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Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 16
by Judith Beattle and Bernard Pothier The BattleThe Louisbourg squadron, under Byron, made contact with the French on 22 June when the Fame was anchored alone off Miguasha Point (most of the squadron having been dispersed by fog). Four of its boats captured an armed reconnaissance schooner which the French had previously taken as a prize.1 Failing instructions from Montreal, Giraudais was forced — albeit reluctantly — to initiate on his own the defense of a position in which he unequivocally held strategic and tactical advantages. His forces comprised the Machault, 26 guns (but only 14 mounted on 8 July, the day of the final engagement); the Bienfaisant, 16 guns mounted: the Marquis do Malauze, 12 guns mounted; six English ships captured in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and 25 to 30 Acadian sloops and schooners from the Miramichi and elsewhere whose crews had joined the French when they learned of the fleet's arrival in the Restigouche. In terms of manpower, the French had 200 regular Troupes de la Marine (infantry under the authority of the Navy Department) under D'Angeac; 300 Acadians capable of bearing arms, "tous adroits mais paresseux et indépendants s'ils ne sont gouvernés,"2 and 250 Micmacs. Nevertheless, the capture of the reconnaissance schooner marked the inauspicious beginning of a particularly inept military effort by the French.
23 June Byron weighed anchor on the morning of 23 June and set out for the head of the bay in search of the enemy, but the vagaries of the unfamiliar shallow channel soon compelled him to abandon the cumbersome Fame. Resuming his navigation in the Fame's boats, he soon "saw sevl ships & vessls at anchor above them about 2 leag near a point of land (on the Northern shore) . . . a frigate . . . 2 others seemed to be Merchant or Storeships the others sloops and schooners in all 10 or 12 sail. . . ."3 24 June At dawn the next day Byron dispatched two boats to make further soundings, but within two hours they were compelled to return to the flagship with several French boats in pursuit. On 24 June Giraudais set his men to the rapid completion of the battery, being built en barbette, that he had begun on the north shore at Pointe à la Batterie. He transferred four 12-pounders and one 6-pounder from the Machault, his flagship, to the battery and appointed his second in-command, Donat do la Garde,4 to command the position. As a mobile supplement to the shore battery, Giraudais retained the Machault in readiness in the channel, close behind a chain of small sloops and schooners which he scuttled one-half cannon-shot below the battery. The 60 men and seven women taken prisoner on their way to Quebec City in May, although "well used before the English ships appeared," were now packed into the hold of a small schooner for security reasons. According to the moving testimony of the prisoners, they were henceforth
25 June On 25 June the Fame weighed anchor and attempted to move closer to the head of the bay; however, at low water, at noon, it went aground "on a patch of mud,"6 "where I thought we never should have got off again."7 It did get off, but only after nine or ten hours of arduous effort and jettisoning "one of her anchors for the present,"8 and with the help of the schooner recaptured earlier off Miguasha Point. It is difficult to comprehend Giraudais's failure to capitalize on the definite tactical advantage of having his adversary aground on the shoals. Decisive action by the French on 25 June might have altered the outcome of the encounter. However, the French commander was not altogether unmindful of his advantage. As Byron learned later, Giraudais has actually contemplated sending a boarding party to the Fame,9 but had changed his mind when he perceived the man-of-war to be a fully armed two-decker. The Fame's admittedly formidable firepower notwithstanding, the French held enough of the classic advantages of a war situation to virtually guarantee their success; they enjoyed adequate manpower, the advantages of a secure defensive position, mobility both on land and on water, surprise, and for at least two hours before the Fame was released from the shoals, darkness. Their only serious disadvantage, albeit an essential one, was the low morale of both officers and men. Disheartened by the events both in Europe and North America in the previous two years which undermined France's position, neither Giraudais nor D'Angeac, any more than their subalterns, possessed the energy or bold offensive spirit which, combined with their physical advantages, might have led to a decisive French victory on the Restigouche in 1760.
26 June On 26 June the rest of the English squadron came into view off Miguasha Point. While the captains of the ships of the line, the Achilles and the Dosetshire, realized they were facing an unknown channel and prudently anchored east of the point, the captains of the frigates, the Scarborough and the Repulse, at first took the Fame to be French and endeavoured to get up to it. The enthusiasm of both Captain Scot and Captain Alien was exceeded only by their brash disregard of the navigational realities under which they were to labour. Both frigates ran aground and although the Scarborough was soon released thanks to assistance from the Fame, the Repulse was forced to spend the night on the shoals.10 27 June His squadron at full complement now, on 27 June Byron ordered the Fame's boats and the captured schooner to search for the elusive channel. The Scarborough, the Repulse and the Fame cautiously took up the rear.11 The most serious disadvantage of the English, given the low morale of the French, was the hazardous navigation. The channel ran very close to the north shore and was therefore exposed to the French guns and musketry. It was also, as Byron put it, so narrow there was "no room for a ship to swing."12 28 June When, on 23 June, the captured schooner went aground in less than a fathom,13 it was clear that the English had unwittingly penetrated into a cul-de-sac. At the same time, the Repulse and the Scarborough lay aground within range of the French guns at Pointe à la Batterie. Giraudais gave the order to open fire, but the French action was limited to a rather passive and half-hearted effort and their fire caused little real damage to the English. Nevertheless, coupled with musketry from a detachment of regulars, Acadians and Miemacs hidden in the surrounding woods, it harrassed the English in their efforts to get the ships afloat. However, the powerful artillery of the Fame was brought to bear on the French position as a cover for the grounded frigates and by evening the French musketry was effectively dispersed. Giraudais reverted to the defensive once again, ordering the Marquis de Malauze and the Bienfaisant as far upstream in the Restigouche as possible in order to protect their cargoes.14 He brought the Machault to the mouth of the river only slightly beyond the range of the English guns, later explaining; "Javois medité de resté avec ma fregatte Pour Soutenir la Batterie mais la force de l'Ennemis Estant trop Supérieure Maurois Empeché de regoindre tous les Batiments que Javois fait monter.15 As a further precaution, Giraudais ordered the English prisoners transferred from their prison aboard a schooner to the more secure hold of the Machault where they apparently underwent more severe treatment than previously.
The search for a navigable channel remained Byron's essential first objective. He might well have dispensed with this exercise given the inability of the French to undertake a spirited defensive effort. Indeed, had he been willing to depart from the classical norm. Byron could well have landed a party, routed the French on shore, and then proceeded to harass the enemy squadron unimpeded. The fact that even Byron's captured schooner, of low draft, had run aground while the Machault had retreated upriver with relative ease was sufficient indication that considerable further effort was required before a passage could be found. Thus the soundings continued and during the night of 28-29 June a new and apparently promising channel was discovered close to the south shore of the Restigouche. 29 June Byron immediately ordered the Repulse and the Scarborough to swing back and attempt the new passage, but further sounding soon belied his premature optimism. The passage, the "So[uth] channel" of the Allen map (or, more accurately, "le faux chanal du Sud" as Giraudais called it17), was not a channel at all, but another cul-de-sac which from an impressive seven fathoms had quickly fallen to nine feet before running into mud flats at low water. With the transfer of English efforts to the south channel on 29 June, the Repulse and the Scarborough fell beyond the range of the French guns at Pointe à la Batterie;18 however, the battery remained within range of the powerful guns of the Fame which enjoyed the further and more significant advantage of firing at the unprotected French flank.19 Although the French at first returned the Fame's fire, they were overwhelmed within a few days. 2 July By noon on 2 July, the Fame had smashed the easternmost French gun and a short time later the French began "making off from thence."20 Their retreat was premeditated and orderly for the remaining four guns were spiked, "split and burst to pieces."21 When the English landing party put ashore at Pointe à la Batterie, not a Frenchman remained in sight. The gun carriages and other woodwork at both the battery and the adjoining camp were burned and the English, carrying their fury still further, also burned between 150 and 200 buildings which the Acadian refugee community had recently built.22 This spirited action was the first decisive factor to affect English fortunes. Nevertheless, Byron declined his newly acquired land bridgehead, opting rather to maintain his original aim of finding a navigable channel and effecting the essential task of destroying the French squadron. Following their withdrawal from Pointe à la Batterie on 2 July, the French reassembled at Pointe à Bourdeau where Giraudais ordered the establishment of a new camp and the unloading of his storeships. In an effort to stop the English advance, he ordered two new batteries erected at the mouth of the river, one on Pointe aux Sauvages (now within Campbellton) and the other across the narrows at Pointe de la Mission. 3 July The day after the reduction of Pointe à la Batterie, Captain Allen of the Repulse dejectedly withdrew from the south channel. As he and Byron were discussing alternatives aboard the Fame on the evening of 3 July, "giving up all hopes of finding a channel,"23 word came that a new passage had been found close to the north shore where soundings had resumed the night prior to the French withdrawal from Pointe à la Batterie. Heartened by this breakthrough, Byron ordered the Repulse, the Scarborough and the schooner (now armed with four 6-pounders and manned by 50 men) to prepare to move into the new channel. During the night of 3-4 July the English squadron began moving toward the river mouth, but it was two days before a passage could be cleared through the chain of hulks the French had sunk below Pointe à la Batterie.24 5 July As soon as the English had cleared the chain of hulks below Pointe à la Batterie, on 5 July, Byron ordered the armed schooner against workmen he saw at the site of the new battery at Pointe aux Sauvages "to annoy them all he could with his great guns."25 However, Lieutenant Cummings, the commander of the schooner, anchored too close to the shore, well within range of the deadly musketry which suddenly began to rain from the barely completed breastwork and the surrounding woods and was forced to draw back to safety. Cummings himself was seriously wounded, barely escaping with his life.26 6 to 7 July Maintaining his original aim of protecting his cargos, during the night of 6-7 July Giraudais sank a second chain of five hulks across the channel at the narrows between Pointe aux Sauvages and Pointe à la Croix.27 The English remained undaunted and showed every sign of continuing hard after the French. Giraudais then decided to transfer his prisoners from the Machault to the hold of the Marquis de Malauze, less vulnerable to immediate fire from the attackers. D'Angeac noted the transfer in his report; "Nous nous étions debaracé des prisonniers que nous avions à bord du Machault en les envoyant à bord du Marquis de Maloze avec un détachement de vingt-cinq hommes et un Sergent et un Sergent de Confiance [sic] pour leur garde."28 When the English schooner again attempted to reduce the Pointe aux Sauvages battery on 7 July not only did it have concealed sniper muketry to contend with as before, but also the fire of three 4-pounders which now stood at the ready. In the face of superior firepower, a better position and a spirited French defense, the English again suffered the indignity of a hasty retreat to the safety of the frigates.29 Across the narrows at Pointe de la Mission another party of labourers had been busy erecting a second battery, en barbette, with an ordnance of three 12-pounders and two 6-pounders and a supporting detachment of 30 sharpshooters. This battery was ready to fire in the afternoon of 7 July.30 In the course of the night of 7-8 July, the Repulse and the Scarborough, preceded by the schooner, continued their advance and their survey of the channel. Although it is not clear how the English managed to skirt the second chain of hulks, they did so during the night of 7-8 July. Despite intermittent fire all night from both batteries and the musketry, at daybreak the schooner, the Repulse and the Scarborough all stood in the Restigouche, upstream from the French chain of hulks and face to face with the Machault. 8 July As dawn broke on 8 July, Giraudais saw with dismay from the bridge of the Machault that the two English frigates and the armed schooner stood at anchor only one-half cannon-shot downstream. The engagement which the French had ardently hoped to avoid was inevitable and imminent. To the 32 guns of the Repulse, the 20 of the Scarborough and the four of the schooner were opposed the ten starboard 12-pounders of the Machault,31 the three 4-pounders at Pointe aux Sauvages and the five guns at Pointe de la Mission. Every man who could be spared from manning the French artillery, guarding the prisoners in the Marquis de Malauze, and other tasks essential to the immediate defense of the French position was dispatched to disembark cargo from the two storeships and to tow a score or more smaller vessels within range of the French sharpshooters lining the north shore of the river.32 Shortly after five o'clock in the morning, the Repulse, now within range of the French battery on Pointe aux Sauvages, quickly drove the defenders from their position. As the frigates moved slowly upstream they were met by brisk fire from the battery on Pointe de la Mission and, close by, from the Machault.33 The French fire was so brisk that the Repulse, in the lead, was driven "aground in a very bad position with her head on to the shoals."34 The French fire inflicted such heavy punishment upon the Repulse that Giraudais claimed that technically his guns had sunk it.35 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the Repulse, had it been standing in deep water rather than aground on the shoals, could have avoided sinking. Far from being able to capitalize on the enemy's discomfort, the Machault, in an incredible example of military unpreparedness, was almost out of powder and cartridges.36 As a safety precaution Giraudais had earlier transferred part of his war stores to a smaller vessel and to this vessel he hastily dispatched one of his boats. However, the terror of the moment affected its crew for they were never heard from again although the boat, fully laden as ordered, was later found abandoned. As its powder supply dwindled the Machault's fire became more sporadic until it ceased at nine o'clock. The powder situation being compounded by the presence of seven feet of water in the hold, Giraudais determined to abandon ship37 and at 11 o'clock the Mchault struck its colours. In the meantime the Repulse had managed to get off the shoals, and, with the Scarborough, resumed firing on the French battery at Pointe de la Mission. The latter's fire had virtually stopped when the Machault had struck its colours, but resumed at intervals "not more than one or two guns in a quarter of an hour."38 The English frigates were unable to move higher because of the shallow water. Under ordinary circumstances, the tactic of storming the moribund Machault would have suited the occasion; however, Captain Allen of the Repulse surmised that the French intended to blow it up rather than turn its cargo over to the enemy. Given his irreversible advantage at this juncture, Allen accordingly hold back his boats in order not to run unnecessary risk.39 Shortly before noon, Giraudais and D'Angeac, their determination to remain to the last aboard their flagship honoured now, descended into a boat and made for the French camp at Pointe à Bourdeau. Their orderly retreat did not even lack an appropriate flourish of enemy fire, "ayant pendant une partie du chemin les boulets à nos trousses."40 At or around noon the Machault blew up with a "very great explosion."41 Presumably the charge had gone off prematurely for several Frenchmen were wounded. Fifteen minutes later the Bienfaisant similarly blow up, its entire cargo still in its hold.42 The Marquis de Malauze would undoubtedly have suffered a similar fate had the prisoners not been within its hold. The prisoners, now numbering 62,43 had heard the "two terrible reports." Shortly after, they were brought up on deck and ordered into an inadequate makeshift raft "which would have sunk with one half of our number." Half-crazed by the prospect of delivering themselves into the hands of the Micmacs on shore, the prisoners refused to move and finally prevailed upon their captors to admit that to force them to leave would amount to sacrificing them to the Indians. The French therefore left them to their fate, but not before marching them back into the hold where they were fettered and handcuffed anew and the hatches again secured above them.44 The prisoners were "almost mad with fear, expecting every moment to be blown up," helpless in their dark and stifling prison. When a bulkhead was finally knocked down and the hatches forced open, what greeted them on deck was hardly more reassuring; dense smoke from the burning Machault and Bienfaisant stood between them and recognition by their compatriots beyond and "all the shore was lined with Indians, firing small arms upon us. Although fortunately out of musket range for the time being, they were in terror of night. "We were in the utmost perplexity to get away, because we knew, had we remained aboard that night, we should have been boarded by the Indians, and every man scalped."45 Ironically, the prisoners were responsible for the single most valiant feat of the entire Restigouche incident. A young follow among them "who could swim very well" offered to set off for the Repulse, a full league downstream. Passing under the guns of the Pointe de la Mission battery, he arrived safely at the English frigate. Captain Allen immediately dispatched Lord Rutherford with nine boats escorted by the schooner to the Marquis de Malauze to the relief of the prisoners. Not withstanding brisk fire from the one remaining French position, the English prisoners were all released and brought to the Repulse by mid-afternoon on 8 July.46 The English, determined to destroy every French vessel within their reach, set the Marquis de Malauze ablaze as soon as it was cleared of the prisoners. Like the Bienfaisant, its cargo of "wine and brandy, bales of goods and warlike stores" was jettisoned entirely. The efficiency of this aspect of the English operation was marred only by the death of six Englishmen, including a midshipman who, in spite of repeated calls to, had tarried too long with the liquor and went down with the flaming hulk.47 Rutherford's men continued their destruction of all available French shipping and by nightfall French losses totalled 22 or 23 vessels which, with the exception of the Machault, the Bienfaisant and the Marquis de Malauze, were mainly Acadian sloops, schooners and small privateers. (These figures do not include the ten vessels the French scuttled in the channel.) Like the Machault and the Bienfaisant, many had been fired by the French in order to avoid their falling into the hands of the enemy. One English source claims that of all the vessels in French hands on the morning of 8 July, only one schooner and two shallops remained by nightfall.48
Having thus burned and destroyed or caused to be destroyed everything within their reach in complete fulfillment of the aim of the expedition's singleminded commander, the Repulse, the Scarborough and the armed schooner swung around at 11 o'clock on the evening of 8 July and withdrew downstream. The French fleet destroyed, Byron did not even silence the empty tauntings of the one remaining enemy position, the Pointe de la Mission battery. After pausing off Pointe à la Batterie while rum was issued, Byron's squadron sailed. On 14 July, near Paspébiac, they met Wallis's squadron from Quebec which had been searching the lower St. Lawrence and the gulf for the French ships, then continued on their way, four to the Fortress of Louisbourg and the Repulse to Halifax, "her rigging, masts and hull much shattered and no stores left at Louisbourg."49 After the unexpected and overwhelming attack of the British, the French were left to salvage what they could of the situation. Most of their ships' cargoes had been lost, many men had been killed,50 and only a few boats were left to cross a large ocean. When St. Simon returned with Vaudreuil's instructions, the French had little means with which to implement them.
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