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Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 11
by Victor J. H. Suthren The BattleHaving determined the nature of the defences confronting him, Major General Hampton ordered the march of the flanking party at sunset on the evening of 25 October. Under the command of Colonel Robert Purdy, this force, consisting of the 4th, 33rd, and 34th U.S. Infantry Regiments plus some unknown "volunteer and light" units, crossed the Châteauguay River from the American camp most probably at a spot where a ford is located and which later was the site of an Ormstown grist mill. Under their none too reliable guides, these units then set out on the overnight trek in single file through the heavy woods which hopefully would put them beside the ford(s) to the rear of the Canadian position as Hampton perceived it.1 It was immediately following the departure of Purdy that Hampton received one of the intelligences which would later affect his decisions when he came to face de Salaberry.
The darkness of the night very nearly rendered Purdy's march impracticable as well. Rather than the silent march to a quick capture of the ford, Purdy's force struggled with difficulty through a wet and confusing night which was not illuminated by help from the "reliable" guides Hampton had assigned to Purdy.
Dawn of Tuesday, 26 October, saw Purdy in heavy bush on the right bank of the Châteauguay, still some distance upriver of the abatis line, rather than near Morrison's or Grant's Ford; Hampton mustering his main body to move from the Ormstown camp against the abatis, and the Canadians not very well prepared for the arrival of either.4 It will be recalled that as part of the defensive preparations, de Salaberry had posted a picket on the far or right bank to prevent an unannounced attack on the fords. Identified by O'Sullivan as "sixty of the Beauharnois Militia," this body is identified by Wood as 40 members of the Chasseurs d'Elite de Châteauguay, under the command of Captain Jean-Baptiste Brugière. Again, the only clue to the exact position of this picket is the de Rouville plan, and it suggests that, if the ford depicted is Grant's, Brugière's company was posted slightly upriver of the present "ford defence" cairn.5 On de Salaberry's side of the river, O'Sullivan indicates that a working party was busy at the abatis, protected in front by a picket of 20 Voltigeurs under Lieutenant Guy and in the rear by another picket under the command of Lieutenant Johnson, also of the Voltigeurs. Present as well with Guy were 10 Fencibles. As Pinguet relates,
The remainder of the Canadian forces were to the rear in the fortified positions along the gullies. Among the more remarkable troop movements made by Canadian forces was a 60-hour march to the advanced positions at Châteauguay by the 1st Light Battalion of Select Embodied Militia, which had been under the command of Lieutenant Colonel George Macdonell of the Glengarry Light Infantry. The men of this battalion were predominantly French Canadian, with a number of English and Scots-Irish. After receiving orders on 21 October from Sir George Prevost to march immediately to the Châteauguay positions, the battalion gathered together flat-bottomed river scows and bateaux from the Kingston area and made a perilous, storm-tossed descent of the St. Lawrence through the Long Sault, Coteau, the Cedars, and Cascade rapids. After a brush with a severe storm at the western end of Lake St. Louis, they reached Beauharnois village on the evening of 24 October, setting off immediately at a quick pace along a narrow footpath which led toward de Salaberry's position, where they arrived on the morning of 25 October. Macdonell's exhausted men put up rude shelters on Morrison's land near the ford. Later, they would undertake the building of the breastwork at the rear ford.7 Under overcast skies on the morning of 26 October, Hampton directed Izard to form his infantry and accompanying dragoons into column on the cart track and, preceded by a small advance guard, move on the abatis. As his troops crunched along the rutted cartway, Hampton awaited the expected sound of musketry from Purdy's attack. No such sound reassured him as he neared the abatis, nor was there any evidence to indicate that Purdy had made his attack earlier in the morning.8
At the abatis, the work party was well into the morning labour when, at approximately 10:00 A.M., Izard's lead party came into view of the sentries posted by Guy in the forward picket. Guy's Voltigeurs and Fencibles exchanged several shots with the American advance guard while the militia men got to cover in the rear of the abatis, then retired into the abatis to join Johnson's men as Izard's impressive column came into view in the distance.9 Probably with more than one quiet word to providence at the sight of massed blue columns in the distance, Guy and Johnson's squads nevertheless continued a sharp exchange with the lead American party. As well as alerting the Canadians to the presence of Hampton, this skirmish may have helped orient Purdy and his floundering column in the heavy bush and marsh on the opposite shore.10 De Salaberry, in the rear at the breastwork positions, advanced hurriedly to the abatis at the first sign of fighting, taking with him Captain George Ferguson's Light Company of the Canadian Fencibles, two companies of Voltigeurs under Captains Jean-Baptiste and Michel-Louis Juchereau-Duchesnay, a party of about 22 Indians under Captain J.-M. Lamothe, and a company of the 2nd Battalion Sedentary Militia of Beauharnois, under Captain Joseph-Marie Longuetin, of which the working party may have formed part. Arriving at the abatis, de Salaberry found Guy and Johnson directing the defence, but not being pressed by the main American column some distance further to the rear; Hampton had received word from Purdy that the latter's position in the morning was short of the ford, and had decided to await the advent of that attack.11 As the firing at the abatis petered out and a silence broken only by an occasional shot settled over the site, de Salaberry quickly learned from Guy and Johnson what had occurred, and possibly of the presence of Purdy's hapless group on the far shore. De Salaberry immediately began posting his companies. He sent Lamothe's Indians to push as far as possible into the thick bush flanking the slash of the abatis, where their whoops and stealthy movements added to the swampy terrain might aid in deterring any flanking attempt by the Indian-wary American troops. Closer on the right he placed Ferguson's Fencibles, sending some of these men out as skirmishers in the front tangle of the abatis. In the centre de Salaberry posted Jean-Baptiste Juchereau Duchesnay's Voltigeur company, which extended out almost to the river bank. On the river end of the abatis and along the undergrowth-lined river bank he placed Michel-Louis Juchereau-Duchesnay's Voltigeur company, to the left of which he placed Longuetin's company of militia. From there these two companies could fire from a flanking position on the American column suspected to be moving on the Chasseur picket across the river.
Thus posted, the Canadians looked to their priming and waited for a move from the halted mass of blue, white and silver in the distance across the stump-dotted clearings. Equally on their minds were the movements of the hidden American column they knew was paralleling the river, De Salaberry moved among them, using first names, talking encouragingly and calmly, no doubt with an eye to the morale of his outnumbered and seriously threatened troops. De Salaberry, in the meantime, had informed Macdonell of the threat posed by Purdy, and Macdonell was prepared to respond whenever the movements on the far shore warranted. Having brought troops up from Morrison's to the first and second breastwork lines, Macdonell returned and ordered two companies of his Light Battalion to cross in support of Brugière.12 The need for this support was not long in coming. Purdy's advance party of two infantry companies came upon Brugière's company almost to the complete surprise of both, at about 11:00 A.M. As Morrison relates,
Brugière's Chasseurs had indeed been shaken by their first encounter with the American regulars, but rallied almost immediately to the support of the companies Macdonell had sent across. These companies were Captain Charles Daly's left flank company of the 3rd Battalion Lower Canada Select Embodied Militia, and Captain G. G. de Tonnancour's left flank company of the 1st Battalion Lower Canada Select Embodied Militia, both of which formed part of Macdonell's Light Battalion. Macdonell had directed Daly to support Brugière and pursue the Americans, who were in a shaky state of discipline at this point, while de Tonnancour's company was to hold in reserve in the vicinity of the near ford. Daly's and Brugière's sally against the two halted companies of Purdy's advance sent the latter retreating in some disorder toward Purdy's main column, still trying to reorganize itself after floundering through the swampy gully just upriver from the abatis line. This sally occurred quickly enough, and with the desired results. The observers of the Morrison family, watching from the banks of their farm clearing down stream at Macdonell's location, were able to turn their full attention to dinner at noon.13 As noon passed, Purdy's advance companies were retiring in some confusion upriver. Daly and Brugière, some distance to the rear, were pursuing them cautiously. De Salaberry's men looked at the waiting American column before them and wondered what had occurred on the far bank. Hampton sat awaiting developments which would favour his attack on the abatis, not knowing the flanking movement was already largely a lost cause.
To the retreating infantrymen of Purdy's two advance companies, the surprise at the sharp resistance Daly and Brugière had put up added to the glimpses caught of the Canadian reserve lines gave an impression of large numbers. The first returnees to Purdy's position, somewhat after 11 o'clock, reported these reserves to Purdy, who in turn sent off a messenger to Hampton informing him of the column's halt. With this news, Purdy gave up further movement downriver, and pondered again how to complete the regrouping of his scattered column after the disastrous blunder into the swamp which had occupied the morning. The point of Purdy's farthest advance, with the exception of the two advanced companies, was this swampy area just slightly upriver from the abatis line. Portions of his force would advance along the river bank to a point almost opposite the blockhouse, but the main body of Purdy's command had gone as far as it could that day. Finally, at about 2:00 P.M., Purdy received an order from a Colonel King, serving with Hampton's column, to retire four miles back upriver, ford the stream and rejoin the main army. This order immediately raises the question of Hampton's entire motivation; Why did he dispatch this order to Purdy, apparently before mounting the attack on the abatis, only to terminate his attack with the claim that Purdy's failure made a successful result impossible? The possibility seems to be that Hampton was reluctant to carry out any attack at all. Just as Purdy was considering this order, "the enemy made a furious attack on the column by a great discharge of musketry, accompanied by the yells of the savages." Daly and Brugière had closed the gap.14 Meanwhile, on the left bank, Hampton waited as noon, then 1:00 P.M. passed. By 2:00 P.M., he was prepared to act. There seems to be no evidence that he either heard, or was made aware of, the eleven o'clock skirmish near the ford until receiving Purdy's delayed message. The sound of musketry at 2:00 P.M. might have indicated to Hampton that Purdy was indeed carrying the ford. During the long wait over noon, Hampton had allowed Izard's troops to prepare lunch around fires beside the cart track, with the exception of those advance men keeping an eye on the abatis. Now Hampton ordered Izard to move. Izard's column was formed on the roadway and advanced. As they approached the abatis, it would appear that de Salaberry was prepared to seize the initiative from the Americans in opening fire, a move he may have felt would strengthen the morale of the Canadians. As soon as the huge American column appeared to be within range de Salaberry fired a single shot which, whether by design or accident, was seen to bring down a mounted American officer. Almost immediately the Canadian bugles sounded the "commence fire" and a roar of musketry burst from the abatis. The American column did not remain still, however. Pausing only momentarily, Izard moved his companies into line to the left, facing the abatis. The American line began to deliver well-disciplined rolling volleys which contrasted with the irregular continuous fire from the abatis.15 As the abatis was curved, Izard had adjusted his line to it, thereby throwing most of his volleys into the lightly defended right of the Canadian line. He altered his front line, his men "filing up with speed," however, and the redirected fire quickly drove in the few Fencible skirmishers. At the sight, the American infantrymen shouted of victory. De Salaberry, apparently sensing a moment of possible crisis, immediately ordered his men to return the shout through the smoke, and this they did loudly, with the shout being echoed by the whooping of Lamothe's Indians on the right. De Salaberry also sounded the advance on his bugles, and Macdonell, situated at the first breastwork line, "caused the bugles to be sounded in all directions, so as to induce the enemy to believe that we were in far greater numbers." Macdonell also despatched two reserve companies to march to the abatis, and undertook to move up himself. The clever counter use of noise at this point in the abatis fight led Hampton's line to be misled as to the size of de Salaberry's force and the reserves, and even for a brief moment to expect an attack. The moment when the massive American line might have surged over the abatis had been averted by a clever ruse de guerre. Almost immediately thereafter, somewhat after 2:00 P.M., Izard's companies slackened their fire, "as if their attention were directed to the other side of the river."16 On the other side, Daly's and Brugière's attack at 2:00 P.M. had somewhat confused Purdy's force, and in the interval when Izard's column wheeled into line before de Salaberry, Purdy was attempting to organize a coherent defence. As Izard's fire slackened, de Salaberry turned his attention to aiding Daly and Brugière. who were closing in on Purdy's column once more in a seesaw series of sharp squad actions. Standing behind the concealed Voltigeurs and militia along the river bank, de Salaberry shouted directions across to Daly, who was visible from time to time through the trees and undergrowth, "cautioning him to answer in the same language [French], that they might not be understood by the enemy."
For some time, Daly and Brugière had been engaging the outer fringes of Purdy's command. They approached Purdy's main body almost as de Salaberry was able to turn his attention to the far shore, at about 2:15 P.M. With remarkable courage, Daly led the two companies into close range of Purdy's command, which had formed an uneven firing line in the bush. There Daly's and Brugière's companies fired a kneeling volley. Purdy's thunderous counter volley whistled over the heads of the kneeling Canadians, but wounded Captain Daly, who nonetheless ordered a charge to bayonet distance. As the Canadians moved forward Daly fell again with a severe wound, almost at the feet of the American line. Simultaneously, Captain Brugière fell with a wound, and command of the two companies fell to Lieutenant Benjamin Schiller of Daly's company. Pressed in difficult close-quarter attack by Purdy's men, Schiller ordered the Canadians to retire. The wounded Daly was in danger of being captured, and Schiller was attempting to carry him to the rear when an American rushed them; Schiller was forced to fight a short but savage duel over the prone form of Daly before decapitating his opponent and managing to carry Daly to safety. The American infantrymen pressed forward with shouts of victory, and it would appear that only the density of the bush prevented severe casualties being inflicted on the members of the two Canadian companies, who were now retiring slowly under pressure from Purdy's forces.17 Hoping to pursue and surround Schiller's retreating men, Purdy's infantrymen burst in groups out of the woods and marsh on to the river bank and were astonished to look across almost directly at the Canadian position where de Salaberry, atop a stump, was eyeing them coolly through a telescope. As they emerged from the trees, the waiting Voltigeurs and Longuetin's militia opened a murderous fire. The torrent of enfilading musket shot withered the American rush along the bank, and the men of Daly's and Brugière's companies were able to hold their ground. Groups of American infantry broke into the bush in confusion, leaving numerous casualties in the telling crossfire along the river shore. Purdy's attack, if not halted earlier, without doubt was halted now, at approximately 2:30 P.M.18 Hampton had finally received Purdy's morning message, and had already despatched his own order to Purdy to retire; now, from men who managed to swim across to his position in Izard's line and from what he could see of the disorganized withdrawal partially visible on the far bank, Hampton had clear grounds to conclude that the attack was a failure and withdrawal therefore justifiable. Subsequently he ordered Izard to retire from the field and march back in column to a position three miles in the rear to which the army's baggage and supplies had been brought. Izard's line reformed its column on the cart track in good order and discipline, and no fire was directed at them from the abatis. Daly's and Brugière's men retired with their wounded to the ford positions and to the field hospital with two army surgeons who had been set up in Morrison's house. Purdy, after the disastrous events on the river bank, had withdrawn with his column into an upriver bend of land known as "Round Point" and set up a defensive position. There he ordered rafts built, and the wounded were ferried to the far bank in the late afternoon. Purdy sent a messenger to Hampton asking for a guard to protect these wounded and his own crossing, but was astonished to learn that Hampton was already over a mile to the rear, making for camp.
Realising that his wounded, who now lay unguarded on the opposite shore, were helpless without defence. Purdy had his troops construct a floating log bridge from timbers and wood found along the river bank. By this bridge, about 100 men under a Major Snelling managed to cross and rejoin the main army to the rear, taking with them the wounded on that shore. This crossing, however, was carried out under fire from some of Lamothe's Indians, and several of Purdy's men were killed while crossing the log bridge. As for the remainder, Purdy relates,
Morrison tells of hearing this "attack," but maintains that the American troops were in fact engaging each other. No evidence exists to indicate that any of the Canadians were abroad from the abatis that night, with the exception of some of Lamothe's Indians, and it is probable that Purdy's scattered forces were engaging each other as much as the watchful Indians. At the Canadian line, the primary business at this time continued to be the transport of wounded and any American casualties the Indians had not reached to the field hospital which had been established at Morrison's. As Izard's line was withdrawing from the clearing before the abatis, de Watteville, followed by Sir George Prevost and members of his staff, galloped into the rear positions and made their way to de Salaberry's line. The latter apprised Prevost of the situation just past, even as Izard's last companies were vanishing down the cart track. Prevost paid de Salaberry an apparently genuine but somewhat reserved compliment, of which de Salaberry is said to have later remarked, "I hope he is satisfied, though he appeared cold." As Cruikshank puts it,
The line of Canadians at the abatis and the reserve positions spent the remainder of the rapidly fading afternoon with a watchful eye to the front, and slept that night, under miserable conditions, on the ground they had defended during the day. De Salaberry had sent out his pickets after the battle, and these, mostly Lamothe's Indians, had no doubt been the source of the fire at Purdy's log bridge. The pickets were eventually able to place themselves two miles further upstream than the posts which Hampton's main body had surprised in the early hours of the morning. The most detailed numerical and positional breakdown of the Canadian force is Wood's, and although not entirely complete, runs as follows: In The Firing Line
In Reserve
The initial estimate of Canadian losses gave the following figures:
This count was later amended to two killed, sixteen wounded and four missing, with the discovery that the three Fencible casualties were in fact taken prisoner by the Americans.22 On the following morning, 27 October, de Salaberry was reinforced at the abatis by Lieutenant Colonel Macdonell, who moved to that position with three companies of the reserve.
The night of 26 October Purdy's discomfited band had spent under conditions even more trying than the rain-sodden defenders of the abatis. Nerves were on edge as brief exchanges occurred in the wet gloom, either mistakenly with other confused groups of exhausted American stragglers, or with the hovering small numbers of Indians who had dogged Snelling's crossing downriver at Round Point.
On 27 October Purdy's column managed to ford the river and cross to Hampton's new camp, a relatively short distance from the Spears' camp and no more than a few miles from the abatis. The baggage train had moved up to this point on the day of the battle. Here Hampton remained until noon of 28 October.24
Contemporary sources differ widely in their estimate of the number of American casualties. Hampton states that the "entire loss of killed, wounded, and missing, does not exceed fifty"; Purdy makes no mention of casualties at all. De Salaberry, in his letter of 1 November to Baynes cites "about 70 killed and 16 prisoners, beside a great number of wounded." O'Sullivan indicates 20 prisoners captured by unspecified forward pickets, which would add to the number taken in the morning, and "upwards of forty of their dead were buried by our troops, independently of those who were buried by the enemy. Among the latter were two or three officers of distinction. Two horses were found dead on the left bank, and the enemy carried off in wagons several of their wounded from that side of the river." At least 10 prisoners were noted arriving in Montreal from Châteauguay. Cruikshank cites an unnamed "unofficial return" of some weeks later which gave a loss of 21 killed, 33 wounded, and 29 missing, with a Major Baker of the New York Militia named as the only officer wounded. An American list dated 1850 gives 15 killed and 20 wounded. Morrison, as a final note, indicates that the casualties from the exchange heard at midnight were buried on William Bryson's land (Lot 12) between Ormstown and Allans Corners, "near two elm trees."25 At his camp, Hampton called a council of war and to it put the following question:
Hampton was no doubt pleased with the reply to his query.
Accordingly, the army moved out at noon on 28 October, a movement which was reported to de Salaberry by a reconnaissance party led by Colonel Hughes of the Royal Engineers. This news led de Salaberry to send out Captain Lamothe with a large party of Indians to observe the retirement which was already being dogged by the scattered groups of warriors who had followed on the Americans heels right from the retirement on the afternoon of 26 October. A working party of the Beauharnois militia was also sent out under Captain Debartzch to destroy the temporary bridges Hampton's men had built to within half a mile of Hampton's camp and scout Purdy's campsites on the far shore. They returned with a sizeable amount of discarded equipment,26 having found Purdy's route strewn with "a large quantity of muskets, drums, knapsacks, provisions, etc." De Salaberry later totalled the muskets recovered at 150, along with 6 drums. Hampton's march had taken him back some six miles to a point then known as Piper's Road. Here, on the evening of 29 October, Captain Lamothe and his Indians attacked the American perimeter, killing one sentry and wounding seven. The following day Hampton's army again took to the road and was escorted from Canadian territory by a watchful Indian party under another French Canadian officer serving with the Indian department, Captain Dominique Ducharme, who "had distinguished himself so remarkably at the action of Beaver Dams in Upper Canada, only four months before." On either 28 or 29 October, de Salaberry paid Morrison's father a small sum to scout southward along the cart track across the border to locate Hampton in the United States. When Morrison returned from Four Corners to confirm Hampton's exit from Canada altogether, de Salaberry knew with certainty the danger was momentarily over.27
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