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Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 18
by Raymond F Baker PreliminariesIt was after sunrise on 11 May 1745 when the first colonial vessels sailed across Gabarus Bay toward a small inlet known as Freshwater Cove, about four miles southwest of Louisbourg, where the landing would be made. From the ramparts of the fortress, French soldiers watched anxiously as, one by one, the tiny transports assembled in the bay between the cove and Flat Point. Upon the fleet's appearance in the bay, the French rang bells and fired cannon in Louisbourg to alert the garrison and the inhabitants of the outlying settlements. Throughout the town, soldiers went to their posts. Almost at once, the men took measures to secure the low wall at the southeast part of the fortress, working hurriedly to erect a platform of thick planks, upon which, before the day was out, they had two 24-pounder cannon mounted and firing. At the same time, soldiers mounted a number of swivel guns along the quay wall next to the harbour.1 The New England militiamen on board the transports in the bay heard the bells and the cannon and saw the defensive measures being taken against them. But, undismayed, they prepared to scramble into the landing boats as soon as the signal was given. The Landing of 11 May In the confusion and excitement of the moment, few of the New Englanders who kept diaries or journals during the campaign remembered the exact time the fleet came to anchor in Gabarus Bay. Some of them believed it was 9 o'clock, while others thought it was not until 10 o'clock. Benjamin Cleaves, a clerk in Captain Benjamin Ives' company of Hale's Fifth Massachusetts Regiment, wrote that the fleet "came in fair sight of Cape Breton about 9 o'clock; Came to anchor about 10." The official account of the expedition, prepared by Pepperrell and four of his officers, places the time as between 9 and 10 o'clock. And Governor Shirley (who received his information from Pepperrell) gives the same time in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle in October 1745.2 The diarists were less uncertain about the place of anchorage. Most of them agreed that it was about two miles below Flat Point or about four miles southwest of the fortress. "Here we saw the light house & ye steeples in the town," noted Benjamin Green, Pepperrell's secretary. If these observations are reliable, the place of anchorage would have been in the vicinity of Freshwater Cove, an inlet the French called Anse de la Cormorandière. Because of the many vessels involved (about 90), probably the whole area between the cove and Flat Point was occupied by the transports.3 While the provincial army's presence off the coast in Gabarus Bay was far from being a secret to the French, Governor Shirley seems initially to have entertained some hope that Louisbourg could be taken by surprise. Before the Massachusetts contingent sailed from Boston, he gave Pepperrell a lengthy letter with detailed instructions on how the campaign should best be conducted (see Appendix C). Many of these instructions appear naive and impossible to execute. An early New England historian, Dr. Jeremy Belknap, writing some 40 years after the Louisbourg expedition, concluded that Pepperrell would have needed seven years' experience as a general, the power of a Joshua, and men with the eyes of owls to accomplish what Shirley suggested. And a noted British naval historian, Admiral Herbert Richmond, called them "a perfect model of the type of instructions to be avoided."4 But while Shirley's tactical ideas were scarcely credible, his scheme did anticipate the importance and relative vulnerability of two vital points of attack: the Royal and Island batteries.
Shirley contended that to surprise Louisbourg, the fleet's arrival should be so timed that the landing could be made at night, "about nine of the clock." The men were to be put ashore immediately and as quickly as possible, all the while maintaining "a profound silence," lest they awaken the unsuspecting Frenchmen. After the men had been properly positioned around the fortress (all this to be done in the dark), at a prearranged signal they were to storm the walls.5 Because of the delay at Canso, however, and a contrary wind from Canso to Louisbourg, the fleet did not arrive until after daylight on 11 May, and whatever chance for surprise that might have existed had vanished. The French probably would not have been taken completely by surprise in any case. Louis Duchambon, who had been military governor at Louisbourg a little over six months, reported that as early as 14 March ships had been sighted cruising off the fortress.6 (The intendant, François Bigot, confirms Duchambon's statement.)7 The number of these vessels steadily increased throughout March and April and, though still in doubt as to whether the ships were French or English (the ice in the harbour and bay keeping them at a distance), the governor arranged for the safety of the inhabitants of the outlying settlements should the ships prove to be English and a forewarning of attack. He told the residents of the coastal villages near the town to be ready to obey any signal he might give them. He also called together all the residents of the town and harbour, divided the former, group into four companies for defensive purposes, and instructed the latter group to repair to the Royal Battery or the Island Battery upon a signal from him.8 The anonymous habitant de Louisbourg asserted that for a considerable time before the provincials appeared in Gabarus Bay, the French were not unaware "qu'il se trâmoit une entreprise secrette contre nous, à la Nouvelle Angleterre. Tous les jours nous recevions de secrets avis qu'on armoit le long de la Côte." On 22 April, two men who had come overland from Port Toulouse told Duchambon of hearing cannon fire from Canso and that work was under way to restore the defences of that place. A third man told of witnessing a battle between French and English ships along the coast. By 8 May, Duchambon was certain that the ships off Louisbourg were English, and two days later, in the dark and fog of night, he despatched one of two ships prepared for the purpose through the blockade to France to inform the government of the colony's situation.9 Despite the apparent knowledge that "a secret enterprise" was in preparation in New England, Duchambon seems to have made little effort to meet the impending attack. He had tried to provide a large number of fagots on the quay for the use of the fire ships; he had proposed a battery on Cap Noir; and he had asked the ministry in France to send more cannon, remarking that the cannon he did have were not "Suffisant pour soutenir un Siege en form."10 His request for the additional cannon had gone out in November 1744, much too late for the ministry to send them in time, for it often took as long as a year for such requests to be acted upon. So the French government had not responded and none of Duchambon's proposals was carried out. Even had he been able to take adequate defensive measures, it is unlikely that he would have been able to effect them satisfactorily because of the quality of the troops under his command. Altogether, Duchambon's force amounted to some 1,500 men of the Compagnies Franches de la Marine and militia, plus several companies of the Swiss mercenary Regiment de Karrer. (The habitant stated that this number could have been increased by 300 or 400 men who were at Ingonish and vicinity, but that by the time Duchamdon decided to send for them, communications with that place had been cut off.)11 The militia lacked training and the Compagnies Franches which constituted about one-third of the total force, were inexperienced and disgruntled over back pay and poor food and clothing. Duchambon had inherited this discontented garrison from his predecessor, Duquesnel, who had died in October 1744. Military discipline had been so poorly maintained by Duquesnel, and Duchambon had so little succeeded in controlling the disaffection, that in December 1744 the garrison mutinied. Since then it had been in open rebellion against Duchambon's authority.12 Only after the provincial army appeared in the bay was he able to harangue them into obedience, with promises that all would be forgiven if they settled down and did their duty. Even so, the habitant later admitted, "nous n'avions pas sujet de compter sur elles . . . . Des Troupes si peu disciplinées n'étoient guéres capables de nous inspirer de la confiance . . . . je décidai qu'il étoit naturel de s'en défier."13 It is hardly surprising that Duchambon was so ill-prepared for the attack when it came. The only measure Duchambon could offer when the provincial fleet appeared on 11 May was to send a detachment of about 80 men to oppose the landing. This force was made up of about 50 civilians (militia) commanded by Port Captain Pierre Morpain and about 30 soldiers under Mesillac Duchambon, the governor's son. (Another force of 40 men was already somewhere in the woods around Gabarus Bay, where they had for several days been watching vessels from Warren's fleet which anchored in the bay from time to time.) One of the militia captains, Girard La Croix, remarked that even this action by the governor was rather futile, since the provincials were already ashore before Morpain and Duchambon could arrive.14 In Gabarus Bay, the landing signal was given and the New England troops scrambled into the landing boats. According to Pepperrell's instructions from Shirley, the landing would take place in four divisions, three of which were to go ashore at Flat Point and the fourth at White Point farther up the coast. A council of war held at Canso on 16 April had, in effect, confirmed these instructions and the army was divided into four sections. But the council decided against making the landings at Flat and White points, choosing instead to send the army ashore some three miles from the town and four miles from the Royal Battery; in effect, between Flat Point and Freshwater Cove. As the army prepared to disembark at this point, the French force sent out by Duchambon appeared on the beach, "marching towards the place where it was proposed to land our Troops."15 Seeing the enemy force approach, Pepperrell, instructed to keep any resistance away from the main landing area as long as possible, sent several boatloads of men to make a feint of landing at Flat Point Cove. This "diverted the Enemy from proceeding further till they saw the Boats put back and row up the Bay." In the meantime, the main landing had started at Freshwater Cove. It was now almost 12 noon and a high surf had developed, "which made it difficult landing," but pulling vigorously against the breakers, a force of nearly 100 men managed to get ashore. A few provincials disappeared into the woods in search of any concealed enemy force, while the rest of the men advanced along the shore to meet the French troops, who had discovered the deception and were now racing for Freshwater Cove.16 After a brief but sharp skirmish, the French broke and ran for the woods. "These Scoundellus french Dogs," wrote one New Englander, "they Dare not Stay to fite."17 In the encounter, the French suffered a loss of about six men killed, five wounded and one civilian captured. Port Captain Morpain was also slightly wounded but managed to return to the town. The captured civilian was Le Poupet de la Boularderie, a retired officer of the Duke of Richelleu's regiment in France. Several other Frenchmen were captured or killed in the woods before they could regain the fortress. The provincials' loss was two or three men slightly wounded.18 The French in Louisbourg, alarmed at the easy repulse of Morpain and Duchambon, set fire to the houses and outbuildings beyond the Dauphin Gate to deny their use to the enemy. The inhabitants with their personal effects were brought into the town.19 Throughout the fighting on the beach, the provincial army continued to come ashore along the coast between Flat Point and Freshwater Cove.20 The high surf that continued throughout the day increased the difficulties of landing, but by nightfall some 2,000 men were ashore. Toward evening most of the transports moved up to the head of the bay, where the riding was smoother and safer.21 On shore, the undisciplined volunteers succumbed to chaotic impulse, and "Indeed! wee fill'd the Country," noted one enthusiastic soldier. They had no specific orders as yet, but "Everyone Did what was Right in his own Eyes Among which I was one." The men took to the hills, and soon the French saw them ranging the heights in great numbers opposite the King's and Dauphin bastions. The provincials were within cannon shot and "at about two P.M. the cannon en barbette fired on several platoons which seemed to be marching without formation toward the far side of the bay." One of the New Englanders on the hills that day recorded (somewhat matter-of-factly) that "one of the Balls wee took Up while it was a roalling (wee Judg'd it to be A 24 Pounder)."22 The French saw still other men marching along the edge of the woods toward the Royal Battery. This was probably a detachment of 400 men under Colonel William Vaughan of Damariscotta, Maine, on its way to plunder and burn the storehouses and the northeast harbour.23 The provincials on the surrounding hills so alarmed Duchambon that "Je fis fermer Les portes, et Je fis pourvoir Sur Le champ a La Surette de la Ville et placer environ 1100 hommes, qui se sont trouves pour La deffendre."24 Even more alarmed was Chassin de Thierry, commandant of the Royal Battery. The Abandonment of the Royal Battery The relationship between the appearance of the provincials on the hills around Louisbourg on the afternoon of 11 May, and the abandonment of the Royal Battery has never been clearly defined. Many historians — those who bother to treat the subject at all — have attributed the abandonment directly to the burning of the northeast harbour storehouses on 12 May.25 The burning of the storehouses might well have hurried the men who had returned to complete the removal of the stores and ammunition, but the decision to abandon the Royal Battery was made on the evening of 11 May. In the late afternoon on 11 May (probably sometime after 4 o'clock), Thierry wrote to Duchambon stressing the poor condition of the battery and stating that he did not believe it could be held if attacked. Thierry asked permission to withdraw the garrison, and he cautioned Duchambon not to let the Royal Battery fall into enemy hands. He advised that the cannon be spiked and the place blown up.26 Duchambon, upon receipt of Thierry's communication, hurriedly assembled a council of war to decide what should be done about the Royal Battery. Etienne Verrier, the chief engineer, was summoned. He reported that the battery was indeed in a poor defensive condition: that some of the epaulements of the left flank had been taken down the previous year and had not been replaced; that the covered ways were not fortified, and that without reinforcements the battery could not be held against an attack of 3,000 or 4,000 men.27 On the strength of Verrier's report, the council voted unanimously to abandon the battery after spiking the cannon and removing all the stores and ammunition possible. Such stores and ammunition as could not be salvaged were to be dumped into the harbour. The council also wanted to have the battery blown up, as Thierry had urged, but Verrier apparently objected so strongly that the matter was dropped.28 Duchambon ordered Thierry to withdraw the garrison and abandon the battery. Thierry had, at this time, probably 200 to 300 people at the Royal Battery to be transferred. Some of these may have been residents of outlying settlements who repaired to the battery when the alarm sounded. (One account indicates that the garrison there was made up of 300 soldiers and gunners, including 90 militia under a Captain Petitpas. But Duchambon, in his report to the minister written at Rochefort, implied that Thierry's company amounted to 200 men.) Thierry spent the remainder of the evening of 11 May attending to the cannon and arranging for the transfer of the supplies and ammunition. About midnight, he and his troops arrived in town by chaloupe.29 In their apparent haste to abandon the Royal Battery, Thierry's men had spiked the cannon poorly, had left the gun-carriages mostly intact, and had not dumped the excess shot into the harbour as the council had ordered. So hurried was the withdrawal that a barrel of gunpowder, carelessly ignited, exploded, nearly killing several persons and burning the face and robes of a récollet friar. Also in the haste, it seems that 12 men were left in each of the towers, Thierry apparently neglecting to alert them of his departure. These men found a chaloupe in a creek near the battery and arrived in town about two o'clock in the morning. The next day, 12 May, Duchambon sent Lieutenant St. Etienne and Ensign Souvigny, with about 20 men, to complete the removal of the stores and ammunition Thierry had left behind; "ce qu'ils firent" wrote Duchambon, "a Lexception de tous Les Boullets de canon et Bombes qui y ont resté n'ayant pas peu Les emporter."30 The clean-up work was undoubtedly hurried by the burning that day of the northeast harbour storehouses. The habitant de Louisbourg could not understand the decision to abandon the Royal Battery, "si ce n'est une terreur panique, qui ne nous a plus quitté de tout le Siege." He bemoaned that "Il n'y avoit pas eu encore un seul coup de fusil tiré sur cette batterie, que les ennemis ne pouvoient prendre qu'en faisant leurs approches comme pour la Ville, & l'assiégeant, pour ainsi dire, dans les régles." He acknowledged that a breach existed on the landward side, thus endangering the battery, but "le crime est encore plus grand, parce que nous avions eu plus de loisir qu'il n'en falloit, pour mettre ordre à tout."31 Many Frenchmen undoubtedly sympathized with the habitant's view, but his argument that the battery could only have been taken "by making approaches in the regular way" is tenuous at best. The work was completely exposed to the heights behind it. Cannon placed on those heights by the provincials would have immediately commanded the position and rendered it indefensible regardless of breaches. In any case, by the morning of 13 May, the Royal Battery stood empty.
The Provincial Army Encamps The evening of 11 May was pleasant for the soldiers of the provincial army encamped before Louisbourg. The weather was fair, a fresh southwest wind rustled the grass and trees, and while the men had expected a greater resistance to their landing, they were pleased with the results of the day's activities. For hours, clusters of men had been straggling back from their first curious look at the great fortress they had come to conquer, bringing with them cows, sheep, horses, and whatever else they could drive or carry. The expedition was a magnificent adventure for most of them, and many believed, as did Samuel Curwen, merchant turned warrior, that "our campaign will be short, and [we] expect the place will surrender without bloodshed." In the morning, when the rest of the army landed, they would show the French how well New Englanders could fight; for the moment there was mainly "singing and Great Rejoicing."32 Their bivouac that first night was a makeshift affair, the men resting as best they could until the army could be assembled on shore. Major General Wolcott noted in his journal that "our men lay in the forest without any regular encampment." There were as yet no tents on shore and shelters were improvised from whatever materials were at hand, one soldier writing that "wee Cut A few boughs to keep Us from the ground." After the cramped holds of the transports, even this was a "most Comfortable Nights Lodging."33 The rest of the army came ashore unopposed on 12 May and about noon "proceeded toward the town & campt." A more permanent encampment was then begun, its construction taking several days. The men laboured in the woods cutting timbers for storehouses, shelters, and fires, one New Englander admitting that there were "More Conveniences for our Living on the Island Than was Represented to Us."34 Much uncertainty exists about the location of this encampment. The instructions Shirley gave to Pepperrell stated that "the first thing to be observed [after all the troops have been landed], is to march on till you can find . . . a proper spot to encamp them on; which must be as high as possible to some convenient brook, or watering place." The encampment was probably located at, or near, Flat Point. Here Flat Point Brook (called "Freshwater Brook" on contemporary maps), flowing roughly north and south, empties into Gabarus Bay and offers a considerable source of fresh water. The official account of the campaign states that "the camp was formed about half a mile from the place where they [the troops] made a feint of landing," and Benjamin Green, Pepperrell's secretary, says that they camped "about 1-1/2 miles from the town." This would put the encampment in the vicinity of Flat Point. Benjamin Cleaves, in his journal, also hints that the encampment might have been in this area.35 There is some evidence to indicate that the camp might have been relocated soon after the army moved to the Flat Point area. Two contemporary maps show the location of the provincial camp. One map shows it on either side of Flat Point Brook; the other shows it directly on Flat Point itself.36 No explanation for the disparity between the two maps has been found, but Green noted that on 13 May the camp was moved, "the enemy's balls having disturbed us the last night."37 The distance from Louisbourg to Flat Point seems rather far for the provincials to have been greatly bothered by cannon shot, but Cleaves confirms Green's statement and adds that in the night a new camp was built. It is therefore possible that two camps were started — one around Flat Point Brook, and, when this camp proved to be within range of French cannon, another on Flat Point itself. We do not know where the provincials were when the French shot began to disturb them. They may have been beyond the Flat Point area and then fell back, and the disparity in the maps might be nothing more than two generalized representations of the same encampment.38 The arrangement of the permanent encampment is equally uncertain. Shirley's instructions as to the manner of laying out the camp specified that,
Whether the encampment was established precisely on the lines Shirley envisioned has not been determined, but Colonel John Bradstreet, a regular army officer who was usually very critical of the provincial soldiers because they lacked proper military training and discipline, remarked that "with as much dispatch as could be expected, all the Troops, cannon, and Baggage were landed and properly Incamped [italics mine]."40 Bradstreet's statement offers a clue to the manner in which the encampment was laid out. To a regular officer like Bradstreet, being properly encamped would probably have meant encamping according to division (or, in this instance, regiment), with proper intervals between, and a protective picket line drawn up about the front and flanks to guard against a sudden attack by the enemy.41 This is the type of arrangement Shirley seems to have had in mind. There is, however, little direct evidence to substantiate that the encampment was so arranged. The official account merely states that at first the camp was formed "without throwing up [picket] Lines; depending only upon their Scouts and Guards [for protection]. But afterwards they encamped regularly [italics mine], and threw up Lines."42 The provincials maintained their encampment in the Flat Point area throughout the siege. While all of the regiments would have been initially assembled at the encampment, only five regiments appear to have been permanently headquartered there during the progress of the campaign. These were Pepperrell's (including his personal headquarters), Burr's (nominally Wolcott's), Moulton's (which returned from Port Toulouse on 16 May), Moore's and Willard's.43 Soldiers from these regiments, however, were later posted to the ranks of the remaining four regiments (Hale's; Richmond's, Waldo's and Gorham's, plus Dwight's artillery train), which subsequently sustained the several batteries erected against Louisbourg. These latter regiments encamped at or near the batteries they sustained. No information has been found concerning the location of Dwight's artillery train during the siege; it, like the soldiers of certain of the regiments, probably was scattered among the various batteries. Duchambon Prepares for Defence While the provincials laboured to prepare a camp, Duchambon prepared for the ordeal ahead. He had all the entrances to the town secured; and the soldiers who had been completely out of hand for the past five months now swore resolutely to defend the fortress to the last man before they would allow it to fall into English hands.44 Duchambon posted them according to their individual commands. Duvivier's company, under the command of de la Vallière, was posted at the Maurepas Bastion with de La Rhonde's company, which held the Maurepas gate near the loopholes (meurtrières). Bonnaventure's company was at the Brouillan Bastion and the crenellated wall. With Bonnaventure were Schoncher's Swiss companies, guarding the loopholes of the Princess Demi-bastion. At the Princess Demi-bastion and as far as the Queen's gate was d'Espiet's company. Duhaget's company sustained the Queen's Bastion, Villejoint's company the King's Bastion, and Thierry's company the Dauphin Demi-bastion. De Gannes' company held the Pièce de la Grave fronting the harbour. De Gannes retained command here until 23 June, when he transferred to the Island Battery to replace its commander, d'Ailleboust, who returned to the town because of illness. D'Ailleboust, when sufficiently recovered, would take over command at the Pièce de la Grave. Sainte-Marie, artillery captain, was in charge of the cannon, while Port Captain Morpain was given the general supervision of all the posts.45 On 12 May, Bigot and Duchambon decided to sink all the armed ships then in port to prevent them from being captured by the provincials. Accordingly, Ensign Verger, along with five soldiers and a number of sailors, was ordered to sink those which were opposite the town, and Ensign Bellemont was instructed to carry out a similar operation at the back of the bay. Bellemont was also ordered to retrieve the oil from the lighthouse tower. These orders seem to have been carried out by 16 May. It was probably at this time, if not earlier, that the casemate doorways were covered over with wood timbers in preparation to receive the women and children.46 Duchambon, realizing that his present force was inadequate to hold out indefinitely against the provincial army, on 16 May sent an urgent despatch to Lieutenant Paul Marin in Acadia to come immediately with his detachment of French and Indians. Marin possibly could have reached the fortress in 20 to 25 days, but the messenger had such a difficult time locating him that by the time Marin eventually arrived, Lousibourg had fallen. Duchambon would later claim that had Marin arrived 15 or 20 days sooner, the New Englanders would have been forced to raise the siege.47 The Provincials Occupy the Royal Battery The provincials took possession of the Royal Battery on 13 May. Governor Shirley had considered the capture of this battery to be of considerable importance to the success of the expedition. He called the work "the most galling Battery in the harbour," and felt that its capture would expose the whole harbour to attack by sea. Shirley believed the battery to be lightly defended and that with an attack upon a low part of the wall "that is unfinished at the east end" (i.e., the left flank where the épaulements had been taken down the previous year), "it is impossible to fail of taking [it]." Colonel John Bradstreet, "with 500 Chosen Men," was to have made the attack the night following the landing, but the attack was never made and the Royal Battery was taken without firing a shot.48 On the morning of 13 May, Colonel William Vaughan, with a small party of men, was returning from the northeast harbour (Vaughan himself said he was trying to find the "most commodious place" to erect a counter battery) when, passing behind the Royal Battery, he noticed that there was no flag flying from the staff and no smoke rising from the barracks' chimney. His suspicions aroused, Vaughan (according to many subsequent accounts of the incident) bribed an inebriated Indian to crawl to the battery to determine the true state of affairs. Ascertaining that the work was indeed abandoned, Vaughan and his men took possession of it. He then wrote to Pepperrell that "with the Grace of God and the courage of about thirteen men I entered the Royal Battery about nine a clock and am waiting here for a reinforcement and a flag."49 The manner in which Vaughan reputedly determined that the French no longer occupied the Royal Battery is open to question. It smacks of legend. The story of the Indian is not confirmed by the diaries, journals, or testimonials of men who were there at the time. Lieutenant Daniel Giddings of Hale's regiment, along with several men from his company, had gone to the Royal Battery out of curiosity (independent of Vaughan and his party) and had entered it at the same time as Vaughan.50 Giddings recorded the incident in his journal, but made no reference to an Indian, drunk or sober. The testimonial of another witness, one John Tufton Mason, likewise fails to mention an Indian, and Vaughan himself simply states that "by all Appearances [I] had Reason to judge that said Grand Battery was deserted by the enemy," whereupon [we] "marched up and took."51 Until further documentation comes to light, the story must be regarded as a tale that adds interest but little enlightenment.
Before reinforcements could reach Vaughan, four boatloads (Vaughan says seven boatloads) of French troops put out from the town toward the Royal Battery. Leaving four men in the battery, Vaughan, with eight others, ran out along the shore for "near half a Mile," and, picking up another four men along the way, began to fire upon the French. According to Vaughan, his little group was "within point blank Shot" of the town, from which they were fired upon by cannon.52 The French retired to the fortress. That this encounter was the result of a French attempt to retake the Royal Battery, as Vaughan and other provincial diarists believed, is extremely unlikely. That it was meant to be an attack at all is doubtful. French sources make no mention of such an intended attack (and there is no reason why they should be silent about it). These men were probably part of a force sent out by Duchambon to assist in the destruction of those houses of the barachois area which were not destroyed at the time of the provincial landings. One party was already at work in the area. This force included all the militia as well as 80 French and Swiss soldiers under Captain De Gannes and a Swiss officer named Rosser. Armed with hatchets and other tools, they were to bring back for use in the town whatever salvageable wood they could collect, as the supply was low. As they were finishing, according to Governor Duchambon's report, a number of provincials appeared at the barachois and in the upper valleys ("il parut au Barrachois et dans les vallons des hauteurs") and fired upon the French, who returned to town.53 Vaughan himself indicates, as does one David Woaster, then a captain of a company of volunteers, that the engagement took place some distance from the Royal Battery and "within point blank Shot" of the fortress. Since the French were approaching the "Battery-Side of the Harbour," as Vaughan and other observers admitted, it is understandable how the New Englanders might conclude that the enemy troops were trying to retake the Royal Battery, when actually they were going to assist the militia and soldiers in the clean-up operations around the barachois.54 Returning to the Royal Battery, Vaughan waited for the reinforcements and flag he had asked Pepperrell to send. In the meantime, two English ships' flags had been found in one of the nearby houses and these were hoisted on the staff. According to some chroniclers, one William Tufts climbed the pole and fastened his red coat to the staff to serve as a flag. (At least one account claims that it was another Indian that performed this act.) This story also seems spurious, despite an obituary notice of 3 June 1771 referring to such an exploit by Tufts at the Island Battery, during the abortive 6 June attack.55 Perhaps the story has its origins here. According to at least one contemporary account, Captain Joshua Pierce of Willard's regiment was the first to raise the English colours over the Royal Battery on 13 May. Colonel Samuel Waldo, who soon moved into the battery with part of his regiment, supports Vaughan's statement that the flag raised that day belonged to a ship's ensign and was not Tufts' coat. In a letter to Pepperrell dated 14 May, Waldo asks for one of the Union flags, "as the fisherman's ensign gives a mean appearance." We do not know what this "fisherman's ensign" looked like, but a French militia officer who accompanied a number of men across the harbour to retrieve the oil from the lighthouse tower, noticed the flag and said that it resembled an English weathervane ("un petit pavillon comme une Girouette angloise").56 Colonel John Bradstreet soon arrived at the battery with a reinforcement, and reported back to Pepperrell that the place was in bad condition but it could be repaired. Colonel Waldo, who arrived with five companies of his regiment later that day, reported that the cannon (twenty-eight 42-pounders and two 18-pounders) were plugged up and most of the carriages damaged, "tho' with small repairs, all capable of service." Bradstreet requested smiths and armourers to drill open the vents of the cannon, and that "handpicks, ramers [sic], & sponges & a quantity of powder" would also be needed. Many balls and shells were found, and Bradstreet promised to have a 42-pounder ready to open fire on the town by noon of 14 May if his needs were speedily met.57 They seem to have been met quickly; by 10 a.m. on 14 May, the 42-pounder he promised to have ready was cleared and had opened fire. The first shot killed 14 of the enemy. Waldo reported that 40 shot were subsequently fired against the town, while the French return fire from the fortress and Island Battery amounted to 146 shot and 50 shells. Only four of the embrasures of the Royal Battery pointed against the town, and while the fire from the Island Battery was "troublesome," Waldo intended to concentrate his fire on the town rather than the island to aid Pepperrell's designs against the fortress.58 The Landing of the Provisions and Artillery While Vaughan and his men were taking possession of the Royal Battery, the provisions and artillery were being brought ashore four miles to the west at Flat Point. The army that went to Louisbourg was provided with provisions for four months. Governor Shirley had asked the Massachusetts Committee of War to compute the total number of men in the army and fleet at 4,400 at least, and the General Assembly had before its dissolution empowered the committee to purchase and forward provisions for one month over and above the original four months, thus assuring provisions for five months.59 Despite Governor Shirley's efforts, supplies were deficient. At Canso, Pepperrell wrote Shirley that the provisions were inadequate; that they were far less than had been expected, and that he intended to write the war committee for additional stores. He also reported that the troops were deficient in necessary accoutrements, though the armourers were fitting for service what they could. Shirley promised to look into the matter and to send Pepperrell anything that it was in his power to send.60 Whether the deficiencies were remedied is not known, and the exact nature and extent of the provisions initially sent has not been determined. No invoices for these shipments have been found. From various references in journals and letters, however, we can be reasonably certain that the men had large quantities of rum, as well as bread, pork, rice, beans, peas and molasses.61 Also, they apparently had a supply of fresh meat, since there are numerous references to cattle being butchered during the course of the siege. And the rations were supplemented by fresh lobster and trout.62 The provisions were brought ashore near the encampment at Flat Point. The landing "was attended with extreme Difficulty and Fatigue," the surf continually running high, and it was nearly two weeks before all the stores were landed. On some days, "there was no landing any Thing at all" because of the high surf, and "many Boats and some Stores were lost."63 The work was even more difficult when the artillery was brought ashore the following day, 14 May; the men were "obliged to wade high into the water to save everything that would have been damaged by being wet." The soldiers who brought the guns ashore "had no Cloathes to shift themselves with, but poor Defence from the Weather, and at the same time the nights were very cold, and generally attended with thick heavy Fogs."64 Once ashore, the cannon still had to be moved over the difficult marshy ground stretching between Flat Point and the fortress.65 While several roads ran out to the east and southeast from Flat Point (one of which roughly paralleled the coast to the southern extremity of the Green Hill range within a mile of the town), and while the provincials constructed additional roads after the landing, they proved of little use, as the official account of the siege testifies.
The French had regarded the marshes and bogs to the west of the fortress as impassable, and so they might have been but for the ingenuity of Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel Meserve of Moore's New Hampshire Regiment. Colonel Meserve believed that if the cannon were placed on flat sledges, they could be drawn across the marshes to the points where they would be required. He thereupon designed and had constructed several wooden sledges 16 feet long and 5 feet wide, by which the guns were hauled across the morass. The shot, shells and powder, in the meantime, were transported on the soldiers' backs.67 The Erection of the Green Hill Battery, 15 May Meserve's sledges would come later, however, and on 14 May it was the brawn of the soldiers that moved the heavy guns over the marshes and inadequate roads and onto the southern extremity of Green Hill, where the first provincial battery was to be erected. For nearly two days the men laboured in the wind and mud, dragging and pushing the cannon and mortars into position. By 15 May, two 9-pounder cannon, two falconets, one 13-inch mortar, one 11-inch mortar, and one 9-inch mortar had been mounted. Five hundred men (probably Colonel Sylvester Richmond's Sixth Massachusetts Regiment) were ordered to support the battery.68 The exact location of this work (referred to as the "battery on Green Hill" or the "Green Hill battery" in the documents) has not been determined. Duchambon, who watched as the guns were mounted, says it was "sur la hauteur derriere les plaines vis a vis Le Bastion du Roy" approximately 1,500 yards distant.69 Most probably it was situated on the hill mentioned by Governor Shirley in his instructions to Pepperrell.
The Green Hill battery opened fire on the fortress on 15 May. Shirley's hope that the battery would inflict considerable damage on the town was disappointed however. Duchambon later reported that while this work "napas Cessé de tirer de distance en distance . . . ce feu na fait aucun progrés . . . et na tué ny Blessé personne." The distance was too great. In turn, the Green Hill battery sustained little or no damage from French counterfire until 20 May, when a cannon shot fired from the town wounded five men, one of whom lost both legs and afterwards died.71 With the fire from Green Hill proving ineffectual, a council of war on 16 May recommended that a battery be erected closer to the town's west gate. Later that day the same council advised that the mortars, coehorns and cannon at Green Hill be moved to a hill northwest of the town, and that the proposed new battery be erected there. It further recommended that eight 22-pounders, along with two 18-pounders and two 42-pounders removed from the Royal Battery, also be mounted there.72 While the men were in the process of transferring the guns, Pepperrell and Warren were preparing a surrender summons to send into Louisbourg. The Summons to Surrender on 18 May On 14 May, the day the Green Hill battery was begun, Pepperrell assembled a council of war and asked it to consider whether a surrender summons should be sent to the commanding officer in Louisbourg. But the council adjourned without making a decision. The same day, Colonel Waldo at the Royal Battery wrote to Pepperrell that both he and Colonel Bradstreet believed that the governor of Louisbourg would be justified in hanging any messenger sent with a summons, unless the army could present a more formidable appearance than it so far had shown.73 In council the next day, the matter was again broached. The members of the council initially voted to send the summons as soon as the gunners at the Green Hill battery were ready to open fire. But at its afternoon session, the council, possibly with Waldo's communication in hand, decided that firing against the town should be commenced before any surrender demands were made. Finally, on 17 May, after two days of firing from the Green Hill and Royal batteries and over the objections of several senior officers who still considered it unjustified, the council voted to send the following summons to "the Commander in chief of the French King's Troops, in Louisbourg, on the Island of Cape Breton":74
Early on the morning of 18 May, Pepperrell ordered a general cease-fire. The batteries fell silent, and as the provincial soldiers stood to arms, the walls of the fortress were crowded with women and children who joined their men to get a glimpse of the besieging army. From the provincial lines at about 11 o'clock appeared a Captain Agnue, accompanied by a drummer and a sergeant bearing a flag of truce. The captain carried the surrender summons. Entering the town through the Dauphin Gate, Agnue was met by Port Captain Morpain, who blindfolded and escorted him to the office of the Commissaire-Ordonnateur, François Bigot, where the summons was delivered to Duchambon.76 Duchambon's reply was firm, and vindicated the view of the provincial officers who considered the summons premature. He said that he would not consider any such proposition until the English army had made a decisive attack and until he was convinced that the fortress could not be held. Until then, the only answer he would offer would come from "La Bouche de nos canons."77 Duchambon's refusal to surrender the fortress caused little disappointment among the soldiers of the provincial army. One volunteer happily wrote that "Seeing the Terms was not Complied with We Gave a Great Shout and Began to fire Upon the town Again."78 They had come to fight and fight they would. French Sortie of 19 May and the Proposed Provincial Assault on Louisbourg of 20 May As the war council of 16 May had advised (since the fire from the Green Hill battery was ineffectual), a second battery was begun under the direction of Captain Joshua Pierce of Willard's regiment. This work, called the Coehorn or Eight-Gun Battery, was situated approximately 900 yards northwest of the King's Bastion. By 22 May it mounted four 22-pounder cannon, as well as the 9- and 11-inch mortars from the battery on Green Hill. Four more 22-pounders were added on 26 May, along with the 9-pounders and the 13-inch mortar from Green Hill. The provincials brought additional cannon from Flat Point, probably hauled at night on Meserve's sledges.79 On the night ot 19 May, a French party made a sortie from the fortress with the possible intention of hindering the men transporting the guns to the Coehorn Battery. Very little is known about this sortie (its exact point of origin and its purpose), but it was repulsed and its failure seemed to dissuade Duchambon (at least for the moment) from making any more such attacks. Duchambon's officers voted flatly against further sorties on the grounds that it was difficult enough to defend the ramparts with the 1,300 men they did have. The did not wish to risk them in attacks that might prove futile at best. Besides, while the soldiers professed loyalty and submitted to authority now, they still faced charges of mutiny and insubordinate behaviour. Who could tell what they might do if they had the opportunity to escape from the punishment of a crime which was rarely pardoned?80 The morning after the sortie, 20 May, a decision of another sort was made in the provincial camp. Another council of war met and announced that Louisbourg would be attacked by storm that night. The soldiers learned of the attack about 10 a.m. and the subalterns objected strongly, preferring a longer bombardment of the town before considering such an assault. Great uneasiness pervaded the army as the men talked about the council's decision. Commodore Warren, on shore with a number of his sailors who were to participate in the attack, noticed the general temper of the men and feared the consequences of an assault made by such unwilling soldiers. He talked with Pepperrell for some time, and afterward the company captains were asked to meet with the council in the afternoon and give their opinions on the proposed attack.81 Apparently the captains were as much opposed to the idea as the lieutenants and enlisted men, for after the meeting the council announced that the assault had been cancelled. The council advised officially that "as there appears a great dissatisfaction in many of the officers and soldiers at the designed attack on the town by storm this night, and as it may be attended with very ill consequences because of this dissatisfaction, the present attack is to be deferred for the present."82 The army would wait for the cannon to open a breach in the walls.
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