Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 21

Whisky, Horses and Death:
The Cypress Hills Massacre and its Sequel

by Philip Goldring

Epilogue

Eager writers have tried to attach as much importance as possible to the Cypress Hills massacre. Significant it was, but traditions cling to it which can be swept away by extensive research. The massacre and its result have been credited with everything from the formation of the North-West Mounted Police to the establishment of the force's reputation for efficiency and fair dealing with the Indians. The real circumstances of the creation of the Mounted Police have been alluded to above and the tradition is clearly in error, [1] but the second legend is at least partly true. The collective courage and fairness of the early Mounted Police had an enormous influence on the Indians in permitting the peaceful settlement of the northwestern prairies and the pursuit of the actors in the Cypress Hills affair was one of the more conspicuous episodes in the force's first decade. But a lot of that image was due not only to the force's handling of the affair, but to the government in general. As Lieutenant Governor Morris told the North West Council when he opened the winter meeting in 1875, You called attention to the necessity of steps being taken to punish the actors in the Cypress Hills tragedy, and your recommendation has been acted upon by the Privy Council, with the best effect, as regards the Indian population. [2]

In 1873 the Dominion's possessions west of Manitoba were a house of cards. A stiff breeze of American annexationism or an energetic flurry of Indian hostility could have brought the whole thing tumbling down, Manitoba was considered safe only because of its garrison. Morris was deeply, often painfully, aware of this and Ottawa, to his chagrin, was less aware. Yet the early Canadian adventure into sovereignty over the Northwest survived its initial fragility. This has inevitably invited comparison with the American frontier experience, a more costly and more bloody enterprise. [3] The patient integrity of the Mounted Police, the scrupulous respect for individuals regardless of race which appeared to be at the basis of the investigation of the Cypress Hills massacre, all buoyed up the Dominion's image in contrast to the military battles and vigilante raids which were a widely deplored but firmly entrenched aspect of American conduct of Indian affairs beyond the immediate frontiers of settlement.

Paradoxically, it was in part the vulnerable state of the Canadian frontier which induced the government to move quickly but delicately to consolidate its hold on the lands in question. There were no regiments of cavalry in reserve, no ample treasury to pour out gold to fight the Indians and retain the West. Good diplomacy was the indispensable weapon against every danger. Until a patchwork of settlement could be spread across the prairies and stitched together with railroads, the authority of the government would rest wholly on the consent of the governed. This was the challenge facing the Dominion and the handling of the Cypress Hills massacre was ideally suited to reassure the Indians and win their confidence.

None of this ought to suggest that Canadian expansion through the Northwest was either painless or blameless. Nor were all the advantages Canada enjoyed purely the result of sound policy. To name but a few factors, the Canadian government's ability to settle most Indians on reservations well in advance of the coming of white settlers was one asset in averting frontier conflict. This development was itself encouraged, grimly, by the subjugation of tribes by the United States Army, by smallpox and by the disappearance of the buffalo, all of which made the Indians more tractable, because more dependent on the government. Different circumstances, then, help to explain the contrast between United States and Canadian westward advances.

Yet the traditional story has merit: before any of the other trends had become decisive, a degree of the Indians' confidence was won by the Canadian government, its agents and its emissaries to the Northwest Indians. The good news of the government's firm handling of the Cypress Hills massacre, as Morris said, reassured the Indians that they might fare better under the subjects of the queen than under the citizens of the republic to the south. [4] It also inhibited the development of a frontier mentality as rabid as that which prevailed in Montana. The massacre did indeed prove a landmark in Canadian administration of the Northwest Territories and it was not the disaster that Morris, in 1873, had feared. The Canadian frontier failed to breed many men in the mould of Tom Hardwick and his friends. To the extent that this was not due to chance and circumstance, it was the conscious outcome of Canadian policy. This policy was inspired, if not by superior virtue, at least by superior wisdom.