The Role of Fort Chambly in the Development of New France, 1665-1760
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Cyrille Gélinas

Studies in Archaeology
Architecture and History

National Historic Parks and Sites Branch
Parks Canada
Environment Canada
1983
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SUMMARY

In this study of Fort Chambly the main purpose was not to add to the fund of knowledge on the military history of New France or the Richelieu Valley, but rather to shed new light on the reasons for the tenacious presence of the French military in the Richelieu region. The construction of five forts by the Carignan regiment along the Richelieu River in 1665-66 was not the result of an administrative caprice. Nor was the hostility of the Iroquois which gave rise to this decision an inexplicable phenomenon; neither was it the manifestation of an obscure, cruel, and bloodthirsty instinct inherent in this people. Reasons also existed for the French-English wars, those odious manifestations of imperialism on foreign soil. From 1665 to 1760 Fort Chambly underwent many profound changes. Nevertheless it survived throughout this period and far beyond, even though at times it was ill-suited to the various roles assigned to it. This phenomenon was of primary interest. I would have liked to shed greater light on the soldiers who formed the garrisons of Fort Chambly and acted out its history in their daily lives, but unfortunately little is known of them. The sources drawn on in conducting this study did not permit greater detail. But in a future study on the military presence in the Richelieu Valley, more detailed attention will be given to the soldiers. Recently undertaken research into notarial and judicial records has yielded more ample material and will allow for a more thorough analysis.
THE RICHELIEU VALLEY: GEOGRAPHIC SETTING

In selecting the promontory of Quebec as the site for a permanent settlement in 1608, Champlain made a wise choice. In addition to serving as a convenient trading point, Quebec offered its first European inhabitants major natural defences and a highly satisfactory vantage point for controlling the St Lawrence. This great waterway, flowing from its source in the distant "inland sea," was destined to play a vital role throughout Canadian history. On either side of this artery lay a vast and complex river system, its many branches giving "rapid" access to far-distant regions. This geographic context explains in part the rapid extension of New France over such a vast portion of North America. It also helps to explain the ability of a handful of Canadians to hold out against the English colonies, with their overwhelming numerical advantage. Because they could travel more quickly than their adversaries, the Canadians were generally able to take them by surprise and, in turn, to react more promptly to enemy initiatives. This phenomenon could be observed throughout the French period, during which almost all the troops travelled from the Richelieu to Quebec or vice versa to counter an imminent offensive.

The St Lawrence drainage basin, while serving the Canadians so well, also exposed the colony to the dangers of invasion. To be sure, the waterways enabled the Canadians to spread rapidly across the continent and to attack regularly the English outposts to the south and west; but in return, nothing prevented the English from using the same route in an effort to reduce the enterprising and troublesome French colony to the north. Thus arose the problem of protecting the territory.

Confined to a narrow strip of land along the Atlantic seaboard, the English colonies stretched from north to south, wedged between the ocean and the Appalachians; the latter mountain chain considerably inhibited overland communications between the colonies to the south and New France, further to the north.

As if to give support to the relief, the vast, dense forests of North America also served to inhibit overland movement, or at least to deter the great majority of the people who lived in that period from undertaking it. To make their way through this land of forests and mountains, travellers had to use the only routes open to them, the watercourses that threaded their way through and around these obstacles and their many tributaries reaching into the most remote regions of the continent.

In its efforts to defend such a vast territory, the French colony could count on geography to make up for numerical disadvantage. With nature preventing access to the frontier, the French colonial leaders had only to fortify the main invasion routes to enjoy relative security. New France, whose primary territory was limited to the St Lawrence Valley, the most vital region, had to deal with several routes of penetration converging on this heartland, including three that were particularly well travelled. To the east, the St Lawrence offered Atlantic traffic coming in via the Gulf a route that was both wide and easily accessible (assuming a certain knowledge of the river) into the heart of the continent. To the west, numerous waterways extended to the Great Lakes. From there one could embark on the St Lawrence, which originated there, travel downstream to Montreal without difficulty, and move throughout the colony. To the south the axis formed by the Hudson River, Lake Champlain, and the Richelieu River, whose waters flowed into Lac St-Pierre upstream from Trois-Rivières, constituted the major natural pathway linking New France with the English colonies, with Montreal and New York situated more or less at either end of this great water highway. And it was on the banks of the Richelieu River that Fort Chambly was built.

There are two other routes running north-south, but the difficulty of using them deterred voyageurs and war parties alike. The first followed the Connecticut River along its channel between the Green Mountains and the White Mountains. Via a series of lakes and portages, the voyageur could reach the Rivière St-François, which emptied into Lac St-Pierre. This long and difficult route, with its numerous portages, held little attraction for voyageurs of the period. It was, however, the route taken by Joseph-François Hertel de la Fresnière, who left Trois-Rivières on 8 January 1690 at the head of a force of 25 Frenchmen and as many Indians on a mission to destroy Salmon Falls, one of three New England frontier villages to suffer this fate that winter. But this was a winter expedition which only the Canadians dared to attempt, and which obviously entailed enormous risks.
New France did not have to cope with such attacks by its enemies, owing to the excessive difficulties posed by such winter expeditions. Finally, the route extending along the Kennebec and Chaudière rivers entailed as many disadvantages as the preceding. One of the three expeditions mounted by Frontenac in 1690 used this route successfully.\(^4\)

To block the path of invaders, the Canadians were faced with the necessity of fortifying these passages into their territory. To the east, Louisbourg served this purpose admirably, barring access to the St Lawrence by obstructing its mouth and preventing penetration of the continent. To the west, a series of forts had been constructed at various points throughout the immense territory bordering on the Great Lakes. However, in this part of the continent the forts did not serve exclusively to hinder the movement of enemies or "pacify" (in other words, subjugate) a territory. They were used primarily as trading posts. Solidly implanted among tribes that supplied furs, these French outposts saw their primary mission as preventing the Indians from selling their pelts to the English.

The absence of fortifications along the Chaudière and St-François rivers should not surprise us. I have mentioned above the many difficulties that these two passages posed -
difficulties which in themselves afforded adequate protection. For a European army, access to these rivers was not easy and the danger was great. The many rapids, entailing numerous portages, and the necessity of crossing a series of lakes to get from the Kennebec River to the Chaudière or from the Connecticut River to the St-François exhausted the soldiers and slowed their progress. Because of the slowness of movement the troops were obliged to carry additional provisions to counter the ever-present risk of starvation in the wilderness, which would decimate the expedition more surely than any adversary. The burden of additional provisions increased the soldiers' fatigue and further slowed their movement. A lightly equipped expedition prepared to wage war Indian-style could, despite an excess of fatigue and a shortage of time, overcome these obstacles, as the absence of heavy materiel made it possible to move more quickly. In addition, a small group of men could count on hunting and fishing, and accordingly reduce the weight of the baggage that each member of the expedition had to carry. As Champlain tells us, this was how the Indians travelled.

[...] When they form a war party, they divide their men into three groups: one to scatter and hunt; another to constitute the main force, with weapons in hand; and the third to serve as scouts, searching along streams for any sign that their enemies or allies have passed that way. [...] The hunters never hunt in front of the main force or the scouts, so as not to sound the alarm or cause confusion, but rather stay behind or to the sides, so as not to alert their enemies; they continue in this manner until they are within two or three days of their enemies, when they begin travelling under cover of night, as a body, except for the scouts, withdrawing into the depth of the woods by day, neither wandering away from the main party nor making noise nor building fires, so as not to be perceived, should their enemies pass. This also applies to their eating habits: they start fires only if they want to smoke, and these are almost negligible. They make a kind of gruel from cooked cornmeal mixed with water. This meal is used only when necessary, and when they are near their enemies, or when they are withdrawing following an attack, at which time they prefer not to take time to hunt, but rather to withdraw speedily.³

Although this procedure was appropriate for a small party, it was impractical for a large fighting force. A wide swath of territory for hunting and considerable time would be required to feed an entire army in such a manner. Thus, it was better not to count on such an approach. These obstacles, too difficult to surmount, usually discouraged anyone considering making such an expedition. Arnold, who ventured to do so in 1775, was to learn a harsh lesson. It was only at the price of great suffering and the loss of part of his army that he finally reached Quebec. Because the English and even the Iroquois rarely travelled these rivers, it was considered unnecessary to line them with defences and thus put additional strain on colonial finances, which were continually exceeding limits.

Clearly, then, Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River constituted the superior invasion route - the one which was most convenient and best situated for an operation to conquer the French colony or to mount an invasion in the opposite direction. Flowing out of Lake Champlain, the Richelieu runs its entire course on what was to become Canadian territory and covers a distance of 75 miles (1 mile = 1.609 km) between Lac St-Pierre and Lake Champlain. As a whole, the system covers a distance of 210 miles. Lake Champlain alone is more than 107 miles long and about 12 miles wide at its widest point. As regards the river itself, it is easily navigable except for the rapids that extend from St-Jean to Chambly. Although there is only a 1-foot (1 foot = 0.3048 m) drop between the border and St-Jean, the change in elevation increases sharply thereafter, reaching 6 feet per mile. Then, from Chambly to Sorel, the river is fairly placid, but too shallow to allow larger boats to pass in the summer and fall. In the spring, high waters make navigation easy.⁶ Very early it became clear that it would be necessary to fortify this highly travelled water highway. As early as 1642 a wooden fort was erected at the mouth of the Richelieu to protect against raids by the Iroquois. By 1666 no less than five forts guarded the river. These forts fulfilled several functions. They were used in both defence and attacks, their role varying with the situation. The form of these forts and the materials used in them also varied with the needs of the moment. Wooden fortifications such as those constructed on the
Richelieu River, while effective against the Indians, proved to be an inadequate defence against cannons. It was for this reason that Fort Chambly was reconstructed in stone in 1709. The siting might also vary. Although site selection sometimes showed evidence of considerable foresight, only experience could correctly determine the ideal location for a fort. For example, it quickly became clear that because it was situated on Ile La Motte at the entrance to Lake Champlain, Fort Ste-Anne was totally ineffective. Only a few years after its construction the fort was abandoned. Only few years after its construction the fort was abandoned. The forts along the Richelieu together formed an indissoluble whole, a defence system in which each part, like a link in a chain, served to support its neighbor. Each fort fulfilled a highly specific function that varied with the circumstances. It is not possible to understand fully the history of one without relating it to the others.

The need to resupply such a great number of forts dispersed over such a vast territory caused the colonial authorities serious problems. To do so adequately, it was necessary to mobilize an army of voyageurs. This was time consuming and very costly, and it deprived the army of its best elements (militiamen). To circumvent this difficulty, the authorities tried to establish a road system in the Richelieu Valley so as to accelerate the resupplying of the most advanced forts and thus support the river traffic. The presence of rapids compelled travellers to undergo exhausting portages and caused serious delays in the delivery of supplies. Under these circumstances, roads could be or actually were highly advantageous. On the whole, the Canadians were able to use the rivers to their advantage - even in winter, when they used the frozen surface for transporting heavy objects such as cannons. And the notorious winter raids were carried out by way of frozen rivers. But this phenomenon had its negative side, as Steele explains:

There was only one way in which nature was unkind toward the defences of Canada. On both the St Lawrence, which contributed so much to the mobility of the Canadians, and the Hudson - Lake Champlain - Richelieu waterways, there were several weeks between the breakup of ice for American forces moving northward and the clearing of the ice from the waters flowing through the heart of New France, which permitted Canadian movement south and west from Montreal.

A glance at a geographical map reveals the size and scope of the watershed of this valley, which appears as an extension of the Montreal plain. At a given point, Montreal can be reached from the river by way of fields or the numerous seigneuries of the region (Boucherville, La Prairie, Verchères, etc). Overland movement in this part of the colony was perhaps not as difficult as elsewhere. Moreover, many of the tributaries of the Richelieu could accommodate light craft and facilitate the task of those wishing to circumvent points known to be under surveillance. Because the Canadians had no means of controlling all waterways, or even the major ones, the Iroquois made ample use of this technique.
THE GENERAL CLIMATE BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE CARIGNAN-SALIÈRES REGIMENT

The Arrival of the Europeans

When they established their settlement at Quebec, the French noted a fierce rivalry among some of the Indian nations. Along the St Lawrence, the Montagnais and the Algonquins, who occupied adjoining territories, maintained peaceful relations. They had regular contact with the Hurons, whose territory ran along the shores of Georgian Bay on the Great Lakes, the Attikamegas of the upper St-Maurice, and the Malecites and Micmacs on the Atlantic coast. All these nations, the first three in particular, regularly joined forces to combat the Iroquois, their traditional enemies, who lived to the south of Lake Ontario. Divided into five tribes, the latter formed an alliance known as the League of the Five Nations. Little is known of the origin of this conflict, which with the arrival of the Europeans assumed much greater dimensions than in previous times, when wars tended to be the doing of a few individuals rather than a whole people.

In establishing themselves at Quebec the French hoped to draw a heightened volume of fur trade to their entrepôts. To attain this objective they had to create solid bonds of friendship with the natives, a task to which Champlain began applying himself upon his arrival. To ensure their loyalty Champlain felt obliged to show tangible evidence of his commitment to them. The opportunity to do so was not long in coming. The tribes occupying the territories to the north of the St Lawrence, the Montagnais and the Algonquins, very early sought the support of the French in their wars against the Iroquois. Champlain could not refuse if he wanted these tribes to deal regularly with the French trading posts. Therefore he decided to accompany them in their wars. It was thus that Champlain and 11 of his companions set out on 28 June 1609 with a group of Montagnais, Algonquins, and Hurons to reach the Iroquois territories. This was the first voyage by Europeans up the "River of the Iroquois." Having reached the foot of the rapids that were later to be known by the name of Chambly, Champlain did not fail to leave us this description of the place:

The entrance to the rapids is a sort of lake, where the water drops. It is some three leagues in circumference, and there are several meadows where no savages live, as a result of wars. There is little water in the rapids, which flow very swiftly, and a great many boulders and rocks, such that the savages cannot travel up them by water; but on the return voyage, they descend them with ease. All this country is highly uniform, filled with forests, vines and nut trees. No Christians had ever reached this spot before us and we ourselves found it difficult to row up the river.

On 14 July they reached Lake Champlain. Two weeks later, on 29 July, they encountered the Iroquois at the southern end of the lake. It was here that the first confrontation between the French and the Iroquois took place—a confrontation that was to have serious consequences. The superiority of European weapons enabled the French and their allies to win the battle in fairly short order. But they were not destined to enjoy this technological superiority for very long. Several weeks later, Henry Hudson, sailing on the Half Moon, ascended the river that was to bear his name and stopped at the place which was to be named Orange and later Albany. By way of the trading post that the Dutch established several years later, the Iroquois would be able to narrow the technological gap that put them at such a distinct disadvantage in relation to the French. But that time had not yet come, and for the moment the prestige of the French was raised a notch in the eyes of their native allies. The return trip was made without incident. The forces separated at the Chambly rapids, and Champlain headed back to Quebec.

The following year a second skirmish breathed new life into the still-smouldering embers of the previous confrontation. This second clash took place near the mouth of the Richelieu. It ended in another victory for the Laurentian alliance. Five years later Champlain deepened his involvement by once again accompanying his allies in an expedition of war, this time in the west, probably among the Oneidas and Onondagas.

The Disorganization of the Indians' World

These three interventions were to change profoundly the "New World." In the fur trade
Europeans saw the potential for a new Cathay. Lured by the prospect of fortunes to be made quickly, they showed no reluctance to interfere in the affairs of the natives. And the Indians' great desire to obtain European products gradually made them totally dependent on the whites. The objects that they obtained in exchange for their furs were ones they were incapable of making for themselves. The result was a process of acculturation that has been well described by André Vachon. It became vital for the Indians to acquire these products, which gave them technological superiority over neighboring peoples, increased their bartering power, and in many cases eased the harshness of the times. Thus, those who possessed furs or were able to obtain them would be able to enter the world of trade in which the Hurons occupied a key position. Because the trade routes all converged in Huronia, the latter were able to intercept all furs from the peoples of the west and the northwest, where the highest quality pelts originated, and to serve as middlemen in dealings between these peoples and the French. Themselves bold travellers, they did not hesitate to undertake long and difficult voyages that led them to Lac St-Jean by way of the upper St-Maurice and even toward the far-off Hudson Bay. They also controlled the
vast territories bordering on the Great Lakes. They even reached the lands of the Illinois and the Sioux.

The Hurons themselves did little hunting. A sedentary or rather semi-nomadic people, they lived mainly on farming. They traded their agricultural products with nomadic peoples who lived entirely on hunting. The Hurons were long opposed to all contact between the French and the tribes of the north and the northwest, fearing that they would lose their lucrative role as middlemen.

The Iroquois, another semi-sedentary people, with blood ties with the Hurons, also practised agriculture. The dearth of furs in their territory threatened to exclude them definitively from the trade circuit, for fur was the very basis of trade. Lacking it, "they seemed destined to look on helplessly as the Hurons grew wealthier." In a world that was coming to rely increasingly on European technology, they were obliged to participate in this trade to survive and avoid being subjugated by their neighbors. Unfortunately for them the Europeans were unwilling to accept their agricultural produce or their earthenware in trade. Before the arrival of the whites there had existed a trade equilibrium in which all the tribes had had their place. Now that all trade was centered on the European trading posts and everything had to be paid for in pelts, this equilibrium had vanished. Because the Hurons blocked their way to the northwest and the west, fertile fur territories, the Iroquois found it difficult to sell their products. Thus cornered, they had to react quickly. They needed new hunting grounds and made an all-out effort to appropriate those of their neighbors. If they succeeded they would be able to take their furs to the Dutch, who had recently established settlements in what is now the state of New York, in proximity to their own territory. Using European weapons they increased their striking power and were able to mount more successful attacks on the French, who threatened to play the role of spoilsports in this conflict. Assured of a lucrative market, the Iroquois set out to destroy systematically the peoples who stood in their way. Thus "the long and bloody wars of the Iroquois began somewhere west of Fort Orange."

The war that began at that point was to be of a different order from those that had preceded it. In the past a few individuals, wishing to avenge the death of a relative or acting for other personal reasons, assembled a war party and set out for enemy territory. It was a family undertaking, with no larger dimension. After the arrival of the Europeans, war became a matter of survival as a nation. It took on proportions that were probably until then unknown in North America, and several nations drawn into the conflict vanished one after another in the space of a few years.

This long explanation of the division which took place upon the arrival of the Europeans was necessary to situate clearly the antagonists and bring out the reasons for their hostility. To be sure, it would also be useful to know the origins of intertribal rivalries reaching far back into time, but this knowledge is for the moment beyond our scope.
THE CARIGNAN REGIMENT AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FORTS ON THE RICHELIEU

The Tragic Years

In 1632 the French returned to the St Lawrence Valley, from which they had been driven by the Kirke brothers 3 years earlier. They quickly resumed seeking furs as energetically as in the past. The Iroquois, whose problem remained the same, saw in this situation an excellent opportunity to ruin French-Indian trade ties by seizing fur convoys en route to Trois-Rivières and Quebec from the west and northwest. They took up positions along the trade routes where they waited in ambush for the fur-laden canoes of the Algonquins, Hurons, and Ottawas to pass. This tactic did not fully achieve its objective, so in 1641 the Iroquois began attacking the French settlements and continued to do so until 1666. While continuing to haunt the trade routes, they roamed throughout the colony in small bands, here and there striking isolated dwellings and imprudent settlers or travellers.

In past years, the Iroquois came in fairly large parties at times during the summer, leaving the river free after their departure; but this year they have changed their pattern and have divided into small bands of twenty, thirty, fifty, or a hundred or more, visiting all the passages and places along the river, and when one band leaves, another takes its place. These are nothing but small, well-armed war parties, which come one after another from the Iroquois lands to occupy the whole of the great river and set up ambushes, from which they attack indiscriminately the Montagnais, the Algonquins, the Hurons and the French.

These raids did not prevent Paul Chomedey de Maisonneuve and a handful of mystics from settling at "Mont-réal" (mount royal), which they named Ville-Marie, and which was certainly one of the most exposed places in New France. The new settlement meant that despite the colony's alarming numerical disadvantage, it was now necessary to defend an additional 100 miles of frontier. To stop the raids or at least lessen the pressure of the Iroquois to the north of the "great river," Governor Montmagny sent 40 soldiers who had just landed at Quebec to the mouth of the River of the Iroquois to build Fort Richelieu. During its short history, this fort proved totally useless in holding back the Iroquois. They merely stopped a little upstream and, travelling overland or taking a tributary, nevertheless reached the St Lawrence. Confined within the palisade, the small garrison felt unable to patrol the area to keep it under control. It would have been annihilated in a trice. By 1646 it became clear there was no point in maintaining a garrison at this site, and it was withdrawn. The following year the Iroquois burned the fort.

Following the outbreak of open war with the Iroquois, the successive governors of the colony sent urgent requests year after year for aid from the home country. Such aid as was provided, when distributed parsimoniously, was barely sufficient to keep the colony on the map and head off the total annihilation that threatened in the not-too-distant future. In 1660 the Dollard episode afforded New France a brief respite. Once more Versailles was beseeched to provide substantial assistance to force the Iroquois to negotiate a settlement. Upon his arrival in the colony the new governor, Dubois d'Avaugourd, commissioned Pierre Boucher to go to France and submit to the newly crowned King Louis XIV a memorandum that described the deplorable state of the colony and recommended means of remedying it. This time the message was heard. To bring the war with the Iroquois to a conclusion, Louis XIV dispatched Alexis de Prouville de Tracy and a whole regiment, the Carignan-Salières regiment, consisting of 1200 men divided into twenty-four 50-man companies.

The Arrival of Reinforcements

Owing to the troops' late arrival, it was not possible to take any action against the Iroquois that year. Keeping his objective in mind and looking ahead to an inevitable campaign against the Mohawks, Tracy ordered the construction of a chain of forts along the River of the Iroquois to develop secure provisioning points along this route leading into Iroquois territory. Originally these forts were not intended to protect the colony against attacks by the natives. The mission of the Carignan regiment was to impose peace on the Iroquois whether they liked it or not. In the documents of the period the word "annihilate" appears frequently. The French were going onto the
offensive, and the construction of the first forts along the Richelieu was a part of this effort. Father François Le Mercier wrote: "The plan in this first campaign was to build several forts along the way; they were considered absolutely necessary, not only in order to ensure passage and the free movement of trade, but also to store supplies for the troops and to provide shelter for sick or wounded soldiers." For his part, Raguenau refers to a bivouac: "[...] Monsieur de Tracy had sent 200 soldiers, along with a few Canadian volunteers, to build a fort at the foot of the Richelieu rapids, to serve as a stopping place for troops heading into enemy territory." The following year Talon expressed the same idea, writing to the Minister that Fort St-Louis served as a depot and supported Fort Ste-Thérèse.

In July 1665 the four companies that had already arrived, including the Chambly company and another company formed of Canadian volunteers, prepared to leave Quebec for the Richelieu rapids. To transport the troops a great number of small boats were constructed. On this subject Raguenau wrote: "He [Tracy] was unable to find any boats that were suitable for the expedition into Iroquois territory. But he applied himself so diligently to overcoming this deficiency that it was hoped that there would be forty portable boats, capable of carrying twenty men each, before August 20; ten had already been constructed." On 23 July, 1 month after its
arrival, Jacques de Chambly's small army left Quebec for the Richelieu rapids, there to build the first in a series of five forts that were to constitute the river's defence system. Construction of the fort began during the week of 25 August, as Father Le Mercier tells us: "The second fort, named Fort St-Louis because its construction commenced in the week during which was celebrated the feast of that great saint, the protector of our kings and of France [...]."12

This first fort formed a square, 144 feet13 on each side. On three sides was a redan, while the fourth side contained the door, protected by an enclosed entryway. Because the plans we possess of this first fort contain no elevation, we cannot determine precisely the height of the palisade, but as most palisades varied between 15 and 20 feet in height it may be deduced that this one was of similar dimensions. As regards the width of the stakes, they may have ranged from 8 to 12 inches (1 inch = 25.4 mm) on average. But there again much depended on the type of wood available. Within the enclosure was "a house in the middle, surrounded by huts for the soldiers."14
Figure 5. "Plans des forts faits par le régiment de Carignan-Salières sur la rivière de Richelieu dicte autrement des iroquois" (plans of the forts built by the Carignan-Salières regiment on the Richelieu River, otherwise known as the River of the Iroquois). Like the preceding one, this map shows the location of the five forts on the Richelieu. However, it provides a more general overview of the Iroquois territories. Note that the mapmaker has represented the Iroquois' huts as European-style houses. Such transpositions were very common in the iconography of the past. (France. Archives nationales; copy on file in the Public Archives of Canada.)

Although the documents make no mention of it, one may easily speculate that the fort contained a warehouse for the storage of provisions and munitions. It is also highly probable that there was a chapel, but we do not know when it may have been constructed.

At the end of August Pierre de Saurel went to the mouth of the Richelieu River at the head of five companies to construct a fort on the site of the old Fort Richelieu, giving the new fort the same name as the old. Soon afterward the structure came to be known interchangeably as Fort Richelieu and Fort Sorel.

On 2 September, Salières in turn was ordered to set out "with seven companies, to go build a fort at the entrance to Lake Champlain, without a carpenter or any other worker to help me, and very few tools [...]". On 28 September, he arrived at Fort St-Louis, "where we unloaded everything, and I received the order to build the fort above the rapids, three leagues away," opposite the island that was given the name Ste-Thérèse.

Once the first three forts were erected, it was necessary to facilitate access to them by building roads that would supplement river transportation. At the end of August
construction began on a portage road around the Chambly rapids. Soon afterward Salières was assigned a similar task, but in this case the road to be built was to link Montreal and Fort St-Louis. As 1665 drew to a close, operations on the Richelieu were nearing completion and the troops prepared to go to their winter quarters, scattered throughout the colony. Fort St-Louis itself was to accommodate the companies of Chambly and Petit. We do not know what conditions were experienced during this first winter, but it is not hard to imagine that they were particularly difficult. Adaptation to the Canadian winter has never been an easy matter, particularly if, as was generally the case with the soldiers, one is poorly clothed, poorly nourished, and poorly housed.

### The Campaigns of Tracy and Courcelles

The adventure experienced by Charles Le Moyne, captured in July 1665 by the enemy while hunting on Ile Ste-Thérèse, gives a clear indication of the impression that the arrival of the Carignan regiment made on the Iroquois. By invoking the specter of inevitable reprisals if they carried out their plans to burn him, Le Moyne escaped torture and even secured his release. On 2 December 1665 the Iroquois took their prisoner to Quebec, where they released him and initiated peace talks that led nowhere. Alarmed but not yet convinced, the Iroquois vacillated. While one nation talked peace, another continued to fight. The French, resolved to force a settlement and opposed to any separate peace, decided to strike a first blow and thereby clearly demonstrate their intention to achieve a final and definitive solution. On 9 January 1666, at the head of 300 soldiers from the Carignan regiment and 200 Canadian volunteers, Courcelles set out for the villages of the Mohawks, who at the time were the most unruly and restive nation within the confederation. Organized in haste, without any knowledge of the terrain, this campaign looked less than promising.

Problems were not long in coming, and at the very outset the soldiers had a foretaste of what awaited them. "[...] By the third day [after leaving Quebec], some had frozen noses, ears, knees, fingers or other parts of the body, and the rest of the body covered with scars; several others, who were entirely overcome or numbed by the cold, would have died on the snow had they not been carried with great difficulty to the next night's campsite." Toward the end of January, the battered expedition reached Fort St-Louis. Courcelles, described by Father Le Mercier as extremely impatient, left Chambly without waiting for his Algonquin guides, who arrived several days later. Without them Courcelles lost his way and instead of heading toward the Mohawk villages, reached the Dutch settlement of Corlaer or Schenectady. The expedition had been a total failure. The small army lost several men as a result of skirmishes with Iroquois bands. On 8 March, Courcelles was back at Fort St-Louis and lost no time in venting his feelings on Father Albanel, the fort's chaplain, whom he accused of intentionally causing the Algonquins to be late, "which was not true. But since he was dissatisfied, he tried to pass the blame onto the Jesuits." In reality, a lack of planning and a lack of understanding of the native mentality appears to have been at the base of this disagreement. According to Salières the Algonquins' late arrival did not prevent them from coming to the aid of the soldiers and saving the bulk of the army from starvation.

The French had carried out their first winter raid in enemy territory, and it would not be their last. For them it was the beginning of a long apprenticeship, during which they would gain valuable experience and at the same time acquire clear superiority over the English soldiers. Even though this expedition had failed because of Courcelles' impatience, this type of undertaking would in the long run prove to be the main strength of New France, reminding opponents that whatever the distance or season, they were never safe from possible reprisals. At the end of the century New England was to learn this, and to pay dearly for the knowledge.

The following spring several Iroquois nations sent ambassadors to Quebec to resume peace talks. The desire of these nations to conclude a separate peace met with a French refusal, and once again a stalemate was reached. Determined to settle the matter once and for all, Tracy decided to make his point by sending a large force to ravage the
Mohawk territories. Past experience led the strategists to postpone the date of departure until autumn. There was nothing fortuitous about this choice. "All those who accompanied Monsieur de Courcelles on his expedition last winter are in agreement that winter is too harsh and takes too great a toll of the troops."26 Spring was also out of the question, as "the water is usually so high in this season that the only way to cross the rivers that stand between us and the Mohawk nation is to build wooden bridges or boats."27 Nor was summer any more advantageous, "for in addition to the extraordinary heat, the mosquito bites cause such severe swelling that they can sometimes make a soldier useless in combat [...]."28 This left autumn as the ideal season, but even then it was necessary to act quickly in order not to be caught unawares by winter.

Beginning immediately after the spring thaw, Tracy completed the chain of fortifications along the Richelieu by constructing Fort St-Jean and Fort Ste-Anne, the latter on Ile La Motte at the entrance to Lake Champlain. All was now ready for the expedition against the Mohawks. On 16 October, an army of 1300 men reached the first Iroquois villages. As the inhabitants had fled, the army had to content itself with burning the entire village and the year's harvest. Five other villages experienced the same fate, and still the Iroquois did not respond. They totally refused to enter into combat. Because the season was too far advanced the army did not dare to pursue them into the territory of the Oneidas, who lived at some distance. It turned back, and on 5 November returned to Quebec.

There had been no confrontation, but the material damages had been considerable. A wigwam could be reconstructed quickly, but the loss of the harvest was more serious and threatened to take a heavy toll during the coming winter. Thus the Mohawks were obliged to ask for assistance from their allies. This temporary state of dependency could well diminish their prestige within the Iroquois confederation, which they clearly sought to control. Mindful that they were no longer safe from French incursions, they finally followed the example of the four other nations and in July 1667 went to Quebec, where a final settlement was reached.
THE SECOND FRENCH-IROQUOIS WAR AND
THE WAR OF
THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG: 1687-1701

The Compagnies Franches de la Marine

After the peace of 1667, two-thirds of the soldiers in the Carignan regiment returned to France. Clearly, the "golden age" that was dawning would not require the presence of such a large military force. An emergency, should it arise, could be dealt with by the militia, which had kept New France on the map of the world during the conflict that had just ended. The growth of the population, and especially the presence within it of 400 soldiers from the Carignan regiment who had elected to settle in New France, helped to strengthen the colonial militia and increase its efficiency. However it was not until 1669 that the militia officially saw the light of day, even though it was in fact functioning well before then. But from then on it was to be better structured; through greater regulation, its efficiency would be increased. Henceforth, until the arrival of the Troupes de Terres (France's regular army) in 1755, the militia was to shoulder responsibility for the defence of the colony.

Toward the end of the 1670s the Iroquois began to show signs of restlessness, and the frequent clashes that occurred in the west, centering on the fur trade, threatened to plunge the colony into war once again. Special interests and diplomatic blunders* caused discontent among the Iroquois nations, who were already grappling with the Illinois. This time it was the Senecas who were calling the tune—the very ones whom Salières had described as "meek" in 1665.2 This state of simmering warfare made the trading routes hazardous. Faced with the imminence of a conflict that had become inevitable, the governor urged the Court to send him troops to force the Iroquois to remain peaceful. After repeated requests on his part, the first contingent of Troupes de la Marine, 150 strong, arrived at Quebec in 1683, marking the beginning of a short period of abundance in this regard. During the next 5 years no less than 32 companies of 50 men each landed, bringing the number of soldiers to make this trip between 1683 and 1688.3 The campaigns of La Barre in 1684 and Denonville in 1687 account for the arrival of a great number of soldiers in a short while, a quantity that nevertheless was insufficient to impose peace on the Iroquois. Not until 1755 would New France have at its disposal a numerically equivalent force of regular soldiers. By 1688 only 1418 regular soldiers were stationed there,4 the ranks having been considerably thinned by death, desertion, and injuries. Pressed from all sides in Europe, Louis XIV refused to send any new recruits to America to compensate for these losses. In 1689 he ordered that the forces be consolidated into 29 companies;5 men from the abolished companies were to be transferred to the remaining ones to bring them up to strength. Ten years later he reduced the number of men per company from 50 to 30. Despite these cutbacks, all the companies were chronically short of men.

The soldiers, recruited by the Ministry of the Marine, belonged neither to the regular Troupes de Terre nor to the actual Troupes de la Marine, which Colbert had recently organized.6 Hastily recruited shortly before their departure, they sailed for Canada without knowing what to expect; indeed, they were kept in ignorance of their destination. The physical condition of these recruits was such that they were often unsuitable for military service. The crossing itself served as an initial selection process. Unhealthy conditions, the poor quality of the food, the constant rolling of the ship, and the length of the voyage all frequently contributed to ending the life of these soldiers. The instructions of the Minister of the Marine to commanders of ships transporting soldiers to the colony give us an idea of the deplorable living conditions on board:

... See that they are washed, swept and scrubbed down every day, prevent the men from eating between decks or leaving any refuse there, close the gratings only during rainstorms, have the scuttles opened as often as possible, keep the sick in separate quarters, have the hammocks brought on deck during the day, have everyone come up once or twice a day, use red-hot cannon balls dipped in vinegar or tar to scent the air between decks. And finally, use every means that may have been learned from past experiences with long voyages.7

It remains to be seen to what extent these instructions were followed. The soldiers, with little or no recourse to higher authorities, were unable to express their discontent. In many cases abuses had to reach catastrophic
proportions before action was taken. Louise Dechêne states that the loss of 1/16 of the troops during the crossing was considered normal by the authorities. As to the survivors, the military life awaited them at journey's end, with all its tribulations and horrors. Very often forced or tricked into going to war far from their native land for reasons that they understood only dimly if at all, far from their families and friends that they would probably never see again, the men found this adventure a difficult one to support, even though they were already hardened to suffering.

It was in this pitiful state that the survivors presented themselves upon their arrival to the governor, who proceeded with a second selection process - not a very rigorous one, however.

The report to be sent to Monseigneur will show him what troops remain; of these, he will note that one quarter are scarcely worthy of mention. Those who cannot be used for either warfare or shipbuilding are a pitiful sight indeed.

Once the selection was made, those who passed muster were incorporated into the little colonial army. The governors complained continually of the poor quality of these recruits, but their complaints seem to have met with little sympathy at Versailles. Often incapable of supporting the rigors of military service, poorly clothed and poorly armed, lacking in training, plunged into an alien physical environment (canoe travel and portages, the faithful and persistent presence of insects, the harshness of winter, and so forth), these men were ill-suited for soldiering in North America, and their effectiveness was practically nil. Under such circumstances the governors preferred to make greater use of the militia, which was infinitely superior to any other force in America, the English colonies included, and to assign the majority of regular troops to other tasks such as building roads, manning forts, and so forth. During the sensitive periods of sowing and harvesting, one might witness the rather bizarre spectacle of the habitants leaving for battle while the regular soldiers continued to work in the fields. However, the main task of the regulars was to serve in the garrisons protecting the towns and royal outposts scattered throughout the immense North American territory. Beginning in 1683 it was they who guarded Fort Chambly, and they maintained a continual presence there until the end of the regime.

The Usefulness of Fort Chambly during the Second French-Iroquois War

In 1684 the Iroquois tribes of the west again went on the warpath, and the expeditions of La Barre in 1684 and Denonville in 1687, which were intended to subdue them, ended in failure. Along the Richelieu it was not until 1687 that the Mohawks again made their presence felt. The position of the French there was not of a nature to intimidate greatly a determined adversary. Unfortunately the documentation available does not clearly indicate the state of the fortifications located along the river that year. Forts St-Jean and Ste-Anne had been abandoned several years earlier. Almost nothing is known of the enigmatic Fort Ste-Thérèse during this period. Only Chambly and Sorel showed signs of life. Lahontan, who spent a month and a half at Chambly in 1684, described it as follows:

The little fort which is situated at the foot of the rapids on the edge of the Chambly basin, consisting merely of palisades, can do little to prevent many people from making a voyage that promises to be highly profitable (i.e. participating in the illicit fur trade with the merchants of Albany). The settlers who live nearby are greatly exposed to the passage of the Iroquois in time of war, despite the presence of this feeble fortress.

Denonville's repeated appeals to the Minister for the funds necessary to fortify Chambly clearly show the inadequacy of this fort. In 1688 Denonville advised his superior of the urgency of the situation: "It is absolutely vital to build a fort at Chambly and to close the walls. There should be two stone redoubts, one above the large basin and the other above the rapids which mark the end of the portage. This must be done, Monseigneur, peace or war, and the sooner the better." Following Denonville, Frontenac made similar appeals, but he had to wait until 1693 for his prayers to be answered. Until then the main invasion route into the colony from the south was as open as a sieve. As was shown in an earlier chapter, such forts were useless in the type of war waged in North America. It was too easy for the Indians to go around them without
changing their objective. This is borne out by the Iroquois' repeated raids along the Richelieu and in the Montreal area between 1687 and 1696. Unless the entire territory were to be literally peppered with such forts, it was an illusion to believe that they could be effective. But there again the chronic shortage of soldiers and the meager financial resources at the intendant's disposal militated against such an undertaking. And even if it had been possible, the thorny problem of supplying the forts would have been further aggravated. Already this task was sapping the strength of the colony. In 1688 the intendant Champigny complained that supplying the forts and maintaining communications between them and Quebec or Montreal was extremely costly. The proliferation of these forts over a vast territory would necessitate the mobilization of an army of voyageurs to carry supplies to them and transmit orders from the governor. In the absence of roads the voyageurs were obliged to travel by river, a task made difficult by the presence of rapids. In the Richelieu Valley there was in fact a road linking Montreal and Chambly. A memorandum of 1683 seeking to prevent fraudulent fur trade tells us that this road still existed: "But it (Chambly) is only five leagues from Montreal, and a path that has been made through the woods makes travel between the two points fairly easy [...]." However, little is known of the quality of this road and the frequency with which it was used. It seems unlikely that it was used for carrying supplies to Fort Chambly, as the annual accounts of colonial finances kept by the intendant mention only the use of boats for this purpose. At the beginning of the 18th century, Champigny wrote that the colony could not get by without boats because they were the only means of resupplying certain posts, such as Fort Chambly.

All these factors implied a considerable investment of time - time during which the countryside was deprived of manpower needed for sowing and harvesting crops. Assigning habitants or soldiers to this task depopulated the militia and the regular forces and paralyzed all military endeavors of any scope. This problem was to worsen with time, and it would cause Vaudreuil many headaches during the war of the Conquest. When Tracy asked the Minister for permission to abandon Forts St-Jean and Ste-Anne in 1667, he was already raising the obsessive problem of provisioning. In 1688 it took a convoy of 1100 men to resupply Fort Frontenac. To be sure, this fort was one of the colony's most important trading posts. On the Richelieu the problem was perhaps less severe. The waterway was easily navigable, with only one particularly difficult set of rapids - at Chambly - which in any event did not need to be ascended to reach the fort. The distances involved, although appreciable, were not of the same order of magnitude as those involved in traveling in the west. Nevertheless, in 1692 it took no less than six companies and about 50 Indians to resupply Fort Chambly.

Thus, in accordance with the Count's orders, Monsieur de Callières resolved to resupply Chambly and dispatched a canoe to visit the passages of the Richelieu, where it was discovered that the water was too low for loaded boats to navigate. During its return, the canoe party learned that the enemy had killed or captured several persons at Verchères, taken domestic animals into the woods and scalped a soldier at St-Ours. It was felt that this must have been a small party, detached from the main one. The convoy that set out for Chambly was composed of six companies which were to winter over in the district of Quebec, as well as some fifty savages for reconnaissance. All the wood needed to heat the garrison was cut and hauled [...].

In addition to transporting provisions, arms, ammunition, and so forth, soldiers were also needed for protecting the convoys in the event of ambush.

Without increasing the number of forts within a given territory, the mere presence of a major garrison in the existing forts would have ensured better control of the region, but the governor had too few forces at his disposal to consider such a solution.

In light of these circumstances it is not difficult to understand why the war that was beginning was looked on with some trepidation. The human and material possibilities did not look particularly promising. Since the failure of the expeditions of La Barre and Denonville against the Iroquois tribes of the west, the French had adopted a defensive stance. "Until such time as the colony could be made secure by a crushing assault on the Iroquois, the best that could be done was to build forts in each seigneury, where the habitants could take cover in the event of
Because it was not possible to stop the Iroquois from making raids throughout the colony, the colonists sought to protect themselves as best they could. This lay behind the construction of forts in the seigneuries. The situation had to be very serious indeed for permission to build such forts to be granted. From the earliest days of the colony, Versailles had taken care, in granting seigneurial rights, to deprive the seigneurs of all military power, so as to avoid an overseas repetition of the nobility's attempts against the power of the monarch. In perusing the governors' correspondence one is struck by the emphasis placed on obtaining these permissions, which are seen as essential to the survival of the rural settlers. It should be noted that Fort Chambly was of a higher order than these forts, although it played the same role during this war. Built by troops, it was directly under the governor's command, even though it was situated in a seigneury. Moreover, its garrison, while not large, was much more sizable than any that might be stationed in one of the local forts.

After 1687, the Mohawk presence on the Richelieu River became almost continual, a situation that greatly worried the settlers and made it dangerous to work in the fields. The governor and the intendant ordered settlers not to go any great distance from their dwellings, particularly if they were unarmed. But frequently the settlers disobeyed this order, and a number of them paid for this imprudence with their lives. Small forts were constructed in all the seigneuries, and if the settlers were menaced by a band of Iroquois whose presence had been detected in the area, they could take shelter there with their belongings and livestock. Generally the Iroquois did not attack these small forts but nevertheless forced the settlers to remain inside them until help arrived from elsewhere. In the meantime they took advantage of the situation by burning barns, houses, and crops. Sometimes, when these alerts lasted too long, the crops could not be sowed in time. The same was true for the autumn harvest season, for the Iroquois were particularly active during these two crucial seasons of the year. The Iroquois raids put the colony in grave danger of famine.

To protect themselves from the fury of the Iroquois, it was necessary in each parish to build a type of fort, in which the inhabitants could take refuge at the first alarm. Such forts were guarded day and night by one or two sentries, and all were equipped with a few pieces of artillery, or at least a few small cannons, not only to scatter the enemy, but also to warn the habitants or call for help. These forts were merely large clearings enclosed by palisades, with several redoubts. They contained the Church and the Seigneur's house, and there was enough room for women, children and livestock to be sheltered there when the need arose. They were sufficient to protect against attack, and I know of no case in which the Iroquois ever took one of these forts.

Indeed, the Iroquois seldom held them under siege, and even less frequently did they openly attack them. The latter tactic is too dangerous for the savages, who have no defensive weapons and no taste for a victory tainted with their own blood, and the former does not accord with their manner of waging war.

This passage of Charlevoix, in which he explains the behavior of the Indians in dealing with a fortification, leaves me very puzzled as to the famous "attack on Fort Chambly" in 1687. Much has been made of this incident, on the basis of several meager documents that do not always stand up to criticism. First, it may be noted that the actors in the drama kept fairly quiet about it. Among them, only Captain Duplessis Faber, in a statement motivated by self-interest, broke the silence: 10 years after the event, in seeking a bonus, he reminded the Minister of the attack, which had passed almost unnoticed in the correspondence of the period.

He was sent to Canada in 1687, and that same year defended Fort Chambly, the post that was most exposed to the enemy. There he had the honor to be in command during the attack of more than 300 Iroquois; the latter left in disarray, having lost many of their men. He had the soldiers mount the body of one of them inside the fort in full view, at noon during the height of the attack.

Such requests for favors strongly tended toward exaggeration. The number of attackers and the losses suffered during the confrontation were often inflated or minimized in support of the request.

In 1688 Denonville had briefly noted this incident in his correspondence. "Thus roaming
over wide areas, the Iroquois carried out such raids daily, smashing skulls and taking prisoners; they even besieged Fort Chambly, which they tried to take.\textsuperscript{29} Although this brief allusion by the governor generally corroborates the preceding document, it adds nothing new and is not very specific. For his part, François Vachon de Belmont, a Sulpician priest who spent much of his life among the Iroquois who had settlements within the colony, reports this event in his \textit{Histoire du Canada}. "On October 4, 150 Mohawks besieged Chambly, which was under the command of Monsieur Du Plessis. They captured a soldier and his wife and child."\textsuperscript{30} Here again there is nothing that might enlighten us further, except, perhaps, for the disappearance of half of the attackers and a mention of three victims. In a letter to Denonville, Dongan, the governor of New York, differs from the preceding account in the choice of victims. According to him, "only" four children were captured.\textsuperscript{31} Finally, Charlevoix, writing 30 years after this episode, also describes the Iroquois raid.

On November 3, Fort Chambly was suddenly attacked by a large party of Mohawks and Mohicans; it was later learned that this attack was the work of the governor of New York.

It is true that because of the resistance that they encountered at the fort, they were obliged to decamp the next day, but this was only after they had burned several isolated farms and taken several prisoners.\textsuperscript{32}

What can be said with certainty of this enigmatic attack? There is no doubt that Mohawks were present at Chambly in the fall of 1687. A band of between 100 and 300 warriors withdrew after taking several victims. But what happened in the meantime? A full-scale attack on the fort would seem paradoxical and inconsistent with the practices of the Indians of northeastern North America. In actual fact the most plausible explanation would seem to be that having taken the local settlers by surprise, killed several persons, destroyed some farms, and forced the settlers to take refuge in the fort, they withdrew from the area shortly afterward, as was their practice. Much could be said regarding the behavior of the Indians in time of war. Marie de l’Incarnation wrote in this regard, "The nature of these savages is such that when they have captured or killed only twenty men, they turn back so as to show them off in their own lands."\textsuperscript{34} This behavioral trait dumbfounded more than one governor and intendant. After a troop of allied Indians had at great expense been armed for a war expedition, the latter would often turn back after the first engagement, even if they had been victorious. For them, the objective had been attained. In 1660, after the victory of the Long Sault, the Iroquois returned to their villages, leaving behind their plans to attack Montreal. "After the distribution (of prisoners), they decamped, abandoning their resolve to come inundate our settlements in favor of taking these miserable victims back to their territories to appease the rage and cruelty of the most barbarous of nations."\textsuperscript{35} We could cite numerous other examples of this type of behavior; and although they would not prove our hypothesis, they would show that if there really was an attempt to take Fort Chambly by assault in 1687, it was most unusual.

The raid of 1687 marked the beginning of a wave of Iroquois incursions, mainly against the seigneuries along the Richelieu and in the Montreal area. In 1688, Contrecoeur, Sorel, St-Ours, and St-François were visited.\textsuperscript{36} The following year the famous Lachine massacre took place, sending shock waves through a colony that had already been shaken by the announcement of a new war between France and England.

The presence of the English in this war made the colonial authorities uneasy, and for good reason. The Richelieu route, which was very poorly fortified, was an open gateway into New France. And although the Indians might be loath to mount an all-out attack on a fortress, however frail it might be, the same could not be said for the English, who were used to this type of operation. Until 1689 the French-Iroquois wars had called for a relatively simple type of fortification. Wood construction was fully sufficient to ensure effective protection. But the use of artillery would make the wooden forts highly vulnerable. It was in vain that Denonville sought funds for the rebuilding of Fort Chambly. He did not give any indication as to whether he intended to reconstruct the fort in wood or in stone. In any event the redoubts that he planned to construct on either side of the basin that lay at the foot of the fort would be in stone.\textsuperscript{37} The governor never obtained the necessary permission, and New France entered into this first real Anglo-French conflict in
North America without adequate fortifications.

The Involvement of the English Colonies in the Conflict and the Gradual Withdrawal of the Iroquois

If ever there was a year when the term "reprisals" was more than an empty word, that year was 1690. After the Lachine massacre the Canadians accused the English of having fomented it, and in reaction they decided to go on the offensive. Guy Frégault wrote as follows on this subject:

Although the attack was mounted by the Iroquois, there was little doubt as to where it originated. It was the English colonies that provided the warriors of the Five Nations with their arsenal and their advisers; and it was the Iroquois that the pious burghers of New England saw as what might be considered their secular arm. Iberville was aware of this. "I see no reason," he had written a year earlier, "why we should not do to them what they have done to us at Orange and Manhattan, where they give the Iroquois ammunition (against the treaty) and pay them to come to Montreal to kill Frenchmen." The complicity of the English colonies and the Five Nations was, moreover, a secret to no one. At the time of the Lachine massacre, Callières had for months been sending one memorandum after another to Versailles,

Figure 6. The three winter raids of 1690, launched by Frontenac against frontier villages in New England and the colony of New York. (Drawing: Steve Epps.)
urging the home government to take possession of New York in order to cut off the Iroquois menace at its roots.  

The attack on New York never came to pass; instead it was decided to harass the frontier villages of New England. For this purpose Frontenac, in the winter of 1690, organized three groups who would leave respectively from Quebec, Trois-Rivières, and Montreal in the direction of Casco Bay, Salmon Falls, and Schenectady. The latter expedition is of particular interest to us because of the route that it followed. In early February, the expedition, which consisted of 114 Frenchmen, 16 Algonquins, and 96 "domicilled" Iroquois from Sault St-Louis and Mount Royal, and which was under the command of Nicolas d'Ailleboust de Manthet and Jacques Lemoyne de Sainte-Hélène, left Montreal for the English colonies. It probably stopped for a time at Chambly, either to wait for stragglers or to take on supplies. The group reached its destination during the night of February 18-19, and after massacring some 60 settlers, headed back. The other two raids achieved similar results.  

In the short run these attacks served to heighten the colony's sagging prestige among the natives, as well as to raise morale. "Our reputation might even be restored somewhat in the minds of our allies when they learn that our current approach is the opposite of the one we followed in years past, and that we intend to some extent to wage war in their manner, which is the one best suited to this country." According to Eccles, "Frontenac claimed that these raids would prevent the Iroquois and the English from combining in an assault on New France. In fact, they had the exact opposite effect. The only positive result that can be claimed for them is that they did raise morale in the colony." The opposite effect referred to by Eccles took the form of a punitive action undertaken by the English colonies in the summer of 1690, which was intended to eliminate the troublesome French presence to the north. A combined land-sea attack focusing simultaneously on Quebec and Montreal was launched. As is well-known, Phipps foundered off Quebec and Winthrop's army, encamped to the south of Lake Champlain, never left its base. The grand design of the English was thwarted by dissention within the colonial militia as well as an outbreak of smallpox. When the Iroquois heard that this disease was ravaging the troops, they refused to join the army and returned to their villages. For his part, Charlevoix offers another reason for the defection of the Iroquois. He states that the latter "do not want either of the European nations between whose colonies their territory is situated to acquire too much superiority one over the other, convinced that they themselves will soon be the victims." Whether or not this was the real reason for their withdrawal, the fact remains that the Iroquois were already becoming aware of the tragedy that would one day be their lot if ever the French-English antagonism were laid to rest in North America. Once they lost their utility in the political strategies of the whites, all that remained for them would be the fate reserved for the Indians of the 19th and 20th centuries by the Canadian and American governments.  

While the English army retreated, a group of 120 Iroquois and 29 Englishmen and Dutchmen detached from the main force carried out a lightning raid along the Richelieu, where they killed or captured some 50 Canadians and Troupes de la Marine. Since 1684 New France had suffered several harsh blows, and the future hardly looked more promising. The year 1691 was a veritable disaster for the French colony. First, the Iroquois continued to harass the colony with frequent and successful incursions. At the very beginning of the year two bands of Iroquois totalling some 1000 warriors tormented the Montreal area for a time. But it was for 11 August that the English and their allies reserved their worst blow. On the morning of that day, 266 English and Dutch militiamen from Albany, accompanied by 80 Mohawks and 66 Loups (Mohicans), surprised a much larger force of French troops assembled around the fort at La Prairie and inflicted serious losses. On the return trip, Schuyler (the commander of the detachment) and his men came up against the troop of the Seigneur de Valrennes, and a violent battle ensued. Several days earlier Valrennes had received the order to go to Chambly, "which is the place to which the
enemy was to come, with the order to let them pass and to follow them from behind." Valrennes performed his task well, and in heading for La Prairie in pursuit of the English his men caught sight of the vanguard of Schuyler's troop, which was withdrawing "full of pride and insolence."

They had scarcely gone two leagues when one of their scouts was seen by the troop commanded by Monsieur de Valrennes, who gave chase. He barely had time to put the few men that he had in a state to defend themselves properly, having in all only 180 men, so that the English outnumbered them by more than two to one. He came across two large trees which had fallen across their path, and which would serve as barricades. He arranged his men behind them three deep, with orders to fire row by row, which they did admirably. The enemy marched quickly, and thinking that their cries would frighten us, they came within shooting range of the barricades, and when the first row fired upon them, more than thirty men fell. This great volley did not, however, unsettle them, and the English and the Mohawks returned up to three times to the attack; the Loups, who had not expected such vigorous resistance, faltered a little ... and his band, expecting to surround them and put them all to flight, was itself repulsed by the enemy. It was then that a sort of melee broke out, with each man leaving his position to fight hand-to-hand, or with a firearm if he had one; but at this close range, the men could be said to be burning each other rather than firing on each other.

According to Eccles, this battle had at least one positive consequence for the colony. "The Albany men had been mauled badly enough and they did not venture near New France again until peace was declared, much to the disgust of their Iroquois allies." Although the English moved to the sidelines, they nevertheless continued their efforts indirectly, encouraging their allies to increase their pressure on the French. Their presence in New France was noted throughout the rest of that year, and in December a group of Mohawks attacked some Iroquois from Sault St-Louis who were hunting near the "mountain of Chambly."

The year 1692 saw the continuation of the foregoing; it too was punctuated by repeated attacks by Iroquois bands along the Richelieu and on the outskirts of Montreal. To put an end to this exhausting and costly war, Frontenac decided to strike a decisive blow that would oblige the Iroquois to conclude an immediate peace. Like Courcelles in 1665 he organized a winter expedition against the Mohawk villages. On 25 January 1693, 100 Troupes de la Marine, 200 Indians, and 325 militiamen set out from Montreal, determined to smite their enemy. On 26 January the troop camped at Chambly, setting out the next day from this last bastion of the French on the route into the Iroquois territories. Although the primary objective of the expedition was achieved, the return trip was nearly a catastrophe. A sudden thaw in the vicinity of Lake Champlain made the going extremely difficult, and rain had destroyed the provisions stored in caches for the trip back. Had there been any additional difficulties whatever, the expedition might never have reached Montreal. In such a situation an outpost like Chambly had the allure of a veritable oasis. For men at the limits of endurance, such as those described by Frontenac and Champigny, one day more or less of marching was a matter of life or death, particularly with the enemy lurking not far behind.

To support an offensive on enemy territory, a solid rear was essential. In this sense the presence of outposts near the frontier, such as Chambly, was an absolute necessity. Indeed, Chambly, being too far from the frontier, was less than ideal for this purpose. The abandonment of forts St-Jean and Ste-Anne had shortened the supply line. As to Ste-Thérèse, the silence surrounding it suggests that it was not very important, if indeed a garrison ever occupied it. These forts were intended to support one another, and their absence greatly weakened New France's offensive strategy or at least made it more risky. During the disastrous return of the expedition of 1693, the presence of Fort Ste-Anne on Ile La Motte would have greatly aided the French cause. But Chambly was far away, and not everyone could be so lucky as the Chevalier de Clairmont was in 1690. The latter, having been ordered to "go up to Sorel River (the Richelieu) to spy on the enemy," was discovered and pursued back to Chambly, where he found refuge. Although very useful as a place at which to bivouac, take on supplies, or rally, Fort Chambly was, under these circumstances, much less valuable from an offensive standpoint. And in terms of...
defence it proved to be totally incapable of holding back the Iroquois. The latter were generally able to strike at will before the population could react and seek shelter behind the palisades of the fort. And because it was impossible to stay within the walls permanently, the habitants were forced into what amounted to a game of cat and mouse.

The active entry of the English onto the military scene raised serious questions regarding the condition of fortifications which, on the Richelieu, left much to be desired. The governors' pressing demands on this matter had previously fallen on deaf ears. But finally, in 1693, the Court released funds for this purpose. Soon afterward work began on reconstruction of the stockade, which according to Frontenac was greatly dilapidated. "Forts Chambly and Sorel were rebuilt using new stakes; the old ones were rotten, and in some places they were far enough apart to allow entry."60 The repairs to the stockade offered an opportunity to make several improvements to the buildings inside, in particular the "fort house." It is not known, however, whether this house was for the exclusive use of the commander, or was a main building designed to accommodate the troops and officers.

For the moment Frontenac appeared to be satisfied with the repairs. "It (the fort) has been rebuilt by the Seigneur des Bergères, who has been in command of it for the past four years, and it offers the best defence that can be expected of a wooden fort."61 Because of the low level of English military activity, stone construction was not yet required.

This decision to reinforce Chambly came a little late, considering the inaction of the English as well as the cooling of the Iroquois' ardor. On the latter subject, Governor Fletcher of New York wrote at the end of 1693, "I have never more seriously questioned the loyalty of our Indians than at present.... To all appearances, they would be disposed to go over to the enemy as soon as it appeared. They are war-weary, and we can obtain nothing from them without providing immediate remuneration...."62 Several months earlier a delegation of Iroquois had initiated peace negotiations with the French. The raid of the preceding winter was not unrelated to their mission. These negotiations were lengthy and very difficult, and they broke down altogether in 1695. Another expedition against the Iroquois, in the west this time (directed against the Senecas and the Oneidas), forced them to reopen negotiations, which culminated in the great treaty of 4 August 1701. In the meantime, on 20 September 1697, France and England had signed a treaty at Ryswick.
Reorganization of the Defence of the Richelieu: A Pressing Concern

The peace that followed the treaty of Ryswick in 1697 brought New France little relief. It took until 1701 to conclude a satisfactory peace with the Iroquois. And by then new war clouds were gathering on the horizon. This time, because of the withdrawal of the Iroquois, the English colonies would be obliged to shoulder the entire burden of defending their territory and harassing the rival colony.

On the French side new efforts were made to solve the problem posed by the defence of the Richelieu. Previous strategies had not proved very effective. The war against the native peoples in America required an imposing network of fortifications, supported by a substantial military presence. But France, itself involved in a war that threatened to suffocate it, locked in a struggle with the rest of Europe, was not in a position to provide its colony with these means. Left on its own the colonial government had to make do with the means at its disposal.

When hostilities resumed in 1702, the neutrality of the Iroquois served to simplify considerably the thorny problem of defence and to bring it back into a European perspective. Henceforth the activation of a heavily fortified line, identical with that of 1665, could prove highly effective. Because of the difficulties that a European-style army would face in deviating from the major travel routes, it was possible to concentrate defences at key points along these routes. Chambly was one such point. At the same time the possibility of a European-style war implied the use of artillery, which would render wooden fortifications useless. But the Richelieu was not Flanders. Stone forts cost dearly and the intendant did not have sufficient financial resources to support such a policy, as the reconstruction of Fort Chambly in wood in 1702 well illustrates.

The preceding year the intendant Champigny had informed the Minister of an indispensable expenditure required for the re-establishment of the fort, which was already showing obvious signs of decay. The Court was always reluctant to approve any request that would involve dipping into the royal coffers, and when it did so it took great care to specify its reservations and recommendations. To this request from the intendant, the Minister replied:

As regards the second item, the 3000 livres for Fort Chambly, His Majesty wishes to know whether the maintenance of this fort is absolutely necessary in the event that there is no war with the Iroquois; if so, only the absolute minimum number of men required must be left there, so as to reduce to the lowest level possible the expense of transporting supplies [...].

Early in 1702 the situation was clarified by a fire which destroyed the fort. With war brewing between the two colonial powers, there was no alternative: the fort would have to be rebuilt. According to Governor Calières the fire had been started accidentally by the chaplain, who died in the blaze. Several months later regular troops were assigned to the task of reconstruction. The stockade, consisting of stakes 10-12 inches in diameter, was 12 feet in height.

Something of an opportunist (to be so was the only way to rise through the ranks of the royal bureaucracy, where influence was often more important than worth), Levasseur de Néré, the royal engineer for the colony, suggested to the Minister an inexpensive means of developing this site and preventing the enemy from passing. At the heart of the proposal was the suggestion that Chambly be granted autonomy. It was a matter of elevating the place to the rank of a district, on a par with Montreal and Trois-Rivières. Levasseur himself would be appointed its governor. This idea was not a new one. The importance of Chambly was a matter of general agreement.

Levasseur was not the first to covet this position. Back in 1681 Frontenac had proposed Pierre de Saint-Ours as a candidate "highly qualified for this position" (as governor of Chambly). Nineteen years later the idea was again put forward, this time with more insistence: in 1700 Callières suggested the appointment of Charles-Gaspart Piot de Langloiserie. Three years later Vaudreuil in turn came forward with a recommendation to the effect that the position be given to Nicolas Daneau de Muy.

Anxious to become governor of Chambly, Levasseur took his fate into his own hands and
sent the Minister a memorandum to this effect. He promised that once appointed he would take a series of measures to achieve the desired objective, namely to make Chambly a post capable of preventing the English from reaching the colony. As an engineer he considered the utility of the fort to be beyond question. In terms of offence, its reputation was firmly established. As a depot and a place at which to bivouac and take on supplies, it had proved its effectiveness in past conflicts. But in terms of defence it was less than ideal. With a few inexpensive alterations, Levasseur argued, it could be transformed into an impassable obstacle and yet retain its offensive qualities.

First he proposed the construction of a redoubt, which would serve to extend the fort's field of action as well as ensure better protection of the village. Levasseur, with an expert's knowledge of the wheels of State, took care not to offend the sensibilities of the Court. He assured it that the project would entail no increase in troop strength, because the enemy, not knowing the number of defenders, would in any case be afraid of placing itself in a crossfire.

The development of an adequate road system was a central concern of Levasseur. His memorandum contains a precise and excellent description of the routes leading to Fort Chambly:

There are three routes for reaching the said fort, two by land, cutting through the forest: one goes by way of Longueuil and the other by way of La Prairie. The latter route, although not the most heavily used, is the most passable, because there is no mire to pass through, like the one of the former route, which extends over a good quarter league, knee-deep, in addition to a
stream that must be crossed by means of trees, to say nothing of a number of other trees that have fallen across the way, forming obstacles over a distance of more than three leagues. This is very tiring in summer; in winter it is scarcely noticeable because of the quantity of snow. The path is five to six feet wide.

This is not the case with the route that passes through La Prairie, which is nothing more than a footpath which has long been used by the savages. Its only drawbacks are a series of short, gentle slopes, which are not, however, very numerous. There are also several streams to cross, which are not very large. It is half a league longer than the route through Longueuil, but this is more than made up for by the ease with which it can be travelled, and I feel that it is important not only to start on it, but to improve it without delay, so as to make it suitable for carts; this could not be done on the other route without great expense, owing to the mires that I mentioned above.

The benefit and advantage that would be derived from this route is that at all times we would be able to come to the aid of Fort Chambly, and it would cost the King infinitely less to transport military supplies on it than it does to send them by boat up the Richelieu River, which is the third route. The latter passes before Sorel, from which it is sixteen leagues upstream to Chambly, and sixteen back down, for a total of thirty-two, and from Sorel to Montreal another thirty-six leagues either way, for a total of sixty-eight leagues. This assumes that the supplies are transported from Montreal, for if they are sent directly from Quebec, the distance is fifty-eight leagues, to say nothing of the fact that from either place one must have the benefit of favorable winds, which are of no small consequence in the case of delays.

River traffic was still the most utilized mode of transport in the colony, even on the Richelieu, despite the importance of this region and its proximity to Montreal. Our sources leave no doubt in this regard. The boats used for supplying Chambly still came from Quebec. It would not be until several decades later that a usable road was developed for this purpose. Levasseur's development plan of course included the seigneur, whose lush forests and fertile soil were described in glowing terms.

Before rendering a verdict the King sought the advice of Beauharnais and Vaudreuil. In 1706, having received no reply, Levasseur resumed his campaign. The following year he refreshed the Minister's memory in the same terms. He always took care to point out to him that the project would entail no expenditure on his part or at least very little when compared with the advantages the colony would derive from it. He based his argument on this crucial point, for his chances of success would depend upon it. His influence at Versailles, if it was great enough, would do the rest. Once again, as in 1705, Pontchartrain referred the matter to Vaudreuil. Finally, in 1708, the King asked Levasseur for further information on his proposal. The latter then submitted a memorandum in which he went over the proposal he had made in 1704 point by point, occasionally providing additional details. For example, he revealed his intention to fortify the wall surrounding the village, which he is most anxious to enclose. He also proposed to have the troops and the habitants maintain the fortifications and roads. Finally, obliged by the Court, he unveiled his financial conditions. In return for his services he asked for an annual pension of 2000 livres and the Croix de St-Louis, an honor highly prized in the colony. Raudot, the new intendant, strongly opposed Levasseur's plan and sent the Minister a highly unfavorable plea in which he undertook to refute all the arguments advanced by the plan's author. He contended that the King, unlike Levasseur, would derive no real benefit from the project. He also developed a very interesting argument in which he tended to debunk the notion of Chambly's importance. "The post at Chambly, Monseigneur, is an advantageous post for this country, but it does not shield it, and if the English wanted to come into this colony, there are other rivers that they could take in order to do so." Finally, he challenged the idea of creating a governorship at Chambly. In an area as strategically important as the vicinity of Chambly it was best to be able to move commanders about with ease, and this would no longer be possible if a governor was appointed to the post. In the end, despite the approval of Rigaud de Vaudreuil, the Court in 1709 responded with a categorical refusal.

The project was not, however, forgotten. Several officials continued to seek the position, perhaps further attracted by the recon-
struction of the fort in stone, so that in 1712 the Court once again sought information, asking Vaudreuil and Bégon, Raudot's successor, to enlighten it on this matter.\textsuperscript{28} Again Versailles opposed the project,\textsuperscript{29} and after that it was not until 1720 that the proposal was briefly revived, in a memorandum submitted by Chaussegros de Lery. When the Minister refused to transfer military headquarters from Trois-Rivières to Chambly to develop an actual town at Chambly, Lery abandoned the idea, and it rapidly sank into oblivion.

While Levasseur was struggling in vain to convince Versailles of the value of his plan, the colonial authorities were putting forward another proposal to block the Richelieu route. They wanted to resettle the Abnakis at Chambly. At the time the latter inhabited what is now New Brunswick and Maine. They were waging a terrible war against the villages of New England, using Iroquois-style tactics. As Vaudreuil frankly acknowledged, the idea was "to make the Abnakis and the English irreconcilable enemies."\textsuperscript{30} However such an undertaking would not be without consequences, and this worried the King. He feared that the Iroquois would take umbrage at this development. He also dreaded a possible alliance between the Abnakis and the English. The operation could prove costly, and it might tend to weaken Acadia.\textsuperscript{31} In the end Chambly was dropped as the place of resettlement, and instead the Abnakis set up their dwellings along the Rivière St-François, further to the east.
Construction of the Stone Fort

The years passed, and the fortification of Chambly did not improve. In 1709 the increasing determination of the English colonies to rid themselves of their troublesome neighbor caused the colonial authorities to rethink their fortification policy, end their vacillation, and make greater demands of the home government. For the first time there was talk of constructing a stone fort at Chambly.

Seigneurs Vaudreuil and Raudot cannot help drawing your attention to the importance of the post at Chambly. This year, more than ever, they are convinced that it is the only place by which the English can enter the colony in large numbers, bringing cannons and small mortars. They consider it absolutely necessary to build a stone fort there; the latter would be impregnable because the largest cannon they could bring would be one that fires four-pound balls at most. Such a fort would not have to be repaired every year, a task which always entails new expenditures. In addition, a wooden fort can be burned at any time. This well-fortified post, equipped for defence, would protect the town of Montreal, since in bringing in their wagons, they have no choice but to pass by this place [...].

In a letter written in collaboration with Vaudreuil, Raudot acknowledged the strategic importance of Chambly. Although the English could enter the colony by other rivers, as he had written earlier, in so doing they could not bring their artillery with them, and even without it the going would be very difficult. Several months later he elaborated on his thoughts: "The English can, however, enter this colony by other rivers, but because of the number of portages involved, they can do so only in small parties, from which we could easily protect ourselves." But there were no illusions: the effectiveness of the fort depended on the neutrality of the Iroquois. "This fort will protect Montreal from the English; the town will have nothing to fear unless the colony is at war with the savages."

Early in the fall of 1709 the English massed great numbers of troops to the south of Lake Champlain, clearly with the intention of invading Canada. Although this proved to be a false alarm, it served as a useful warning. At the beginning of November Raudot informed the Minister that there was unanimous agreement in the colony as to the urgency of the work to be undertaken. The work was to begin "early in the following spring, with work on the interior to be put off until 1711." Two weeks later a letter signed jointly by Vaudreuil and Raudot confirmed this decision. The imminence of the danger called for a rapid decision on the part of the governor and the intendant. By taking this initiative, they were going beyond their authority. Although the governor could order the construction of a wooden fort, he was required to seek the approval of the King before proceeding with the construction of a fort of stone. The colonial authorities were fully aware of the gravity of their act. Thus they constantly sought to justify it, sometimes exaggerating its importance while apologizing to the Minister for acting prior to receiving his authorization. Faced with a fait accompli, the Minister graciously acceded to the wishes of his subordinates and authorized the work.

In accordance with the decision taken earlier, Raudot on 16 November 1709 issued an order which obliged [...] the inhabitants of the district of Montreal to bring to the site as quickly as possible the stone and lime required for the construction of Fort Chambly in stone; they shall also provide and carry to Chambly the squared-off beams and wood required. Monsieur Daigremont is appointed to divide up the inhabitants assigned to the said tasks in the various sectors of the district of Montreal.

Each inhabitant of the administrative district of Montreal was obliged, according to Gédéon de Catalogne, to provide one week's work for this purpose. He states that he himself went to the site to direct the work, "and throughout the winter quoins were cut and doors and windows were made." The following spring work began on the excavations that were to accommodate the foundations of the enclosure and the internal partition walls. At that time the troops relieved the settlers needed to sow the crops. They continued working at this task "from spring through to Michaelmas." While this work was under way at Chambly, Vaudreuil dispatched "a large detachment to Lake Champlain, not only to
protect them, but also to confront a party of fifty men sent by the governor of Boston, who, I am informed, are coming to attack several of our settlements.\textsuperscript{46}

By 2 November 1710 the fort was "safe from attack," meaning that the curtains and bastions were complete. And by the fall of 1711 only the finishing touches remained to be added. On 7 November of the same year Vaudreuil and Raudot wrote that the fort was "complete in all respects."\textsuperscript{47}

The King expressed great satisfaction regarding the project and congratulated Beaucours for his industry and zeal.\textsuperscript{48} However, although the latter designed the fort, he was not on the site at all times in 1710-11. During that period his presence was often noted at Quebec, where he was working on the town's fortifications.

Vaudreuil and Bégon estimated that the fort would accommodate 500 men, and that it could hold 1000 in an emergency. Moreover, "it can hold provisions sufficient to feed this number of men for a year and as much ammunition as might be needed for as long as necessary [...]".\textsuperscript{49} They neglected nothing in their efforts to impress the Minister and justify their actions. They reminded him of the wisdom of their decision and its beneficial consequences. And yet not everyone seemed to agree about this undertaking. As early as the spring of 1711 a dissident voice was heard. A memorandum whose authorship is now unknown expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of the new fortress. It contended that the village was insufficiently protected, as the new geographic position of the fort was such that its cannons could not rake the streets in the event of an attack.\textsuperscript{50} But for the moment, according to the authorities, everyone agreed that the fort constituted "Canada's rampart on the frontier."\textsuperscript{51}
Figure 10. "Vue du Fort de Chambly en Canada Nouvelle France situe sur la Rivière de Richelieu à cinq lieues au Sud de la ville de Montreal" (view of Fort Chambly in Canada, New France, located on the Richelieu River five leagues south of the town of Montreal). The presence of a windmill near the fort did not constitute an infraction of the royal order prohibiting buildings in the proximity of the fort. The first one, constructed of stone and situated on a rise, served as a watchtower and a redoubt, thus extending the defensive action of the fort. (Public Archives of Canada.)

To bring the work to completion, the outer grounds of the fort had to be delimited. To this effect the intendant on 1 May 1711 issued an order transferring to the Crown a band of land extending 300 toises on either side of the fort and 600 toises in from the river. On 22 June 1712 the King confirmed this order, commanding all those "who have buildings or fences on the said land to remove them, and prohibiting anyone from settling on this stretch of land or constructing thereon any building or fence of any description." To ensure the effectiveness of the fort it was felt necessary to clear the surrounding land out to a certain distance of all obstacles that might enable an attacker to advance under cover. Accordingly, steps were taken once construction began in 1709 to demolish several buildings located too close to the new enclosure. These buildings belonged to Joseph-François Hertel de la Fresnière, who did not fail to demand reimbursement for his losses.

Chambly during the War of the Spanish Succession

In 1702, after a brief interruption of 5 years, war again broke out between France and England. So as not to antagonize the Iroquois, Vaudreuil left New York at peace and instead turned his attention toward New England. Winter raids against Deerfield in 1704 and Haverhill in 1708 spread disarray throughout this colony, and along with frequent attacks by the French-backed Abnakis they aroused a strong surge of anger in the English colonies. The English colonial authorities decided that the only way to solve the problem was to take possession of New France, putting a little more red on the map of this part of the world. After lengthy representations they obtained the Queen's consent in the spring of 1709. Preparations began at once. Plans were made for a two-
pronged invasion, by land and by sea, as in 1690. Nicholson, commander of the land forces, began to mass his troops to the south of Lake Champlain. The Richelieu route looked promising for his purposes, as the fortifications along it were not in a state to put up much resistance. In the north all this activity was understandably causing concern. Alerted by his own scouts whom he had dispatched to Lake Champlain to spy on the movements of the English, Vaudreuil raised an army of some 1600 men, consisting of militiamen, regular troops, and Indians, and rushed to Chambly to await the English. He arrived there toward the end of September and left on 15 October after hearing that the English army was retreating. Owing to a shortage of provisions, he was obliged to send back the militia, the Indians, and part of the regular troops. The rest remained at the fort until 20 October. Vaudreuil took all the credit for the English retreat. He wrote candidly:

By these same letters, Monseigneur, I have already had the honor of showing that the expedition that I made last fall to Chambly was fully as successful as I had hoped, since the enemy, knowing that I was there, not only hastened their retreat, fearing that I would move into their territory with all the forces of the colony, but also, in withdrawing, burned the forts that they had constructed along the Orange River, along with their boats, their canoes and a large quantity of provisions. In reality it was not his presence at Chambly that forced the English to retreat, but rather the withdrawal of the naval squadron promised by the Queen. At the last minute its destination was changed so that it could be used elsewhere. Consequently the invasion plan fell through and Nicholson, upon learning the news, felt obliged to withdraw. The Minister, fully aware of this situation, was not taken in by the account given by Vaudreuil, and reprimanded him for his unnecessary and costly expedition. Vaudreuil was also obliged to answer the charge that he left Quebec undefended during his stay at Chambly. He contended that Quebec was in no danger, since

"everyone [was] convinced that it was impossible for the enemy to launch any action from below [i.e. from the river] given that it was so late in the season." The charge clearly illustrates the dilemma that plagued all the governors. Because of the small number of troops at their disposal, they could not attempt a simultaneous attack on two fronts. In the absence of adequate fortifications they were obliged to assemble all their forces in the most exposed places. Against this backdrop it is easier to understand the numerous appeals to the King for funds to close off this invasion route. Faced with the procrastinations of the Court, Vaudreuil exceeded his powers and together with Raudot ordered that a stone fort be constructed at Chambly. In 1711 the two men had occasion to congratulate themselves on this initiative, for the English colonies revived the plan that had been aborted in 1709. This time the matter was serious.

In the summer 1711 the English fleet, commanded by Admiral Hovenden Walker, set out for Quebec. But during the night of 3-4 September eight ships sank to the floor of the Gulf of St Lawrence, taking with them the glorious dream of conquest. On 7 October a French ship sailed into the harbor at Quebec, having encountered no English vessels on its way. At once Vaudreuil assembled his troops and rushed them toward Chambly, alarmed by the movements of the English army massed to the south of Lake Champlain. This proved to be unnecessary because Nicholson, having heard that the fleet had floundered, had already turned back. En route for Chambly, Vaudreuil got wind of the retreat of the English army. He sent part of his troops back to Quebec and Trois-Rivières but continued on his way to the Richelieu. "As for myself, I went on to Chambly where after I had [reviewed] the troops and the militiamen who had already arrived there and [discharged] the savages, I sent everyone back, having first, however, assembled a detachment of French soldiers and a hundred savages [...]" to attack and destroy Nicholson's rear and anything that he might have left behind. This was the last alert of the war that ended on 13 April 1713 at Utrecht.
THE INTERLUDE OF THE PEACE OF UTRECHT AND THE GROWTH OF SMUGGLING

The Lure of the English Trading Posts

With the normalization of relations between France and England in 1713, the population was finally able to breathe somewhat easier after 30 years of war; but the same could not be said for the companies who sought to make large profits. The war had not been too detrimental to trade activities, particularly after the treaty of 1701 with the Iroquois, but the end of hostilities caused a major upheaval on the fur market. Contraband, the very mention of which strikes terror in the hearts of monopolists, found fertile ground in New France. The advantageous conditions offered by the merchants of Albany had all the lure of forbidden fruit for the Indians and the French fur traders originally attached to the French companies. In exchange for a pelt, one could obtain much more at Albany than at Montreal, and the merchandise obtained was often of better quality. The furs which were thus diverted to the south represented a corresponding reduction in profit for the French companies. To wipe out this "evil" which, if allowed to spread, threatened to plunge them into bankruptcy, the companies exerted strong pressure on the King to take forceful measures.

Several decades earlier, during the peace of 1667-83, this lucrative activity had captured the fancy of the Canadians and their allies. To put a stop to it the simplest solution would of course have been to cut it off at its roots, namely by reducing the price of merchandise. But market conditions in France and the remoteness of New France considerably increased freight costs and from the start placed the French companies in an extremely unfavorable position in relation to their English rivals. Not content to market their merchandise at a lower price, the latter also offered better quality. The English blankets were highly popular with the Indians, who did not hesitate to travel to Albany to obtain them. The French mills tried to manufacture similar ones, but without success. The Indians complained that the material was flimsy or that the colors or patterns were not to their taste. And instead of the heavy iron caldrons offered by the French, they chose the English copper pails, which were light and easy to transport.1 Understandably, the Indians were drawn by the English trading products, and they gradually shifted away from trading with the French. To retain their hold on this market, the Montreal merchants who financed and fitted out the voyageurs heading out west to collect the furs went to Albany to obtain these products in exchange for furs. If they could not lower the price of their goods - and clearly they could not - they could at least offer equal quality. Nor were the merchants the only ones to purchase trade items from the English, which they saw as a vital necessity; their example was followed by a sizable number of private individuals who themselves patronized Albany instead of the trading outlets of the Compagnie d'Occident to increase their profits. This type of trade was of course strictly prohibited. According to an order issued in 1716, anyone found to be in possession of English goods was subject to a fine of 500 livres and confiscation of the goods. Second offenders could be prohibited from practising business.2

The First Control Measures

The colonial authorities were supposed to promote the interests of the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales, which was in danger of suffering great losses owing to the decrease in the volume of furs reaching its warehouses, and they felt obliged to take action. As mentioned above it was not possible to attack the problem at its roots by becoming more competitive. The only possible solution was to oppose the trading practices in question. And there was little point in issuing an order without backing it up with concrete means of enforcing it. By controlling the Richelieu River, which led directly to Albany, the authorities hoped to paralyze the illegal trade. In 1679, by which time the route to Albany had become particularly familiar to fur traffickers, Frontenac considered installing a garrison at Chambly to keep an eye on the situation. Confiding in the Minister, he acknowledged that

... whatever precautions I take, and even though I have sent the Seigneur de St Ours to Chambly to keep watch over the main route [...] he cannot be successful in this unless he has some men, and may it please Your Majesty to maintain a garrison at that place, which is one of the most important posts in the country, through which
almost all communication between Canada and New England takes place.  

The presence of a fort at Chambly, as well as that fort's strategic position, explains the governor's choice of it as the site for establishing a barrier. There was also another factor that militated in favor of this site, as may be seen in a memorandum written in 1683.

And the second place [Chambly] by which numerous beaver pelts were diverted to the foreigners, namely in Orange, Manhattan and Boston. [...] There were formerly a fairly large number of settlers there, but most of them have abandoned their farms or become impoverished owing to a lack of support, so that it [this seigneury] has become a refuge for people whose sole purpose is trade with Orange and Manhattan.

Not only was Chambly the last settlement on the route to the English colonies, it also lacked a garrison. The temptation was great for the local settlers to trade their axes and spades for oars and hire themselves out to the Montreal merchants for travel to the English trading posts. In peacetime this was an easy and pleasant means of earning money, if we are to accept the idea that this type of voyage was the dream of the colony's entire younger generation.

In 1683 the governor did not yet have sufficient troops to establish a control post at Chambly. The resumption of war with the Iroquois the preceding year had made this route extremely dangerous, with the result that the volume of trade had dropped off. The war with England which broke out several years later, in 1689, was not of a nature to facilitate a revival, although the author of a memorandum states that no less than 400 000 livres worth of beaver pelts were smuggled through Chambly between 1710 and 1712. This figure seems somewhat inflated, considering that the total value of exports of beaver pelts to France during those 3 years was scarcely more than 70 000 livres. What is important to retain here is that the war did not have the effect of stopping contraband. Until 1701 the prospect of ending one's days in an Iroquois stew pot was a powerful disincentive to making a trip to Albany. But after the treaty of 1701 the route was once again open. The War of the Spanish Succession, which broke out shortly thereafter, must not have overly disrupted this traffic, given that the merchants did not easily accommodate themselves to "nationalistic" constraints. Nevertheless, in the world of trade, peace is not to be scorned, as it ensures stability. Thus the years following 1713 saw a prodigious increase in smuggling, as the correspondence of the colonial authorities testifies. But in comparison with preceding years, the colony, now being better structured, had more substantial forces to control the situation. The authorities counted heavily on the strategic situation of the fort to eliminate or at the very least to curb this traffic substantially. They did not hesitate to use it in their control efforts, which they saw as an excellent means of keeping the garrison occupied in peacetime, and in 1714 the Minister of the Marine wrote in these terms to François Mariauchau d'Esgly, the commander of the fort:

[...] I advise you to apply yourself, while you are at Chambly, to preventing smuggling and trafficking with the English, and to behave in such a manner that I receive only positive reports of your conduct, which will enable me to obtain for you the graces of His Majesty, which must be earned by executing his orders and having others execute them.

By dangling before the commander's eyes the prospect of obtaining a Croix de St-Louis which he was in fact never to obtain, the Minister hoped to dissuade him from any collusion with the fur traffickers.

Chambly aside, the authorities in 1717 commenced sending a detachment of soldiers to Lake Champlain each spring to reinforce the measures taken to control smuggling. In 1731 a wooden fort was built on the south shore of the lake at the place known as Pointe-à-la-Chevelure, so as to prevent the English from realizing their territorial ambitions in this region. From that time onward Pointe-à-la-Chevelure, now equipped with a permanent garrison, was to be the main link in the chain of efforts to control smuggling. Chambly's commandants nevertheless continued to receive orders to take measures to prevent smuggling, but the fort on Lake Champlain that was to be named St-Frédéric in 1737 was more strategically situated.
Seizure of Merchandise: Several Incidents

It is difficult to determine how effective this type of control was, despite two rather spectacular hauls recorded at Chambly. The first took place one afternoon in June 1715 when a soldier in the Chambly garrison, upon returning from hunting, caught sight of some English merchants hidden in the woods near Île Ste-Thérèse. He rushed back to Chambly to tell his superior of his discovery, and the latter immediately sent a detachment of soldiers to seize the merchandise they were carrying. Thus concealed, the merchants were probably awaiting the arrival of a French contact who was to take delivery of the merchandise in exchange for furs. The articles seized consisted of three pieces of material which proved to be the red and blue English scarlets so highly prized by the Indians. They were auctioned off and the proceeds of the sale were split three ways, with one third going to the soldier who discovered the traders, another third to the Hôtel-Dieu of Quebec (a hospital operated by a religious order called the Hospitalières), and the remaining third to the Company.

Three years after this event, the du Monceau affair came along to fuel official correspondence and give the population an excellent topic of conversation for whiling away the evenings of the long Canadian winter. On 5 June 1718 two soldiers from the Chambly garrison, Périgord and Lambert, informed their commander of the presence of a shifty looking person loitering about above the portage road. Sensing that smuggling was involved, the commandant promptly sent his lieutenant, the Sieur de Beaulac, and several soldiers to inspect the area with orders to confiscate anything suspicious. When they reached the spot indicated they discovered "eleven bundles of semi-bleached cloth about one-half ell in width, consisting of a total of 83 pieces measuring from 19 to 22 ells each, and 9 copper pails, together weighing 35 pounds." After a routine report and statement had been drawn up, the bundles reassembled, and so forth, the intendant was preparing to burn all the seized goods in accordance with the 4 June 1719 order of the Council of State when a certain d'Auteuil du Monceau came forward to reclaim the articles, stating that they belonged to him. He had fled to the colony of New York 2 years earlier because of a lettre de cachet that had been issued against him. When the latter document was rescinded d'Auteuil contemplated returning to New France and went to Quebec to ask Vaudreuil for permission to bring a quantity of merchandise back with him. He claimed that during his exile he had earned a great deal of money in the form of a local currency that was not legal tender under the French crown; therefore he asked permission to convert his money into merchandise. Vaudreuil agreed and sent him a passport in which every item that d'Auteuil wanted to bring with him was specified. This was intended to prevent the latter from abusing the privilege granted to him. The passport stipulated that d'Auteuil had to ship his goods to Canada by sea, on a boat that he was to purchase in New York. Upon his arrival at Quebec a lieutenant of the admiralty was to make an inventory of the cargo to determine whether d'Auteuil had in fact kept to the terms of his agreement. By using the Lake Champlain route the latter had infringed his passport, and moreover the items that were confiscated were not listed in it; clearly they were intended as trading articles as they were among the items the most highly prized and sought after by the Indians. With regard to these two infractions d'Auteuil replied that because of his hasty departure from New York, prompted by the fear that he would be arrested by the local naval authorities - he had been obliged to leave a sizable portion of his goods with a shopkeeper. The latter, unaware of the French regulations, had in good faith sent the said goods to Montreal by way of the Richelieu, where they were intercepted by the Chambly garrison. No one was fooled, least of all Vaudreuil or Bégon. Comparing dates, they found it strange that d'Auteuil had arrived at Quebec on 4 October while the seizure at Chambly had taken place on 5 June. They felt that 4 months was too long for such a voyage. Irritated by this matter the Minister ordered Vaudreuil and Bégon to have the ship inspected upon its arrival at Quebec, and added that if it was found to contain a single object not specified in the passport the entire cargo was to be confiscated along with the ship, and "the Sieur d'Auteuil [was to] suffer the penalties for his infractions." It does not appear that d'Auteuil violated his agreement concerning the ship's cargo, but he was unable to recover the cloth and pails that were intercepted at Chambly. The nine pails were given to the Grey Nuns at the General Hospital of Montreal, and the cloth was auctioned off. The proceeds from this
sale went entirely to the informers, soldiers Périgord and Lambert of the Chambly garrison. 19

The Indians Act as Go-betweens

Refusing to be beaten by the proliferation of prohibitions against trading with the English, or more particularly by the measures taken to enforce these prohibitions, the merchants of Montreal resorted to subterfuge to overcome the vigilance of the authorities.

Each year a pilgrimage to the English trading posts was made by Indians who for the reasons noted earlier were more interested in English goods and who in particular wished to obtain the alcohol that was refused to them by law north of the St Lawrence; among them were the "domiciled" Iroquois - i.e. those whom the Jesuits had managed to attract to the French camp between 1667 and 1683 (they had been settled in reserves at Lac des Deux-Montagnes, Lac St-Louis, and Saut aux Recollets, now called Laval des Rapides) - as well as the Abnakis of the Rivière St-François and a number of other allied Indians. Not wishing to alienate them the authorities tolerated this trade, hoping that with patience and time they could be induced to discontinue these exchanges, so detrimental to the interests of the owners of the Compagnie d'Occident. The Montreal merchants were not long in discovering the opportunity that lay before them. It quite naturally occurred to them that they might entrust their furs to these Indians, who had free access to the English trading posts, so that they might make the transactions in their place. Although this arrangement was advantageous for the French, who avoided the risks involved in a trip to Albany, it nevertheless entailed several minor hazards, as Jean Lunn tells us:

It seems curious that large packs of valuable furs and goods should have been entrusted to anyone as notoriously untrustworthy as the Indian, but there was little else that the merchant could do. Moreover, in the legitimate trade very considerable credit was regularly extended by traders to the savages with no really adequate guarantee of repayment. The same Indian names recur constantly in the Sanders correspondence, so, no doubt, the merchants kept employing those savages who had been found to be reasonably faithful, that is to say, those who stole only a percentage of the furs instead of disappearing with the whole lot. Comparatively small losses were fairly constant. According to Sanders, the savages nearly always took out a beaver skin and made up the weight by wetting the furs, or by adding sand to the pack. To judge from the correspondence itself, the Indians usually arrived with the bulk of the shipment intact, but with five or ten pounds of fur missing, and sometimes the loss was more serious. Moreover, the best-intentioned savage in the world might come to grief, for he might be waylaid by English traders who made him drunk, took his furs, and destroyed the letter which he was carrying from his French employer. The practice is clearly analogous to hijacking. The Intendant Hocquart estimated the risk and loss to the Canadian at 10 per cent, in addition to the 10 or 12 per cent paid as wages to the Indian carrier. 20

Having got wind of the scheme the colonial administration, caught unawares, tried unsuccessfully to induce the Indians to refuse to collaborate with the French merchants. The commandants of the garrisons at Chambly and Pointe-à-la-Chevelure were asked to inspect every Indian canoe that passed, [...]

It was known how many pelts an Indian could gather in the course of a winter, and from visiting the canoes it was possible to see whether the load was within acceptable limits. To achieve greater certainty the final date for reaching Albany was set at 30 June, "[..] because at that point they are disposing of
pelts they obtained from hunting, and it may be assumed that the pelts that they bring later belong to Frenchmen using them as go-betweens in order to carry on this trade.\textsuperscript{22}

As might be expected these measures, which were to say the least rigorous and above all arbitrary, leaving far too much room for abuses of authority on the part of the commandants, were not easy to apply. However Vaudreuil had assured the Minister that the domiciled Iroquois would agree to submit to these control measures. They also apparently agreed to allow commandants at Chambly and Pointe-à-la-Chevelure to confiscate all furs in excess of the quantity permitted.\textsuperscript{23} According to Jean Lunn, the Indians used a number of subterfuges to circumvent the commandants' vigilance.

Sometimes they outwitted the commandant at Crown Point by passing repeatedly with small quantities at a time, or by sending empty canoes past the fort while the furs were portaged around behind it. Or, impatient of guile, they might employ force. On one occasion, sixty Indians, meeting the detachment on Lake Champlain simply grasped their tomahawks and informed the Frenchmen that they were going to Albany and were coming back the same way. There was nothing that the French could do about it. Similarly, two hundred domiciled Iroquois with a valuable cargo of beaver forestalled interference at Crown Point by first extorting passports from the Governor, under threat of going to settle among their heathen brethren of the Five Nations.\textsuperscript{24}

In 1737 Hocquart admitted to the Minister that he was powerless to counter the Indians' determination to go to Albany.

You are aware, Monseigneur, of the total freedom of movement that the savages have always enjoyed, and the degree of independence that characterizes their lives. They come into Montreal, and they leave with packs which they claim to own. Similarly, they have until now customarily gone past Chambly and the fort at Pointe-à-la-Chevelure without being inspected, with the exception of two or three incidents which, I am told, occurred long ago. You are surely aware of the difficulty of subjecting these savages to any type of law; the only rules they have are those dictated by their self-interest \ldots\textsuperscript{25}

Only a few seizures of Indian cargoes are known to have taken place in the Richelieu - Lake Champlain area, two of them at Chambly.\textsuperscript{26} Nevertheless each year the governor and the intendant reassured their superior that surveillance at Chambly and on Lake Champlain was as strict as ever, and that they were acting scrupulously in accordance with the King's wishes in this regard.\textsuperscript{27} But despite all these measures illicit trade with Albany never lessened. The colonial government could not take action against it for fear of alienating the native population, a vital mainstay to the survival of New France.

**English Visitors to the Colony**

To minimize commercial exchanges between the two colonies, in 1725 the authorities began to concern themselves with Englishmen travelling to the shores of the St Lawrence under various pretexts, mainly the recovery of old debts. It was common knowledge that in reality they were using their visits to conduct business and meet with potential trading partners to work out the terms of commercial exchanges. In 1731 English merchants wishing to enter the colony were required to carry a passport issued by their governor and to refrain from all business activity during their stay on French territory.\textsuperscript{28} Some time after this regulation was promulgated officials seized 80 pounds of pewterware discovered above the Chambly rapids, having been hidden there by four Dutch merchants who had come to Montreal under the pretext of recovering old debts.\textsuperscript{29} The four "undesirables" were promptly sent home, obviously without their merchandise. Hocquart was not long in discovering the scheme and confided his fears to the Minister: "The fact that a canoe without its crew as well as several pieces of pewterware were seized above the portage road at Chambly owing to Monsieur de Contrecoeur's vigilance suggests to me that this pewterware was not the only merchandise that was being carried, and that those people were not satisfied with receiving payment on their old debts but contracted new ones."\textsuperscript{30}

Weary of this game of hide-and-seek with the English merchants, the colonial authorities simply decided not to tolerate the presence of Englishmen north of the 44th parallel.\textsuperscript{31} In so
deciding they were following through with the policy adopted in 1725. As if to give greater weight to this new regulation a sizable amount of merchandise, valued at more than 700 livres, was seized shortly thereafter at Chambly.32 The commandants at forts Chambly and St-Frédéric were to take particular care to intercept all foreign merchandise that anyone tried to bring into the colony, and to turn back immediately all foreign merchants wishing to spend time in the shadow of the French flag for any reason whatever. If such persons wanted to recover any debts they had to send statements of account showing the amount owing them to the intendant, who would himself collect the said amount and have it sent to them.33

To arouse the garrisons' zeal and maintain the spirit of incrimination that is so useful to those in power, Hocquart dangled the prospect of a reward before the troops, as he explains below:

I have strongly recommended to the commanding officers of these two posts that they make every effort, and I have given them the hope that the Company will compensate them for their pains. Beyond the goods that they seize or have seized under this arrangement, which I shall have confiscated to their profit, the Company shall incur no expense other than a modest bonus for the commanding officers and the soldiers of the two garrisons who are employed in looking after its interests. You may rest assured, Messieurs, that I will see that such bonuses are provided only in instances where your interests are being served and furthered. [...]34

In short, despite several very concrete measures, smuggling continued throughout the life of the regime. Moreover, it would appear never to have decreased. It must be said that the colonial government was badly equipped to combat this type of activity. The geography of the colony was ideally suited for it, and the use of Indians as go-betweens was all that was needed to paralyze the government's efforts. To be sure there were several seizures, but it seems probable that their only effect was to make the offenders more cautious.
At Chambly, a Change of Orientation

The construction of a stone fort at Chambly in 1709 had aroused high hopes. But the war ended shortly after Utrecht, before the fort had even had its ordeal by fire or the opportunity to demonstrate its capacity to respond effectively to a full-scale attack. In 1711 a voice was raised against the weakness of the construction. Six years later the engineer Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros de Lery, who had arrived at Quebec 1 year earlier, in turn expressed doubts about the importance of the new fort. In a memorandum to the Minister he wrote that the English "can reach Fort Chambly, at a distance of seven leagues from the town, without being discovered. Once they reached La Prairie de la Madeleine, two leagues from the town, where they surprised the King's troops. Fort Chambly is so small and has so little defensive capability that they can leave it behind them without fear." He proposed to the Minister that a whole series of improvements be undertaken immediately to increase the fort's effectiveness. The following year the Council of the Marine gave its assent and specified the work to be done. This included raising the curtain on the north side, constructing a covered battery there with a corridor and crenels, redoing all the crenels in the fort, and clearing out the embrasures on the sides of the bastions facing the capitals. The work began in the spring of 1720 and was completed later in the same year, to the great satisfaction of Lery. He now praised the merits of the fort, emphasizing one of the main elements in the history of this fortification, namely its garrison:

It is located six leagues from Montreal, and by reason of its location, it protects the entire district. The English cannot reach Montreal without first taking this post, which is prepared to receive them. If they leave it to their rear and march on Montreal, the garrison can cut off their supply lines, and if they should have to withdraw, it can make their retreat very difficult.

According to this account by Lery the value of the fort resided above all in the strength of its garrison; but this had always been one of its major deficiencies. The minor improvements that had just been carried out had thus accomplished very little for the defence of the colony.

In 1717 the English constructed Fort Oswego on the south shore of Lake Ontario. Alarmed by this encroachment of the English onto territory that they considered to belong to them, the French hastened to build a machicolated redoubt at Pointe-à-la-Chevelure to the south of Lake Champlain. In so doing they hoped to forestall the English by preventing them from establishing a counterpart to Oswego in this region. In 1735, disquieted by increasingly persistent rumors of war, the colonial authorities obtained permission from the Minister to strengthen the fortifications at Pointe-à-la-Chevelure, which were renamed Fort St-Frédéric. As a result Chambly, which had until then been the most important French fortification on the Richelieu, was suddenly relegated to secondary status. As it no longer had to carry the heavy responsibility of protecting New France from the south, Hocquart suggested to the Minister that its maintenance costs be cut by reducing the garrison to the strict minimum, namely a subaltern officer, a sergeant, and five or six soldiers. According to the intendant a larger garrison would have been superfluous, given the work it was required to do.

Today, the only service performed by the garrison consisting of only five officers and thirty soldiers is to mount guard. Sometimes a detachment is sent to Montreal to carry word of what is happening, such as the arrival of foreigners or letters from New England or from Fort St-Frédéric. A garrison of six men would be more than adequate for performing this service and for protecting this small section of the colony.

As might be expected the Minister agreed to this proposal with alacrity, as he did to all proposals of a nature to reduce the colony's expenses. In a memorandum to Beauharnois and Hocquart he explained the reasons that lay behind his decision:

Before Fort St-Frédéric was established, Fort Chambly had to be seen as necessary for protecting the colony from the south, and it was for this reason that His Majesty maintained a large garrison there. But now the said fort is practically useless, it would
seem that it could be withdrawn entirely. But His Majesty considers it inappropriate to do so and prefers not to abandon this fort; it might prove necessary in time of war for storing the most precious belongings of settlers in the vicinity, and for facilitating in the meantime correspondence between Montreal and Fort St-Frédéric.

The facts of the matter clearly reflected this point of view. The establishment of a French presence to the south of Lake Champlain in 1731 had had no effect on the volume of annual expenditures for the maintenance of the fort. Even in 1737 this volume had not fallen off at all. Hocquart's proposal was to make sizable cuts in payroll by reducing the number of men on duty; it did not relate to the actual structure of the fort, as the Minister was careful to note. In the event of an emergency the garrison could always be quickly expanded; but the curtains, if they were allowed to fall into disrepair, would require time and expense to restore. If for the moment the fort was less useful, this would perhaps not always be the case. This explains why even after the arrangements made in 1742 the expense column for the physical maintenance of the fort did not vary. As to the garrison, the Minister reduced it to one officer, one sergeant, and six soldiers. Hocquart planned for the change to take place on 1 October 1742.

Last, to complete the
change in orientation Fort Chambly was stripped of its cannons, which were then moved to Fort St-Frédéric. All these measures taken on the eve of a new conflict between France and England clearly show that for Fort Chambly, this was the end of an era - the logical outcome of a series of developments that began with the construction of a wooden fort at Pointe-à-la-Chevelure. And yet it should not be concluded too readily that Chambly had become totally useless, for this was far from being the case.

Divested of the primary function inherent in all fortifications, Fort Chambly underwent a certain decline after 1742. During the War of the Austrian Succession it served mainly as a bivouac for troops travelling from Montreal to Fort St-Frédéric and as a rallying place for war parties - a function it had always had, along with its role as a depot for forts further out. Because this war was waged primarily in Acadia and the West, and the English made no attempt to invade Canada, the fort's importance steadily declined and its role in military life became increasingly uncertain and tenuous.

With the war of the Conquest Chambly was to become once again an important tool in the hands of the governors, who were surely grateful for its presence, even if they might have wished its walls were thicker. It was to develop to an extent never previously achieved - the fourfold function of depot, communications link, bivouac, and rallying place. During the final years of the regime these roles proved to be extremely important. As early as 1753 Franquet had accurately gauged its value when he wrote:

Since the establishment of Fort St-Frédéric, it has ceased to be one of our foremost possessions, and this consideration gave rise to the idea that it should be destroyed. This must not be allowed to happen. It supports navigation on the Richelieu River, serves as a shelter for local habitants, provides a secure retreat for troops posted further along; in short, despite its secondary status, it can be used to fully as great advantage as if it were of the first order.

This new orientation of Fort Chambly, which had been emerging since the construction of Fort St-Frédéric, is largely reflected in the development of the road system in the Richelieu region. To obtain a clear understanding of the phenomenon it is necessary to pause for a moment and examine the major features of this development.

The Development of the Road System and the Problem of Provisioning

Prior to 1713 relatively little energy was devoted to road construction, not only in the Richelieu Valley but throughout New France as a whole. In his memorandum of 1704
Levasseur de Néré left us a fairly detailed description of the state of the roads linking Chambly to Longueuil and La Prairie. The years that followed brought no further development in this area. The lessons to be learned from the last war must have caused the colonial authorities to give some thought to this matter, but because war was not imminent they chose not to invest what little money they had at their disposal in road construction for military purposes. Moreover, the absence of advanced posts upstream from Chambly masked the importance of such a road. In 1731, with the construction of a wooden fort at Pointe-à-la-Chevelure and the recent appointment of the dynamic and enterprising Lanouiller de Boiscler as governor of New France (under the Ancien Régime the Grand Voyer was the official responsible for general administration of the public road system), the situation changed markedly.

Fort St-Frédéric posed a serious problem in terms of provisioning. Because of its location at the very doorstep of the English colonies and its isolated position at the far end of Lake Champlain, it was felt necessary to be able to come to its aid as quickly as possible. The water route involved a long detour by way of Sorel and a difficult portage at Chambly. In 1739 Lanouiller de Boiscler ordered construction of a road linking Chambly to La Prairie. To be sure, an overland route between these two points already existed, but it appears to have been no more than a trail. It had in poor condition in 1704, and nothing had been done to improve it since then. Boiscler believed that the new road would not only accelerate communication between Montreal and St-Frédéric but would also encourage settlers to establish themselves along the route, as the land bordering it was well-suited for farming. The road work appears to have gone fairly well, to judge from the following comment by Boiscler: "Monsieur Hocquart travelled there by calèche this summer and used the same vehicle to return to Montreal." It is not known whether this road was used to transport supplies or served simply for pedestrian movement. In any event river transport continued to be used widely for replenishing Chambly and St-Frédéric, as may be seen in a memorandum by Lery. The latter proposed to the Minister a means of accelerating the replenishment of St-Frédéric while lowering the transportation costs. There already existed a road linking La Prairie and La Bataille (now called St-Luc). Extending this road to St-Jean would make it possible to travel directly and quickly between there and La Prairie and Montreal without going by way of Sorel and Chambly, as was done at the time. The route proposed by Lery owed its importance to the fact that St-Frédéric obtained its provisions from the seigneury of La Prairie. As regards Chambly, before 1713 it received its provisions from the royal depot at Quebec. Thereafter the development of the seigneury enabled the garrison to obtain its nonmilitary supplies directly from the local inhabitants. In 1720 Chaussegros de Lery wrote that "the inhabitants [of Chambly] raise a great deal of wheat, which feeds the garrison stationed there [...]"

In addition, the commandant, officers, and soldiers maintained gardens on the land surrounding the fort. St-Frédéric's situation, however, was more difficult. Because the fort was not located in proximity to cultivated land it had to depend on external sources for its subsistence, hence the problem of provisioning and its organization. Until then provisions had been carted from La Prairie to Montreal, then loaded onto boats and shipped down the St Lawrence to Sorel, and from there down the Richelieu to Chambly. From there they were carried overland to St-Jean, then loaded onto a small boat that carried them to St-Frédéric. In support of his proposal Lery stated that the inhabitants of La Prairie would not be opposed to a change of route. And the royal treasury would surely benefit from it. Although the proposal was never acted upon it nevertheless enables us to see how provisions were transported to Fort St-Frédéric, a process in which Chambly played a major role in that sizable quantities of provisions and military supplies destined for the garrison on Lake Champlain were stored there. But Chambly was far from St-Frédéric, and it was necessary to find means of further shortening the time required for transport. It was for this reason that Sorel and Chambly. From there they were carried overland to St-Jean, then loaded onto a small boat that carried them to St-Frédéric. The overland transport of provisions from
Chambly to St-Jean necessitated the presence of a road between these two points. Such a route had existed since 1665, but it had not been maintained in the intervening years. After 1731 this road acquired great strategic importance. In the absence of a satisfactory communication route between Montreal and St-Jean the success of provisioning efforts depended on it. With the establishment of Fort St-Frédéric it began to receive more attention, and to be better maintained. In 1740 Hocquart instructed Lanouiller de Boiscler to improve the layout of the road. He planned to have the actual work begin during the winter of 1742. In response to this request the Minister asked the intendant to make sure that the project would be viable before taking any action on it.

Last, there was a road linking Chambly to Longueuil. In 1704 Levasseur stated that it was in fairly poor condition. The situation did not improve with time, for in 1725 the author of a memorandum strongly recommended the construction of a road between Chambly and Longueuil to improve communications between Montreal and Chambly. He wrote that "something must be done to ensure that Montreal and Chambly can protect each other and defend the great number of inhabitants between these two points." For this purpose he recommended that a road be opened. Seven years later the Baron de Longueuil called for the same thing, asking the Minister to grant funds for the opening of such a road. No
action was taken in response to these initiatives, other than some minor maintenance activity.26

After the construction of Fort St-Jean, Chambly experienced a period of uncertainty, which was to come to an end in 1754. During the war of the Conquest no one gave any further thought to getting rid of the fort, notwithstanding uncomplementary references to it by Montcalm and Doreil. The former wrote in July 1758, "St-Frédéric, St-Jean and Chambly are not even worthy of being called bad forts."27 Doreil expressed a similar opinion, describing forts St-Jean and Chambly as "miserable dumps."28

During the war of the Conquest the growing determination of the English to be done with their rival put New France under enormous pressure. Even though the events were at first taking place in far-off Ohio, the English colonies were increasingly turning their attention to the north. They felt that it was necessary to "destroy with a single blow this power which has for so long harassed us and threatened us with destruction. Delenda est Carthago; Canada must be destroyed. This is the sovereign's motto. Let it spread along our shores and penetrate our forests...."29

According to this policy the English offensive extended over three fronts: in the east against Louisbourg and then Quebec; in the west against forts Duquesne, Niagara, and Frontenac; and in the center against Carillon and St-Frédéric. Contrary to past conflicts - especially the War of the Austrian Succession, which was waged far away - the theater of operations moved ever closer to the center of the colony. Chambly gradually found itself at the heart of the conflict and played a major role in communications between Montreal and all the posts on the Richelieu. Moreover, the main lines of communication converged on it. Lévis, Montcalm, Vaudreuil, Bourlamaque, Bougainville, and other commanding officers stopped there during their tours of the various posts. Troops stopped there regularly to take on supplies. They sometimes stayed there several days before moving on. In its stores the fort contained a large quantity of provisions and war materiel. Certain regiments made it their winter quarters.

If Carillon and St-Frédéric were to be maintained, it was necessary to be able to resupply them adequately and in short order. To make this possible construction was begun on several roads. After the arrival of the Troupes de Terre in 1755 this activity was intensified, and once a regiment was no longer in the field it was assigned to road construction or maintenance. For example, in 1757 the Guyenne regiment worked on the road linking Chambly and St-Jean until it went to its winter quarters.30 It had already been engaged in this task prior to going into the field the preceding spring. The quality of the work seemed to be a matter of pride for the military authorities; Montcalm described it as solid and said that the road was being built "in the style of the roads of France."31 As regards the other roads, they appear to have deteriorated significantly. Having travelled from La Prairie to Chambly, Lévis commented, "These roads are terrible; almost all of us tripped, although no one was seriously hurt."32 The route linking Chambly and Longueuil was hardly better. Bourlamaque, while finding it tolerable for people travelling on foot, nevertheless described it as poor.33

The particular attention given to the portage road between Chambly and St-Jean may be explained by the fact that all shipments of provisions passed through Chambly.34 The presence of 24 boats in the Chambly basin in 1757 tends to confirm the importance of this place as a transit point.35

This difficult problem of provisioning weighed heavily on the colony and absorbed much of its energies. For example, in 1758 Bigot wrote that 3000 men were engaged in this task throughout the colony.36 Not only did this obligation deprive the militia of its best elements, but it also tragically depopulated the countryside, resulting in a significant drop in production concurrent with a sizable increase in consumption. The calling up of the militia dealt the final blow to the availability of manpower in the countryside. Steele clearly grasped the situation when he wrote:

The Canadians faced a cruel dilemma: they had to retain the initiative in order to protect the crops, but they had to withdraw early, in order to harvest the crops. While they could not push the offensive far enough to do more than prolong the war, neither could they afford to be thrown on the defensive, for the British regulars had no need to break off their offensive in August to go harvesting.37

Moreover the colony experienced three bad harvests in a row from 1756 to 1758.38 All this, along with the effectiveness of the English navy in intercepting supply convoys.
sailing from France, constituted the ingredients of a catastrophe. And in the final analysis, as Frégault points out, it was in this arena that the war of the Conquest was waged.

A modern conflict, the war of the Conquest was not won solely on the battlefield. It was also waged in the offices of financiers and tax collectors, in bureaus of exchange and commerce, at ports and shipyards, in ironworks and arms factories, and even on farms and in salting establishments. Because of its capacity to produce and exchange, and because of its ability to move its well-nourished regiments and its formidable artillery to the front lines, the British Empire was to prevail over its rival.39

More solid fortifications along the Richelieu would have postponed the fateful date by a year, but no more.

The Capture of the Forts on the Richelieu and the Fall of the Colony

The arrival of English reinforcements at Quebec in 1760, shortly after the battle of Ste-Foy, forced Lévis to pull back toward Montreal, where three British armies were now converging. This time there was clearly no way to retrieve the situation. A general
capitulation was now only a matter of time. In the summer of 1760 Haviland's army, which was moving down the Richelieu, arrived opposite Ile-aux-Noix. The morale of the French troops was collapsing, and desertions were decimating the ranks. In May Lévis had already complained that the militiamen had all gone home without leave, and their example had been followed by a great number of married soldiers. In August Bourlamaque noted that the inhabitants no longer showed the will to fight. The pressure on Ile-aux-Noix became too great, and Bougainville was forced to retreat on orders from Vaudreuil. He left several soldiers there under the command of Louis Dazemard de Lusignan, whom he ordered to withdraw to Chambly and assume command there if the English attacks against the island became too persistent. On Vaudreuil's instructions, Bougainville at the same time sent 50 Troupes de la Marine to Fort Chambly. It was they whom the English encountered there several days later. Shortly thereafter Lusignan abandoned Ile-aux-Noix to Haviland's troops. The English brigadier promptly sent a detachment to take possession of St-Jean and Ste-Thérèse. At the same time Colonel Darby was moving toward Chambly to force its surrender. According to Major Robert Rogers, Darby had only a little light artillery with him. He presented himself before the fort, and Lusignan, who had recently arrived from Ile-aux-Noix, waited for the English to mount their battery and dig trenches before he surrendered, on 1 September 1760. Perceiving that his forces were too weak numerically to put up serious resistance and that the walls of the fort were unable to provide adequate protection, Lusignan had sought only to delay the advance of the English army for as long as possible.

At the time of surrender there were some 150 persons in the fort. This figure included the garrison, consisting of approximately 50 men according to Rogers, and civilians. The attackers captured a sizable stock of provisions and 12 cannons, several of which had been taken earlier from the English. Because New France did not have an abundant supply of artillery, the military authorities frequently had to transport cannons from one place to another. It was not unusual for cannons to be stored at Chambly before being sent elsewhere.

After the fall of the latter fort the English troops set out for Montreal via La Prairie to rally with Murray's army outside the city. Too weak to resist any longer, Vaudreuil surrendered on 8 September 1760. Pending the establishment of peace in Europe, an English garrison was sent to occupy Chambly; it was posted at the fort on a permanent basis in 1763, when Canada officially became a British possession.
THE TROUPES FRANCHES DE LA MARINE IN GARRISON AT CHAMBLY, 1683-1760

Before beginning this chapter I should like to call several points regarding it to the reader's attention. The overly narrow limits imposed by the paucity of documentation threatened to lead the study to a dead end and reduce the historical account to a chronological series of anecdotes. To obtain truly significant results it would have been necessary to expand the subject to include all the forts in New France. Only on this scale would it have been possible to depict in detail the life led by the Troupes de la Marine in the royal forts. And even then there would have been sizable gaps.

With regard to the various archives involved (Colonies, Marine, War), which, incidentally, have already been thoroughly studied, the problem of documentation is a real one. On a subject as specific as the one that concerns us here, the silence of this type of document is disheartening. To be sure a handful of interesting facts can be gleaned here and there, but if one wishes to go beyond the organization of the troops as such and tackle the physical, mental, and spiritual aspects of their lives or follow the men through their daily activities, particularly in the forts, the information available is so disparate and incoherent that it is difficult to make use of it.

The judicial archives seem to be more promising in this respect. The various efforts that have been made to date to draw on these sources have been fairly fruitful. But to obtain substantial results it would be necessary to make an exhaustive study of them.

This leaves the examination of notarial records, which for a sole researcher is an extremely onerous undertaking, the outcome of which is by no means assured. In the context of this research it was not possible to proceed in this direction. Time constraints served to limit the study in two respects, namely with regard to the sources used (official archives) and the subject itself (the garrison at Fort Chambly). Although this chapter clearly has weaknesses, I nevertheless felt it important to include it for the benefit of the numerous persons involved in developing Fort Chambly. An examination of the various facets of the subject not dealt with here will be reserved for a subsequent study.

Changes in Troop Strength over Time

The garrison stationed at Fort Chambly prior to 1760 was not a constant and unvarying presence. In general its size reflected the evolution of the military situation, but with a brief time lag, as with a watch that is badly set. At crucial times the garrison was somewhat expanded, although this was not always the case. As explained in the preceding chapter, the difficulties which beset Chambly reigned throughout the colony and centered on the lack of troops. Whether during the darkest hours of New France or amid the attempts to stop smuggling, the numerical weakness of the garrison was always a problem.

As early as the winter of 1665-66 the three forts already constructed on the Richelieu harbored an appreciable number of soldiers from the Carignan regiment. Activity in these forts appears to have been fairly intense until the treaty of 1667 with the Iroquois, after which it declined. Chambly dropped from 70 men in 1671 to total abandonment in subsequent years. In 1679 no garrison was stationed at the fort, and Frontenac seriously considered installing one to clamp down on smuggling. A shortage of soldiers forced him to postpone this project until 1681, when he asked the Minister for troops for this purpose. His appeals fell on deaf ears until 2 years later, when deteriorating relations with the Iroquois led to the sending of the first two contingents of the Troupes franches de la Marine.

It was this army corps that was to be most closely associated with the Fort Chambly garrison. It is not known whether a detachment reached Chambly the same year. The first year for which we can confirm its presence there is 1685. One year later the garrison consisted of 18 men. Thereafter the fort was continually occupied until 1760, with a major reduction in 1742. Until then a company had always been stationed there.

From 1687 to 1699 the companies consisted of 50 men each, including officers. But because it was difficult to maintain full companies, owing to the low level of recruitment, in 1699 the King ordered that the number of companies in service in the colony be reduced and that the number of soldiers in each company be lowered to 30. It was hoped that by decreasing the number of men per company and drawing men from those companies that had been eliminated, it would be possible to top up the remaining units and improve the
functioning of the army. Despite all these cuts the goal was never achieved. This explains why Chambly generally had a garrison of some 20-25 men, with several civilians such as the chaplain, the storeman, and a baker. A company would be stationed there for several years - four or five on average - before being relieved by another one.4

In 1741 the intendant Hocquart, wishing to cut expenses in the colony, suggested to the Minister that the garrison at Fort Chambly be reduced to the strict minimum. He proposed a unit consisting of five or six soldiers, a sergeant, and a former officer, arguing that the garrison's responsibilities were insufficient to justify the presence of a larger force. Only too happy to lessen the drain on the royal coffers the Minister speedily accepted this proposal, and it took effect in 1742. Henceforth a former officer who had either retired or been disabled in combat was to be placed in command of the garrison. This was current practice in France. In the 17th century attention began to be given in Europe to the fate of soldiers who had grown too old, or had been disabled in combat, etc. In the beginning makeshift solutions were found, such as sending the soldiers to monasteries. Veterans were also stationed in fortresses that were behind the lines and of little strategic importance. All these efforts culminated in the creation of the Hôtel des Invalides. In this hospital, as André Corvisier explains, disabled veterans were divided into three classes: officers, subaltern officers and soldiers. The latter were obliged to perform such tasks as knitting stockings. Strict discipline was imposed on these men, who were grouped into companies of subaltern officers and soldiers. Soon there were too many invalids to be accommodated at the Hôtel. Those who were still capable of sedentary military service were selected to form detached companies of disabled veterans to be stationed in the fortresses of the kingdom.5

This is probably what happened at Chambly in 1742. For example, Hertel de Rouville and Daneau de Muy, two former captains who had long served in the colony, found themselves at Chambly at the end of their careers. This arrangement made by the intendant did not last for long. In 1744 the quarrel over the succession to the throne of Austria offered the colonies in America a fresh opportunity to settle their differences. The danger that the English colonies would invade Canada forced the colonial authorities to revise their positions. Governor Beauharnois urged the Minister to send him reinforcements sufficient to considerably expand the garrison at Chambly. His appeals were heard, for in 1747 there were 25 men stationed at Chambly,6 safeguarding the honor of France and the economic interests of the French merchants. When the war ended the garrison was not reduced to more modest proportions, to judge from the fact that in 1751 it contained some 50 soldiers. This sizable figure may be explained by the desire of the colonial authorities to put a stop to smuggling, which was draining off a significant portion of the furs destined for the "Compagnie d'Occident" (the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales). The price and the quality of the merchandise offered by the English merchants of Albany were of more than passing interest to our fur collectors.

For the final years of the regime we lack sufficient data to estimate the size of the garrison; it seems likely, in any case, that it varied. Because Chambly was a major bivouac and provisioning point, the comings and goings of troops considerably animated the day-to-day life of the place and gave it a particular character devoid of the monotony usually associated with garrison life at remote outposts. After the arrival of the Troupes de Terre in 1755 it served as winter quarters for some of the new regiments. The presence of passing troops is, moreover, a constant in the history of Fort Chambly. In 1709, for example, more than 1600 men camped at the foot of the fort.7 Two years later, during the second English invasion attempt, several hundred men were to be found within its sheltering walls.8 In peacetime there was the passage of supply convoys and troops en route to Lake Champlain, the comings and goings of Indians trading their pelts in Albany, the almost continual presence of specialized workers at the fort, and the numerous contacts that the soldiers maintained with the inhabitants of the area; all these activities strongly suggest that garrison life at Chambly, particularly during the 18th century, was not as hermetic as one might think.

Civilian Employees

To complete our inventory of the occupants of the fort it now remains to speak of
beyond doubt, but after that date all traces of several other persons who provided what might be termed essential services. First among them was the guardian of souls, the chaplain. During the construction of the fort a representative of the clergy was on hand in the person of Father Chaumonot. Until 1667 the presence of a priest within the garrison is beyond doubt, but after that date all traces of such an individual are lost. In 1683 the presence of a missionary priest at Chambly was noted, but it is not known whether there was a garrison at the fort at that time. Nor is it known whether the priest inhabited the fort or lived among the population that he served. But it is certain that a chaplain was attached to the garrison from 1691 until 1 October 1742, at which time the priest serving in this capacity was withdrawn from the fort. It will be recalled that at that time, on the suggestion of the intendant Hocquart, the King ordered that the garrison be reduced. At the same time he wrote, by the hand of his Minister, "[...] and since the church which has been constructed in the parish of Chambly is close enough for the garrison to do without a chaplain, His Majesty trusts that the Sieur Hocquart will have eliminated the expense of maintaining one." The following year the chaplain disappeared from the annual statement of expenses for Fort Chambly.

After the guardian of souls came the guardian of earthly goods: the storeman. The latter, reporting directly to the intendant, was responsible for keeping track of royal assets stored in one of the towns or the various posts scattered throughout the colony, and for distributing them to the appropriate parties in accordance with requests already approved by the intendant. At Chambly the storeman saw to it that rations, uniforms, blankets, guns, powder, and so forth were distributed to the soldiers. He provided passing troops with the equipment necessary for an expedition, utilizing a list that had been carefully prepared or verified in advance by the intendant or his clerk. He also kept guard over materiel which was kept in the fort's stores and destined for more advanced posts such as St-Jean, St-Frédéric, and later Carillon. The storeman had to keep strict accounts of the entry and exit of merchandise and submit reports on this matter to the intendant. Sometimes there were clashes between the commandant of the fort and the storeman concerning the sale of brandy, as occurred at Fort St-Frédéric in 1752. Each wanted to control this very lucrative business, and the officer in charge of the garrison often used his powers to force the storeman to close up shop. The latter complained to the intendant, and these interminable quarrels ended only with the departure of one of the antagonists. Although there is no record of such a phenomenon at Chambly, it was very common throughout the colony. Franquet, in his Voyages et Mémoires, stresses this fact and proposes measures to avoid such conflicts.

In 1742 the storeman was affected by the reorganization that Fort Chambly underwent. His function was not eliminated but was combined with another, that of baker. A baker had been in service at the fort since at least 1699, each day baking the garrison's bread. In the stone fort of 1709 two ovens had been constructed for this purpose, probably in anticipation of a large garrison should the need for one ever arise. Since in actuality the garrison never reached very large proportions, it is quite possible that one of the ovens was never used. The arrangement proposed by Hocquart and approved by the Minister did not last very long, for starting in 1747 the fort harbored a regular garrison, consisting of 30 men. Despite doubts regarding it after 1742, Chambly regained some of its importance several years later, owing to its strategic position and the lack of adequate structures in the area. As a result of this new lease on the fort's life, one man alone could no longer bake the bread needed to supply the garrison and also ensure that the King's stores were in proper order. In 1751 the two tasks once again became officially distinct. It should also be noted that between 1742 and 1752 the storeman-baker, as he was known, had a helper to assist him in his various tasks. This arrangement was less costly to the Crown as a helper received only 120 livres per year, while a baker was paid 300.

Because of the discretion of the sources regarding the work of the storeman at Chambly, this activity seemed destined to be forever obscured by the shifting sands of time. But fortunately at the last minute an entirely commendable action was taken that was to result in a historical record indicating the advantages and disadvantages of this obscure occupation. During the winter of 1757-58 the person performing these duties was arrested along with his counterparts at St-Jean and Ste-Thérèse, "[...] having been found guilty of having engaged in mischief involving 60 thousand francs." These wily characters were charged with "[...] having received pre-
sents, as a consequence of which they drew up and certified accounts showing individual provisions and rations in excess of actual stocks in the forts in which they were employed. It must be said that the temptation was great. Bigot's gang had opened a door to all sorts of fraud, and the total absence of control encouraged employees of the State to try their chances before the end that was felt to be near. During the final years many highly placed officials behaved like pillagers in a conquered land. The task of our two partners in crime (for there were two at Chambly who took part in this affair) was made all the easier by the complicity of the commandant, Hertel de Rouville, and a certain Sacquespee, an officer and local land-owner. They too were brought to justice, in Paris in 1763, before the Châtelet Commission, which was responsible for inquiring into the Canada Affair. They were accused of "having also received gifts, as a consequence of which they validated the said padded accounts; in addition, the said Rouville is suspected of having padded other accounts in which false entries were made respecting supplies of rations and individual provisions distributed to troops in winter quarters during the campaigns." They received penalties that were judged to be proportionate to the seriousness of their "crimes."

For atonement and other causes, we have banished the said [...] Dumoulin and Villefranche [...] and Rouville from the City, Provostship and Viscounty of Paris for three years, ordering them to observe their banishment under the penalties imposed by decree of the King; we further order, in payment to the King, the said [...] Dumoulin and Villefranche [...] a fine of fifty livres [...] Rouville [...] a fine of twenty livres [...] shall be the present penalty [...] transcribed on a board which shall be attached to a post to be implanted for this purpose by the enforcer of high justice in the Place de Grève [...].

Before ending this brief survey of civilian employees at the fort we should note the intermittent presence of a mass of laborers and specialized workers such as blacksmiths, locksmiths, masons, cart-drivers, and laundresses, hired to perform a specific repair, construction, or maintenance task.

Living Conditions

During the first years of the French occupation of the St Lawrence Valley the worst enemy the new arrivals faced was undoubtedly the cold. But once they had undergone the devastating assaults of the Laurentian winter they gradually learned to adapt to the climatic conditions, and they strove to improve their heating techniques so as to combat more effectively this natural enemy. With improvements in the food supply and what they had learned from native medicine, they were able in time to envisage the approach of winter without apprehension. By 1665 the French had achieved a certain degree of adaptation, and for the habitant, provided that he had the means to cope with it, winter no longer constituted a major obstacle. However, this was not the case with soldiers in service to the King. Some of them were obliged to serve in a succession of forts scattered throughout the colony. In the winter of 1665-66 several companies of the Carignan regiment took up winter quarters in the forts that had already been built along the Richelieu River. Very little is known about these beginnings. Although this lack of information prevents us from assembling a detailed picture of these winter quarters, certain allusions provide a strong image of the dreadful living conditions of these soldiers and the fate that awaited them. In a letter to Tracy and Courcelles, Talon sets out the arguments in favor of taking immediate military action against the Iroquois as opposed to a delay. Among other points, he noted "... that inevitably, the winter, which is always harsh in this country, will take the lives of several soldiers, and will weaken many others; to say nothing of the fact that the inconveniences that it causes may make them less able to support the fatigue of combat." This cold calculation on the part of Talon suggests that the garrisons serving in the royal forts did not have an easy life. Constructed in haste, the forts on the Richelieu must not have provided ideal accommodation. To understand fully the intendants' assertion regarding the mortality associated with winter, one need only refer to Dollier de Casson's poignant description of the winter of 1666-67 at Fort Ste-Anne, which is reproduced in the Appendix. At Chambly the garrison was apparently no better off. At the end of his account Dollier de Casson draws the reader's attention to the efforts of the General Hospital of Montreal to look after the soldiers.
that the military authorities at Fort Ste-Anne had managed to send back to the town.

I must say beyond this that the Hospital of Montreal distinguished itself by the assortment of sick persons that it received from there, to whom it rendered so many services in treating their illness that it deserves too much praise to pass over it in silence - as with the great number of sick and wounded that it received all last year from forts St-Louis and St-Jean, to say nothing of those from the little army of Monsieur de Courcelles, who on his return fortunately found this place for his sick and wounded, after that terrible war of the winter that we neglected to mention in its place.20

This little sentence says a great deal about the precarious situation of the soldiers at Chambly. And yet there was no shortage of firewood. During the early years of the French presence in the Richelieu Valley, the proximity of the woods made the acquisition of fuel fairly easy. But while this proximity and abundance of firewood were in themselves reassuring, it was nevertheless necessary to be able to go out and gather the wood. In wartime, particularly during the French-Iroquois conflicts, this could be an especially risky activity, and it must not have been undertaken with complete ease of mind. Later, with the retreat of the forest, the problem of transport was added and it made this chore, which of course was the responsibility of the garrison, all the more laborious. The soldiers were required to cut the firewood needed for cooking and for heating their quarters and those of their officers. The difficulties of this task must have been substantial ones, for Longueuil, acting governor after the death of Vaudreuil, and the intendant Bégon complained of them to the Minister.

They have in this matter shown you that too much wood is being consumed, and this greatly tires the soldiers of the garrison who are obliged to gather it. Eleven fires must be maintained, namely three for the commandant, two for the guardroom, one for the chaplain, two for the Sieur de Bragelonne, lieutenant, one for the Sieur de Beaulac, ensign, and one for the Sieur de Montcour, also an ensign.21

To improve the situation they suggested to the Minister that the number of fires maintained in the fort be reduced, and that to this end, "there being only two unmarried officers besides the commandant, they could share a room and would require only one fire."22 The Minister, always partial to budget cuts, was highly receptive to such a proposal and emphatically approved it.23 It is not clear that this arrangement was a lasting one, for the garrison is known to have undergone sizable fluctuations several years later. Reduced to 8 men in 1742, it was expanded again to 25 men in 1747 and to 50 in 1751. Last, it should be noted that although cutting the wood was the chore of the soldiers, the task of hauling it, for several years at least, was contracted out to inhabitants of the area. At least this is what occurred between 1731 and 1735. On the basis of recent events at Fort St-Frédéric, Franquet in 1752 suggested that the cutting operations also be contracted out:

Lastly, since all soldiers serving in companies are obliged to cut each winter fifteen cords of wood at a price of twenty to thirty sous for their own heating as well as that of the officers and all the employees in this fort, and since this obligation is repugnant to them and causes them to make up their minds to desert - three last year and five this year went over to the English and stated that this chore was what caused them to do so - we feel fairly strongly that they should be exempted from this duty and that the wood indispensable for heating should be harvested at the King's expense in the form mentioned in the memorandum of the Court.24

There can be little doubt that a matter that caused the St-Frédéric garrison to complain so vociferously did not leave the soldiers at Chambly indifferent. There is no evidence that the authorities acceded to Franquet's wishes. In any event it was a little late to take action.

It is possible that living conditions improved over time, particularly with the construction of a stone fort in 1709. And because soldiers had the opportunity to go hunting and fishing and cultivate gardens, they may have been able to improve the quality of their food. As early as 1667 Talon wrote in this regard: "These troops have no other task than to guard the posts assigned to them. They go hunting and cultivate land, either for themselves or
for the inhabitants. They cannot commit any act of hostility against the Iroquois, so long as these savages keep the peace that the King saw fit to grant to them. In 1725 the soldiers were still tending garden plots, and it would appear that this was a common practice among troops throughout the colony.

The physical hardships of the early period were combined with the fear of the enemy. The soldiers were aware of what would happen to them if they were captured alive by the Iroquois. Since their arrival they had had ample time to familiarize themselves with all the stories about Frenchmen or allied Indians who had been captured by the Iroquois and then burned alive amidst unspeakable torments. In wartime this fear must have caused sufficient anguish to destroy the soldier's mental balance. Denonville wrote on this subject in 1688, at the height of the second great French-Iroquois war:

The difficulties of maintaining remote outposts in heavily forested regions amidst enemies are so great, along with the suffering engendered by scurvy, that one cannot conceive them unless one has experienced them, as we did this past year: for when a person can go no further than half the range of a gun without running the risk of being killed by a savage hiding behind a tree, this so distresses the soldiers that they soon fall ill. We believe that this is the main reason for the level of mortality in the forts, a matter of excessive confinement, in addition to the salted meat that they must eat.

In the medical taxonomy of the day this anguish of which Denonville speaks was known as "nostalgia." Corvisier writes,

Physicians considered it an illness. A man suffering from it lost his appetite and his willpower. Nostalgia tended to strike mountain dwellers or people isolated by reason of their dialect. It is less common in units based on territorial recruitment, but when nostalgia strikes them, it is likely to be more contagious.

Often, this disease was fatal.

In such a situation desertion was scarcely a viable alternative to military service. Often obliged to take refuge in the forest, deserters ran the risk of rushing straight into the mouth of the dragon by getting caught by the Iroquois. After the treaty of 1701 with the latter, desertion became more tempting. The possibility of taking refuge in the English colonies and from there returning to France incognito must have attracted more than one soldier. Prior to 1701, however, it is difficult to imagine a French soldier appearing before the Council of the Five Nations to obtain a residence permit. Unfortunately there are at present no statistics on desertion in New France, and it seems unlikely that there ever will be. In this sphere our findings are strictly qualitative in nature. The magnitude of the phenomenon may be gauged by the numerous complaints made by the governors in their correspondence, as well as the number of amnesties announced by the Minister.

The question of living conditions in the royal posts is a difficult one to discuss given the current level of knowledge; practically nothing has been written on this subject. It would, however, be an interesting subject to explore. In order not to distort such a study the phenomenon should be examined in its actual historical context, with all its components. For example, it is of little use to know the salary earned by a soldier if we do not know what it represented in terms of purchasing power. It would also be necessary to be able to compare this salary with the wages earned by a laborer. Before 1713 a soldier's gross salary stood at 9 livres per month. This amount was subject to a series of deductions to pay for the soldier's clothing and food, as well as the salary of the officers. At month's end our man was left with a net salary of 1 livre and 19 sols - a pittance compared with the 90 livres for a captain or 60 for a lieutenant. In 1749 the soldier's gross earnings were the same, but his net salary had risen to 6 livres and 19 sols. In the civilian sphere a laborer in 1730 could earn 30 sols per day, which would represent between 20 and 35 livres per month, depending on the number of days worked. Tradesmen received much more. On the other hand civilians had to pay for their own lodging, food, heat, and clothing. What remained after they had paid these expenses? Were they better or worse off than the soldier? With fluctuations in prices was the civilian laborer better equipped to survive? It is true that even in a period of inflation the soldier could be sure of being fed. But did the rise in prices affect the quality and quantity of food he was given? These and other questions remain unanswered. Economic historians have preferred to study the profits.
and losses of large companies or to examine general economic conditions or structures rather than to look into the living conditions of 95% of the population (both civilian and military). Research in this area would enable us to see how the soldier's material condition compared with that of other workers and to discern his place on the socio-economic ladder. Thereafter this eternally invisible member of society could be integrated into studies analyzing the relationships between the various social classes.

The Occupations of the Soldiers at Chambly: A Brief Sketch

Details concerning the use the soldiers at Chambly made of their time do not abound. With the fragments of information gleaned from various sources it is not possible to reconstruct the full range of tasks they performed from dawn to dusk. Nevertheless this information is sufficient to give us a good idea of the soldiers' main activities, even though we cannot arrange them in a daily chronological order or determine the amount of time allocated to each of them.

It is not known how much time the soldiers at Chambly spent in military exercises such as mounting guard or passing in review. In principle the latter exercise was performed twice daily. A sergeant was supposed to report the disappearance of any soldier who had been gone for more than 12 hours. If one of his men slipped between his fingers and failed to report within the time limit provided, the sergeant fined him 6 livres. Such an offence could also earn the soldier a demotion.

Beyond these purely military activities the soldiers were required to perform certain chores such as cutting firewood. The construction and maintenance of roads in a highly militarized zone such as the Richelieu Valley was also generally their responsibility. They were sometimes assigned to maintenance of the fort, performing several minor tasks such as cleaning the yard or the surroundings. In return for this work they received a salary supplement ranging from 3 to 12 sols per day, depending on the nature of the task. Generally more specialized workers were assigned to more complicated tasks involving a trade, such as metalwork, locksmithery, carpentry, joinery, masonry, etc. However it happened that some soldiers had learned a trade before enlisting or being enlisted, and they could occasionally be given more specialized tasks, although in that case they received only two-thirds the salary of a civilian tradesman.

According to an account given the intendant Hocquart, purely military tasks did not take up a very sizable proportion of the garrison's time.

Today, the only service performed by the garrison consisting of only five officers and thirty soldiers is to mount guard. Sometimes a detachment is sent to Montreal to carry word of what is happening, such as the arrival of foreigners or letters from New England or from Fort St-Frédéric. Because the various construction and maintenance tasks mentioned above were assigned only occasionally, the soldiers had a certain amount of free time which they used in various ways. Hunting and fishing were an advantageous way of passing the time. Throughout the summer months some of their attention was focussed on tending gardens. Some soldiers went even further in this regard, arranging with inhabitants of the area to cultivate land so as to supplement their monthly income. Others went together with civilians to produce tar. Under the impetus given by Médard-Gabriel Vallette de Chevigny this industry briefly flourished around 1730. Wishing to develop it, Chevigny left for France in 1731 to familiarize himself with tar production techniques. When he returned to the colony the following year he became an ardent promoter of this industry, which did particularly well at Chambly and Baie St-Paul. In 1732, noting the growth of this enterprise, Hocquart wrote,

Tar production is increasing little by little. Two inhabitants of the lower end of the river (the St Lawrence), working for themselves, produced some 90 barrels. I am informed that several soldiers in the Chambly garrison have gone together with other inhabitants and produced 30, but of the total only 114 barrels must have been shipped, since the rest have not yet arrived.

Tar production in the colony declined shortly afterward. It is not known whether it was problems of quality, markets, or organization that caused the project to fail. Last, the soldiers probably participated in
numerous other activities, on a scale unknown to us, to enliven slack periods. Among other things they may have hunted for smugglers or gathered ginseng. The discovery of this plant in Canada in the 18th century engendered a great deal of excitement owing to the great demand for it on the international market. Seeing an easy means of making a fortune, habitants, soldiers, and Indians alike took to gathering this plant. This caused it to die out in some parts of the colony, including the Richelieu Valley, where it had grown in abundance.

In short there was no lack of choice for anyone wanting to keep himself busy, provided he had the desire to do so.
CONCLUSION

It seems pointless to try to identify one period in the years between 1665 and 1760 as the most important in the existence of Fort Chambly. It would appear more appropriate to determine the attitude of the colonial strategists and the population towards this fort. Unfortunately the attitude of the population can be grasped only indirectly, through the perspective of a distinct social class that was certainly less exposed than the colonists. In this study less attention has been given to this aspect of the subject because of the difficulties it posed. To examine it in depth would have taken too long to obtain results that would in any case have been problematic. Therefore attention has been concentrated on the second aspect of the subject, namely the importance of the fort from the standpoint of the colonial authorities. This theme led to examination of the reasons the fort was established and maintained over a fairly long period. In examining the role of the fort in relation to its surroundings, the concerns of the population, which was always highly vulnerable and sensitive to external pressures, have also been touched on. In the final analysis the population benefited from the existence of the fort; indeed it was the latter's presence that caused Chambly to be settled as early as it was.

After the treaty of 1667 with the Iroquois the area experienced a certain amount of development, which dropped off after the Iroquois tribes, threatened by France's imperialist policies, again took up arms against the latter in 1684. Taken unawares, New France, with human and financial resources in short supply, assumed a defensive posture. Fort Chambly, constructed for offensive purposes in 1665, was henceforth to play a basically defensive role. But the Indians' mobility - in other words, the great ease with which they were able to circumvent the fort - made it of little use in this regard. The garrison was too small to control the surrounding countryside, and its effectiveness was limited to the area within gunshot of the stockade. The colonists who had held out against the Iroquois menace could enjoy the protection afforded by the fort. The families that had settled in the surrounding area came to take refuge in the fort at the least sign of trouble, bringing their furniture and livestock with them.

When the English became directly involved in the conflict in 1689 the use of wood in the construction of fortifications was called into question. With the belligerents employing artillery, greater use of stone was required. But stone forts were costly, and France was not disposed to invest in a colony that consumed far too much for its liking and provided little in return.

In 1701 the Iroquois, who had grown weary and had come to feel that they had been fooled by the English, who were trying to subjugate them and use them as pawns on the political chessboard of North America, opted for neutrality. With their withdrawal from the conflict Chambly regained all its defensive value. A European army did not operate in the same manner as an Indian war party. With its larger fighting force equipped with heavier arms, it moved more slowly and with greater difficulty. The major waterways were the least hazardous, if not the only, routes available to it. In this sense the Richelieu, along with the St Lawrence, was one of the finest invasion routes, a great highway more or less linking New York to Montreal.

When they observed the English colonies' preparations for a conquest of Canada the colonial authorities took the initiative to construct a stone fort at Chambly, an undertaking they saw as urgent. Faced with a fait accompli the Minister sanctioned the project.

At the time of the fort's construction it was firmly believed that the English could not bring powerful artillery with them. Barring such an eventuality the fort, with its high curtains, seemed the ideal fortress for repulsing any invasion attempt. With experience, however, it became clear that the forests of North America, even though they constituted solid natural defences, were not impenetrable. With ingenuity it was possible for an army to bring with it guns that were capable of knocking down the walls of the fort, particularly as the Hudson River, Lake Champlain, and the Richelieu facilitated such an operation. Gradually confidence in the fort's capabilities waned.

After the treaty of Utrecht in 1713 the Canadians rapidly returned to the practice of trading their furs at Albany, where the quality of the merchandise and the prices paid were highly competitive with the offerings of the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales. To block this illegal trade the commandants at Chambly were ordered to prevent Canadians from travelling south with furs and to seize all mer-
chandise that anyone tried to bring into the colony illegally.

In 1731 a wooden fort was erected at Pointe-à-la-Chevelure, at the southern end of Lake Champlain, for the purpose of preventing the English from establishing themselves in that area as they had done on the shores of Lake Ontario when they built Fort Oswego. From the beginning the garrison at Pointe-à-la-Chevelure was more active than the one at Chambly in the effort to prevent smuggling. It was larger and more strategically situated for this purpose. Pointe-à-la-Chevelure quickly eclipsed Chambly in this function.

In 1735, with rumors of war becoming increasingly persistent, the wooden fort on Lake Champlain was transformed into a real fort, named St-Frédéric, with the intention that it would make up for the weakness of Fort Chambly. Until then the latter had played various roles, all of them of great importance. Though not a powerful installation it had previously been the most important French fortification on the Richelieu. After 1737, and particularly after the construction of Fort St-Jean, Chambly underwent a marked decline and its future appeared increasingly uncertain. But because it was by way of Fort Chambly that supplies were delivered to Fort St-Frédéric and Fort St-Jean, the latter being itself a depot for the former, the older fort nevertheless served as a relay station and even a provisional depot. All the land routes in the region converged on it. And the lack of money and manpower paralyzed any desire to develop a new road system in the valley.

When the last war of the regime began Chambly quickly found itself at the very heart of the conflict. Despite the weakness of its walls it served a vital purpose: it accelerated communication between the various forts on the Richelieu. It was used then as a depot, a bivouac point, and a rallying place. All communication between Montreal or Quebec and the forts on the Richelieu passed through it. Thus, despite its defensive weakness it became a key element. But in any event the die was cast. France was losing interest in its colony. The latter, weakened by a worsening famine, with reduced troop strength and chronic shortages - of manpower, of voyageurs to resupply the outposts, and of arms and ammunition - was living the last days of its existence. After 1757 the disproportion of forces in place left no doubt as to the approaching end of the colony. Even if Chambly had had walls 20 feet thick it would have made little difference; conquest had become inevitable.
As regards the war with the Iroquois we shall say no more of their ambushes, for the preceding campaign had so badly frightened them that they took every tree to be a French soldier, and they did not know where to seek cover. Nevertheless, because we did not know of their terror we remained very much on guard here. This made it very difficult for the ecclesiastics of the place to go to the aid of Fort Ste-Anne, which was without a priest, in addition to being more exposed to the enemy as it was much further out than the other forts that had been built since the arrival of the troops. Monsieur de Tracy, having carefully considered how deplorable it was to leave the fort without any spiritual assistance, wrote to Monsieur Souard, then the superior of the Seminary, asking him to send a priest there. There was no one in the Community that did not consider this commission to be highly advantageous as it was bound to afford the opportunity to suffer mightily and to expose oneself greatly for God. However Monsieur Souard, who had to exercise caution on behalf of all, could not resolve to send a priest in time of war where he was likely to be burned alive without providing him with a sizable escort, considering that this newly constructed fort was nearly 25 leagues away, in the direction of the enemy. It was for this reason that the matter was left in abeyance. Monsieur de Tracy had indeed sent a letter to Monsieur Souard proposing that spiritual assistance be given to all his soldiers and officers there who were in a fairly pitiable state, but he had not thought to give any order that troops be provided to escort the missionary, and the officers of this place did not deem it appropriate to risk their soldiers and give them such an assignment in the absence of an outright command from him. This being the case Monsieur Souard contented himself with naming the priest that he felt should go to Ste-Anne, so that the latter might be in a state of readiness should the occasion arise - which in fact it did shortly afterward, at a time most awkward for the priest in question, who had a large swelling in the shape of a magnifying glass on his knee as a result of going to war the preceding autumn. After attempting several remedies he had himself bled, but because the surgeon had improperly drawn an immense amount of blood from him he fainted in the latter's arms. Regaining consciousness he saw two soldiers entering his room, who saluted him and told him that they came from Fort St-Louis, four leagues away, en route to Ste-Anne. Hearing these words, having asked them for news of their fort, he enquired as to when they wished to return. They replied that it would be the next day, to which he responded, "I will leave with you for Ste-Anne if you will give me one additional day, which I need because of the terrible bleeding that I have just received." He was granted this extra day and once it had passed he set out with the Superior's leave, which was difficult to obtain, accompanied by Messieurs Lebert, Lemoine, and Mijeon, who wanted to go as far as St-Louis with him. It is true that on this journey the priest, who was newly arrived from France, had much to cope with, including his problems with his knee, the weakness that he felt as a result of being bled, and the difficulties caused by the snow, which were considerable at that time especially for a new Canadian who had never used snowshoes and who was carrying a sizable load on his shoulders during a goodly part of the journey. Once arrived at St-Louis he was at first refused an escort; but after 24 hours, when it was clear that he was determined to set out regardless, he was given 10 men to be commanded by an ensign who had requested this assignment because of the kindness the priest had shown him. Providence is great. He did not believe that he had ever suffered so much as during those 24 hours; he would have been incapable of walking but he did his best to conceal this for fear it would make it all the more difficult for him to obtain his escort. Without anyone knowing of his suffering he was given time to rest, after which he was provided with his escort and he set out, despite his Superior's orders that he was not to do so unless he had 25 or 30 men, because he had a strong premonition of the suffering which, as we shall see, he was to find at Fort Ste-Anne upon his arrival. The journey was unremarkable except for the difficulties posed by the ice, which exposed the party to great dangers. At one point it even looked as if a soldier was done for: the ice gave way beneath him and although he was able to hold on with his gun so as not to sink all the way to the bottom, he could not get back onto the ice because of the snowshoes he was wearing. The priest, seeing him in such immediate and ob-
vious danger, felt out of love for him that he had to venture out to pull him from the water, which he did: having armed himself with the sign of the cross he went to him and took him by the arm, but because the soldier was so heavy and so encumbered by his snowshoes he could only pull him halfway out; this is why he asked for help. But no one was inclined to help him in this situation until he had assured Monsieur Darienne (?), the ensign that we mentioned, that the ice was very firm on the edge of the hole, whereupon the latter himself came out, not daring to order one of his men to do so. Together the two of them pulled the large man out and sent him to be warmed up as quickly as possible, thanking God for his rescue. But let us leave this scene and draw near to Fort Ste-Anne, where for several days soldiers had been crying out and calling for a priest; already two soldiers had died without the last rites and one of them had pleaded for them for 8 full days to no avail, finally dying with his wish unfulfilled. Several dying men were sending the same clamor heavenward, at the very moment when heaven was sending them help. Amid these sighs, expectations, and longings, he was sited far out on Lake Champlain, which surrounded the fort. Monsieur de Lamotte, the commandant of the place, was promptly informed whereupon he set out immediately with all the officers and soldiers not absolutely required for the defence of the fort, all of them going out to meet him with inexpressible joy, embracing him with an affection so tender that words cannot describe it. They told him, "Welcome. If only you had arrived a little earlier; how you have arrived; how indebted we are to you." Monsieur de Lamotte told the priest, "Since we take our meals together, the provisions should be sent to me." The priest replied, "I do enough work for the soldiers, the King will see that I am well fed. As for my provisions, I shall not touch them; they shall all be given to the sick, since I am healthy enough to do without them." Having said this he had everything that had been delivered to his room sent over, and thereafter every morning he gave all the sick persons a serving of broth that he had prepared, to which he added a small piece of bacon along with a piece of chicken. In the evening he gave each one 12 or 15 prunes that he had stewed. This saved the life of a number of soldiers; because they were able to live longer they could be transferred successively to Montreal by sleigh. This was the only way to save them because the air at Ste-Anne was so contaminated. Of two that could not
make this trip, neither survived. They lay ill for 3 full months and they were at death's door for 8 days. The stench was so powerful that there were some who could smell it almost as far away as the middle of the fort, even though the dying men were shut away in their room. The latter were so completely abandoned that no one dared to come near them, except the priest and a certain Forestier, the surgeon, who acquitted himself very well and would not have gone without recompense if it had been known what charity he had shown in exposing himself, to such an extent that he was not expected to last. The priest, who was constantly attending to the sick men, gave everyone the following account of the surgeon's conduct, namely that whenever summoned, whether day or night, he came immediately. It is true that toward the end, seeing that he was severely weakened, and fearing that he would be overcome, the priest called him as little as possible. The sick men, seeing themselves thus abandoned, found an ingenious means of getting a few of their comrades to help them: for this purpose they took it into their heads to make elaborate wills, as if they were extremely wealthy, saying "I give such a sum to so-and-so because he has assisted me in this final illness, abandoned as I am." Every day these wills were seen and those who were more knowledgeable laughed at the ingenuity of these poor devils who had not a sou in this world and who made such good use of their imaginary goods. What may be said of all this suffering is that while the body was afflicted, the spirit had its satisfaction because of the pious life that the men in this place were beginning to lead. Healthy or ill, the soldiers lived as if they had taken communion every day, and indeed they did so very frequently. Masses and prayers were said regularly, and everyone took care to attend. Curses and unsavory words were almost never heard. So great was the piety that the missionary serving them found himself abundantly compensated for his pains. He assisted at the deathbed of 11 of the soldiers, and they were assuredly as well prepared as could be hoped. Every shipment from Montreal brought him new supplies of fresh food, which served him well in ministering to the sick. If he was not in their room or his own, taking a brief rest, he was obliged, to ward off sickness, to go out between the bastions of the fort, where the snow was trampled down, to take the air. As a further means of protecting himself from disease, the effects of which he was feeling to some extent, he was obliged to go running. If he had been seen doing this, and the viewer had not known how necessary such violent exercise was to ward off illness, he would have taken the priest for insane. It is true that it was amusing to see him recite a breviary while running, but as he had no other opportunity to do so he felt he was making good use of this time, and the casuists would have been hard put to gainsay him. If his room had been more spacious he would have said his offices there, with greater decorum, but it was a mere hovel, so narrow and small and so dark that the sun perhaps never entered it, and it was so low that he could not stand upright. One day Monsieur de Lamotte, seeing himself with such a small fighting force in an area so exposed to the enemy, said laughingly to his missionary, "You should understand, Monsieur, that I will never surrender; I'll give you a bastion to guard." The priest, responding in the same spirit, told him "Monsieur, my company is composed of sick men with a brother for a lieutenant. Have some stretchers on wheels made for me, and we will transport them to whatever bastion you say. They are brave now; they won't flee, as they did from your company or Monsieur de la Durantaye's, which they deserted for mine." After these pleasures were exchanged it began to look as if we would be attacked, but fortunately it was a party of Iroquois ambassadors coming to seek peace, accompanied by several Frenchmen they were bringing back from their territories. As soon as they appeared large fires were built in all the cabins, to give the impression that they were full of men. In addition the visitors were told that it was a wonder that they had not been killed on their way to the fort, as there were parties of soldiers on all sides. They were later convinced that this was true as in proceeding on from there to Montreal they encountered a troop of 14 or 15 convalescents coming toward them with guns held to fire point-blank. They would have fired had not Batard-Flamant, who is well-known among the Iroquois, yelled to a Frenchman at the rear of their party to speak up quickly. The latter called out, "Don't shoot, comrades, they are coming in peace!" At this, the convalescent soldiers lowered their guns and came forward as friends, to the great relief of the Iroquois gentlemen. What we should again point out concerning Fort Ste-Anne as it relates to Montreal is that if the priest from Montreal had not gone there at
that time, the trip from Montreal would not have been attempted, at least not at that time, because it was felt that it was not yet possible, owing to the ice. This would have resulted in the death of many men who would have died without confessing. I must say beyond this that the Hospital of Montreal distinguished itself by the assortment of sick persons it received from there, to whom it rendered so many services in treating their illness that it deserves too much praise to pass over in silence - as with the great number of sick and wounded it received all last year from forts St-Louis and St-Jean, to say nothing of those from the little army of Monsieur de Courcelles, who on his return fortunately found this place for his sick and wounded after that terrible war of the winter that we neglected to mention in its place.
Introduction

1 This is not at all to suggest that the French resistance in America can be explained solely by this factor. The military, social, and political organization also played a significant role.

2 The governor was obliged to order this risky maneuver because of the lack of troops.

3 It was here that agriculture, a basic activity essential to any colonial development, was practised. It was also here that authorities recruited the militia, the body responsible for the defence of the territory. To be sure, other regions were also of great importance for the colony. Considering that most if not all of the economy was based on the fur trade (depending on the period), it was essential for the Canadians to control the regions where the furs originated. But it was impossible for those holding this trade monopoly to continue to exploit it without a solid population base. On this subject, see the article of Denis Monière, "L'utilité du concept de mode production des petits producteurs pour historiographie de la Nouvelle-France," Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, Vol. 29, No. 4 (March 1976), p. 495.

4 This refers to the attack on Casco Bay.


The General Climate Before the Arrival of the Carignan-Salières Regiment

1 See the map showing the territorial distribution of the major tribes of northeastern North America. This map represents the configuration that existed at the time of the arrival of the Europeans and does not take account of the profound upheavals that the Amerindian world underwent or the migrations that followed.


3 The Iroquois that they were setting out to combat on this occasion were the Mohawks, the main enemies of the Laurentian alliance (Algonquins, Montagnais, Hurons, and several other tribes).

4 So named because it led to the lands of the Mohawk nation of the Iroquois. This river was to be given a variety of names - not only the River of the Iroquois but also the Chambley, the Sorel, the Richelieu, and even the St-Jean River.

5 Samuel de Champlain, op. cit., pp. 181-82. The rapids were known as the rapids of the River of the Iroquois (Saut de la rivière des Iroquois). It was only after the construction of Fort St-Louis (Chambly) that they came to be called the Chambly rapids.

6 Marcel Trudel, op. cit., p. 164.


8 Marcel Trudel, op. cit., p. 221.

9 It is also true that the Indians actively sought the intervention of the Europeans to settle their disputes. But the Europeans went far beyond what they were requested to do.


14 The final word has not yet been said on this much-discussed plan of the Iroquois. In his book, The Wars of the Iroquois (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1972), George Hunt claims that the Iroquois wanted to take over the trade empire of the Hurons and replace the latter in their role as intermediaries between the peoples of the west and the
Europeans. More recently, in an article of rare scholarship, Allen Trelease has contested Hunt's findings, arguing, among other things, that the evidence for them is too tenuous. Re-examining the documentation listed by Hunt and adding to it a number of documents unknown to the latter, he reaches a different conclusion altogether. He thinks - although he takes care to specify that this is only a hypothesis - that the Iroquois were seeking only to take possession of their neighbors' hunting territories and not to impose themselves as go-betweens (Allen Trelease, "The Iroquois and the Western Fur Trade: A Problem in Interpretation," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 (June 1962), pp. 32-51). For my part, I believe Trelease's findings to be more justified, and it is they that I have incorporated into my study.

A controversy exists concerning the quantity of arms that the Dutch supplied to the Iroquois and that the French in turn supplied to their allies. Without going into the arguments, which are on the whole rather slender ones, we would merely note that the Iroquois clearly acquired a sufficiently large quantity of arms and ammunition to pose a serious threat to New France and its allies.

The Carignan Regiment and the Construction of the Forts Along the Richelieu

2 Dictionnaire biographique du Canada, Vol. 1, s.v. "Charles Huault de Montmagny."
5 Any reference to the Iroquois prior to 1667 primarily designates the Mohawks, who were the Iroquois tribe most heavily involved in the conflict with New France.
7 Letter of Paul Raguenau, 17 September 1663, quoted in Gérard Malchelosse and Régis Roy, Le régime de Carignan, Ducharme, Montreal, 1925, p. 112.
8 Quebec (province). Archives nationales. Rapport des Archives de la Province de Quebec 1930-31, pp. 50-51, Talon to the Minister, 3 November 1666.
9 Since the construction of Fort Richelieu in 1642, this waterway had begun to be known as the Richelieu River.
10 Letter of Paul Raguenau, loc. cit.
11 Relations des jésuites, op. cit., p. 7.
12 Relations des jésuites, op. cit., Vol. 5, "1665," p. 10. The feast of St-Louis took place on 25 August (Pierre Nadon, A Narrative History, Manuscript Report Series, No. 128 (1963), Parks Canada, p. 2, Note 4, Ottawa). Originally named Fort St-Louis, the installation quickly came to be known as Fort Chambly after Jacques de Chambly, who was its first commandant and the first owner of the seigneurie in which the fort was located. The earliest reference to Fort Chambly is in 1679 (France. Archives nationales (hereinafter designated as AN), Archives des colonies (hereinafter designated as AC), C11A, Vol. 5, Fol. 13).
13 Or 24 toises. A toise was equal to 6 French feet or 6.396 modern English feet. See Marcel Trudel, Les débuts du régime seigneurial au Canada, Fides, Montreal, 1974, p. XXI.
15 "Mémoire de M' de Salières des choses qui se sont passées en Canada les plus considérables depuis qu'il est arrivé," in Gérard Malchelosse and Régis Roy, op. cit., p. 48.
16 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
17 Ibid., p. 49.
18 Ibid., p. 51. The fort was called Ste-Thérèse because "it was fortunately completed in October, on the feast day of Saint Theresa, from which it derived its name." (Relations des jésuites, op. cit.,
The Second French-Iroquois War and the War of the League of Augsburg: 1687-1701


2 "Mémoire de M. de Salières," op. cit., p. 58.


4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 This army corps, which was established by Richelieu in 1622, had a checkered career under a variety of names before passing into oblivion in 1642. It was revived by the Colbert administration (Christopher Russ, op. cit., pp. 2-3). On 16 December 1690 it was named the "Compagnies franches d'infanterie" or "Compagnies franches de la Marine" (ibid., p. 23).

7 "Instruction que le Roy veut estre mise en main du s.f. Damblimont Capne entretenu en la marine choisy par Sa Mate pour commander les vaisseaux qu'Elle envoie en la nouvelle-france," quoted in Christopher Russ, op. cit., p. 86.

8 Louise Dechêne, Hablants et marchands de Montréal au XVIIe siècle, Plon, Paris and Montreal, 1974, Civilisations et mentalités series, p. 84, Note 131.

9 Ibid., p. 83; W.J. Eccles, Frontenac, the Courtier Governor, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Toronto, 1959, p. 215; Christopher Russ, op. cit., p. 83.


11 Louise Dechêne, op. cit., p. 83; W.J. Eccles, Frontenac, the Courtier Governor, op. cit.

12 Frontenac, in comparing the effectiveness of the Canadian militia with that of the regular troops, wrote that "the Canadians taken on as soldiers in the companies have given incomparably better service than the soldiers from France in terms of their ability to undertake travel in the bush and on the river. The French are not ready for this until they have served for several years. The Canadian youths, if mixed in with the soldiers, serve to train them for these expeditions. We have tried this wherever possible, and most of the old soldiers are now imitating them fairly well [...]" (France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 13, Fol. 302, Frontenac to the Minister, 10 November 1693). Two years later Champigny confirmed this statement, remarking that "there are only 300 men in the regular troops who are capable of following them on expeditions in the bush [...]" and that it was less expensive to equip Indians and Canadians for war since they could make do with less (France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 15, Fol. 83, Champigny to the Minister, 13 October 1697).

13 W.J. Eccles, Frontenac, the Courtier Governor, op. cit., p. 219.

14 By this date the name "Fort Chambly" had definitively replaced the name "Fort St-Louis."


16 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 10, Fol. 109, Denonville to the Minister, 6 November 1688.

17 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 10, Fol. 123, Champigny to the Minister, 8 August 1688.


19 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 18, Fol. 95, Champigny to the Minister, 15 October 1700.


21 Christopher Russ, op. cit., p. 48.
France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 12, Fol. 184, "Relation de ce qui s'est passé en Canada depuis le mois de septembre 1692 jusques au départ des vaisseaux en 1693," 1693.

23 W.J. Eccles, Frontenac, the Courtier Governor, op. cit., p. 187.


25 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 16, Fol. 37, Frontenac to the Minister, 10 October 1698.


27 Each year, the governor sent the Minister a list of officers along with his evaluation, as well as the special requests of each: bonus, promotion, return to France, etc. Sometimes a similar document was also sent by the intendant, at the Minister's request (Guy Frégault, Le XVIIIe siècle canadien, HMH, Montreal, 1968, Constantes series, p. 174).


29 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 10, Fol. 88, Denonville to the Minister, 30 October 1688.

30 François Vachon de Belmont, Histoire du Canada, quoted in David Lee et al., Fort Chambly: Interpretation Papers, Manuscript Report Series, No. 169 (1966), Parks Canada, Ottawa, p. 13. In his biography of Belmont, Jacques Mathieu warns us of the latter author's tendency to take liberties with the facts that he relates (Dictionnaire biographique du Canada, op. cit., Vol. 2, s.v. "François Vachon de Belmont").

31 Ibid.

32 Charlevoix did not witness these events. He did not arrive in New France until 1705, and his writings, which date from even later, are based in part on the oral tradition and in part on written sources.


34 Marie de l'Incarnation, quoted in Dictionnaire biographique du Canada, op. cit., Vol. 1, s.v. "Dollard."

35 Relations des jésuites, quoted in Dictionnaire biographique du Canada, ibid.

36 David Lee et al., op. cit., p. 14.

37 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 10, Fol. 107, Denonville to the Minister, 6 November 1688.


39 Frégault, who studied this expedition in detail because of the participation of Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, whose biography he was writing, was unable to determine the exact date of the departure.

40 Ibid., p. 98.

41 For an account of these other two raids, see W.J. Eccles, Frontenac, the Courtier Governor, loc. cit.


43 Ibid.

44 W.J. Eccles, Frontenac, the Courtier Governor, p. 203.


47 W.J. Eccles, Frontenac, the Courtier Governor, op. cit., p. 245.

48 Quebec (province). Archives nationales. Rapport des Archives de la Province de Québec, 1927-1928, pp. 70-71. Frontenac to the Minister, 20 October 1691; France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 11, Fol. 45v, "Relation de ce qui s'est passé de plus considérable en Canada depuis le départ de la frégatte le 27 novembre 1690 jusqu'au départ de 1691," 1691.

49 Frontenac to the Minister, ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 France. AN, AC, C22A, Vol. 11, Fol. 45v, 1691. "Relation de ce qui s'est passé de plus considérable [...]."

52 W.J. Eccles, Frontenac, the Courtier Governor, p. 249.

53 Numbering thirty-four, according to Charlevoix, op. cit., p. 112.

54 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 12, Fol. 93, "Relation de ce qui s'est passé en Canada au sujet de la guerre depuis le mois de novembre 1691 jusqu'au mois d'octobre 1692."


56 They managed to ravage several Iroquois villages and take more than 300 prisoners.
It should be noted, however, that the majority of the men were absent. As was their usual practice in the winter, they were far away, hunting.

57 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 12, Fol. 186v, "Relation de ce qui s'est passé en Canada depuis le mois de septembre 1692 jusqu'au départ des vaisseaux en 1693."


59 In October 1695, it was once again used as a rallying place for an expedition against the Iroquois. Having learned that the latter, coming via Lake Champlain, were headed toward the French settlements, Frontenac ordered the Marquis de Crisafy, "who was in command of 120 men at La Prairie de la Magdelaine, to have 60 of them, along with fourteen savages from the Sault whom I had sent for, go under the command of the Marquis de la Groye to Chambly, there to receive orders from the Sr de la Durantaye, who was sent from here on September 21 with 90 men, including both regular soldiers and Canadians, to travel the Richelieu River by canoe so as to discover by land and by water the movements of the enemy. This expedition went as planned. Three leagues away from Chambly were the enemy's cajeux, on which they had crossed the river [...]." Durantayes men encountered the Iroquois at Boucherville, killing several of them and taking a few prisoners (France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 13, Fol. 380v-381, Callières to the Minister, 27 October 1695).

60 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 12, Fol. 207v, Frontenac and Champigny to the Minister, 4 November 1693.

61 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 12, Fol. 194v, "Relation de ce qui s'est passé en Canada depuis le mois de septembre 1692 jusqu'au départ des vaisseaux en 1693."


The War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-13


2 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 22, Fol. 245v, the Minister to Champigny, 31 May 1701.

3 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 20, Fol. 92v, Callières and Beauharnais to the Minister, 3 November 1702.


6 The fertility of the soil, the presence of timber for use in naval and domestic construction, a more temperate climate, and an easily navigable waterway all served to make this region an attractive and prosperous one.


8 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 17, Fol. 95v, Callières to the Minister, 2 November 1701.

9 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 21, Fol. 15v, Beauharnais and Vaudreuil to the Minister, 15 November 1703.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 This is probably the route to which Vaudreuil had referred the year before. He had informed the Minister of the pressing need for work on the road linking Chambly and Montreal. He had proposed to assign troops to this chore if other, more urgent tasks did not stand in the way (France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 21, Fol. 10). The following year, Pontchartrain gave his consent to the project.

15 France. AN, AC, F1A, Vol. 11, Fol. 198; Vol. 12, Fol. 47.


Vaudreuil et Beauharnais," June 1705.
19 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 27, Fol. 25v, Levasseur de Néré to the Minister, 12 November 1707.
20 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 29, Fol. 64v, memorandum from the King to Vaudreuil, 30 June 1707.
21 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 29, Fol. 369v, the Minister to Levasseur de Néré, 6 June 1708.
23 Ibid.
24 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 28, Fol. 268v, Raudot to the Minister, 18 October 1708.
25 Ibid. This allegation by Raudot is overly broad. As we shall see further on, he later made the necessary corrections to it. But for the moment, ignoring any finer points, he was intent on discrediting the engineer in the eyes of the King, for he cordially detested him. Levasseur was accused of being a stooge of the governor. The hatred that those in charge of the colony felt for each other often explains the relentless efforts of some of them to denigrate the actions of others.
26 Ibid.
27 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 30, Fol. 136, the Minister to Raudot, 6 July 1709.
28 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 34, Fol. 315, reply of Vaudreuil and Raudot to memorandum from the King, 15 June 1712.
29 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 36, Fol. 389, the Minister to the Sieur de Langloiserie, the King's lieutenant at Québec, 17 May 1714.
31 France. AN, AC, C^11G, Vol. 3, Fol. 10, memorandum from the King to Vaudreuil and Beauharnais, 10 June 1704.
32 France. AN, AC, C^11G, Vol. 4, Fol. 28, reply of Vaudreuil and Raudot to memorandum from the King, 6 July 1709.
33 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 30, Fol. 247, Raudot to the Minister, 1 November 1709.
34 Ibid., Fol. 246.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 30, Fol. 17v, Vaudreuil and Raudot to the Minister, 14 November 1709.
40 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 33, Fol. 306v, memorandum from the King to Vaudreuil and Raudot, 2 November 1710.
43 Ibid.
44 A joint letter from Vaudreuil and Raudot tells us why construction of the fort began in November. "Although these duties are in a sense an imposition, they are not seen as odious in this country, as the people here have long been accustomed to them. Since it is necessary to time these duties for periods when the inhabitants are least occupied on their land[...]." (France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 34, Fol. 253v, Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Minister, 20 November 1714).
45 Michaelmas is celebrated on 29 September.
46 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 31, Fol. 5, Vaudreuil to the Minister, June 1710.
47 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 32, Fol. 201, Vaudreuil and Raudot to the Minister, 7 November 1711.
48 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 33, Fol. 390, the Minister to Beaucours, 7 July 1711.
51 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 33, Fol. 26, Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Minister, 12 November 1712.

54 France. AN, AC, C^A, Vol. 30, Fol. 44rv, Raudot to the Minister, 11 October 1709.


56 Guy Frégault, Le XVIIIe siècle canadien, p. 68.


58 France. AN, AC, C^A, Vol. 30, Fol. 41v, Vaudreuil to the Minister, 14 November 1709, loc. cit.

59 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 32, Fol. 295, the Minister to Vaudreuil, 10 May 1710.

60 France. AN, AC, C^A, Vol. 30, Fol. 41v, Vaudreuil to the Minister, 14 November 1709.

61 Guy Frégault, Le XVIIIe siècle canadien, p. 75.


63 Ibid.

The Interlude of the Peace of Utrecht and the Growth of Smuggling


2 Canada. Public Archives (hereinafter designated as PAC), MG2, B1, Vol. 8, Fol. 513, order respecting the trading of beaver pelts, 1716.

3 France. AN, AC, C^A, Vol. 5, Fol. 13, Frontenac to the Minister, 6 November 1679.


6 Louise Dechêne, op. cit., p. 141.

7 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 36, the Minister to the Sieur d'Esgly, 17 May 1714.


14 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 40, Fol. 137-137v, Charles d'Auteuil de Monceau to the intendant, 6 November 1719.


17 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 41, Fol. 211, Bégon and Vaudreuil to the Minister, 14 November 1719.

18 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 45, Fol. 548, the Minister to Vaudreuil and Bégon, 3 June 1719.


21 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 42, Fol. 16v-17v, Vaudreuil and Bégon to the Minister, 26 October 1720.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Jean Elizabeth Lunn, op. cit., p. 73.

"Ordonnance qui déclare bonne et valable la saisie faite par le sieur Herbin, lieutenant des Troupes, commandant au fort de Chambly en l'absence du sieur de Sabrevois, de dix pacquets de castor pesant dans un canot d'écorce conduit par des sauvages qui se rendaient dans la Nouvelle-Angleterre," 5 September 1722; "Ordonnance qui déclare bonne et valable la saisie faite par le sieur de Sabrevois, commandant à Chambly, dans un canot de sauvages qui venait d'Orange, de huit grands bassins d'étain, vingt-quatre cuillers, deux tasses d'étain, vingt-un creusets de grès, dix-neuf paires de cardes à laine et quarante-livre de fil à rets," 16 August 1723 (Pierre-George Roy, Inventaire des ordonnances des intendants de la Nouvelle-France conservés aux Archives de la Province de Québec, Teclaireur, Beauceville, 1919, Vol. 1, pp. 229, 239).

From the War of the Austrian Succession to the End of the Regime

4 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 75, Fol. 326, Hocquart to the Minister, 26 October 1741.
5 Ibid.
6 Hocquart and Varin planned to save from 4000 to 5000 livres annually (ibid; France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 76, Fol. 276v, "Mémoires sur quelques parties des dépenses du Canada qui pourroient être considérablement diminués en prenant les arrangements proposés par M de Varin").
7 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 125, Fol. 458, memorandum from the King to Beauharnois and Hocquart, 30 April 1742.
8 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 55, Fol. 346v, Hocquart to the Minister, 22 November 1742.
9 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 81, Fol. 142, Beaucharnois to the Minister, 8 October 1744.
11 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 72, Fol. 224, Lanouiller de Boiscler to the Minister, 29 October 1739.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
16 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 47, Fol. 73-78v, Longueuil and Bégon to the Minister, 31 October 1725.
18 Ibid.
20 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 68, Fol. 26, "Etat de la dépense faite en Canada

21 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 73, Fol. 107, Hochquart to the Minister, 28 September 1740.

22 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 75, Fol. 333, Hochquart to the Minister, 3 October 1741.

23 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 72, Council of the Marine to Hochquart, 4 April 1741.

24 France. AN, AC, Dépôt des fortifications des colonies, Memorandum 29*, Fol. 385, "Moyens pour empescher les Anglois de venire à bout de leurs vues prejudiciables à la france par rapport à la colonie du Canada," 1725.


28 Quebec (province). Archives nationales. Rapport des Archives de la Province de Quebec, 1944-45, p. 142, Doreil to the Minister, 28 July, 1758.

29 Guy Frérgault, La guerre de la Conquête 1754-1760, Fides, Montreal, 1975, p. 288.


34 Ibid., Vol. 2, 4 September 1757, p. 137.


36 Guy Frérgault, La guerre de la Conquête 1754-1760, p. 296.

37 I.K. Steele, Guerillas and Grenadiers 1689-1760, p. 69.


39 Guy Frérgault, La guerre de la Conquête 1754-1760, p. 282.


41 PAC, MG18, K9, Vol. 3, Fol. 405-07, Lévis to Bourlamaque, 26 August 1760.

42 Ibid.


44 Louis de Courville, Mémoires du sieur de Courville contenant l'Histoire du Canada durant la guerre et sous le gouvernement anglais depuis 1769 jusqu'à 1760, Société litteraire et historique de Quebec, Quebec City, 1838, pp. 201-02; France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 89, Fol. 182, "Précis des services de feu Sr de Lusignan," 18 May 1766; France. Archives de la marine, C7, Carton 40, "Etat de service de Yves Bouillette dit Laviolette," 1 February 1770. In the latter document, Bouillette complains that he lost a piece of property when the English dug a trench on it during their siege of the fort in 1760.

45 PAC, MG13, War Office 3*, Vol. 51, Fol. 57, "The Examination of the Prisoners taken by Major Robert Rogers at St-Therese, 15th June at 10 o'clock in the morning."


The Troupes Franches de la Marine in Garrison at Chambly, 1683-1760

1 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 3, Fol. 207, "Description du Canada et de ce qui s'y trouve davantageux tant pour les interest de Sa Majesté que pour ceux des colonies francaises qui y sont établies," 1671.

2 France. AN, AC, C^11A, Vol. 5, Fol. 13, Frontenac to the Minister, 6 November 1679.

3 Christopher Russ, op. cit., p. 54.
4 E.Z. Massicotte has published a list of company captains who were commandants at Chambly, along with their period of service (E.Z. Massicotte, *Les commandants du fort de Chambly*, Bulletin des Recherches historiques, Vol. 31, pp. 453-59).


10 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 76, Fol. 88, memorandum from the King to Beauharnois and Hocquart, 31 May 1743.


15 If Bigot and his gang had only pilfered from the King it would have been fair enough. But during the last years of the regime they built their fortunes on the backs of the populace, which was already sorely afflicted by the war, famine, and epidemics, and was forced to witness the excesses - highly offensive under the circumstances - of this band of thieves.


17 Ibid.


19 Quebec (province). Archives nationales. Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Quebec, 1930-1931, p. 48, Talon to Tracy and Courcelles, 1 September 1666.


21 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 47, Fol. 73-78v, Longueuil and Bégon to the Minister, 31 October 1725.

22 Ibid.

23 France. AN, AC, B, Vol. 50, Fol. 488, the Minister to Beauharnois, 22 April 1727.

24 Louis Franquet, *op. cit.*, p. 78.


26 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 10, Fol. 10v, Denonville and Champigny to the Minister, 6 November 1688.


31 Christopher Russ, *op. cit.*, p. 103.


34 Ibid.


36 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 59, Fol. 68, Beauharnois and Hocquart to the Minister, 1 October 1731.

37 France. AN, AC, C11A, Vol. 58, Fol. 9-10v, Hocquart to the Minister, 1 October 1732.

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