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Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 11
by Carol Whitfield Appendix DVan Rensselaer to Dearborn Sir, — As the movements of the army under my command since I had the honour to address you on the 8th, have been of a very important character, producing consequences serious to many individuals, establishing facts actually connected with the interest of the service, and the safety of the army; and as I stand prominently responsible for some of these consequences, I beg leave to explain to you, sir, and through you to my country, the situation and circumstances in which I have had to act, and the reasons and motives which governed me; and if the result is not all that might have been wished, it is such, that, when the whole ground shall be viewed, I shall cheerfully submit to the judgment of my country. In my letter of the 8th instant, I apprised you that the crisis in this campaign was rapidly advancing; and that (to repeat the same) "the blow must be soon struck," or all the toil and expense of the campaign go for nothing, for the whole will be tinged with dishonour. Under such impressions, I had, on the 5th instant, written to Brig. Gen. Smyth of the United States forces, requesting an interview with him, Majr. Gen. Hall, and the commandants of regiments, for the purpose of conferring on the subject of future operations. I wrote Maj. Gen. Hall to the same purport. On the 11th, I had received no answer from Gen. Smyth; but in a note to me of the 10th, Gen. Hall mentioned that Gen. Smyth had not yet then agreed upon any day for the consultation. In the mean time, the partial success of Lieut. Elliott at Black Rock, (of which, however, I have received no official information) began to excite a strong disposition in the troops to act. This was expressed to me through various channels, in the shape of an alternative, that they must have orders to act, or at all hazards they would go home. I forbear here commenting upon the obvious consequences, to me personally, of longer withholding my orders under such circumstances. I had a conference with ________, as to the possibility of getting some person to pass over to Canada, and obtain correct information. On the morning of the 4th, he wrote to me that he had procured the man who bore his letter, to go over. Instructions were given him; he passed over — obtained such information as warranted an immediate attack. This was confidentially communicated to several of my first officers, and produced great zeal to act; more especially as it might have a controlling effect upon the movement at Detroit, where it was supposed General Brock had gone with all the force he dared spare from the Niagara frontier. The best preparations in my power, were therefore made to dislodge the enemy from the heights of Queenstown, and possess ourselves of the village, where the troops might be sheltered from the distressing inclemency of the weather. Lieut. Col. Fleming's flying artillery, and a detachment of regular troops under his command, were ordered up in season from Fort Niagara. Orders were also sent to Gen. Smyth to send down from Buffalo such detachment from his brigade as existing circumstances in that vicinity might warrant. The attack was to be made at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 11th, by crossing over in boats from the old ferry, opposite the heights. To avoid any embarrassment in crossing the river, (which is here a sheet of violent eddies) experienced boatmen were procured to take the boats from the landing below, to the place of embarkation. Lieut. Sim was considered the man of the greatest skill for this service; he went ahead, and, in the extreme darkness, passed the intended place far up the river, and there, in the most extraordinary manner, fastened his boat to the shore, and abandoned the detachment. In this front boat he had carried nearly all the oars which were prepared for the boats. In this agonizing dilemma stood officers and men, whose ardour had not been cooled by exposure through the night, to one of the most tremendous northeast storms, which continued unabated for twenty-eight hours, and deluged the whole camp. Col. Van Rensselaer was to have commanded the detachment. After this result, I had hoped the patience of the troops would have continued, until I could submit the plan suggested in my letter of the 8th, that I might act under and in conformity to the opinion which might then be expressed. But my hope was idle; the previously excited ardour seemed to have gained new heat from the late miscarriage; the brave were mortified to stop short of their object, and the timid thought laurels half won by the attempt. On the morning of the twelfth, such was the pressure upon me from all quarters, that I became satisfied that my refusal to act might involve me in suspicion, and the service in disgrace. Lieut. Col. Christie, who had just arrived at Four Mile Creek, had late in the night of the first contemplated attack, gallantly offered me his own and his men's services; but he got my permission too late. He now again came forward, had a conference with Col. Van Rensselaer, and begged that he might have the honour of a command in the expedition. The arrangement was made, Col. Van Rensselaer was to command the column of three hundred militia, and Lieut. Col. Christie a column of the same number of regular troops. Every precaution was now adopted as to boats, and the most confidential and experienced men to manage them. At an early hour in the night Lieut. Col. Christie marched his detachment by the rear road, from Niagara to camp. At 7 in the evening Lieut. Col. Stranahan's regiment moved from Niagara Falls; at 8 o'clock, Mead's and at 9, Lieut. Col. Bloom's regiment marched from the same place. All were in camp in good season. Agreeably to my orders issued upon this occasion, the two columns were to pass over; then Major Mullany's detachment of regulars, and the other troops to follow in order. Col. Van Rensselaer, with great presence of mind, ordered his officers to proceed with rapidity, and storm the fort. The service was gallantly performed, and the enemy driven down the hill in every direction. Soon after this, both parties were considerably reinforced, and the conflict was renewed in various places. Many of the enemy took shelter behind a stone guard-house, where a piece of ordnance was now briskly served. I ordered the fire of our battery to be directed upon the guard-house; and it was so effectually done, that, with eight or ten shot, the fire was silenced. The enemy then retreated behind a large store-house; but, in a short time, the rout became general, and the enemy's fire was silenced, except from a one gun battery, so far down the river as to be out of reach of our heavy ordnance, and our light pieces could not silence it. A number of boats now passed over unannoyed, except by the one unsilenced gun. For some time, after I passed over, the victory appeared complete; but, in expectation of further attacks, I was taking measures for fortifying my camp immediately; the direction of this service I committed to Lieut. Totten of the Engineers. But very soon the enemy were reinforced by a detachment of several hundred Indians from Chippewa; they commenced a furious attack, but were promptly met and routed by the rifle and bayonet. By this time, I perceived my troops were embarking very slowly. I passed immediately over to accelerate their movements, but, to my utter astonishment, I found, that, at the very moment when complete victory was in our hands, the ardour of the unengaged troops had entirely subsided. I rode in all directions; but in vain. Lieut. Col. Bloom, who had been wounded in the action, returned, mounted his horse, and rode through the camp, as did also Judge Peck, who happened to be here, exhorting the companies to proceed — but all in vain. At this time a large reinforcement from Fort George was discovered coming up the river. As the battery on the hill was considered an important check against their ascending the heights, measures were immediately taken to send them a fresh supply of ammunition, as I learned there were left only twenty shot for the eighteen-pounders. The reinforcements, however, obliqued to the right from the road, and formed a junction with the Indians, in the rear of the heights. Finding, to my infinite mortification, that no reinforcements would pass over, seeing that another severe conflict must soon commence, and knowing that the brave men at the heights were quite exhausted, and nearly out of ammunition, all I could do, was to send them a fresh supply of cartridges. At this critical moment I despatched a note to Gen. Wadsworth, acquainting him with our situation, leaving the course to be pursued to his own judgment, with assurance that, if he thought best to retreat, I would endeavour to send as many boats as I could command, and cover his retreat, by every fire I could safely make; but the boats were dispersed; many of the boatmen had fled panic struck, and but few got off. My note, however, could but little more than have reached Gen. W., about 4 o'clock, when a most severe and obstinate conflict comenced, and continued about half an hour, with a tremendous fire of cannon, flying artillery, and musketry. The enemy succeeded in repossessing their battery, and gaining advantage on every side. The brave men who had gained the victory, exhausted of strength and ammunition, and grieved at the unpardonable neglect of their fellow soldiers, gave up the conflict. I can only add, that the victory was really won, but lost for the want of a small reinforcement; one third part of the idle men might have saved all.1
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