brought into focus units which would figure in the defence at Châteauguay. The occupation of the British regulars available to Prevost in other theatres of the war would see Hampton face what would be an essentially Canadian force.

Distribution of Troops in Canada. Quebec, December 21st 1812

(signed) E. Baynes

It is revealing to examine in some detail the process of general orders for troop movements from this time to the days of battle in October 1813, for from it arises a clear picture of a continual flow of troops westward from Montreal, passing through those units which continued to form the brick and mortar of Prevost's south shore line. Links of this line were borrowed from time to time to strengthen the westward defences, but Prevost's overriding concern for his defensive position as outlined to Liverpool in 1812 remained largely unaltered.

With the arrival of September and the substantial threat posed by the build-up of American troops under Wilkinson and Hampton at Sackets Harbor and Burlington, the British command made the major adjustment on the Montreal frontier which established in large part the defensive alignment that faced Wade Hampton the following month. Prevost's "impenetrable line" was divided into reserve and advanced divisions, the former under Major General Sir Roger Sheaffe, the latter under Major General Stovin. The plan commenced with the detailing of the reserve, of which the right was

to occupy La Prairie on the St. Lawrence, extending through St. Pierre, St. Philippe, L'Acadie to St. John's on the Richelieu, and to consist of a Car Brigade, a squadron of the 19th Light Dragoons, the Company of Guides, the Flank Battalion of the Line-detachment of 103rd Regt. four companies 3rd Battalion Sedentary Militia of Longueuil, Boucherville and Vercheres.

The post of St. John and Isle Aux Noix is to be garrisoned by the Battalion Companies of the 13th Regt. one company 10th Royal Veteran Battalion and the 4th Battalion E. Militia. —

The Advance is placed under the command of Major General Stovin — the Right to occupy Châteauguay extending through the settlements of Sherrington and Hammingford to the mouth of the Lacolle on the Right to consist of the following corps: —

Two Three Pounders of Artillery
One Troop of 19th Lt. Drago.
Captain Watson's Troop
Canadian Light Infantry
Canadian Voltigeurs
Frontier Light Infantry
Canadian Battn. of Light Infantry
1st Battn. Embodied Militia
2nd Battn. Embodied Militia

The Chasseurs and Sedentary Militia of Beauharnois, Châteauguay, and the 1st and 4th Battalions of the Townships — the distributions of these corps will be detailed to Major General Stovin.¹⁰

As well, the city of Montreal was to undertake formation of a brigade under Colonel James McGill from the three battalions of town militia and the "Montreal Volunteer Companies."

4 Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost, by S. W. Reynolds. (Public Archives of Canada.)

Between 4 and 6 October the companies of the 103rd Foot were put in motion from their reserve position to march to Coteau-du-Lac via Sainte-Anne. The knowledge of Major General Hampton's presence at Châteauguay, New York, and Wilkinson's position on the St. Lawrence added impetus to this move and other hurried ones which followed. The general order for 8 October 1813 delineates the increasing pace of defensive preparations: all Montreal area troops were to cook two days' salt provisions to be carried with biscuit in their packs; two 24-pounders and a 19th Light Dragoons detachment were sent from La Prairie to Montreal; Major General Stovin was to march to Caughnawaga from La Prairie with "all the residue of the troops," leaving only a small guard; flank companies and four battalion companies of the 1st Battalion Embodied Militia were to march with two field pieces to Caughnawaga, leaving the battalion companies of the 13th Foot at L'Acadie. To Caughnawaga as well went a detachment of the Canadian Fencibles and four companies of the 3rd Battalion Embodied Militia. The Caughnawaga Indians as well as the 2nd Battalion (Beauharnois) Sedentary Militia were sent to the shores of the Beauharnois Channel to back up the 103rd Foot at Coteau-du-Lac; while a detachment of the 1st Battalion Royal Marines at Trois Rivières was ordered up to Montreal "in all possible haste." The militia was under orders to carry 40 rounds at all times as well as the cooked salt provisions.¹¹

The tense anticipation throughout the lower province is evinced in the further orders for the tocsin to sound when necessary; a sweeping order went out for all north shore militia within 50 miles of Montreal to repair there with arms or earthworking tools. Meanwhile, south shore militias were ordered to assemble at Caughnawaga, while the militias of the Richelieu and Yamaska regions not under orders were called to L'Acadie and Saint-Jean.¹²

5 Colonel George Macdonell, C.B. (Public Archives of Canada.)

The relative positions of the units directly involved in the fight at Châteauguay are not clear, nor does elucidation appear in a further general order dated 9 October at La Prairie, in which the stations indicated were probably those from which the members of de Salaberry's command marched later in the month. The Saint-Denis garrison of militiamen was ordered to L'Acadie; the 1st Battalion Embodied Militia under Colonel de Rouville was ordered to Chambly; Colonel de Lery's Boucherville Militia moved to Saint-Pierre, while two companies each of the 4th Battalion Select Embodied Militia and the 13th Regiment were ordered to "incline" toward Saint-Philippe and Saint-Pierre. Major General Stovin was to order the Voltigeurs to Saint-Pierre as well, while he proceeded to Saint-Regis; the 1st Battalion Select Embodied Militia was to occupy L'Acadie, while the Canadian Fencibles were to join the reserves at La Prairie.¹³

That a great deal of movement occurred in the Canadian defence formations in the period prior to the battle is apparent in the entry for the period in the diary of Charles Pinguet, lieutenant of Canadian Fencibles.

De la Halfway House, où nous étions dans mai, on nous a envoyés à Chambly; de Chambly nous avons été à Plattsburg, environ quinze lieues audelà des lignes sur le lac Champlain; de là, nous sommes revenus à Chambly ou nous avons joint le régiment; là, quatre des nos compagnies nous ont laissés pour le Haut-Canada où elles sont a présent. De Chambly, nous avons été à Laprairie, de là à Saint-Philippe; de St-Philippe notre compagnie a été envoyée à Douglas Settlement, près des lignes, ou nous ont joint deux compagnies des Murons; nous avons été là trois jours et sommes revenus à Saint-Philippe; le lendemain de notre arrivée, nous avons reçuordre d'aller à Saint-Pierre.¹⁴

The presence of Hampton on the upper Châteauguay caused the principal headquarters of the defence to concentrate on Châteauguay county by the middle of October, with the advance positions along that river receiving reinforcement from local militia drafts. The question of authority was altered somewhat with the appointment on 17 October of Major General de Watteville to command the advance in place of Major General Stovin. De Watteville was to remain in command for the period of the battle. Directly beneath him, and responsible for the defences of the Châteauguay River and its watershed, was Lieutenant Colonel Charles M. de Salaberry of the Canadian Voltigeurs.¹⁵

Charles Michel d'Irumberry de Salaberry was the son of a Canadian seigneur who had served with the British forces and had been a member of the Legislative Council. Three other sons as well as Charles entered the army, supported in part by a family friendship with the Duke of Kent. Charles alone survived his early career, the other young officers dying in India and Spain. De Salaberry served in the West Indies, and was on garrison duty in Ireland. On returning to Canada shortly before the war as an aide-de-camp, he married a Canadian girl and was called on to form the Voltigeurs at the approach of hostilities with the United States. For his meritorious service during the war, de Salaberry received a C.B., and was appointed a member of the Legislative Council. He lived a successful and comfortable life surrounded by his family until he died quite suddenly on 26 February 1829 at the age of fifty-one.¹⁶

George Richard John Macdonell, who would command the reserves at the Battle of Châteauguay, was born in 1770 and began his military career with the Loyal British Fencibles in 1794. After attaining the rank of Captain in the 8th Foot (King's) Regiment, he undertook in 1811 to raise the Glengarry Light Infantry, and became its major in February 1812. Prior to Châteauguay he had distinguished himself in the capture of Ogdensburg, New York, leading the attack across the river ice. For his services at Châteauguay, Macdonell received the C.B. and the Châteauguay gold medal. He later became lieutenant colonel of the 79th Foot. He married a daughter of Lord Arundel of Wardour; he died in 1870.¹⁷

To these two career officers, one Canadian, one British, of the British forces in Canada, would go the key responsibilities in the approaching battle which held such significance for the fate of Lower Canada.