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Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History No. 11
by Carol Whitfield Sir Isaac BrockAs a number of biographies which adequately relate the events of Isaac Brock's life have been published, this report will merely summarize his early life and emphasize his career in British North America as a soldier and administrator of the government of Upper Canada. For more information on Brock's military exploits in England, the West Indies, Holland and Denmark, the reader is referred to The Life and Correspondence of Major General Sir Isaac Brock, by Ferdinand Brock Tupper. "The Hero of Upper Canada" has so seldom been looked at through eyes which were not misted with nationalistic tears that an accurate judgment of his career is difficult to ascertain. This report is an attempt to examine his faults as well as his genius. On 6 October 1769, a son was born to John Brock and his wife, Elizabeth Delisle Brock, in St. Peter's Port, Guernsey. Seven days later he was baptized Isaac. The eleventh of fourteen children, Isaac Brock could trace his parentage back to Sir Hugh Brock, defender of Guernsey in the 14th century and Sir John Delisle, its governor in 1405. The family belonged to the upper ranks of Guernsey society.1 Isaac's education began in Guernsey but at 11 years of age he was sent to Southampton for several years' schooling. A year in Rotterdam learning French from a French Protestant clergyman finished the boy's education. On 2 March 1785, Isaac purchased the commission of ensign in the 8th or King's Regiment, in which his oldest brother John held the rank of captain. Five years later he was a lieutenant in the same regiment, which was quartered in the Channel Islands at that time. His energy was soon displayed and promptly rewarded: for recruiting enough men to complete a company he was given its command.2 He soon left the 8th Regiment by availing himself of the opportunity of exchange by purchase into the 49th Regiment which, in 1791, was quartered in Barbados. In 1793 the regiment moved on to Jamaica, but Isaac was shortly forced to apply for sick leave and return to England. Here he utilized his earlier experience in recruiting for the benefit of the 49th, and was placed in charge of a group of recruits stationed in Jersey. Although he purchased his majority on 24 June 1795,3 he remained in charge of the recruits until the 49th returned to England the following year. Brock was fortunate for, throughout his career, promotions were achieved quickly. The senior lieutenant colonel of the 49th became involved in some deals of dubious legality and was forced to sell out or face a court martial. On 25 October 1797, Brock purchased the rank of lieutenant colonel. Unfortunately the regiment was badly disorganized and demoralized, but by the time it sailed for Holland on 26 August 1799, Brock had done much to repair morale and discipline. The Duke of York commented at the time that "out of one of the worst regiments in the service Colonel Brock had made the 49th one of the best."4
During the expedition against Holland under Sir Ralph Abercrombie, Brock first experienced battle. At Egmont-op-Zee or Bergen on 2 October, he distinguished himself but was almost killed: a thick scarf around his neck deflected the bullet.5 Brock's next battle experience was the attack on Copenhagen in April, 1801, under Lord Nelson. As second in command of the land forces, it was Brock's responsibility to attack the principal Treckoner or Crown Battery. The attack never became practical because the battery was not first silenced by the British navy, as had been planned.6 A year later the 49th sailed for Canada. Lieutenant Colonel Brock's division arrived at Quebec City on 20 August 1802. The second division of the regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Roger Hale Sheaffe arrived a month later, followed shortly by the last division under Captain Plenderleath.7 The regiment was soon ordered to Upper Canada, Brock commanding a group at York and Sheaffe in charge of the rest at Fort George. Here Brock faced the problem of all regiments quartered in sparsely settled country: desertion. The rigours of army life and the proximity of the border induced many to attempt escape. Early in 1803, six soldiers deserted from York but were apprehended by the prompt action of Brock, who followed them to Niagara in an open boat.8 A second desertion attempt was much more serious. Sheaffe, according to Brock,
These faults in Sheaffe's character led to discontent among the soldiers which erupted in a conspiracy to mutiny and desert in the summer of 1803. Fortunately Sheaffe became suspicious and sent for Brock, who arrived quietly and soon had the ringleaders under guard. Three of the would-be deserters were shot and eleven were transported to Barbados. It is claimed that Brock wept openly while reading the account of the execution to the troops. Certainly he was depressed at the thought of misguided men dying.10 Brock recommended that Sheaffe be left in charge at Fort George arguing that for him to be moved elsewhere would be not only humiliating but also detrimental to his position as an officer, and that he had learned from his near fatal mistakes. Nevertheless this wise counsel was ignored and Brock replaced Sheaffe at Fort George, moving to Quebec City the following year.11 In October, 1805, Brock became a full colonel and was granted leave to return to England.12 There he placed before the commander in chief a recommendation for a veteran battalion to serve in Upper Canada. This document shows how much the desertions had affected him, for he states,
To prevent further desertions, Colonel Brock recommended the formation of a veteran battalion consisting of retired soldiers. Their length of service in Upper Canada would be in inverse proportion to their length of service in the regular army; that is, a veteran of 25 years would serve 3 years in Canada while a veteran of less than 10 years would serve 10 years. Brock argued that these veterans would be staid, loyal, and unlikely to desert as, at the end of their service in Upper Canada, they would be given 200 acres of virgin land in the colony. An added inducement to the proposal would be the resultant group of loyal, trained settlers who would counteract those "known only as our enemies in the war of the rebellion," who had settled in Upper Canada but were not loyal to His Royal Highness. Brock would always be disturbed by this "great influx of bad men into the Country" which "must long be productive of serious evils to the army."14 Superficially Brock's proposal seemed excellent. However he failed to consider that men who had served 20 years or more in the army would not likely be fit to homestead or know anything about farming. Furthermore, those who served the least amount of time before being posted to Upper Canada, where they would have to serve 10 years, were the least likely to be loyal and might easily be induced to desert. Ten years might seem a long time to serve when just the Niagara River lay between you and freedom. The commander in chief, after thanking him, took Brock's proposal under consideration. Shortly afterwards, the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion, a unit organized on similar principles, was posted to British North America.
On 26 June 1806, Brock left England on board the Lady Saumarez.15 This was his last glimpse of his homeland and beloved brothers for, despite frequent pleas for leave of absence, his duties in British North America detained him until his death. Although only a colonel he became, upon his return, the senior military officer commanding in the colonies succeeding Colonel Bowes of the 6th Regiment.16 His zeal and activity in this new position of responsibility were phenomenal, leading him, however, into frequent quarrels with the administrators of Lower Canada. One of the first problems to attract the young colonel's attention was the dilapidated state of defences in his headquarters, Quebec. The city's fortifications had not received any attention since the administrations of Sir Guy Carleton and Sir Robert Prescott.17 Concerned by the hostile attitude of the United States in consequence of the Chesapeake affair,18 Brock began to give serious consideration to the defence of Lower Canada. Writing to Thomas Dunn, President Administering the Government of Lower Canada in the absence of the governor, Brock stated,
Brock's full confidence was not met. When he asked that 600 to 1,000 militia be embodied for a period of 6 weeks to 2 months and that he be supplied with a large number of carts, the Executive Council informed him that their power was limited to mobilizing a small proportion of the militia from the whole province. This power had been used only once previously and on that occasion some had failed to serve. They expected similar problems if the militia was again assembled. They further notified Brock that, under the Militia Act, the members of the embodied militia were entitled to the same pay and allowances as the regulars but that the civil government lacked the funds to pay them. The council also stated that in the past such funds had always been provided by the Commander of the Forces. In addition they wanted to know if the essential materials could be provided without encroaching upon private property.20 Brock took immediate offence at the information and question placed before him. He addressed Dunn on the subject.
Brock did recover from his displeasure sufficiently to suggest that he expected most of the militia would willingly come to his assistance in an emergency.22 At a subsequent meeting the Executive Council sought to reassure Brock that they had not meant to imply that the whole militia would refuse to serve but that some "defaulters" might be found.23 The problem of Quebec's defences was not yet solved. The Executive Council next proposed to Colonel Brock that he make use of the means employed previously to repair the fortifications, "employing the regular Troops together with hired Artificers and Labourers." The council also noted that Brock had failed to comment upon the most important issue: Who was to pay for the repairs? Dunn claimed that the funds of the provincial treasury were insufficient to meet ordinary expenses.24 At this time the argument with the Executive Council on the repairs to the citadel was dropped, and all subsequent correspondence with that body related solely to embodying the militia if the colony was invaded. Late in August the militia was mobilized with very few dissenters. Previously Colonel Brock had agreed to supply arms for any number, up to 5,000 men, who were assembled and instructed.25 Brock later used British army resources to improve the defences of Quebec City. A large battery of eight 36-pounders was raised in the centre of the citadel where it could command the opposite heights.26 The fortifications of Quebec City were not the only issue upon which the commanding officer clashed with the civil administration. They also disagreed about paying the Indian Department and the use of the Jesuits' Gardens. The problem with the Indian Department accounts arose because the department's expenses were paid by the army, although it was under the "sole Control of the Person exercising the Government of the Province." Brock, in accordance with what he understood to be the instructions from England, wished the accounts to be transferred to the civil administration, knowing that eventually the army would pay them, since the civil deficit was defrayed from the army extraordinaries. Transferring the account would simplify the bookkeeping and prevent mistakes. Brock had become aware of the unwieldy situation when it was discovered that one account of long standing was still being paid while the civil administration was under the impression it had been closed. Disagreement also arose over hiring of batteaux and the paying of Indian crews.27 The new system as initiated by Brock was simpler, but he failed to realize that the instructions he was following applied only to Upper Canada. Thomas Dunn, however, did note this fact, and was unwilling to make any changes. Writing to England, Dunn said he hoped that Brock "began to be aware of the Labyrinth into which he had got and of the probable ill consequences of suddenly overturning a System which a late Commander in Chief (Lord Dorchester) had been so many years in bringing to perfection and which the Secretary of State had so positively ordered to be continued."28 A student of human nature such as Brock claimed to be29 should have been aware that an obsequious man like Dunn, in a temporary situation, would oppose all innovations. In a letter to England Dunn described himself and his position.
Brock had certainly misjudged the man to whom he proposed a number of changes. Since he was forced to withdraw gradually his instructions to the paymaster general's department and revert to the old system, Brock lost this round; however, it is an example of his continuing fight to simplify army bookkeeping. He was always most insistent that a proper warrant be presented before funds were issued. It was Brock who noticed the missing £36,350 in the accounts of the deputy commissary general. Further examination revealed that one account had not been audited since 1788 and another since 1796.31 The third issue that arose between President Dunn and Colonel Brock was the use of the property of the Jesuits, which was adjacent to the military barracks. The property was under the supervision of a board of commissioners which was to decide how to appropriate the estates now that the last of the order had died. Colonel Brock, acting on Dunn's verbal assurance that he would not interfere, had appropriated the extensive property for a parade ground, the original military parade ground being too small.32 The commissioners, however, were only willing to allow Brock temporary use of a small area of the total gardens. This drew from Brock an unwarranted and tactless comment upon the commissioners to the effect that
This thoughtless remark inflamed the issue and was a direct cause of Dunn submitting the substantial correspondence on the subject to the Colonial Office for mediation. Brock later tried to claim that he had not intended to suggest that some of the commissioners were hoping to acquire wealth as a result of their position, but the purport of the remark is unmistakable. In addition, he had the gall to accuse Dunn of addressing him in a "novel and ungracious manner."34 Eventually sanction came from England for the army to use the Jesuits' Gardens.35 Meanwhile the extensive correspondence revealed two facts about Brock: his concern for the welfare of his troops and his disdain for the civil administration.
Brock was known for his attention to the welfare of the soldiers under his command, even when they were confined to jail. In the summer of 1803, Brock ordered a court martial held for two soldiers who had been imprisoned for some time. He further requested the court not to inflict the sentence, claiming that the men had already served their time. A year later, worried that two prisoners were not getting sufficient air and exercise, he converted a larger building into a jail.36 Perhaps it was fortunate that the new governor general and commander in chief, Sir James Craig, arrived in the fall of 1807, superseding Brock as senior officer commanding and relieving Brock from contact with the civil administration. He did not have any more business with civilians in authority until a year before his death, when he assumed the position of president administering the government of Upper Canada. Meanwhile there were compensations for being relieved of the command of the troops. Sir James Craig appointed him brigadier general: an appointment which was confirmed as of 2 June 1808. He was also transferred to Montreal.37 The next few years were very frustrating ones for Brock. An ambitious man, he felt he was wasting away while promotions were being earned on the battlefields of Europe. A letter to his brothers expressed his feelings.
Brock's desire to return to England became much more urgent in the fall of 1811. Financial problems had beset his brothers and he was impatient to know what was happening and what he could do to alleviate the poverty and heal the dissension. His brother William was co-owner of a London bank in which Irving, another brother, was employed. The bank was forced to declare bankruptcy due to the losses resulting from a number of vessels having been captured on the Baltic Sea.39 The bankruptcy of one brother affected the rest of the family. Irving, left poor and unemployed, blamed William. Savery Brock also lost money in the bank's collapse. Most important, however, was the financial dependence of the whole family upon William. Isaac had been given the money to purchase his commissions by William. Although William had no intention of ever collecting these gifts, it was entered upon the firm's books that Isaac Brock had received loans totalling more than £3,000. Part of Isaac's distress was undoubtedly due to the worry about whether or not he would be compelled to sell his commission to repay the loan. Apparently the bank's creditors decided not to collect this debt since Isaac heard no more about it. Upon learning of the family disaster, Brock disguised his personal apprehensions when he wrote:
The offer to retrench his own expenses that he might share his salaries clearly shows Brock's devotion to his family. Later, after his victory at Detroit he wrote that he hoped to be able to contribute more to their physical comfort from his share of the prize money.41 Given these feelings, his impatience at being separated from his family is understandable. Meanwhile Brock had been transferred twice: from Montreal to Quebec in 1808 and then to Upper Canada in 1810. Here life was unbearably dull. He utilized some of the time to visit Detroit, acquiring, no doubt, some information which was useful two years later. The rest of his time was spent reading — mostly military history.42 His complaints to his brothers about boredom and the absence of any congratulatory messages discredits the contention of many secondary sources that, at this period, Isaac became engaged to Sophia Shaw, daughter of General Aeneas Shaw. The story of their last meeting, as he galloped to Queenston on 13 October 1812,43 is so touching that it might well have been created to add the final touch to the Brock myth. His enforced inactivity in these years — shown by the lack of information about his activities other than his own references to boredom and reading — must have increased his desire for European service. Sir James Craig was unwilling to transfer Brock when he was himself on the verge of returning to England because of ill health. In compensation, Craig sent Brock his own horse, Alfred.44 Finally in January of 1812, permission to return to England was granted, but Brock turned it down because
The "high ostensible position" Brock referred to was two appointments. By 18 June 1811, he was a major general on the staff of North America, a promotion which must have partially compensated for not being transferred to the more active European theatre. The second appointment, although just as important, was achieved by default. Francis Gore, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, returned to England on leave so Brock, as commanding military officer, assumed the presidency of the civil administration of Upper Canada on 9 October 1811.46 The appointment facilitated decision-making, especially once war was declared. Here in one person were combined the responsibilities for both the military and civil administration of the province. The approval and support of the lieutenant governor for proposals to the legislature to assist the defence of the province was no longer necessary. One intermediary was removed. Nevertheless Brock had problems. The first arose out of this very union of roles. Questions relating to courts martial illustrate the confusion. As president, Brock's powers over courts martial of the militia included calling them and inflicting, if necessary, the death sentence. As commanding officer, however, his powers were limited to convening courts martial of regular soldiers. Brock appealed to Prevost for advice on how to handle this discrepancy in powers: Prevost signed a warrant increasing Brock's military powers. Isaac also wanted to know whether or not militia officers could sit with regular officers upon courts martial. If they could not, declaring martial law was useless: there were so few regular commissioned officers in Upper Canada that convening a court martial with them alone would be impossible.47 Some of Brock's other problems related to his attitude toward civil administration and Upper Canadians. Brock had learned how to handle civilians since the imbroglio of 1807. There were no tactless comments this time about the character of the persons with whom he was working. His derogatory remarks he expressed only in private letters to Sir George Prevost. Addressing the Legislative Council for the first time on 3 February 1812, Brock referred to "a loyal and brave band of veterans" and "the loyal and virtuous inhabitants of this happy land." Similarly, speaking to the House of Assembly, he said, "I doubt not but that you will cheerfully lend your aid." However, writing to Prevost about the same time, Brock worried about "the many doubtful characters in the Militia"; and writing of a subsequent assembly he feared, "nothing material will be done." Brock was worried about "The great influence which the vast number of Settlers from the United States possess over the decisions of the Lower House." Having expressed his distrust of most Upper Canadians, Brock went on to attack the original inhabitants. Referring to the Indians he said, "They may serve to intimidate, otherwise expect no essential services from this degenerate race."48 The important factor was that Brock hid his opinions from the people. The general order he issued from Detroit praises the militia.
The evident disparity between Brock's public statements and private sentiments indicates that he had learned not to alienate the civilians and their administration. He deserves credit for this, considering the prevailing unenthusiastic response of Upper Canadians to the war. Brock commented upon this attitude in a letter to a friend in Montreal.
Brock did, however, become involved in one squabble as a result of his position as president of Upper Canada. Fortunately the person with whom he quarrelled resided in Quebec City. Brock decided to ignore the bishop of Quebec's nominee for the Anglican Benefice of York. Instead he wrote Bishop Mountain recommending Doctor Strachan for the position. The quarrel arose because he offered the position to Strachan before seeking the bishop's approval. When the bishop replied to Brock, noting that the request for his approval was obviously an afterthought, Brock was insulted. The bishop then felt compelled to apologize for all unintentional "insinuations."51 The incident shows that Brock, still unaccustomed to having his decisions questioned, was unwilling to consult with anyone except his military superior. Since Brock had learned not to express his thoughts when speaking to civilians, it could be expected that his relations with the Upper Canadian assembly would be amicable and fruitful. Such, however, was not the case. When he addressed the first meeting of the legislature held under his auspices on 3 February 1812, Brock drew their attention to the militant attitude of the United States and asked them to consider a new militia law providing for the formation of militia flank companies. He also asked for an act to suspend habeas corpus.52 The militia bill which did pass was, according to Brock, so changed "as to defeat very materially my views." The Oath of Adjuration, which Brock had considered one of the most essential clauses to ensure the loyalty of the recent immigrants from the United States, was deleted, and the bill was to last only until the end of the next session of the legislature. The bill for the suspension of habeas corpus was also defeated.53 Since he had failed to achieve his aims from this session, Brock called another meeting after war had been declared. Of the House which assembled on 27 July, Brock wrote, "A more decent House has not been elected since the formation of the province — but I perceived at once that I shall get no good of them." He again desired an improved militia act, sanction of the legislature for the declaration of partial martial law, and extra finances.54 The legislature was prorogued on 3 August because,
Meanwhile, of course, Brock was concerned with the military defence of the colony. Early in December, 1811, Brock wrote to Prevost stating his ideas about the strategy they should follow in the event of war. Brock believed that Amherstburg was the key: from here offensive operations could be launched which would hold the Americans in check and keep them on the defensive from Niagara west. The Indians would be essential to assist the British in this area but their help could not be depended upon until the British had captured Detroit and Michilimackinac. Pointing out the vital situation of Kingston, Brock advised stationing a large force of regulars and Glengarry militia there. The depleted state of the Provincial Marine drew his attention and he recommended buying and renting as many vessels as possible and building gun boats. He also wanted the Car Brigade completed for service by the addition of horses, drivers and gunners.56 Prevost, however, cautioned against initiating offensive measures and worried about controlling the actions of Indians fighting for the British.57 There was a basic difference in the strategy of the two men. Brock wanted to hold on to Upper Canada by offensive action: Prevost wanted to fight defensively, retaining Upper Canada as long as possible and then fighting a rear-guard action as the forces retreated to Quebec, the only defensible position in British North America. Holed up in the citadel, the British forces would wait until Britain, having defeated Napoleon Bonaparte, could send aid. Then they would go on the offensive and recover Upper Canada. Brock, however, seemed to ignore Britain's struggle in Europe.
Brock himself seemed aware of the precarious situation he was in when he wrote to his brother that "if I should be beaten the province is inevitably gone, and should I be victorious I do not imagine the gentry from the other side will be anxious to return to the charge."59 Nevertheless Brock persisted in his opinion that the only way to defend British North America was to go on the offensive. Some of Brock's suggestions for the defence of Upper Canada were very wise; improving the Car Brigade and Provincial Marine was essential; however, he seems to have overrated the value of the Indians in Upper Canada. Militarily they were of dubious value, although they did have a psychological value which cannot be measured.60 Despite the weaknesses pointed out by his superior, Brock set about implementing his strategy once war was declared. He learned of the declaration of war on 25 June and on the 26th, following his first inclination, ordered the detachment at Fort St. Joseph to attack Michilimackinac. The next day, remembering Prevost's instructions, he rescinded the order, but the following day he wrote leaving the decision to the discretion of the commander. Prevost, meanwhile, was ordering the commander at St. Joseph, Roberts, to be cautious in defending his position.61 The confused Roberts decided to protect himself by occupying a more defensible position, Michilimackinac. On 17 July the British, assisted by some Indians, occupied Michilimackinac. Brock did not have an opportunity to personally implement his strategy until the attack on Detroit. Obeying Prevost's injunctions, Brock did not move against Detroit immediately after war was declared. Instead he waited until Canada was invaded by Brigadier General Hull. As soon as he had prorogued the legislature, Brock hurried to the Detroit front, to discover that Hull had retreated to Detroit. Here Brock faced a dilemma: captured letters revealed that Hull was scared and that his force lacked confidence in him, but Prevost had ordered Brock not to go on the offensive. He decided to attack. Early on 16 August, his forces crossed the Detroit River and Brock personally led the men in an attack on the fort across an open plain, despite pleas that he not expose himself to the enemy fire. Luckily he had judged the disposition of his opponent correctly: Hull surrendered without firing a shot. Had he, however, opened fire, the British line could easily have been cut down. Brash tactics worked on this occasion, winning not only a strategic position and a moral victory, but also a medal and knighthood of the Order of the Bath for the British commander.62 Having secured Detroit and having placated the people of the territory of Michigan by not changing the laws, Brock hurried back to Fort George.63 Here he faced a difficult problem: how to allocate the scant forces under his command to protect the whole of the Niagara frontier.
Brock's disposition of troops was wise if the Americans attacked in only one location; the adjacent troops could converge to hold any threatened point until the whole British force had reached the battle site. However, if the Americans made a two-pronged attack, the British line would probably give way. The animosity between the two American commanders, Van Rensselaer and Smyth, fortunately caused plans for a double attack to be cancelled. Van Rensselaer decided to attack only Queenston. Brock's disposition of troops held until reinforcements arrived. If Van Rensselaer had been better organized and pushed across more men and artillery, the British line might conceivably have been broken. On learning of the invasion, Brock hastened to Queenston where he proceeded to the redan battery, an excellent location from which to view the battle. Unfortunately a group of Americans led by Wool charged down the heights and forced the British to flee the redan. Brock realized that recovering the redan would be easier if accomplished before reinforcements reached Wool. Accordingly he gathered a small force, which he led in a direct charge up the escarpment, a brave but ill-considered manoeuvre quickly halted by Brock's death. He had chosen the most direct but the most risky way to dislodge the Americans. Fortunately Brock's successor, Sheaffe, chose a flanking movement and drove the Americans off the escarpment. Three days later, Major General Isaac Brock and his provincial aide-de-camp, John Macdonell, were buried with all due military pomp and ceremony. Then began the outpourings of grief. Even the Americans honoured their brave opponent with a gun salute during the funeral. The Upper Canadian House of Assembly requested His Royal Highness to grant crown waste lands to Brock's brothers as a mark of their respect.65 Brock's quick victories at Michilimackinac and Detroit followed by his sudden demise united the Upper Canadians behind the war effort. He had shown them that Britain did not intend to desert the province and that they could defeat the Americans. People began to forget his faults, remembering only the man who had shown them that victories were possible. Thus began the legend that would call Isaac Brock the "Hero, Defender and Saviour of Upper Canada."66 The king's ministers summed up the prevailing attitude when they wrote Prevost that
Everyone forgot Brock's inability to collaborate with civilians and the flaws in strategic planning were overlooked in the man who united the people he distrusted. His achievements were recognized in a medal, struck in 1816 to honour "Sir Isaac Brock, the hero of Upper Canada,"68 and in the monument erected at Queenston to his memory.
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