Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 11

The Battle of Queenston Heights

by Carol Whitfield

Sir Roger Hale Sheaffe

Major General Sir Roger Hale Sheaffe is usually remembered as the man who fled York, abandoning the inhabitants to capitulate to the invading Americans on the best terms which they could negotiate. The reason he was knighted, the brilliant victory at Queenston Heights, is forgotten. Some of the roots of this injustice lie in Sheaffe's own background; some in the over-shadowing memory of his predecessor, while others resulted from his indifferent attitude to communication.

Sheaffe had the misfortune to be a native of the United States and to have relatives and friends who were citizens of the enemy nation. He was born in the colony of Massachusetts on 15 July 1763¹ to Suzannah and William Sheaffe. His father, who was Deputy Collector of Customs for the Port of Boston, died in 1771, leaving a widow and eight children destitute.² To earn money, Mrs. Sheaffe ran a boarding house in Boston, and one of her tenants during the American Revolution was Baron Percy, the future Duke of Northumberland, who established his headquarters at the Sheaffe home. The earl became young Sheaffe's patron, sending him to sea as a midshipman at 10 years of age, and then transferring him to Locke's military academy in England. Here he was a classmate of his future commanding officer Sir George Prevost.³

Baron Percy purchased the young boy an ensigncy in his own regiment, the Fifth Regiment of Foot, on 1 May 1778, and a lieutenancy in the same regiment on 27 December 1780. It was with this regiment that Sheaffe served his first tour of duty in Canada.

Before coming to Canada, however, he spent six and one-half years with the Fifth in Ireland.⁴

The Fifth sailed for Canada in July, 1787, and did not return to England until September 1797. Apparently Sheaffe spent much of the 10 years in Upper Canada serving under Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe. A letter addressed to his mother indicates that in 1791 he was in the Detroit area.⁵

Early in 1794, during the negotiations preceding Jay's Treaty, Simcoe became disturbed by rumours of new American settlements on the south shore of Lake Ontario, particularly at Sodus. He was worried not only by the possible military intentions of these new settlements but also by the threat that their demand on Canadian wheat supplies would force the price to rise. Accordingly, he dispatched Lieutenant Sheaffe and a military escort to remonstrate with the settlers. Sheaffe delivered the following protest, which caused a furor.

I am commanded to declare that during the inexecution of the treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States, and until the existing differences respecting it, shall be mutually adjusted, the taking possession of any part of the Indian Territory, either for the purposes of war or sovereignty, is held to be a direct violation of his Britannic Majesty's rights, as they unquestionably existed before the treaty, and has an immediate tendency to interrupt and in its progress destroy that good understanding which had hitherto subsisted between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America. I therefore require you to desist from any such aggression.⁶

The whole American government went into an uproar over the Sodus incident, labeling it Simcoe's invasion. George Washington referred to it as the "most open and daring act of the British agents."⁷ The Americans did not blame Sheaffe for the incident, however, realizing that he was acting upon Simcoe's orders.

The Sodus incident became a dead issue when Jay's Treaty was signed in November, and the remainder of Sheaffe's time in Canada apparently passed quietly, as there is very little information on it. He did become a captain in the Fifth on 5 May 1795.

Shortly after Sheaffe's return to England, he became a major of the 81st Regiment, and then he applied for and received a transfer to the 49th Regiment, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the process. As junior lieutenant colonel, he saw action with his new regiment in Holland in 1799 and the Baltic in 1801. The regiment was then transferred to Canada: the detachment under Sheaffe arrived at Quebec City on 7 September 1802.⁸

On the whole, this second tour of duty in Canada, which ended in October of 1811,⁹ was as uneventful as the first. Since Brock always acquired his promotion a few months before Sheaffe, the latter was always the junior, the one who was given the orders, never the one to do the ordering. As he was promoted, he did get opportunities to command at various forts, but Brock always had the better posting. Shortly after they arrived in Canada, the two lieutenant colonels were ordered to the upper country; Sheaffe to Fort George and Brock to York, the capital and the focal point of communications in the colony. These postings were reversed a year later due to a very sorry incident. Transfer for Sheaffe meant censure.

Sheaffe was the commanding officer at Fort George on 7 August 1803 when Brock surreptitiously arrived at the post and imprisoned a number of men who were suspected of conspiring to mutiny and desert. Brock had been sent for by Sheaffe, whose suspicions had been aroused. There is a controversy over why these men, who were found guilty and either shot or transported to Barbados, were led to plan such a crime. Brock blamed the incident on Sheaffe, whom he claimed was too zealous and too much the disciplinarian. Several of the convicted men, however, produced statements praising Sheaffe for his humanity and leniency.¹⁰ Probably the isolation and loneliness of Fort George, coupled with a "follow the rule-book" attitude by Sheaffe, the product of a military academy, created the atmosphere of desperation which induced the men to conspire. There is a brief reference to the escape of two deserters from confinement in the black hole and handcuffs in 1805, which confirms that Sheaffe was strict with prisoners.¹¹

This conspiracy was the only outstanding incident of his second period in Canada. Sheaffe rose to the brevet rank of colonel on 25 April 1808, and shortly before he left Canada he was promoted to major general. His reason for leaving Canada and his destination are not at all clear. Probably it was a leave of absence to visit England with his bride, Margaret, the daughter of John Coffin of Quebec.¹²

6 Sir Roger Hale Sheaffe. (Public Archives of Canada.)

It is unlikely that Sheaffe had rejoined his regiment in Canada when the United States declared war on Great Britain, since he did not receive a posting until 30 July when Prevost appointed him "Major-General on the Staff of the Army Serving in British North America until his Majesty's pleasure be known."¹³ The last phrase tends to support the contention of some writers that Sheaffe asked for a European posting so he would not have to fight his homeland.¹⁴ If Sheaffe did place such a request, it was denied and he was posted to Upper Canada because, in Prevost's words, "from his long residence in that Country, and his known abilities; I feel confident he will prove of material assistance to Major General Brock under whose command I have placed him."¹⁵

When Sheaffe reached Upper Canada, Brock had set out for the Detroit frontier, so Sheaffe assumed command of the Niagara frontier with his headquarters at Fort George. Meanwhile, the British government had rescinded the Orders in Council upon which the Americans had based the declaration of war. Prevost, hoping to end the war, had arranged a temporary armistice with Dearborn until President Madison could consider his position under these new circumstances. Soon after he settled at Fort George, Sheaffe and the opposing American commander, General Stephen Van Rensselaer, signed this armistice for the Niagara frontier, in accordance with the wishes of their commanding officers. Van Rensselaer, however, suggested a supplementary clause that, "No reinforcements of men or supplies of ammunition shall be sent, by either party, higher up than Fort Erie."¹⁶ When this amendment was presented to Sheaffe on 20 August, he had just received word that Hull's army had surrendered to Brock. Knowing that Van Rensselaer was unaware of this important development, Sheaffe quickly signed the armistice.¹⁷ Prevost was furious. He wrote Brock:

In answer to this communication I have to acquaint you that the conditions stated in Colonel Baynes's Letter to the Officer commanding at Fort George ought to have been considered as conclusive and binding not to be deviated from, but to be religiously observed by him;—Any alteration proposed by the American General Officer which it might have appeared to Genl Sheaffe prudent and politic to accede, should have been consented to under the reservation of the Commander of the Forces's final approval. It was expressly stated to Genl Dearborn and clearly understood by him that our mutual supplies and reinforcements should move unmolested, with the contemplation of succouring Amherstburg; as thing's are embarrassment may ensue to His Majesty's Service in Upper Canada which it may be necessary to remove by not acknowledging Major General Sheaffe's agreement.¹⁸

No embarrassment did ensue and it is difficult to conceive how the British government could be embarrassed by the alteration. The situation on the Detroit frontier had already been decided: it was unlikely that reinforcements to either side would change the respective positions since the British had captured an armed brig and sufficient ammunition to hold Fort Detroit against even an attacking American flotilla, while reinforcements and supplies for the British would only be stockpiled, as they had no more objectives to capture on the frontier.

Prevost soon had to stop worrying about possible embarrassing situations and handle Brock's urgent requests for reinforcements for the Niagara frontier. The Americans cancelled the armistice and began building up their forces for an attack, which occurred at Queenston on 13 October.

Sheaffe arrived at the edge of the battle around noon. Brock and his aide-de-camp, Macdonell, had already been killed in unsuccessful frontal attacks on the American position, so Sheaffe wisely chose a flanking movement that took his force well out of cannon range until they were level with the rear of the American army. This excellent manoeuvre resulted in the complete defeat of the American forces and the capture of over 900 prisoners.

The congratulations which streamed in on his overwhelming success would have seemed to indicate a propitious beginning for the new commander of His Majesty's forces in Upper Canada and the new President Administering the Government. (Sheaffe succeeded to both positions on the death of Brock.) The Executive Council referred to

the happy effect of the coolness, intrepidity and Judgment which you displayed in that eminent situation, the Inhabitants of this province do now feel, & will ever most gratefully remember. Such a happy commencement leads us to look to the future with confidence and hope, & to consider what is past but as a presage of what is to come.¹⁹

The king expressed his pleasure with Sheaffe's conduct in more concrete terms: on 16 January 1813, he conferred upon him the title of Baronet of the United Kingdom.²⁰

The general pleasure with Sheaffe was, however, of very short duration. He signed a temporary armistice with the Americans to exchange prisoners, attend to the wounded, and bury Major General Brock with military honours. Sheaffe felt he was unable to press his advantage because he was hindered by the number of prisoners he had taken. Fort George had not been built to incarcerate 900 men. Paroling the militia and sending the regulars off to Quebec seemed to be the only solution. Prevost, however, disagreed.

I am sorry that I cannot approve of the extensive liberality you have practised towards the Prisoners of War nor do I feel the weight of the argument you adduce to justify you having taken upon yourself to allow Brigadier General Wadsworth to go on his parole without having had a previous communication with me... on the policy and propriety of such a measure.

When Sheaffe arranged an indefinite prolongation of the armistice, Prevost was even more reproachful. The only excuse he could see for such a measure was if time was essential to repair a section of the British defences, which had been weakened.²¹

Others were less cautious in their condemnation of Sheaffe's conciliatory policy. The Quebec Gazette said

We do not mean to criticise the acts of our executive, but surely such lenity is not to continue forever, we only wish the people on the other side may feel that gratitude for such unexampled generous conduct which it merits.²²

Later historians were very unkind to Sheaffe's policy

But Sheaffe, who was born in New England before the Revolution, and who had many American connections, was criminally weak after the battle had been won. Evans had driven the Americans out of Fort Niagara, which might have been seized and held against Van Rensselaer's beaten force, now deprived of its best men. With the mouth of the river under British control the American hold on the frontier might have been almost shaken off Brock would have done it in a week. But Sheaffe concluded an armistice, at first for three days, then for an indefinite time; and the military advantages of victory were wantonly thrown away.²³

In Sheaffe's defence it must be added that his commanding officer had forbidden offensive moves. Brock had been held back by Prevost's instructions; it was unlikely that the more cautious Sheaffe would disobey. Prevost, however, overlooked his own standing orders when he wrote the Colonial Office that:

After the Affair of Queenston Sir R. H. Sheaffe lost a glorious opportunity of crossing the Niagara River during the confusion and dismay which then prevailed, for the purpose of destroying Fort Niagara, in which attempt he could not have failed, and by which the command of the Niagara River would have been secured to us during the War, and Niagara, like Ogdensburgh, would have ceased to be an object of disquietude; But the eminent military talents of Sir Isaac Brock having ceased to animate the little army, the advantage of that day was not sufficiently improved.²⁴

Furthermore, Sheaffe had to consider how he could maintain his hold on any territory he seized. Brock had had difficulty allocating his troops to hold the Niagara frontier, and if the British captured Fort Niagara, troops would have to be diverted to fortify it. The troops to form such a garrison were not available. The decision on whether or not to press the advantage after the victory at Queenston apparently was one that could satisfy no one.

Nevertheless, Sheaffe's problems were only beginning. Rumours started which attributed his decision not to attack the United States to a reluctance on Sheaffe's part to invade his homeland. Such an opinion, however, does not explain Sheaffe's decision to weaken Fort Niagara by cannonading it after the expiration of the armistice.²⁵

After the unsuccessful American invasion at Black Rock on 28 November, the commanding officer at Fort Erie, fearing a second attempt, requested reinforcements. Sheaffe wisely replied that reinforcements could not be spared to that extremity of the line because to do so would allow the Americans to cut the small British force in two and defeat each half individually. Sheaffe accordingly advised that the force at Fort Erie should retreat toward Chippawa if it was attacked. The indignant commanding officer at Fort Erie presented Sheaffe's suggestions to a council of his fellow officers who expressed outrage that their superior should condone and even recommend retreat. Rumours quickly labelled Sheaffe a traitor.

The verbal suggestion previously said in joke and not correct, coupled with the written sanction to abandon the Position was circulated as the Sentiment of a Traitor, and gave excuse for meetings and combinations against the Commanding General, in which more than militia officers took part.²⁶

Apparently Prevost heard of the rumblings and faction forming against Sheaffe, for he reported to England in March that confidence in the President of Upper Canada had been restored.²⁷ Significantly, Prevost had received this impression from members of the legislature with whom Sheaffe was always on good terms.

Although he had succeeded to the presidency of the administration as soon as Brock died, it was not until 20 October that Sheaffe had time to go to York and take the oath of office.²⁸ Over the winter he was seldom occupied by administrative duties because he was concerned with the military defence of the colony and his own illness. Throughout January and February, Sheaffe was so ill that Brigadier General John Vincent was temporarily promoted to supersede him.²⁹ As soon as he recovered, Sheaffe summoned the legislature to meet on 25 February. This session implemented everything Sheaffe requested: controls over grain were instituted; an advance on annuities to widows, children and the disabled, was sanctioned; money was appropriated for defence and militia clothing; Lower Canada's army bills were authorized as currency, and finally the militia bill was altered.³⁰ Instead of the flank companies, the president was authorized to issue a bounty to volunteers serving for the duration of the war. It was expected that these regiments of incorporated militia would be more efficient than the flank companies had been.³¹ The legislature had felt that they could afford a bounty of only eight dollars, so Sheaffe added ten dollars from the military chest to be certain of enticing volunteers.³² Having accomplished his goals, Sheaffe prorogued the legislature on 13 March.

It is not surprising that Sheaffe's relationship with the legislature was cordial: at least two members of the Executive Council were close associates. According to a biography of William Dummer Powell, Powell had known Sheaffe from childhood and was Sheaffe's trusted adviser on problems relating to the administration. The other close ally was the new attorney general, John Beverley Robinson, who owed his appointment to Sheaffe.³³

It was fortunate that the duties of president were easily performed: the duties of commander were onerous because Sheaffe inherited poorly organized logistics departments. As one of the senior officers expressed it,

I pity much the General's situation with regard to the inefficient state of the Militia, the Barrack Department, and, I may add, even the Commissariat. These certainly are not the results of any fault in General S[heaffe], tho I plainly see he will have to bear the blame. I would feel sorry to attach blame to our late lamented commander,...but in justice to the living I own that the two former of these departments have from the commencement of the war been miserably defective, without any system or arrangement whatever, and I hesitate not to declare that the persons holding the ostensible positions never have been nor are they now possessed of the necessary information or energy to render them competent to a successful discharge of their several duties. These are not new or hasty observations, but such as have been intimated to poor General B[rock] and which, as Myers can vouch, now stands registered by me as not having been attended to. Indeed, my d[ear] Sir, it is a melancholy truth that everything that had for its object arrangement and method was obliged to be done by stealth. Poor General Brock's high spirit would never descend to particulars, trifles I may say in the abstract, but ultimately essentials.³⁴

The new Militia Act was Sheaffe's attempt to improve the Militia Department. He also suggested a way to relieve the Commissariat Department by transferring the militia accounts to the Receiver General.³⁵ Possibly more alterations would have been accomplished had Sheaffe not been so ill.

There is no written record of Sheaffe's own strategy for the conduct of the war. What can be deduced from his actions seems to be an agreement with Prevost's policy of only defensive measures in the hope that the Americans would either tire and withdraw or that Britain would extricate herself in Europe and send help so offensive measures could become feasible. Sheaffe's decision not to attack after the Battle of Queenston Heights and his retreat toward Kingston after the defeat at York indicate that he, too, believed in not over-extending the British lines and in pulling back toward Quebec City when it became necessary.

Sheaffe certainly followed this policy of caution at the Battle of York. When the American fleet appeared to the east of York in the evening of 26 April 1813, Sheaffe calmly made his preparations. calling the militia to the town, but judging correctly that the attack would not begin until the next day. The next morning he waited until it became apparent where the landing would occur before dispatching Major Givins and his Indians, two companies of the 8th or King's Regiment, a company of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment and a company of the Glengarry Light Infantry (which arrived too late), to resist the landing. Some historians have argued that since the fortifications of York were weak,³⁶ Sheaffe's only chance was to throw his whole force into resisting the landing.³⁷ This argument is particularly interesting when it is considered that the only troops Sheaffe did not order to the landing area were one company of the 8th Regiment, which he withheld in case the Americans tried to land some of their force at the other end of town: 13 men of the Royal Artillery who could not have dragged their guns through the bush, and the York militia. The myth of the value of the Canadian militia has already been exploded.³⁸ Considering the quick success of the American beachhead, it is difficult to conceive how these few extra troops would have made a significant difference.

Despite several rallies led by Sheaffe, the British troops began falling back upon the western battery, where the travelling magazine blew up, upsetting one of the guns and rendering this battery useless. The story was the same as the British kept retreating, trying to make a stand at various emplacements against the onslaught of American troops and the bombardment of the American ships. It became increasingly apparent that York could not be held.

A further stand by Sheaffe might have been quite heroic and in the finest tradition, but it would have been too costly and would have gained nothing. The die was cast for Sheaffe; he would retreat to Kingston and take with him those regulars still capable of performing the march.³⁹

Composed as usual, Sheaffe first ordered destroyed the ship on the stocks, the naval stores, and the grand magazine. The explosion of the magazine wreaked havoc on the American front lines, a circumstance that Sheaffe had not foreseen and one that he was unprepared to capitalize upon. Since Sheaffe was busy organizing the retreat and giving orders to militia officers to negotiate the surrender of the town, he was probably completely unaware of the possibility of a last-minute rally. Despite the opinion of Strachan and his friends.⁴⁰ a last-minute charge by the British would not have deterred the Americans; they outnumbered the British by approximately 2,000 to 600 men.

Although it is hard to imagine what other course of action Sheaffe could have taken, Prevost was dissatisfied. He claimed that Sheaffe had "lost the confidence of the province."⁴¹ This is surprising in view of the address of the Executive Council on 16 June 1813, thanking Sheaffe for his efforts in the administration of the province and for thwarting the objective of the enemy at York (the capture of the ship on the stocks).⁴² Nevertheless, Prevost replaced Sheaffe with Major General de Rottenburg. Sheaffe was ordered to take command of the troops in the Montreal district.⁴³

This appointment was not an onerous one. There was no fighting in this district, and in September Prevost superseded Sheaffe by establishing headquarters in Montreal.⁴⁴ Despite the inactivity on the frontier, Prevost was disappointed in Sheaffe.

When I ordered a senior General Officer to yourself from the Lower to the Upper Province in order to relieve you from the command of the latter, I made a sacrifice of my private feelings to my public Duty, and my own opinion yielded to the General clamour, — I then fully expected you would have pursued such a line of conduct in your new command as would have rendered manifest the inexpediency of the measure, instead of confirming the necessity of it by the indifference with which you discharge the important Duties now committed to you. The difficulties of my situation require the active support of every individual holding a place of trust, you will I hope not again disappoint my expectations as regards yourself.⁴⁵

Sheaffe was mystified: he could not conceive how Prevost had formed the opinion that he was indifferent. As he wrote to Prevost:

I know not on what grounds or information but I flatter myself that those who are best acquainted with me would expect any other charge than that of indifference in the discharge of my duties to be made against me; and I trust that a correct knowledge of my daily employment, and of the thoughts which occupy my mind, would convince Your Excellency that it is not justly imputable to me.⁴⁶

The problem was that Sheaffe did not elaborate: he did not tell Prevost how his time was spent, just as he had not fully explained why he had agreed to the extension of the three-day armistice after the Battle of Queenston Heights, or why retreat had been the only viable manoeuvre at York. Throughout his career, communicating plagued Sheaffe. If he had written for Prevost's sanction to the amendment of the armistice in the summer of 1812; or written for permission to renew the Queenston armistice; or explained to the officers at Fort Erie why it would be foolhardy to strengthen that post at the expense of the centre of their line, Prevost might not have had such a misconception, and the officers at Fort Erie might not have begun conspiring against him. Possibly if he had communicated better he would not have been transferred to England.

Orders were received for Sheaffe to return to England on 14 August 1813, but his departure was delayed until November.⁴⁷ The return to England was softened by the prospect of a better appointment. He did get appointed to the Army Staff of Great Britain on 25 March 1814 but the appointment was subsequently recalled and deferred. Sheaffe did not receive any more appointments but he did receive three promotions; lieutenant general on 19 July 1821, general on 28 June 1828, and colonel of the 36th Regiment on 21 December 1829.⁴⁸ The rest of his life was passed quietly at his seat of Edswale in the county of Clare. He died in Edinburgh on 17 July 1851.⁴⁹

Sheaffe contributed much to this country. He saved it from the Americans at Queenston, and when it was impossible to prevent them from gaining a foothold, he withdrew, holding intact his regulars to fight again. Overshadowed by his predecessor, who cut the more daring figure and who died having never lost a battle, Sheaffe is forgotten. He did not lead courageous charges, he did not waste lives, but he did defeat the enemy overwhelmingly and he did achieve the legislation he wanted. Had he been more explicit on the reasons for his actions and more demonstrative of his loyalty to Britain, he might have been more trusted. The efforts of quiet, unassuming men are often deprecated simply because they are unknown. Sheaffe was not a brilliant general but he was competent, and he deserves more attention in our history than he has received.