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Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 18
by Raymond F Baker The SiegeThe provincial army made no regular approaches to Louisbourg by trenches, but bombarded the town at random from the Green Hill and Royal batteries, as well as from additional batteries erected between 18 and 31 May. Except for the Royal Battery, all of these works were fascine batteries, protected by fagots of various dimensions made of small tree branches or brush. In some cases, as with the Advanced Battery near the Dauphin Gate (see "The Advance Batteries"), they also may have been protected by hogsheads filled with earth. The batteries were reinforced by earth banked against the fascines, but in only one instance — that of a trench dug at the Advanced Battery — were they entrenched works, in the sense of being dug below actual ground level. They were all sited to the northwest and north of the fortress, because the marshy ground to the southeast precluded the construction of works in that sector. Shirley was aware that several years previously the French had built a gallery toward Green Hill beneath the glacis opposite the flanked angle of the King's Bastion. He instructed Pepperrell not to construct batteries and trenches between Green Hill and the King's Bastion, "as the glacis that lies there before the works is to be blown up."1 It is significant to note that no works were made in this vicinity through the entire siege, even though the gallery did not extend beyond the glacis itself. The Provincial Batteries, their Effects, and French Countermeasures Royal Battery By 20 May, the gunners at the Royal Battery had been trying for nearly a week to breach the walls of the fortress, but with little success. Through the efforts of Major Seth Pomeroy and 20 "smiths," who were assigned the task on 16 May, some 20 cannon had now been cleared. While only four embrasures pointed against the town, Waldo reported that 241 shot had been fired from the Royal Battery between 14 and 20 May. The French return fire from the town and island batteries amounted to some 417 shot and shell.2 During this time, the fire from the Royal Battery had reportedly destroyed the roofs of three houses and knocked down several chimneys, as well as a number of embrasures of one of the bastions, probably the Dauphin. It was also reported that earlier, on 14 May, several shots had penetrated the roof of the barracks. Some of the shots fired from the Royal Battery struck short of the town, glanced off the water, and ricocheted over the walls.3 The French return fire against the Royal Battery during this period and throughout the siege, while at times heavy and on occasion continuing both day and night, lacked effect and caused comparatively little damage. The towers, however, did sustain heavy damage, but only one man was killed and only a few were wounded by the French fire.4 The greatest danger came not from the French counterfire but from the provincial gunners themselves, who, in moments of zealousness coupled with inexperience, overcharged the cannon and caused them to explode. On 16 May, one of the cannon was accidentally double-shotted, blew up and severely wounded five men, including Captain Rhodes, the chief gunner. The next day two more cannon burst, probably from the same cause. And again on 27 May, two cannon exploded from double-shotting and wounded two men, one of them Captain Daniel Hale, the man upon whom, after Rhodes, Waldo was most dependent to work the guns.5 Waldo's great concern over this practice of double-shotting is revealed in his letter of 31 May to Pepperrell, in which he regretted the loss of the cannon but feared that all of the guns were in danger of the same fate "unless better regulation [is provided] than at present." The next attempt, he said, would probably be the "trying of three shott in each, which they will increase till they find their mistake . . . ." Waldo was also plagued by food and powder shortages as well as lacking trained gunners, conditions that would persist and prove troublesome throughout the siege.6 (It might be noted here that the Royal Battery served several functions in addition to being a siege battery: it was a base supplying cannon to new batteries; a point from which, after 21 May, attacks on the Island Battery were launched, and a base from which scouting parties and patrols could operate.)7 Coehorn Battery The Coehorn Battery had been erected by order of the 16 May war council and probably was sustained by men from Richmond's regiment. The gunners at this work were as zealous as those at the Royal Battery in trying to open a breach in the fortress wall. Located beyond a small pond northwest of the King's Bastion, the Coehorn Battery began to fire on 22 May and until the day of the surrender "n'a point Cessé de tirer des Boullets sur Les Casernes, Le mur du Bastion du Roy of Sur la ville." The shot raked the streets as far as the Maurepas Gate and the crenellated wall, and damaged the barracks and the right flank of the King's Bastion. No one was safe, in either the street or the houses. The barracks were ruined by this fire, along with several houses.8 To counteract the fire from the Coehorn Battery, which Duchambon considered by far the most dangerous of the provincial batteries, the French placed two 18-pounders on a cavalier of the King's Bastion. Soldiers worked hurriedly and under fire to fill two wooden frames (coffres en planches) with fascines and earth to form embrasures for the guns and to afford a measure of protection to the gunners. At the same time, they opened two embrasures in the parapet of the right face of the King's Bastion, where two 24-pounders were mounted.9 When these measures were taken is not clear, but the work was probably done before the Advanced Battery on the heights opposite the Dauphin Demi-bastion began to fire on 29 May.
These measures did little to hinder or reduce the fire from the Coehorn Battery; French counterfire proved equally ineffectual and the damage it sustained from French shot was minor compared to the damage it inflicted on the walls and town. The damage suffered by the Coehorn Battery was the possibly accidental breaking of the trunnion on one of the mortars, and the wounding of six men (one of whom died) on 24 May by the bursting of two 22-pounders. One man was killed and two were wounded by French fire. On 5 June, the 13-inch mortar burst, "occasion'd by some Flaw in the Shell, which broke in the Mortar," and a gunner was wounded. Another 13-inch mortar was brought from Boston and mounted eight days later.10 The Advance Batteries On 25 May the ring of provincial batteries around Louisbourg tightened further when the New Englanders raised a battery of four guns on a hill within 440 yards of the Dauphin Gate. The coehorns and the 9- and 11-inch mortars from the Coehorn Battery were removed to this work. Three days later, on 28 May, the provincials raised another battery in the same area, within approximately 250 yards of the Dauphin Gate. Although the New Englanders referred to both works as advance batteries, the latter was most commonly called the "Advanced" Battery. It was commanded by Captain Joseph Sherburne of Moore's New Hampshire Regiment. The work consisted of two 18-pounders and two 42-pounders brought from the Royal Battery, "upwards of two Miles, as the Road goes, over a rough, rocky, hilly way." The Advanced Battery, the more effective of the two works, was located on the rise of ground (known to the French as the Montagne à Francoeur) at the end of the glacis of the Dauphin Demi-bastion. It began to fire on 29 May, although only one 18-pounder had as yet been mounted. Colonel Vaughan later stated that he "staked out the Ground [for the Advanced Battery] with his own Hands, & directed Trench to be thrown up sufficient to cover a thousand Men adjoining the Fascine [Advanced] Battery & fronting the City," and that here he "continued four successive Days and Nights doing Duty and undergoing excessive Fatigues, scarce allowing himself common Refreshments."11 Between 23 and 28 May, as a countermeasure against the advance batteries then in preparation on the heights, the French blocked up the Dauphin Gate and the adjoining guardhouses with about 18 to 20 feet of freestone, fascines and earth. Duchambon later stated that had this not been done, the provincials could have entered through the gate immediately after the advance batteries opened fire, claiming that the walls of the gate were only about three feet thick and no stronger than a porte-cochère (carriage gate). Nor, he added, were the sides of the gate protected, the only defence consisting of créneaux on the guardhouse which could not be used once they had been reinforced with earth.12 To hinder further the preparation of the advance batteries, Duchambon ordered his men to construct some embrasures for the four cannon on the barbette of the Dauphin Demi-bastion, on the soldiers' guardhouse. They made these embrasures of sod and earth, as there was no time to make them of stone. Duchambon also said that the flanks of all the bastions of the fortress were supplied with the cannon from privateers and any other ordnance that could be found in the town.13 Once the advance batteries opened fire, Duchambon reported, they never ceased firing until the surrender, despite continual French counterfire from the cannon on the barbette of the Dauphin Demi-bastion and from those of the right flank of the King's Bastion. Captain Sherburne stated that his post, the Advanced Battery, was so poorly entrenched that "the most Shelter we had from the french fire (which was very hott) was Some hhds [hogsheads] filled with earth." The fire of the advance batteries was concentrated on the Dauphin Gate, in an attempt to open a breach in that section of the wall. A number of flakes (frames for drying fish) lay between the gate and the advance batteries, and the provincial gunners "was forst to Beat them away with out Shott to have a fair Sight of the Gate."14 The French soldiers at the Dauphin Demi-bastion annoyed the gunners at the Advanced Battery with musket fire. That battery was so near the walls that "there was no safety in loading the Cannon, but under the fire of the Musquetry, which was very smart on both Sides." The French "generally open'd the Action in the Morning with the Fire of their Small-Arms for two hours; which we returned with Advantage on our Side." Five provincials were killed the first day, two by musket balls and three by cannon shot. One of those killed by cannon shot was Captain Joshua Pierce.15 The gunners at the advance batteries were "warmly entertained" by French cannon fire from a flank of the Pièce de la Grave, as well as from the cannon at the Dauphin Gate and the right flank of the King's Bastion. To provide still more effective fire, the French cut three embrasures in the King's-Dauphin curtain, where they mounted 36-pounder cannon. These embrasures were opened on 30 May. The guns, on the first day, demolished the embrasures of the Advanced Battery and dismounted one of its cannon, but the provincial fire went unabated and continued to wreak havoc on the buildings of the town. Among others, the houses of Messrs. Fautoux, Carrerot, Fizel, Gilbert and Prévost were badly damaged or destroyed. A shot broke the fortress bell, and the chapel was so badly riddled that the Récollet friars abandoned it and thereafter held daily services in the hospital. When the powder magazine in the Dauphin Demi-bastion became endangered, Duchambon ordered the powder removed to the postern in the curtain wall between the King's and Queen's bastions. He also ordered his men to destroy the drawbridge by cannon shot. The flag staff was shot away on 9 June.16 On 31 May, the New Englanders dug a trench at the south end of the Advanced Battery and mounted an 18-pounder and two 9-pounders there. The fire from these guns and those of the Coehorn Battery was concentrated on the King's Bastion (the fire from which flanked the Advanced Battery) where several cannon were dismounted and the cannoneers forced to abandon the guns. This fire so "annoyed" the French "that they were silent the rest of the day." On 3 June, the French mounted two new guns on the right flank of the King's Bastion, but the shot from the advance batteries was so heavy that they abandoned them after only four hours.17 Because much damage was being done to the King's Bastion, the French cut new embrasures in the parapet of the Dauphin Demi-bastion near the gate on 17 June to provide increased counterfire. Two cannon were mounted there, and "soon began to play with great Fury; and [the provincials] were obliged to turn Three Guns against them." In three hours, reportedly, one of the French cannon was dismounted and the other silenced.18 Occasionally the fire would slacken and the men at the Advanced Battery, which was closest to the fortress walls, bantered with the French. One such incident occurred on the morning of 1 June. The New Englanders called out to the French soldiers at the Dauphin Demi-bastion that if they would send out a flag of truce, they could have some of "King George's bread" to eat. The French replied that they were not yet ready to surrender, nor did they wish any of the king's bread. Other conversation followed, the provincials asking if there were any "Pritty girls" in the town; but the interlude was finished off "with 3 or 4 showers of bullets" on both sides.19 While the gunners at the advance batteries inflicted much damage on the town and fortifications, they sustained a minimum loss themselves, suffering a total of 10 men killed and 15 or 16 wounded, several by musket balls. The damage done to the entrenchments or the batteries during the day the New Englanders quickly repaired during the night.20 Titcomb's Battery On 31 May, the provincials raised a fifth battery on the northwestern shore of the harbour (on what the French called the hauteur de Martissans) across a small bay known as the Barachois, approximately 800 yards from the Dauphin Gate. This battery called Titcomb's Battery after its commander, Major Moses Titcomb of Hale's reigment, whose men largely sustained the work, initially mounted two 42-pounders (three more 42-pounders were later added) drawn from the Royal Battery, and was designed expressly to bombard the Dauphin Gate and the circular battery of the Dauphin Demi-bastion.21 Titcomb's Battery opened fire on 31 May. That same day its cannon knocked down the guérite and part of the salient angle of the Dauphin Demi-bastion. The éperon near the gate, which the French had already repaired several times with freestone and earth, was demolished to the height of its embrasures. The cannon of the Advanced Battery were fired in support of Titcomb's, and the shot soon smashed the embrasures as well, and also broke through the quay wall and dismantled its embrasures. The concentrated fire from the two batteries completely demolished the Dauphin Gate, pounded a breach in the wall of the Dauphin Demi-bastion to within 10 feet of the bottom of the ditch, and severely damaged the circular battery. Major General Wolcott recorded that by 17 June, the shot had
The fire from Titcomb's and the advanced batteries demolished the embrasures on the right flank of the King's Bastion (where the French had mounted six 18- and 24-pounders). Duchambon ordered his soldiers to construct some contre-merlons and wooden embrasures, and while this task was completed on 19 June and the cannon once more put to use, the embrasures were again soon smashed.23 On 15 June the provincials had given the French defenders of Louisbourg an added terror by firing red-hot shot from their mortars. The French, using some type of fire-fighting device, acted swiftly to extinguish fires in several houses, and otherwise managed to contain what might have proven a holocaust.24 Other Measures Taken by the French Despite constant counterfire from the cannon of the King's Bastion, the Dauphin Demi-bastion, and the Pièce de la Grave, plus musket fire from the walls and such places as the breach in the Dauphin Gate and the adjoining guardhouses, the provincial batteries continued to rain destruction on the fortress. Fearing the New Englanders would attack the town by landing in barges along the quay, Duchambon ordered his men to construct a floating barricade of masts (estacade de mâts) from the éperon of the Dauphin Demi-bastion as far as the Pièce de la Grave. The French began the barricade about 31 May and completed it on 11 June. The soldiers who built it worked under constant fire from the provincial batteries.25 Fearing an assault through the breach in the Dauphin Demi-bastion, Duchambon ordered chief engineer Verrier to have an entrenchment built across the breach from which to defend it. This entrenchment, which stretched from the quay to the parapet at the front of the Dauphin, was finished on 24 June, the French doing much of the construction work at night.26 Also, at some point during the siege, the French raised an épaulement of dry stone at the king's bakery, and established a corps de garde for the militia.27 But no matter what measures were taken, they were not enough. By 26 June, further resistance would seem useless. "Never was a place so mauled with cannon and shells," Pepperrell would write after the capitulation. He estimated that the provincial batteries had fired into the town about 9,000 cannon shot and 600 mortar bombs. The destruction was tremendous. The streets were rent from end to end, and every building and all of the houses save one were damaged or destroyed and unfit for habitation. The right flank of the King's Bastion no longer existed, except as a pile of rubble, and the King's-Dauphin curtain was riddled with shot. The Dauphin Demi-bastion had taken the brunt of the cannonade and was badly pummeled: the Dauphin Gate had been reduced to a gaping breach; the newly cut embrasures had been knocked to pieces; all but three of the guns at the circular battery had been dismounted and the wall of the battery itself beaten down. The éperon was completely dismantled, as were the embrasures along the quay.28 The French powder supplies were nearing exhaustion, and the garrison waited anxiously for the attack that was sure to come through the breach at the Dauphin. French Morale and the Capture of the Vigilant (30 May) Despite the fatigues and devastation that each day brought, the garrison and residents of Louisbourg displayed a remarkable determination to withstand the onslaught made against them. They worked untiringly to clear the debris from the ramparts so the cannon might still be used. Children, 10 and 12 years of age, bore arms and stood to the walls with the soldiers, "exposing themselves with a courage beyond their years." There were exceptions, however, and deserters reported to the provincials that some of the regular soldiers were succumbing to the mounting pressures. They desired to surrender and would often refuse their duties; these disagreements, it was said, even led to frequent duels, one of which some provincial soldiers saw from a tower of the Royal Battery. Several Swiss soldiers managed to escape, and on 19 June a French soldier attempted to get out of the town with a letter from a captured provincial to his friends, but was discovered and immediately hanged. Yet most of the soldiers and residents seem to have resolved to hold out to the last extremity,29 this despite fitful and sleepless nights on the ramparts and in the casemates; with, reportedly, no meat left in the town and a diet of fish, bread and peas;30 with their powder nearly exhausted, and their last hope of succour gone with the capture of the Vigilant. The spirits of the defenders of Louisbourg were badly shaken by the capture of the 64-gun French man-of-war, the Vigilant, upon which they had relied heavily for relief. The Vigilant, manned by 500 sailors and commanded by Captain de La Maisonfort, sailed from Brest on 26 April with orders to get into Louisbourg harbour and help defend the place. Word had been received that the English were going to attack. (Only one French ship, a snow, had been able to get into the harbour since the provincial landing and she carried only supplies for the fishermen.) Should Louisbourg be blockaded, La Maisonfort was instructed to do what he could to help without needlessly endangering his ship. The Vigilant was laden with stores for the garrison, a large number of cannon, and a great quantity of much-needed powder. She also, reportedly, carried 20 chests of small-arms, as well as stores and rigging for a privateer then being fitted out at Quebec.31 According to the habitant de Louisbourg, the Vigilant came in view of the fortress on 28 or 29 May, about a league and a half distant from Scatarie Island, with a good northeast wind for her destination. The Bristish blockading squadron was at least two and a half leagues to leeward, and if seemed the Vigilant would be able to slip into Louisbourg harbour without difficulty. But about noon on 30 May, La Maisonfort spotted the English ship Mermaid (40 guns), Captain Douglass commanding, close in-shore and gave chase, hoisting the French flag and pennant as he closed.32 The Mermaid's stern gun opened on the Vigilant and Douglass signalled the rest of the fleet that he had sighted a strange ship. The Vigilant replied to the Mermaid with a shot from her bow cannon, and the fight was on. At 2 o'clock, La Maisonfort discovered the remainder of Warren's squadron closing from the northward and, giving the Mermaid a broadside in passing, hoisted full sail and bore off to the southward. Douglass gave chase, and for the next four hours gave broadside for broadside. At about 6 o'clock, Captain Rous in the Shirley galley joined the Mermaid and gave the Vigilant a shot from his bow gun. The Eltham joined at 7 o'clock and Warren in the Superbe fell in an hour later. At 9 o'clock, La Maisonfort asked for quarter. The Vigilant's rigging, masts and yards were badly damaged, and the ship itself was unserviceable. Sixty of her crew of 500 were killed or wounded.33 The French were transferred to the British ships. The next day, 31 May, Warren notified Pepperrell of the capture, advising him that he intended "to Commission [the ship] for his Majesty"; and hoped that Pepperrell would be able to furnish a crew to man her. He also told Pepperrell that as the Vigilant had been "much shattered" in the engagement, he was sending her into Gabarus Bay for repairs and refitting, "and beg that you will direct vessels to come to take the Prisoners from us . . . [as] otherwise the Cruizers will be useless, with such numbers on board." Warren hoped that the capture of the Vigilant "will be a very happy event, for our further success."34 The Vigilant's fate was far from a "happy event" for the French. "Témoins de sa manoeuvre," wrote the habitant, "il n'étoit personne de nous qui ne donnât des malédictions à une manoeuvre si mal concertée & si imprudente." While La Maisonfort had displayed great courage in the engagement,
The loss of the Vigilant "ralentit le courage de ceux qui avoient le plus conservé de fermeté, . . . et plusieurs personnes furent d'avis qu'il falloit dèslors demander à capituler."36 But the fortress held out. To say that Louisbourg would not have fallen had the Vigilant passed through Warren's blockade is debatable. There are arguments for both sides of the question. The siege would have been prolonged in any case. La Maisonfort's spirited sailors would have greatly cheered the defenders and perhaps have instilled in them added determination to resist; the cannon and powder the Vigilant carried would have been of great use to the garrison; and the broadsides of her 64 guns would have made it very uncomfortable for the provincial gunners at the Royal and advance batteries. But the key to the Louisbourg defences was still the Island Battery, and it would probably have been only a matter of time before the provincials erected a battery to counter the fire from that work. Then Warren's fleet could enter the harbour and, though the British squadron would have to come one at a time through the narrow north channel, neither the Vigilant's 64 guns nor the determination of seamen would have much effect against the broadsides of 11 battleships, each averaging from 40 to 60 cannon. The supply of powder on board the Vigilant would now be used by the besiegers, however, and, noted the habitant, "nous nous apperçûmes que leur feu avoit depuis beaucoup augmenté."37 The Attacks on the Island Battery (18 May—6 June) French spirits were raised temporarily on 6 June, when the garrison of the Island Battery aborted a provincial attack on that post. The Island Battery, a strong fortification defended by about 200 men and 36 cannon under command of d'Ailleboust stood defiantly in the middle of the harbour entrance, and was the only obstacle preventing Warren's squadron from entering and raking the fortress from the harbour. The provincial commanders feared that the town might not be taken unless the fleet could get into the harbour and the fortress be bombarded from land and sea.38 The abortive assault of 6 June was the culminating effort of several planned attacks on the island stronghold. As early as 18 May, immediately following Duchambon's refusal to surrender the town, a council of war advised that an attack be made on the Island Battery. Commodore Warren brought a number of seamen ashore to assist, and that night about 800 men, including Colonel Gorham's regiment, were to set out for Gabarus Bay. The whaleboats, however, were late in coming and because of high surf and approaching daylight, the attempt was cancelled. Similar attempts were planned on 19 and 20 May, but these were also cancelled, probably because of high surf. The New Englanders apparently wearied of trying to attack the island by sea, believing that the waters of the harbour afforded a safer approach, because on 21 May the whaleboats were carried overland from Gabarus Bay to the Royal Battery, whence an attack was planned for that night. Warren and his seamen were still on shore to participate, but again the attack was called off.39 On 22 May, Colonel Vaughan proposed that he be allowed to organize an attempt, but nothing came of his proposal. Warren, who for several days had been on shore to participate in the proposed attacks, ordered his seamen back on the ships on 23 May. The commodore himself returned to the Superbe "not a little dissatisfied."40 Not until 2 June were plans again made for attacking the Island Battery, and the whaleboats were again prepared for use. About 150 men carried additional boats from Gabarus Bay, "which was the Hardest Service I've Ever Undergone in all my Life," wrote one soldier, "(and So Said they all) but having a Prospect thereby to take the Island Battery made us Chearfully Endure our burden." Despite the men's exertions, the attempt was cancelled, "oweing to the moon & the northern lights," and because the men who showed up for the attack were without officers and "in liquor."41 Yet another attack, this one much better organized, was prepared for the night of 3 June. That day, Colonel Waldo sent two of his captains to visit other regiments to find suitable volunteers for the project. In a letter to Pepperrell, Waldo said that Major Thatcher of Gorham's regiment had 15 men, including himself, willing to take part, but that he was having difficulty obtaining cooperation from Hale's regiment. Hale's men were using their work on the new Titcomb's Battery as an excuse for not taking part. Waldo, however, did manage to "detach" several unwilling volunteers from Hale and wanted to get 50 or 100 more. He also felt that the services of Captain John Card's company (of Moulton's regiment), Elder Harnar's company (of Pepperrell's regiment), and Captain Terry's men (of Willard's regiment) would be particularly useful. Commodore Warren wrote Pepperrell that he hoped to be able to provide upwards of 200 seamen for the attempt.42 Exactly which units took part in the 3 June attempt has not been determined, but all day a great number of men were busy preparing paddles and ladders for "near fifty" whaleboats, and at about midnight some 500 men of the army and fleet embarked for the island. They were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Noble of Waldo's regiment and Colonel John Gorham.43 When the provincials set off from the Royal Battery, their course was illuminated by a "Remarkable Northern Twilight;" but by the time they drew near the island a dense fog had rolled in and they could not see where to land. The assault was then called off. Colonel Noble's conduct in the affair was called into question, and Seth Pomeroy, the gunsmith, claimed that Noble could not be found at the time the attack got under way. Pomeroy implied that the volunteers went without him and that "For want of an officer the Soldiers Return'd." The rumour of Noble's negligence persisted and the next day a council of war examined the charges. The council, however, found no grounds to accuse either Noble or Gorham of misconduct in the affair.44 The council also announced "that if a number of men to the amount of three or four hundred appear as volunteers for [another] attack of the Island Battery, they be allowed to choose their own officers and be entitled to the plunder found there." The prospect of plunder brought about 400 men together on 6 June. They selected Captain (Edward?) Brooks to lead them. Pepperrell's secretary, Green, directed that all pistols in Hale's regiment be turned over to the men volunteering for the attack. As the men assembled at the Royal Battery, Captain Sherburne at the Advanced Battery prepared to support them with diversionary fire from his cannon. The night was cool and foggy and there was a very high surf. At midnight the men climbed into the boats and rowed toward the island but, Seth Pomeroy wrote, "Providence Seemed Remarkable to Frown upon the affair." They were discovered before all the troops could be landed.45 As the provincials began to disembark at the island, somebody yelled "Hurrah!" and the alarm went up. Some New Englanders later believed that the French had been warned of the attack and were waiting in ambush. The French gunners loaded their cannon with langrage, pointed them toward the whaleboats and opened fire, causing much disorder and confusion among the provincials but apparently doing little damage. Many of the boats were cut off by the cannon fire and turned back, but four or five beached on the island and the men scrambled ashore, firing their muskets and pistols at the shadowy figures on the walls above them. Some of the small arms misfired, the powder being soaked by the mist and by the high surf as the men jumped ashore. Several of the provincials hauled ladders from the boats and placed them against the walls, the men all the while under heavy musket fire from the ramparts above. Duchambon reported later that the commandant, d'Ailleboust, along with the governor's son and an ensign, de La Pérelle, were the first to climb upon the ramparts to fire on the New Englanders, and that their men urged them to get back from the walls and not expose themselves.46 For two hours, the small-arms fighting continued at close quarters. Then, the situation hopeless, the provincials broke and ran for the boats. But the tide had carried off many of the boats and there were not enough left to accommodate all of the men. The remaining boats were soon filled, probably overloaded. Cannon shot cut one of them in half as it was pushed off from the island, the men drowning in the surf. The provincials in the other boats would not come to their rescue for fear they too would be sunk by cannon fire.47 Some of the men went ashore at Lighthouse Point, while others made it back to the Royal Battery to carry news of the debacle to Pepperrell. "Now things lookt something dark," wrote Green. The provincial losses were about 60 men killed and from 112 to 119 captured. Some of the dead washed up on shore at the lighthouse; some of the wounded had to have limbs amputated.48 "Wee have great Reason to be humble'd before God," wrote one diarist, and the next day the batteries for a time were strangely silent. "From all accounts," wrote the Reverend Joseph Emerson, "we learn the men are prodigiously discouraged."49 The French, however, were cheered by the result of this encounter. They had only three men killed or wounded, and the repulse of the provincials at the Island Battery was the only real success they had experienced since the siege began. Duchambon, perhaps unwittingly, exaggerated the numbers of the provincials, reporting that 1,000 soldiers in 35 barges, with 800 reinforcments, had been driven in panic from the island that night.50 To Pepperrell, the repulse at the Island Battery was doubly unfortunate, for he could ill afford the loss of so many soldiers. His army was sick with dysentery, or what was then called the "bloody fluxes," brought on by fatigue, lack of proper food, and poor and unsanitary living conditions. During this period at least 1,500 men were unfit for duty. For days Pepperrell had been appealing to Shirley and the other New England governors to send more men, but he could not count on their arriving for some time yet. The troops were becoming demoralized, and the defeat at the Island Battery only added to the general despair. One volunteer wrote to his father that "I am sorry to find our New England troops . . . want to go home, home, is all ye cry & [they all say] if I was well at home I'd engage they should never find me such a fool again — this is the language of those who are as well used as can be." It is hardly surprising that Pepperrell wrote on 13 June that "I apprehend no further attempts will be made on [the Island Battery] by boats."51 Friction Grows Between the Provincial Commanders The Island Battery had to be silenced if Warren's squadron was to help, and Warren himself was growing impatient. He was far from satisfied with the seemingly inactive role the navy had played blocking the harbour against French ships, and he complained that he was tired of doing nothing. On 4 June, Warren had sent a plan ashore for Pepperrell's review and approval. The plan had already been approved by Warren's ships' captains. It proposed that the Vigilant be fitted out and manned by 600 landsmen; that 1,000 men from the army embark on the other vessels of the squadron; that the harbour be forced; and that a vigorous attack on the town be made by boats from the ships. A council of war called on 5 June "maturely considered" Warren's plan and, in effect, rejected it on several grounds: there was too much sickness in the army and the men could not be spared; Pepperrell had learned that Duchambon had sent for Marin's detachment of French and Indians and the men must be kept at hand to meet that contingent when it arrived; the men, being unused to the sea, would soon be unfit for service by being kept on board the ships. In time, the council advised, a concerted action would be arranged, but not at the present.52 The council's decision did little to alleviate Warren's impatience, and on 6 June he wrote brusquely to Pepperrell
Pepperrell's reply, which did not come until 8 June, was hardly calculated to placate the anxious Warren for it dealt, at some length, only with the army and its condition. The troops, Pepperrell wrote, had in just 29 days
The commodore would have to wait. The council had decided not to make any more attacks against the Island Battery, and Warren's officers advised that it was not practicable for the fleet to try to enter the harbour until that battery was silenced.55 The Erection of the Lighthouse Battery (12-21 June) On 12 June, the provincials decided to erect a battery at Lighthouse Point opposite the Island Battery about 3,400 feet distant. The final decision to erect the battery came only after the repeated failures to take the Island Battery pointed up the need for such a work. Waldo on 6 June had urged Pepperell to erect a work there, and Warren on 12 June likewise pressed Pepperell to "hasten the battery at the lighthouse" because the pilots thought it "impossible to go in [to the harbour] till [the Island Battery] can be silenced."56 Pepperrell told Warren that the battery would soon be completed, that "there are three embrasures facing the Island Battery, and six facing the sea," and that he hoped to have the cannon mounted there in two days. Transporting the cannon must have proved more of a difficulty than Pepperrell had anticipated, because it was nearly eight days before the guns were mounted. The New Englanders carried them by boat from Gabarus Bay to a point about a mile and a quarter east of the lighthouse, where they dragged them up the steep cliffs along the shoreline. By 21 June, they had mounted two 18-pounders (four were mounted on 25 June). The "great mortar" was also carried to the lighthouse and mounted. The battery was sustained by 320 men of Gorham's regiment.57 A number of provincials (possibly Gorham's regiment) had been stationed for some time on the lighthouse side of the harbour in anticipation of erecting a battery there. Duchambon knew of their presence, and a Lieutenant Vallée of the artillery company had informed him that several 18- and 24-pounders, some still serviceable, had been buried at the careening wharf near the lighthouse some ten years previously to serve as piles (corps-morts). Duchambon feared that the provincials would find the guns and use them to equip a battery against the island. Unknown to the French, the New Englanders had already found these cannon. But on the night of 27 May the French commander set a detachment of about 100 local men and militia as well as some privateers under Beaubassin, to try to prevent the provincials from setting up a battery on that side of the harbour.58 Beaubassin and his men set out in three chaloupes, with food for 10 to 12 days and 30 to 50 rounds of ammunition. They reached Grande Lorembec that night, came ashore, and the following morning encountered about 40 provincial soldiers near the lighthouse. The New Englanders were prepared (Bigot asserted they had been warned by a fisherman who had deserted from Beaubassin) and a sharp skirmish resulted. The French failed to press their numerical advantage, panicked, and retreated into the woods. Many, being near their homes and not wishing to be confined again inside the fortress, deserted. Others in the rush threw their supplies away and returned to the town, hungry and tired, several days later. The provincials reportedly suffered no casualties in the fight and the French loss was three men killed and several wounded. Dudley Bradstreet recorded that a French captain who was mortally wounded and taken prisoner offered 10,000 pounds (livres?) for a priest to pardon his sins. Mockingly, Bradstreet asserted that he would have been willing to do this himself, and for half the money.59 The Lighthouse Battery was finished and opened fire on the Island Battery on 21 June. The shot swept the west platform of the French fortification and prevented the gunners from working the cannon. When the large mortar began to fire, 17 out of 19 shells reportedly fell within the work, one of them upon the magazine. "And this together with the Fire from our Cannon, to which the enemy was very much exposed, they having but little to shelter 'em from the Shott, which rang'd quite thro' their Line of Barracks, so terrified 'em that many left the Fort and ran into the Water for Refuge." The provincial fire soon knocked holes in the barracks and the bakery (both of which had been reinforced with wood from the store of a M. Dacarrette), nearly ruining these buildings. The French responded to the bombardment, but the Lighthouse Battery was so placed that they could not bring an effective counterfire against it.60 The Island Battery was rapidly becoming untenable, and it was only a matter of time before Warren's fleet would be free to enter the harbour. The Proposed Assault of 26 June and the Surrender of Louisbourg The time was not long in coming. By 26 June the New Englanders had readied a general assault by land and sea. Between 21 and 26 June Warren and Pepperrell had been in constant correspondence with each other and had held numerous joint councils. The records of the correspondence and councils between the two commanders indicate that, of the two, Warren was the more anxious for the attack, while Pepperrell, mindful of the disastrous results of the 6 June attack on the Island Battery, relied more upon the siege guns to gradually wear down the French defences.61 The Lighthouse Battery was effectively reducing the Island Battery, and Warren was able to win Pepperrell over to the scheme for a combined attack on the fortress. The preparations for the attack had been completed. The fleet, now numbering 11 warships and several armed New England vessels, had been cleared for action; the spare timbers and masts had been removed and the decks barricaded with moss as protection against small-arms fire. Six hundred men of the army supplemented the crews of the warships. Provision for three large beacon fires had been made on three hills west of the fortress. When ignited, these fires would serve as guides for Warren's ships as they entered the harbour, possibly indicating that a night attack had been planned. Ladders and fascines for filling the ditch and scaling the walls had been carried to the Advanced Battery, where Captain Sherburne by 12 noon had "got all our platforms Laid, ambrazures mended, Guns in Order, Stock of Cartridges, Shot in Place, Gunners Quartered, Dined, & matches Lit," ready for the signal to attack. Commodore Warren was on shore and the troops drawn up on parade heard him proclaim that "He'd Rather Leave his Body at Louisbourg, than not take the Citty." Everyone was ready; all that was needed now was a favourable wind.62 The French in Louisbourg looked apprehensively on the preparations for the assault they knew they could not withstand. By 26 June they were dispirited and fatigued from the rigorous defence they had made, from much work and no sleep. Now they began to question whether further resistance was justified. The Island Battery was a shambles; its fire was slack and ineffective and would no longer keep the enemy fleet out of the harbour. The town was in ruins, the fortifications were breached, and of the 1,300 men who had undertaken the defence of the fortress, nearly 50 had been killed, another 80 to 95 had been severely wounded, and several had succumbed to utter exhaustion. Reportedly the French had not changed their clothes since the day the provincials landed in Gabarus Bay.63 The capture of the Vigilant had removed all hope of succour, and Duchambon had heard nothing from Marin's detachment, which he had sent for on 16 May. It was a time of great despair, and the habitant wrote that "Les Conseils étoient plus fréquens que jamais. . .; on s'assembloit sans trop savoir pourquoi, aussi ne sçavoit-on que résoudre." He continued,
Now it seemed that the English were no longer afraid, and while the soldiers might be willing to fight on, the residents had had enough. On the morning of 26 June they petitioned Duchambon to surrender. They pointed out that since the enemy force both on land and on sea was increasing daily, and since the French had obtained no aid and could not hope to defeat the New Englanders, Duchambon and his officers should ask for terms so the residents might keep what little property remained to them. Duchambon asked Verrier to report on the state of the fortifications; he made a similar request of Sainte-Marie about the status of the ammunition. These reports were rendered and a council of war was called, the members voting unanimously that, because of the growing enemy force and the condition of the fortifications, ammunition, and town, it would be best to capitulate.65 After the council's decision, Duchambon composed the following note to Pepperrell and Warren:
Ensign de La Pérelle, who had recovered from a wound received during the 6 June attack on the Island Battery, was designated to carry the letter to the provincial commanders. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the ensign appeared at the Dauphin Gate under a flag of truce. He was met halfway between the gate and the Advanced Battery by Captain Sherburne, who then escorted him to Colonel Richmond at Green Hill. There he was either met by or taken to Pepperrell and Warren, to whom he handed over Duchambon's letter. The provincial commanders granted Duchambon until 8 o'clock the next morning (27 June) to present the terms upon which he would surrender the fortress.67 A general cessation of hostilities was called. Duchambon submitted his terms between 8 and 9 o'clock on the morning of 27 June. These terms, carried to the provincial lines by Bonnaventure, were not accepted by Pepperrell and Warren, who then sent in their own terms for the capitulation (see Appendix D). The articles were basically the same as those contained in the summons of 18 May: that the inhabitants and their effects would be transported to France and, if needed, vessels would be provided for the purpose; that the officers and inhabitants would be permitted to remain in their houses and enjoy freedom of religion without molestation; that the non-commissioned officers and soldiers would be placed on board British ships and transported to France; that the sick and wounded would be cared for; that two covered wagons could be sent off under the inspection of only one provincial officer who would search only for war-like stores, and that anyone who so desired might go off masked.68 This last condition was one that Duchambon initially asked for and raises the suspicion that, for various reasons, there were persons in the fortress who wanted to leave without being seen — perhaps a New Englander who had deserted to the French, or a privateer or contraband merchant who might have been recognized by certain members of the provincial army. In return for these terms, the governor was to see that the surrender took place as soon as possible, that the Island Battery or some other battery, along with all its artillery and ammunition, was turned over to provincial soldiers that day, that Warren's fleet was permitted to enter the harbour unmolested, that officers, soldiers, and residents of the fortress would not take up arms against the English for 12 months, and that all British subjects then in the town were immediately delivered up.69 These conditions were to be met by 6 o'clock that evening, or the provincials threatened to "decide the matter with our arms." The terms made no allowance for the "honours of war," that is, the troops being permitted to march out bearing arms, with drums beating and flags unfurled, and Duchambon refused to consider them unless that provision was included. He wrote two letters, one to Pepperrell and another to Warren, saying that he could not allow the troops to leave the fortress without these honours, that they were honours due to soldiers who had done their duty, and that once the provincial commanders agreed to that provision, he would agree to the rest.70 On 28 June Pepperrell informed Duchambon that both he and Warren would allow the French troops to march out with the honours of war. The officers and other inhabitants, he wrote, should repair to their houses where they would be safe, and the arms should be put in a safe magazine and would be turned over to the French soldiers the day they marched out of town. With this, Duchambon accepted the terms and formally ended the siege of Louisbourg. The siege had lasted 47 days, and the number of casualties sustained on either side seems incredibly low. The French claimed that 50 men had been killed and from 80 to 95 severely wounded, while the provincial losses were estimated at 100 men killed by the French and 30 others who had died of sickness.71 No mention of the number of wounded has been found. The Island Battery was delivered up to Warren by M. de Gannes on the morning of 28 June, and the English colours were raised on the flagstaff. At 2 o'clock that afternoon, Warren entered Louisbourg harbour at the head of his squadron, "which made a beautiful Appearance." When the ships were sufficiently moored, a broadside salute was fired and the soldiers and sailors gave three cheers.72 At 4 o'clock, several regiments of the army advanced toward the town to take possession. At the head of the column marched Colonel John Bradstreet, followed by Pepperrell and his officers. They entered through the Queen's Gate and, as the New Englanders moved toward the parade ground where the French were drawn up in order, Girard La Croix noted the flags flying, the drums beating, and the odd combination of sound offered by the trumpets, flutes and violins that accompanied the tread of the victorious provincials. The French men and women who watched "looked very sorrowful," one witness remarked. At the parade ground, the officers of the two armies exchanged the usual salutes, "every Part being performed with all the Decency and Decorum imaginable," and the town was officially surrendered.73 Guards were posted to prevent looting, but they had little effect. The New Englanders, decried the habitant, "contre la foi dûe à notre capitulation . . . se jetterent dans nos Maisons & y ont Pris tout ce qui les accommodoit." Bigot also accused the provincials of "beaucoup de pillage et d'insultes" to the inhabitants after the surrender.74 But there was no recourse against the violators. Conclusions The outcome of the siege both surprised and shocked French officials in Paris who found it difficult to understand how an amateur army of undisciplined volunteers could capture the "strongest" French fortress in North America. The New Englanders, however, who from the beginning were supremely confident of success, were not at all surprised at the outcome. They had come to capture Louisbourg and this they had done; it was as simple as that. If asked for specific reasons for their success, however, most of them probably would not have been able to respond adequately. Many attributed success to the will of God, of whom they were the instrument designed to rid the continent of a great "Stronghold of Satan." Others would not know why they had succeeded, but thought it was "the most glorious and useful thing done in the war."75 Obviously, the reasons for the New England victory at Louisbourg go far beyond the simple explanation that it was the "will of God," and, indeed, beyond any single factor. In searching for answers to the question it is useful to recall the words of Captain H.F. Thullier, R.E., who, in his book The Principles of Land Defence (1902), cautioned:
With this admonition in mind, a few of the more patent factors that contributed to the provincial success might be suggested. Among these factors must be placed the provincial occupation of the Royal Battery early in the siege. Possession of this battery not only gave the New Englanders effective control of the inner harbour but it also provided them with a much-needed supply of serviceable heavy calibre cannon, left behind when the French abandoned the battery. The New Englanders never adequately utilized their control of the harbour to launch an attack by water against the town (although several attacks were directed against the Island Battery), but the surplus cannon were used to strengthen the armament of the several batteries raised against the fortress. Other factors were, first, the erection of the Advanced and Titcomb's batteries, and then, near the close of the siege, the erection of the Lighthouse Battery. Pepperrell and his officers, though ignorant of the fine points in the art of siegecraft, clearly realized the necessity of effecting a breach in the fortress walls before the place could be taken. The Green Hill Battery, raised soon after the landing, was of little use in this respect because of the excessive range. The Coehorn Battery, composed mostly of mortars, proved equally ineffective on the fortifications, although it did cause great destruction to the interior of the town. Not until the Advanced and Titcomb's batteries were formed, mainly of cannon removed from the Royal Battery, were the New Englanders able to greatly neutralize the French defence and breach the walls, thus preparing the way for a land assault. Perhaps the French could have withstood a land assault. The erection of the Lighthouse Battery, however, soon added another dimension to the threat — an attack by sea. One of the key works in the French defence system was the Island Battery, standing athwart the harbour entrance and effectively barring the entry of the British fleet. Both Warren and Pepperrell feared that success would not be assured until the Island Battery was rendered impotent and the ships were permitted to enter the harbour for a combined land and sea assault on the town. Pepperrell was slow to realize the need for the Lighthouse Battery, preferring initially to launch boat attacks against the island stronghold. Not until the abortive attack of 6 June did he concede the folly of such strategy and push forward the completion of the Lighthouse Battery. The New Englanders soon realized the value of that battery. After only two days of firing, it effectively silenced the Island Battery. Duchambon must have known that while a land attack might be repulsed, a combined land and sea assault could prove disastrous. He could not risk subjecting the inhabitants and garrison to the destruction such an attack would bring. Surrender seemed the only course open to him. The importance of the Advanced, Titcomb's, and Lighthouse batteries cannot be over-emphasized. Without them, ultimate success would surely have been delayed and perhaps lost. Samuel Waldo was forcibly impressed by the contribution these works made to the reduction of Louisbourg, and on 7 November 1757, he advised Secretary of State William Pitt of the great benefits to be derived from the erection of similar batteries, should England contemplate another attack on the fortress.77 Of equal, if not greater, significance was Louisbourg's very poor defensive position. Surrounded on the landward side by dominating heights, its security would be threatened by an enemy occupying those heights. The French seem to have given little serious consideration to the dangers thus posed, nor, indeed, to the prospect of an enemy attack at all. If they had given serious thought to preparing an adequate defence, they might have constructed outworks to retard or prevent an enemy from occupying the high ground north and west of the fortress. Although some works apparently were projected, none was constructed. The French should have been particularly concerned about the rise of ground located about 250 yards northwest of the glacis at the Dauphin Demi-bastion and known to them as the Montagne à Francoeur. This height was a very commanding position and posed great dangers to the fortifications in this sector. An enemy battery situated on this hill could quite easily breach the walls. The French should have placed an outwork on this height to prevent it being occupied, or, at the very least, should have levelled it to diminish the advantage it would afford an enemy. Neither of these expedients was taken. The provincials soon raised here the Advanced Battery and effected the breach in the Dauphin Demi-bastion that opened the way for a land assault. Duchambon recognized early that to withstand a siege he would have to have some form of external relief. With very few exceptions, as the history of siege warfare reveals, no fortress has been able to resist a resolute besieging army indefinitely without some form of external aid. To quote Captain Thullier again:
Early in the siege Duchambon doubted his ability to withstand a siege with the force under his immediate command and sent for Marin's detachment to come and drive off the New Englanders. Marin, however, failed to arrive in time. With supplies of food and powder dwindling rapidly and the situation looking bleaker each day, the French attached great hope to the arrival of the Vigilant for the much-needed relief. But Warren's fleet had effectively blockaded Louisbourg's sea communications and captured the Vigilant before she reached her destination. Her capture doomed Louisbourg's chances for relief. With no hope for a successful outcome of the contest, the inhabitants petitioned Duchambon to surrender. The war between Britain and France did not end with the capture of Louisbourg; it continued for another three years. But the Louisbourg campaign was the most significant and dramatic event of the war in the North American theatre of operations. At the peace conference in 1748 England returned Louisbourg to France, much to the anger and protests of the New England colonies. In 1758, during the Seven Years' War, the French fortress was again besieged, this time by regular troops of the British army. It is significant that the pattern of operations during the siege of 1758 very closely paralleled those carried out 13 years earlier. Perhaps the provincials were not such amateurs after all.
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