The Militia of the Battle of the Châteauguay A Social History

Michelle Guitard

Parks Canada Parcs Canada

Cover: Photo from the film "The Battle of the Châteauguay" produced by the National Film Board in 1978 for Parks Canada.

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PREFACE

The Battle of the Châteauguay is a historical event that has had national and mythic ideological meaning from the moment the fighting was over. In the context of a development programme for the historic site of the engagement at Allans Corners on the Châteauguay River, I have tried, from all the interpretations of the battle, to develop a perspective in which the heroes, Charles-Michel de Salaberry and the militiamen of Lower Canada, would be recognized as men of the early 19th century who had temporarily to adopt the soldier's life. As a detailed study of the battle in strategic terms, by Victor Suthren, already exists, I have attempted to stress its social dimension. This fresh reading has brought interesting clarification to many aspects of military life in that period.

No social research on the militia exists in this country beyond J.-Y. Gravel's work on the militia of the end of the 19th century,[1] and Yvon Desloges's preliminary report on the social background of the 1812 militiamen, prepared for Parks Canada in 1970.[2] Militia history is little known and the few works to deal with it have paid much attention to the officers but very little to the common soldier; however, our horizons have been broadened by some foreign works, among them *Anthropologie du conscrit français*, by J.P. Aron's team,[3] and André Corvisier's *Armées et sociétés en Europe de 1494 à 1789*.[4]

Research has taken me through numerous archival collections, the most extensive being in the Public Archives of Canada. There I consulted the documents of Militia and Defence (RG9) and the British army and navy (RG8), as well as a number of collections in the 19th-century pre-Confederation papers (MG24), where I examined the de Salaberry papers. At the Archives Nationales in Quebec City, I looked at the Papineau Collection and militia land petitions for the years 1812-51. The Verreau Collection in the Archives du Séminaire de Québec was an indispensable source. In the Archives du diocèse de Québec, Monseigneur Plessis's correspondence yielded interesting information on the social aspect of militia history. At the Archives Nationales in Montreal, I searched through notaries' registers to find the Voltigeurs' enlistment contracts. The McCord Museum, Montreal, also has some very instructive documents on the War of 1812. And at the University of Montreal I looked at the Baby Collection, which contains a number of relevant documents.

Finally, there is a reason for the use of the article in "Battle of the Châteauguay.' The traditional expression — "Battle of Châteauguay" — leads to confusion; the battle did not take place in the town of Châteauguay, but on the river of the same name, at the site now called Allans Corners. The "Battle of the Châteauguay" is a more accurate term.

INTRODUCTION

Charles-Michel de Salaberry and 300 Canadian militiamen repel an American army three times their size. So runs the story repeated ever since the morning after 26 October 1813. The strategy has been discussed by many authors. The officers have frequently been named. Much ink has been spilt in controversies over the heroes and the meaning of the victory. On the other hand, research has not addressed the history of the militia as a military corps during the War of 1812; neither the names nor the conditions of life of the ordinary fighting men of the Châteauguay were known.

What elements in the victory have combined to make heroes of militiamen defending their country and a major Canadian military figure of their leader? Who were these men? What reward or recognition did they receive? These questions guided my research. In addition, I wanted to know how they lived, not merely at the time of the fighting, but during the entire war, for the conditions of life at the moment of battle were closely linked with those of the period of hostilities.

It is important to stress that the militia is not the regular army; it is made up of temporary soldiers. The militia, to be specific, is a defensive military force consisting of the majority of males in a country. They are called to arms by direct order, by a request for volunteers, or by the drawing of lots; they are put on occasional active service within their national boundaries in time of war to support their country's army.

During the war of 1812 there were three types of militia "corps" or "regiments" in Lower Canada: volunteer corps such as the Voltigeurs, battalions of Select Embodied Militia, and battalions of Sedentary Militia. The volunteer groups are self-explanatory. Most of the members of the Select Embodied Militia were men conscripted to serve for a set period as soldiers on active duty. The term "select" means "special" or "chosen," and carries no connotation of a privileged class. The Sedentary Militia included all the men who, without being taken from their homes, did have military obligations from time to time to ensure the country's security or support the mobilized forces.

The military world has its own special vocabulary. Very often terms have different meanings from country to country or from era to era. Two terms are essential to an understanding of this paper. In military language the word "corps" is a very general one meaning a collection of men within one unit. It replaces the term "regiment," which is never used where the militia is concerned. The people of that time would refer occasionally to the "Voltigeur Regiment," but the usage was not official. A "corps" could be made up of a few men, in the sense of a detachment, but could also mean a very large number of persons. I have tried to use it only in this latter sense: the "corps" of Voltigeurs, the "corps" of Select Embodied Militia, and the "corps" of Sedentary Militia. A second important term is "regular." The regulars, regular forces, regular soldiers, were all members of the British army. In no sense did they belong to the militia.

There is another point to be stressed. The Battle of the Châteauguay took place in the context of the war between the United States and Canada that is usually known as the War of 1812. This war was a consequence of the more general conflict (1803-15) between France and Britain. Beginning in 1806, these two European nations had tried to limit the neutrality of American ocean trade by restrictive commercial policies against that country. With the practice of impressing seamen from American vessels, these policies were not merely damaging to trade, they were an affront to American independence and national pride. The United States responded to the attacks with coercive laws on imports and trade relations with Britain and France. Napoleon moderated his policy and Britain abrogated its orders in council, but too late; unaware of Britain's act, the United States declared war on 18 June 1812. To sum up, according to Reginald Horseman, the War of 1812 had three main causes: the impressment of deserting seamen, the British orders in council, and the United States's need to reassert its economic and political independence from Great Britain.[1]

Canada was the theatre of the War of 1812 because it was a British colony. In the New

England states, more populated and having long-established economic and social ties with Britain and Canada, Americans were against the war. It was the war chiefly of the central and southern states, and it was chiefly Upper Canada that experienced the brunt of the invading army. As soon as the war broke out, the British army rallied the Indians to its cause by turning the Americans out of Michilimackinac. Less than two months later, Brigadier General Hull's army surrendered at Fort Detroit. The United States met defeat again at Queenston Heights in October 1812, and a feeble attempt to invade Lower Canada near Odelltown in November 1812 was thwarted by the diligence of Charles-Michel de Salaberry. The 1813 campaign began more auspiciously for the American forces. As early as April, the American fleet took York and Fort George, while Prevost was pushed back at Sackett's Harbour. Over the following summer the belligerents clashed mainly on Lake Erie and the Niagara Peninsula. In spite of a certain number of American successes, British troops managed to repel the invasion; however, in the fall of 1813 the American fleet seized control of Lake Erie, forcing the British to fall back on Burlington and Kingston. At the same time, the American army was aiming to cut Upper Canada's supply lines by taking Montreal. For this purpose, the United States's northern army was divided into two wings, one commanded by Brigadier General James Wilkinson and the other by Major General Wade Hampton. Wilkinson would leave from Sackett's Harbour to reach Montreal by the St. Lawrence, while Hampton moved down the Châteauguay to meet Wilkinson at Ile Perrot; from there they could attack Montreal. Hampton's march on Montreal was halted by the determined opposition of the militia under Charles-Michel de Salaberry, and the American offensive was thrown into confusion.

Here is the story of the Battle of the Châteauguay on 26 October 1813, won by a force composed almost totally of militia. The event caught my attention. Who were these militiamen? It was quickly evident that it was impossible to study the story of the militiamen without understanding what the militia was in the War of 1812. This prompted me to take the first chapter to describe the militia's place in the organization of Lower Canada's defence, how it was regulated and how structured. I could then, in the second chapter, undertake the study of the recruitment of officers and men. The structure and composition of the militia led to the third chapter, on the conditions of the militiaman's life. Some of these *temporary* soldiers took part in a clash that has taken on mythic proportions. Thus, in the fourth chapter, I have attempted to isolate the elements of the myths and see how they have developed from the time of the famous fight up to the present day. The final chapter dwells on the rewards given or promises made to the veterans of the Battle of the Châteauguay.

Military Organization: Hierarchy and Administrative Structure

Armies of the various European countries were made up initially of militia groups raised and led by their feudal lords to serve in conquest or defence. In war the lords would often attach their effectives to the troops of the royal household. It was only at the end of the 16th century that states began to raise, command and administer regular armies. Thus, the first British regiments appeared in 1660.[1] In the 18th century the practice of *condotta* or contract mercenarism gradually disappeared, but not entirely, so that in company with the regular army were foreign regiments in the service of the crown. Yet in spite of the presence of these regiments, the effectives of the regular army were inadequate and the state relied heavily on militia participation in military activities.[2] This was still the situation at the beginning of the 19th century, the era of the Battle of the Châteauguay.

In the first two decades of the 19th century, Britain's military forces were made up of regular regiments, foreign regiments, provincial regiments and militia battalions. Foreign regiments such as Louis de Watteville's consisted of mercenaries who were hired, trained, paid by, and under the authority of their commander; the commander placed his regiment at the king's disposal for a fixed time and at an agreed price. Provincial regiments were formed of soldiers enlisted in the colony, the British army supplying the administration; in principle they were to serve only in that colony. Next comes the militia that is the subject of this study. All adult male British subjects were militiamen and had to serve as defence, when so required, only in the country or colony where they lived.[3]

The militia had its own administrative structure. In functional as well as material terms, its organization called for a host of administrative services. Here I will identify its main hierarchical systems and its essential services. As indicated on the organizational chart in Table 1, the highest level of its administration was that of the third secretary of state. He directed war and the colonies -- the incumbent, Lord Henry Bathurst, had succeeded Lord Liverpool in June 1812. The commander in chief of the British army (the Duke of York, in England) was connected to Bathurst's office without being integrated into it,[4] hence his position on a level with the secretary of state. The Duke of York was in command of military strategy, raising regiments and appointing senior officers.[5]

The commander of the forces in North America and governor in chief of the Canadas, Sir George Prevost, reported to both the secretary of state and the commander in chief. In his capacity as military and civil administrator, Prevost was in charge of the army and the militia. As such, he communicated with the commander in chief through the secretary for war, but also frequently through Bathurst. As governor in chief, he approached Bathurst only through the secretary for the colonies.

In the Canadas the civil secretary conveyed Prevost's orders for mobilizing and paying the militia. This same secretary also made the necessary contacts with the colony's parliaments and branches of civil government.

As for military organization, whether for strategy or supplies, Prevost's orders were transmitted through the military secretary. He communicated with the army and the militia through the adjutants general. All general orders went out from the offices of both adjutants general; all officers' commissions came from the same source. The adjutant of each regiment sent in the roll of his effectives to the relevant adjutant general. There was one for the army and one for the militia. The former would often encroach on the militia adjutant general's jurisdiction, especially when it came to general orders for troop movements; it even came to pass that these two authorities contradicted one another, which left the officers in great embarrassment. This is why the documents for militia history come from the offices of both adjutants general.

The army and militia each had a quartermaster general. They administered the distribution of lodgings, clothing and rations. They carried out the orders of their respective adjutants general and received the necessary supplies from the commissary general. There was a deputy or quartermaster general of militia in each administrative district, and

Table 1. Administration of the Militia, War of 1812



Table 2. Hierarchy of Command, War of 1812



The Duke of York

Sir George Prevost

Maj. Gen. Sir Roger Sheaffe

Maj. Gen. Louis de Watteville

Lt. Col. George Macdonell

Lt. Col. Charles-Michel de Salaberry

1 The chain of command, autumn 1813. (Details of portraits in Public Archives Canada except de Watteville detail from P. de Vallière, *Treue und Ehre* [Neuenburg: F. Zahn, 1912], p. 550.)

every military station had its quartermaster to watch over the distribution of supplies.

The commissary general had a civil charge and reported to the Treasury. Officially, he was responsible for expenditures and transportation, but semi-officially, he also controlled the supply mechanism for all regular troops and the militia.[6]

As the militia was paid out of provincial funds, the militia paymaster general reported to the civil secretary; however, administratively, it was the commissary general's office that paid the troops. Thus, the paymaster general was closely connected with him (see below re militia wages). Volunteer corps such as the Voltigeurs each had paymasters and every battalion of the Select Embodied Militia had its paymaster; however, there was only one such officer for all the Sedentary Militia.

Prevost, in charge of all the forces, was at the peak of the military hierarchy in the War of 1812. He commanded through two major generals for each province. One major general commanded the reserves, the other the front or outposts on all the province's boundaries. Each reserve and each front (for example, the Châteauguay region) was under a lieutenant colonel. In the fall of 1813 Major General Sir Roger Sheaffe, reserve commander, was the immediate superior of Lieutenant Colonel George Macdonell (known as "Red George"), in charge of the Châteauguay reserve. On his side, Major General Louis de Watteville, commander of the front, was the superior of Lieutenant Colonel Charles-Michel de Salaberry, in charge of the Châteauguay front.

The hierarchy of military functions in the regiments was the same in the army as in the militia. Four main components are found in each regiment: headquarters staff, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. The general composition was as follows:

Headquarters: colonel,[7] lieutenant colonel, 1st major, 2nd "major-adjutant," quartermaster, paymaster, chaplain, surgeon, surgeon's assistant;

Officers: captain, lieutenant, 2nd lieutenant, ensign;

Non-commissioned officers: corporals, sergeants, fifers, drummers;

Soldiers: companies of 50 to 120 men.[8]

Certain officer positions did not exist in some corps or were replaced by another position. For example, the corps of Voltigeurs had no ensign, but an extra lieutenant. When the militia was in action with the regular army, militia officers were subordinate to officers of the same rank in the regular force.[9]

The army and the militia had administrative systems that were common to both, but they were ruled nonetheless by laws that were peculiar to each.

Militia Acts and Regulations

First, it must be noted that the militia in Canada goes back to the colony's very beginnings. In the 17th century, without being organized on an official basis, it came under the leaders of the main settlements for meeting the almost daily requirements of defence. The earliest order for militia training dates from 1651 and affected only the militiamen of Trois-Rivières.[10] It did not establish the militia, but rather confirmed its existence. The militia of New France obtained its first official structure with the law of 1669[11] which, in fact, ratified an already existing organization. Throughout the French régime, since France could not supply an adequate regular army for its colony, the militia was on almost uninterrupted active service. Civil administration and Canadian society in general were thus heavily influenced by activities of a military nature.[12]

With the Conquest, the militiamen were sent home. However, the militia of the French régime was not abolished until 1765, and then with circumspection: the relevant order was issued as the second part of an ordinance dealing with firewood supplies. The reason advanced was that the British government had no interest in organizing a militia in Canada.[13] Yet Governor Carleton did not want to eliminate the existing power hierarchy in the colony.[14] There is an interesting remark in an anonymous document to the effect that the French officers lost their commissions from the crown of France and received new ones from the crown of Britain.[15] This could explain the dispatch with which the governor was able to raise a militia battalion, led by the officers of the old régime, in 1775. Vassal de Monviel commented that there was no militia act and that the militia was organized under the old ordinances.[16] It would seem that the militia was abolished temporarily, but its structure did not disappear.

Under the pressure of circumstances, the governor officially re-established the militia in 1777 by the ordinance "For the regulation of the Militia of the Province of Quebec and to make them more useful for the preservation and safety of the same," which contained the basic regulations for recruitment, training and so on. It was re-promulgated about every two years until 1787, when a new and more detailed ordinance was drawn up to regulate the militia "more solidly." Two years later it would be changed again.[17] The 1787 ordinance was described as perpetual by Vassal de Monviel in 1816.[18] In fact, Lower Canada's first provincial parliament passed an act for militia organization in 1793 that was based on the previous ordinances; however, the article that established that the pay for militiamen on active service, to be paid by the province, was to be the same as the regular soldier's gave the militia act a new and significant dimension. As well, pensions were added for the widows of militiamen killed or wounded while serving.[19] This act was in force until 1803 when it was recast to accommodate administrative changes having to do with the expenses incurred by the militia. It was then extended to 1810. In 1812 the legislature amended the act to provide for a possible impending declaration of war. Thus, one of the amendments in this act, entitled "An Act to continue for a limited time and to amend an Act passed in the forty-third year of His Majesty's reign" (1803), stipulated that the sum for militia expenditures be raised from £2500 to £12 000.[20]

Also amended was the section that limited active service to six months; the government could now call up all or part of the militia for the duration of a war, invasion, insurrection or imminent threat of war. Some sections dealing with training, substitutes and various other matters were excised or altered.[21] When the act was renewed in 1813, the funds needed for militia enrolment were increased. In 1816, after the war, the 1803 act was put back in force; the 1812 amendments, made for the period of hostilities, were removed.[22]

Some sections of the militia act were violated because of the shortage of regular troops. For example, the Voltigeurs were not supposed to go to Upper Canada and were not authorized to leave the province;[23] nonetheless, throughout the war the Lower Canadian militia were fighting in Upper Canada.

Beyond the militia act itself, the office of the militia adjutant general had laid down regulations for the militia in a publication entitled "Regulations and articles for the better ordering of the militia of the Province of Lower Canada when it is embodied for service."[24] The rights and duties of officers and soldiers were there set down.

The Militia Corps during the War of 1812

The imminence of war and its declaration obliged the government to take measures for militia mobilization. This was carried out in three ways: first, by the forming of volunteer corps; secondly, by the enrolment of conscripts in the corps known as the "Select Embodied Militia" for periods of one to two years, and thirdly, through the Sedentary Militia's duty to enter active service for brief periods when called upon.

The Volunteers

Sometimes volunteer corps were formed on individual initiative, sometimes by a group or organization. Thus, on 15 April 1812, following his proposal to this effect,[25] Charles-Michel de Salaberry raised the Canadian Voltigeurs, volunteers who would serve under his command.[26] This corps of light infantry, divided into ten companies, had 12 commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and about 55 soldiers per company.[27]

Of the other volunteer corps, one was the "Canadian Voyageurs" that the North West Company raised in October 1812 to assist with transport. When it was disbanded in March 1813, transportation problems were aggravated, and in April the Commissariat formed its "Commissariat Voyageurs" corps which stuck it out with difficulty up to the cessation of hostilities.[28] Another corps, the Royal Artillery Drivers, formed on 11 January 1813, merged with the office of the Artillery and Engineers Service (the Ordnance) the following July. In December 1812 Joseph Bouchette recruited the Quebec Volunteers corps, whose existence was a brief one.[29] Finally, the Royal Montreal Troop of Cavalry, the Guides Com-

pany, and the Royal Militia Artillery, as well as the Montreal Militia Battalion, all carried out specific duties for more or less lengthy periods.

The Select Embodied Militia

On 28 May 1812 Sir George Prevost ordered the enrolment of two thousand men, chosen by the drawing of lots by men in the Sedentary Militia, to form the first four battalions of Select Embodied Militia;[30] the fifth was formed in September 1812[31] and the sixth in February 1813.[32] Each battalion had a headquarters staff and ten companies. A company was made up of a captain, a lieutenant, an ensign, sergeants and corporals whose numbers depended on those of the soldiers, which normally ranged from 55 to 75. The centre companies had no bugles and were fewer in number than the flank companies.

Some militia corps were formed by reorganizing Select Embodied Militia companies, or men of the Sedentary Militia, under new names. Thus, the Militia Light Infantry was formed on 12 April 1813 by regrouping nine Select Embodied Militia flank companies for service with the light infantry of the line. This new corps was divided into two battalions: the first consisted of the two flank companies of the 2nd and 5th Battalions of Select Embodied Militia, and the second was made up of the two flank companies of the 1st and 4th Battalions of Select Embodied Militia together with the second flank company of the 3rd Battalion of Select Embodied Militia.[33] Another corps, the Frontier Light Infantry, made up its ten companies on 13 August 1813 by raising men from the six Sedentary Militia battalions of the Eastern Townships. The Frontier Light Infantry was brigaded with the Canadian Voltigeurs on 10 June 1814, and formed the 9th and 10th Voltigeur companies.[34]

The Canadian Chasseurs corps was formed by a reorganization of the 5th Battalion of Select Embodied Militia. According to the general order of 12 March 1815, this battalion was to be made up of six companies of light troops and brigaded with the Voltigeurs and the Frontier Light Infantry;[35] it must not be confused with the Chasseur companies from the Beauharnois Division which were Sedentary Militia on active service from May 1813[36] to March 1814.[37] Colonel F. Des-Chambault's Sedentary Militia battalion became the 7th Battalion of Select Embodied Militia. This battalion was demobilized on 17 November 1813.[38]

The Sedentary Militia

The Sedentary Militia included all men from 16 to 60 years of age.[39] It was divided according to the three administrative districts of Quebec, Trois-Rivières and Montreal. Each district contained a number of "divisions" with one or more battalions. In April 1812 Prevost ordered that existing divisions and battalions be subdivided.[40] The excessive use of the term "division" in the militia's organization chart makes its organization difficult to understand. Tables 3, 4, and 5 attempt to show this organizational structure. The complication lies in the habit of referring to battalions as "division of [name]" or "division [name]," when they are simply battalions. In the cases of the Montreal and Quebec City divisions, subdivisions were themselves split up: thus, the 3rd Montreal Division had a first battalion calling itself the "3rd Montreal Division" and a second battalion known as the "Longue Pointe Division." A similar confusion occurred in the 2nd Quebec Division.

Militia organization changed frequently. The tables showing the structure of 1813 (Tables 3, 4, 5) were put together with the help of the 1813 *Quebec Almanac*[41] and documented from a variety of sources. The use of terms like "Montreal Division" for two different contingents often makes document interpretation a very difficult and delicate matter.

Divisions were commanded by colonels. The battalion headquarters staff included the division colonel, a lieutenant colonel, one or two majors, an adjutant, very often one *aide-major* or more, sometimes a quartermaster, a surgeon and a chaplain. Numbers of companies would vary from one battalion to another. A company was made up of a captain, a lieutenant, an ensign, four sergeants, four corporals and about 75 soldiers. One of the lieutenants would very often perform the duties of adjutant or quartermaster for the whole battalion.

Table 3. Sedentary Militia, 1813: Montreal District



The large divisions were generally subdivided into battalions, the usual names of which are indicated. Quebec and Montreal had subdivisions that were further divided into battalions.

The Indians

Little is known about the Indians' military organization as they were referred to in the documents very generally — "the Savages," "the Indians" — and the nations are rarely specified. Very few Indians are named. British and American authorities wooed them to keep them as allies, yet quite often violated former agreements with them, as happened with the St. Régis group that wanted to remain neutral.[42]

In peacetime the Indian Department was the chief agency overseeing Indian business. During the War of 1812 the military authorities raised some Indian corps for battle and used the commissary general to distribute their presents and provisions (which would account for the paucity of wartime documents in the department's archives). Sir John Johnson was put at the head of the Indian military organization and was in charge of the various captains responsible for Indian groups. Assisting the captains were lieutenant-interpreters who lived in the different Indian camps and led them on military expeditions.

At the time war was declared, Lower Canada counted about 770 Indian warriors: 250 Iroquois at St. Régis, 270 Iroquois at Caughnawaga, 100 Nipissings or Algonquins on Lac des Deux Montagnes, 100 Abenakis around Lorette and 50 Algonquins at Trois-Rivières.[43] Provision had been made for the recruitment of six chiefs and 60 men to be attached to the Voltigeurs.[44] In the course of the war, about 250 to 300 Indians took part in military action alongside the troops of Lower Canada.

Table 4. Sedentary Militia, 1813: Quebec District



There were six divisions and 16 battalions in the Quebec District.
*The 2nd Battalion of the Quebec 2nd Division was made up of two corps: "First Lotbinière" and "2nd Lotbinière."

On 26 October 1813 only a part of the militia force was on the battlefield by the Châteauguay River. Present were four Voltigeur companies, two behind the abatis and two in reserve. Of the Select Embodied Militia, only the 2nd Battalion was near full strength; the 1st and 3rd Battalions were represented by their flank companies, which were part of the Militia Light Infantry detachment commanded by George Macdonell. The 5th Battalion flank companies were there as well. Of the Sedentary Militia, only the Boucherville Division participated in the battle. J. Longtin's company from the 2nd Battalion (the Beauharnois Division) was the only one in the engagement behind the abatis. Captain J.M. Lamothe commanded the 150 Indians in reserve. Behind the abatis, 22 Indians were brigaded with the only company of provincial regulars present on the Châteauguay, the Canadian Fencibles.

Table 5. Sedentary Militia, 1813: Trois- Rivières District



There were three divisions and 12 battalions in the Trois-Rivières District.

Studying methods of militia recruitment is a way of judging the seriousness of Lower Canadian commitment to the War of 1812. Officer recruitment was quite different from soldier recruitment and the comparison reveals class distinctions in early 19th-century society. Obviously, attitudes to enlistment often varied between volunteers and conscript soldiers, but a close similarity in terms of physical and material conditions existed between one corps and another. In wartime as in peacetime, the Sedentary Militia had its permanent recruitment pattern; it supplied the army with needed effectives at appropriate times. Recruitment procedures were the avenue by which the Canadian Voltigeurs could be identified. Attendance rolls revealed the names of the soldiers of the Select Embodied and Sedentary militias who were present at the Battle of the Châteauguay. Beyond revealing the procedures used to gather the military force required for the country's defence, analysis of recruitment methods reflects various interesting socio-economic aspects of the Lower Canada of 1812 (which cannot be discussed within the scope of this paper).

French Canadians rallied around the British banner in 1812, whereas they had been noticeably unwilling at the time of the American Revolution. Why? The reasons are economic and sociological.

The poor economy, with agriculture in crisis, the fur trade in decline, inflated prices caused by money shortages, and trade problems linked with the conflict in Europe were all factors that created manpower surpluses and highlighted the need for extra income. Such a situation made military service more acceptable to large numbers of men.[1] National pride was involved too, especially for the elite, for the English-speaking bigots of the *Quebec Mercury* had accused French Canadians of being a degenerate race. The number of remarks emerging in recruitment advertising, private correspondence and comments on the victory of the Châteauguay clearly demonstrate that the French of Canada wanted to show that they retained the military valour and dignity of their forbears. A second sociological factor leads back to "royalist" ideology of the French Canadians, who viewed American political and social philosophy as verging on barbarism and harboured the conviction that the Americans, whether as speculators or as aspiring landowners, by force of arms or otherwise, wanted to seize the land that was theirs.

Professor Wallot thinks that the French Canadians would probably have held back had the military authorities not shown themselves so determined to root out insubordination.[2]

The Officers

From the time of the French régime, militia officers had been recruited from the upper classes. In New France, appointment as an officer of militia, especially of senior grade, was a step on the road to social advancement. The bourgeois looking for a patent of nobility could pad his claims with military experience as an officer. Commissions were sought by noblemen wanting to secure their power and influence. Merchants and professional men saw the positions not as *earnests of ennoblement, but as sources of* power for their group. These attitudes had changed very little by 1812.

In peacetime the officer's responsibilities were inconsiderable, calling for only minimal education and military training; however, wartime requirements were such that the authorities had to make numerous changes in officer postings. Many men who were overage or in poor health had to retire or take less prominent posts, while others were forced to resign. The criteria for officer recruitment became more exacting. The search was on for officers with some military skill and, above all, the ability to exercise authority over soldiers.

In the regular army as in the militia, beginning in the early 18th century, military training and experience became important factors in officer selection.[3] Thus Prevost recommended Charles-Michel de Salaberry to raise the Voltigeurs because he had the necessary influence, zeal and energy to raise a volunteer corps and make it effective or competent in short order.[4] The name de Salaberry

was associated with that of the Duke of Kent and it identified a family with a military tradition. Charles-Michel had won notice in combat in the West Indies and served with the 60th Regiment in Ireland and England, where he had done some recruitment. In 1812 he had 18 years of service as a regular officer. It was not surprising that de Salaberry chose as officers men like himself. Of the 54 Voltigeur officers, the occupations of 26 are known, and of these some 13 (22 per cent of the total) were career soldiers. The proportion is high indeed, considering that it falls within the militia.

Table 6. Chief Occupations of Voltigeur Officers

Career officers	13
Seigneurs	2
Doctors	2
Surgeon's assistants	3
Notary	1
Civil engineer	1
Businessman	1
Surveyor	1
Journalist	1
Lawyer	1
Total	26

In the other militia corps, career officers or officers with previous military experience were not numerous — understandably so, since the last conflict had ended 30 years before. Based on Irving's findings, only 38 officers (10.8 per cent) of the 350 in the five battalions of Select Embodied Militia had military experience. In the Sedentary Militia, officers were more often sons of veterans than veterans themselves.[5]

It was not easy to sign up experienced military men, for a militia commission was not the fastest way for a regular officer to win promotion. Even if his militia rank was high, he was subordinate to a regular officer of the same rank, and his absence from his regiment meant that he was missing chances for promotion. This explains Charles-Michel de Salaberry's fury when Prevost commissioned him as lieutenant colonel of militia: it was a promotion that held back his advancement in the regular forces.[6] On 29 January 1813 General de Rottenburg informed him that he was promoted to superintendent of the Voltigeurs with the rank of lieutenant colonel in the regular army,[7] but the army rank was not confirmed as expected and on 25 March 1813 he had to be satisfied with the lieutenant colonelcy of the Voltigeurs.[8] At last, in July 1814, de Salaberry received confirmation of his permanent lieutenant colonel's rank.[9] There were further obstacles to promotion in the regular army: de Salaberry asked his father to no longer hope to see him reach the rank of general officer (that is, above colonel), since he was a Catholic and, in any case, needed ten to twelve years' more experience.[10] The highest rank he did achieve, and only on a temporary basis, was that of inspecting field officer of militia in March 1814,[11] considered the equivalent of a lieutenant colonelcy in the army.[12]

In spite of these disadvantages of the militia in contrast to the army, some military men, like de Salaberry's cousin Jean de Hertel, insisted on entering the Voltigeurs.[13] Two reasons could prompt regulars to request militia commissions. One was the near-certainty that the Voltigeurs would become a regular unit, with its officer ranks recognized. The other was the quite contrary wish of some officers to set up as civilians, no longer forced to roam the globe with the army, but still entitled to army half-pay in addition to their pay as militia officers.[14]

Virtually all militia officers were recruited from the upper strata of the society of the day. Ouellet has noted, in fact, that 41 per cent of the 336 French-speaking officers whose occupations he managed to trace, out of a total of 1325, were seigneurs. The percentage even increased slightly as the ranks went up: in the senior officer category it was 44 per cent.[15] What is more, of the 552 officers out of the total of 1996 whose station or occupation is known, Ouellet found only 13 who did not fall into one of the following categories: nobleman, seigneur, merchant, businessman or trader, civil servant, or "professional."[16] In short, over 97 per cent of the militia officers were of "superior" social background.[17]

Some officers' duties depended on more than social standing. An adjutant, for example, had to have some education and it was most important that he be familiar with regulations on training and discipline as well

as the inner workings of the military administration.[18] A candidate for a paymaster's position had to offer proof of his probity and solvency by posting a bond.[19]

The main problem in recruiting captains and lieutenants for the Sedentary Militia seems to have been one of education. When Louis de Salaberry commented that educated people might not be very common[20] he was saying what others were saying less delicately: "the ignorance of our captains, the officers whose ignorance and failings have astonished me, our rural militia officers can neither read nor write and they do not understand English" [translation].[21] Such remarks are common enough to indicate a real problem, but although more acute, it was not peculiar to Canada: England was grappling with the same difficulty.[22]

To secure a commission in the militia it was important from the outset to gain contact with a well-placed person in a position to recommend a candidate to Charles-Michel de Salaberry for the Voltigeurs or to the militia colonels for the Select Embodied or Sedentary militias. De Salaberry would then forward his recommendation based on professional considerations to Freer, the military secretary. Generally, militia colonels sent in requests stressing social background (social rank, fortune, family connections) to Vassal de Monviel, the adjutant general of militia. The promotion circulars for officers in the Select Embodied Militia included the names of officers who were already attached to the corps as well as those of the Sedentary Militia.[23] Officially, promotions were decided on the basis of seniority for all ranks, except for ensigns, who were chosen by lots; however, posts vacated because of health, refusal or other grounds were often filled by persons who were recommended.[24] Political considerations lurked behind appointments, of course. As Ouellet emphasized, Prevost would be careful to rectify with these appointments his predecessor's errors in judgement, making the officers as representative of the social balance as possible.[25]

Beyond those who had secured promotion on the basis of social standing were some who rose by gallantry (Voltigeurs Prendergast and Pambrun),[26] zeal, good education and previous service. Charles Daly of the 3rd Battalion, Select Embodied Militia, was "unquestionably the most zealous, active, and most capable officer of any on the roster" [translation],[27] and earned a major's commission in February 1816 with the congratulations of the commander in chief.[28] If anything, such recommendations were rare. Most often, the reasons were social. Louis de Salaberry submitted a very great number of recommendations argued in terms of connections by family, friendship and social standing, which was awkward for his son Charles-Michel since relatives -- cousins and so on -- were often harder to command than other officers.[29] For their part, these relatives found the young de Salaberry too exacting. His brother-in-law, Jean-Baptiste Hertel de Rouville, pleaded with Vassal de Monviel to find him a posting outside the Voltigeurs.[30]

Patronage was clearly standard practice in officer appointments. Vassal de Monviel would try to persuade Lieutenant Colonel Foretier and the governor that he did not indulge in favouritism;[31] nonetheless, he regularly interceded with the governor on certain appointments and confirmed his tendency when he encouraged his nephew, R. de la Bruère, to submit a request for promotion to his nephew's colonel first, on the grounds that he did not know the new governor as well as he had known Prevost.[32]

When the war began, enthusiasm ran high. Noblemen saw officer appointments as opportunities to prove their power and influence and others saw them as chances to improve their social standing. but a number of aspirants, changed their minds when confronted with the hard facts of military service. They either resigned or refused the posts offered to them. There was a considerable turnover in officers. The figure of 1796 officers[33] (410 in the Select Embodied Militia[34]) on duty from 1812 to 1815 says little about their actual participation: some were active throughout the war and others barely made contact with their battalions.

A number of notaries abandoned their practices during the war to serve as officers. Some officers from the liberal professions, such as the lawyer Louis-Michel Viger, accepted their commissions with reluctance; they could not refuse to serve the crown for reasons of personal profit -- an unacceptable attitude, they believed, for the well-born.[35] Others were afraid of losing their civilian jobs, lacking any assurance that they could return to them. This was the case, for example, with the quartermaster general of the militia, who worried about returning to his permanent position as translator for the legislative

assembly.[36] In fact, there were more resignations than refusals and those who refused usually did so because financial considerations made it impossible for them to leave their families or businesses.

In contrast, the candidate passed over or the officer forced to resign because of age or incapacity was insulted and saw the error or decision as an undeserved smear. Some, like Jean McKay, rolled the military record of his entire family, from grandfather to youngest son, into his plea for a commission.[37] McKay's pride was particularly wounded. "A commission could raise my crushed spirit up from unmerited oblivion," he wrote and, to prove that he was worthy of more consideration, added "I implore you, Sir, to obtain of His Excellency's grace that I be the first dispatched against the enemy, in the most desperate of situations...." [translation].[38] He was made captain of the 1st Battalion, Select Embodied Militia.

The militia officer's responsibilities excluded mercenary motives. Peacetime appointments were often made on the basis of social prestige, and in wartime the officer's financial resources were essential since the recruitment of fighting men meant substantial disbursements.[39]

Soldier recruitment was costly for officers. In the volunteer corps, an officer had to raise a quota of recruits in order to obtain his commission. The requirement for a captain in the Voltigeurs was 36 men; for a lieutenant, 16.[40] Was Vassal de Monviel allowing himself to err when he wrote to Perrault on 16 April 1812 that he needed to bring in 40 volunteers for a captaincy? He added that he would be authorized to pay three *louis* to the recruit and one *louis* to the recruiting agent when, according to the corps' enlistment rules, agents received nothing.[41] Some changes had very likely gone unrecorded, as the sums set aside for recruiting agents would later be increased. Recruiting expenditures were known as "bounty" — or bonuses — and varied considerably even though they were not mentioned in enlistment contracts. Beyond the bounties paid by the government, officer candidates often dug deep into their own pockets to make the quotas. In addition, the recruiting officer had complete responsibility for the recruits until they were in camp. To be sure, advances to cover these costs had been provided for, but it is obvious from the flood of complaints that the officers were receiving them too late or not at all. De Salaberry pointed out the financial problems involved in recruiting infantrymen:

> The great expense to which officers of the Voltigeurs are exposed when employed on the recruting [*sic*] service (if not for recruting Commissions) by reason of [there] being no distribution of the enlisting money allowed to the recrut a proportion of which should cover the recruting officers expense when a recrut deserts previous to his having been passed at the Head Quarters of the Regiment. So much loss has been sustained for want of due provision on this head that officers are averse to being sent on that Service.[42]

When Prevost ordered the Voltigeur effectives reduced in June 1812, Jacques Viger, the last captain to be appointed, was to lose his commission. Charles de Salaberry intervened on his behalf with the military secretary: "This gentlemen [*sic*] is very poor and should he not obtain a company, he never will be able to repay the money his friends have lent him."[43]

In March 1813 de Salaberry requested a lieutenant's commission for N. Vigneau, even though he was two men short of his quota, on the grounds that his higher pay could be used for recruitment.[44] In 1816 de Salaberry wrote that "as each man in the first levy only cost Government about £3-12-0, it is evident the contributions of the officers were immense...."[45]

In the Select Embodied and Sedentary militias, officers had no recruit quotas or payments to make for enlistments. This made access to the officer ranks easier in these corps, though not all costs were reduced for officers often made good their militiamen's material needs without always being repaid (see below). In their initial enthusiasm, some officers made substantial investments to dress, train and arm their companies or battalions. One such was J.B. Turgeon of the Terrebonne Division, whose efforts went unrewarded. His eagerness made the authorities uneasy and they refused him the right to purchase arms.[46]

The notion of duty was a personal one with these officers. A number expressed a need to do their duty for king and country. Beyond personal advantage, requests for commissions very often expressed the applicant's desire to do his duty. A letter from Monsieur Pambrun

to his son conveys reasonably well the attitude of a segment of the populace attempting to carve a niche in society:

> I am delighted that you have made the choice for arms, to serve the King, your Religion and your Country. It is the most honourable profession in which a young man of valour and courage can win distinction and make his way.... [Translation.][47]

The officers were members of the social elite and their sense of duty was a reflection of the place they claimed on the social scale. It was this image that made one officer resentful at not being considered for promotion when "the influence and trust that [those who were favoured] could have among the habitants was certainly below what I had myself" [translation].[48]

In contrast, Charles de Salaberry exhibits a quite different perception of an officer's sense of duty. He was complaining about Perrault in particular and others in general when he wrote that "it is a great misfortune to have officers who care for nothing but their pleasures and whose sentiments, as far as military affairs, are nearly dead."[49] On another occasion, he pointed out to his father that the Voltigeurs were lucky to have such a good reputation:

> entre nous, the difficulties I have encountered and indeed daily encounter, particularly on the part of the officers, when I wish to make them do their duty and pay that attention to their men, which humanity requires, and their duty directs, are very great.[50]

He had the lesson turned on himself, though in a different vein, when he wanted to retire at the beginning of 1814; his father's comments have much meaning in terms of the crumbling of old concepts of military duty as society had taken on a civilian cast.

> On reflection, I think the cause of the silence on M. de Rouville's part is the old principle, or perhaps the old preconception, that one cannot decently leave in time of war; but you have refuted me by telling me that our Englishmen are leaving all right and constantly, in time of war as in peacetime, their first and even their only rule being their own self-interest. Seeing that it is accepted for them, why not for you? And besides, to repeat myself: the best thing is to follow your own judgement. [Translation.][51]

All the same, this sense of duty was not carried so far that members of noble or "honourable" families would have agreed to serve as ordinary soldiers and no more. Of the soldiers whose occupations were discovered, not one came from the ruling class. The fact that officers' names, especially those from headquarters, were well known and the soldiers' were not confirms this theory.

Unfortunately, the origins of only 20 (37 per cent) of the 54 officers of the Voltigeurs could be traced. Though they came from 13 different places, they were recruited largely (60 per cent) in the Montreal district.

Table 7. Places of Origin of Voltigeur Officers

	No.	%
Urban or Rural		
Towns (Quebec, Montreal, Trois-Rivières)	5	25
Country	15	75
Total	20	100
District		
Montreal District	12*	60
Quebec District	5	25
Trois-Rivières District	3	15
Total	20	100

* Five of these 12 came from the south shore: 25 per cent of the officers in this corps.

Places of origin were found for 19 of the 41 officers of the Select Embodied Militia who were present on the Châteauguay in October 1813. They came from 15 different localities, but those from the south shore of the district of Montreal clearly predominated (47 per cent).

Bearing in mind that Lower Canada's population at the time was about 85 per cent rural

Table 8. Places of Origin of Officers of the Select Embodied Militia

	No.	%
Urban or Rural		
Towns (Quebec, Montreal, Trois-Rivières)	3	15
Country	16	85
Total	19	100
District		
Montreal District	15*	79
Quebec District	1	6
Trois-Rivières District	3	15
Total	19	100

* Of these 15, 9 came from the south shore: 47 per cent of the officers in this corps.

and 15 per cent urban,[52] these two corps (Tables 7, 8), and especially the second, reflected the town-country split very well. According to Tables 7 and 8, in spite of Montreal's importance, the province is better represented in the corps of Voltigeurs; however, representation of the Select Embodied Militia battalions was scant on the Châteauguay and research covering the whole corps might result in a different spread of its officers' places of origin.

Officers of the Sedentary Militia usually came from the region where their division was located. The Boucherville Division of the Sedentary Militia was the one present at the Battle of the Châteauguay. Thus its officers lived in and around Boucherville.

Letters, and especially the mass of the documentation, reveal a rich abundance of family ties in the officer group. Beginning with officer rolls for the Voltigeurs, Select Embodied Militia and Sedentary Militia, genealogical studies were undertaken to probe the extent of the phenomenon. Table 9 presents 116 officers who were closely related: fathers, sons, fathers-in-law, brothers-in-law, uncles and cousins. More thorough analysis of the question would undoubtedly reveal an extraordinary profusion of such ties. Relatives' signatures on Vassal de Monviel's marriage contract show the complexity of these family networks:

F. Vassal de Monviel,
Louise Perrault,
Laperrière-Labruère,
Contrecoeur Laperrière [widow],
René Labruère,
Charlotte Labruère,
F. Laperrière,
Pierre Noyel Fleurimont,
Contrecoeur Laperrière,
Laperrière-Fleurimont,
Fr. Laperrière [son],
Julie Laperrière,
Louise Laperrière Boucherville,
Labruère Montarville,
Contrecoeur-Montarville,
Perrault Labruère,
Legras-Pierreville,
Conefroy [priest],
St. Blain Boucherville,
Leguay [notary public].[53]

In addition to the conventional family ties were all those arising from second and subsequent marriages and, always, the problem of identification caused by the practice of naming sons after fathers or uncles, or giving a younger son the name of an older son who had died.

In his paper on militia officers, Fernand Ouellet worked from patronymics to establish family ties. He found that the 1325 Francophone officers active in 1812-15 came from some 630 families, 2.1 officers per family. The 471 Anglophone officers belonged to 342 families, 1.3 officers per family.[54] If all the kinship ties among these different families could be established, family concentrations in the militia officer ranks would emerge as an even more decisive phenomenon and hence more revealing in terms of the structure of Lower Canadian society. This situation is outlined in Table 9.

The militia officers' social position can also be seen in terms of their presence in public offices. Of the 116 officers listed in Table 9, 30 were highly placed public servants or held high political office in 1812-13,[55] 34 were seigneurs and a number of others were sons of seigneurs. Of the 1325 Francophone officers active from 1812 to 1815, some 94 (7 per cent) were noblemen.[56] Most militia officers were also justices of the peace.



2 Recruiting. (Drawing by E. Lelièpvre.)

Thus, the senior officers came from the noble and seigneurial families or the great enterepreneurial or merchant clans. Among the junior officers were the sons of senior officers and the men who would join the ruling class of the next generation. The members of the liberal professions and the business community had identified with military life, which they often saw as a means of reaching a higher rung on the social ladder. With their financial resources or their education or both, they could secure low-paid and extremely expensive positions. Although there were certain standards, patronage played a role in officer recruitment. The extent of participation at this level from the Montreal district was related to the proximity of danger in the district, but the choices were certainly sealed by the profusion of family ties. Whether they were senior or junior officers, nearly all these men had political responsibilities or else were big landowners. On the basis of this research, it may be concluded that the military leaders of the War of 1812 wanted to recruit, in preference to experienced soldiers, men whose prestige and authority were acknowledged by the male populace summoned to arms.

Table 9. Militia Officers' Kinship Ties



The Soldiers

The Voltigeurs

At the outset, recruitment for the Voltigeurs went fairly quickly. This is accounted for by the economic context of the age, the fact that the Select Embodied Militia had not yet been organized, and the military reputation of Charles-Michel de Salaberry. However, the speed must not be exaggerated, as Lighthall did, giving all the recruiting credit to de Salaberry and imagining that the entire corps was raised in two days.[57] At first the regiment was to consist of 500 soldiers, but Prevost cut the number to 350 in June 1812 and then to 300 the following month, owing to limits imposed on military expenditures; the Voltigeur and Glengarry levies could not be allowed to proceed at the same time.[58]

According to Jacques Viger, 264 men were signed up in the first three weeks of recruiting.[59] It looked as if enlistment would be easy, but the rough life of military camp seems to have discouraged a number of the early recruits for the roll only went from 323 in June 1812 to 270 in the following October.[60] De Salaberry had difficulty managing a figure of 437 soldiers in March 1813.[61] Some recruits deserted when they had received their bonuses. It has already been pointed out how costly this was for the recruiting officer, yet the pattern must not be thought peculiar to Lower Canada. The British account or military study that does not report the same phenomenon is rare indeed. Prevost countered the recruiting problems by ordering each colonel of the Select Embodied Militia to send, if possible, 25 volunteers to join the Voltigeur recruits;[62] this had formerly been prohibited under the militia act.[63] In the end, according to a report of October 1813, the Voltigeurs could count 29 officers and 481 non-commissioned officers and soldiers, a total of 510.[64]

Recruits were signed up for the duration of the war with the United States or until apprehension of such a war was dispelled,[65] but in early 1813 a number of officers were expecting the corps to become a regiment of the regular army. Jean-Baptiste Hertel de Rouville, among others, was certain of it.[66] In 1814 there was a proposal, apparently written by de Salaberry, for turning the Voltigeurs into a regular provincial regiment.[67] It was not carried through, probably because of the easing of the situation in Europe, and the Voltigeurs were disbanded at the end of the war, scotching any hopes in the corps for military careers.

Studies were done on 575 soldiers of the Voltigeurs who enlisted before 26 October 1813. If one added those recruited after the Battle of the Châteauguay, there would be about a hundred more, but these were set aside in order to focus as closely as possible on the soldiers who took part in the Battle of the Châteauguay. Of the 575 soldiers traced, not all participated in the engagement. A number deserted shortly after enlisting, others managed to get out of the corps for a variety of reasons and, finally, in 1813 at least half of the Voltigeurs had been sent to defend Upper Canada. In the absence of any archival roll of the Voltigeurs, it cannot be determined exactly which of them were on the Châteauguay; however, in spite of these vague areas, the social composition of the corps up to October 1813 would still be relevant. The large numbers of notarized enlistment contracts shed some light on the subject.

By these contracts, militiamen enlisted for the duration of the war or until such time as the government chose to disband the corps. The official bonus ran from four pounds to five pounds.[68] The contract usually included date of enlistment, father's name, place of origin, age, height, physical description, recruit's signature or mark and, on occasion, his occupation. Sometimes this information was found on the certificates of discharge that were submitted with later requests for land or compensation.

In the course of the study, 500 description cards were set up, each containing at least two of these items of information. The father's name often helped to establish a soldier's identity. The places of origin made it possible to draw a recruiting map. Age and height were clues as well to the strictness with which the regulations on recruit selection were applied. All indications about the militiamen's stature, eye colour and complexion opened the way for hypotheses on the Canadian physical type of that period. Signatures, or their absence, revealed something about the level of literacy in the population.

For acceptance into the Voltigeurs, a man had to be of Canadian origin.[69] As not nationality but place of residence was requested in those days, it is the latter that provides

Table 10. Places of Origin of Soldiers of the Corps of Voltigeurs

	No.	%
Montreal and suburbs	184	32.0
Montreal District, exurban	76	13.2
Quebec and suburbs	160	27.8
Quebec District, exurban	21	3.7
Trois-Rivières	8	1.4
Trois-Rivières District, exurban	9	1.4
Outside the province	4	0.7
Unknown	114	19.8
Total	576	100.0

Table 11. Age of the Voltigeurs



Number: 448; average age: 24.8 years.

the information that only three of the 461 soldiers whose homes were located were non-Canadians. They were from England. There may possibly have been a fourth person, one whose origins are hard to place, in this same category. A single recruit seems to have been turned down because he was American, even though originally from Scotland.[70] As nearly as possible, the parishes where the militiamen came from were identified. It was no easy task since there are many parishes with similar names: Ste. Anne de Mascouche, Ste. Anne des Plaines, Ste. Anne de Varennes, Ste. Anne de Yamachiche, Ste. Anne de la Pérade, Ste. Anne de Beaupré, and so on. In such cases the county name, if mentioned, was the only clue.

According to Corvisier, young men in garrison towns had added stimulus to bear arms.[71] This may have been the case with Montreal and Quebec City which together accounted for 59.8 per cent of the effectives (344 soldiers) in the Voltigeurs even though the urban population was only 15 per cent of the provincial total.

The district of Montreal, town and country, provided more soldiers (42.5 per cent) than the Quebec district (31.5 per cent). This is accounted for by the population concentration in the upper region (approximately 54 per cent), its abundant manpower and the fact that it was the most endangered.

On enlistment, recruits were not necessarily attached to the captain who had signed them up; the strongest and most capable went into the flank companies. For the more hazardous expeditions, the fittest men were grouped together and the others collected into one company to guard less threatened positions. Jacques Viger would be left at Cananoqui in the summer of 1813 in charge of a company of the old and sick while his best men were sent to the Niagara frontier. However, there were not many older men; the average age was 24.8, with only 53 Voltigeurs less than 17 or over 35. On the other hand, the rigours of camp life were more likely to affect persons of not robust constitutions, in this case the youngest and the oldest.

The average height of the Voltigeurs was not necessarily that of the overall population, but since the official minimum can be seen in a sense as an indication of the minimal stature of the male population in any given period and, according to J.-P. Aron, is a valuable clue to socio-economic conditions, these data can be useful in describing the population. The minimum height required in Lower Canada in 1812 was 5 feet 3 inches (1.6 m). The average height of 442 Voltigeurs was 5 feet 5 inches

Table 12. Height of the Voltigeurs



Sample: 442 men; average height: 5 ft. 5 in. (1.65 m).

(1.651 m). Fifteen were 5 feet 2 inches (1.574 m) tall or less. In France at this time the required minimum for military service was 1.598 m (5 feet 2-3/4 inches), but was lowered to 1.570 m in 1813 because too many men were being refused on grounds of height.[72] The minimum stature required by the British army at the same time was 5 feet 4 inches (1.625 m) for the line, and 5 feet 3 inches (1.6 m) for general service.[73] In 1844 Britain raised its minimum to 5 feet 5-1/2 inches (1.663 m) for infantry of the line.[74]

Physical characteristics — eye and hair colour, complexion — had been recorded in enlistment contracts or army company rolls since 1716. This measure was intended to eliminate cheating by captains who hired men temporarily to give the illusion that they had more troops than they actually did in order to receive extra wages and rations. Physical descriptions, making substitutions difficult, was the cause of an increase in the number of deserters, but was also used to pursue them.[75] In England this descriptive control was not extended to the militia until 1781.[76]

These indications about the Lower Canadian physical type of the period, taken from 440 infantrymen in a population of about 270 000 inhabitants, may seem somewhat thin; however, the information on their hair and eye colour and complexion are the only physical data available on Canadians of that time. And in spite of the paucity of information about him, I believe that the Voltigeur was representative of the ordinary men of Lower Canada. The characteristics are of interest because with them one can collect and compare the qualitative descriptions that occur in travellers' accounts or contemporary correspondence. They can also broach the possibility of a genetic history of Canadians similar to the work now under way in France.

Most of the Voltigeurs had brown or black hair: 300 of 440. Grey eyes were ahead of blue ones, 181 to 132. It is interesting to note that although the majority had dark hair, their eyes were light. Yet these notations must be treated carefully; the psychology of the contemporary population has to be taken into account. In their article, "La couleur des yeux à l'époque du 1er Empire," P.A. Gloor and J. Houdaille stress how temporary fashions or socio-political influences can affect the way in which this characteristic is perceived and recorded.[77]

The physical data identified eight blacks and one mulatto. These men were described as having woolly hair and black eyes and skin; the word "negro" occurs sometimes near the name or in another reference. It might be possible to swell this group with others, but the information is not conclusive enough. Were these blacks descended from slaves or former slaves? Possibly, but since the beginning of the 19th century there had been virtually no slaves left in Lower Canada. Most had been freed by their masters or else were living far from them, often in destitution, after running away.[78]

Table 13. Physical Descriptions of the Voltigeurs: Complexions and Hair and Eye Colour

Eyes	Hair						
	Blond	Light Brown	Brown	Black	Red	White	Grey
Blue 132	fair: 35 dark: 12 ruddy: 1 48	fair: 12 dark: 11 ruddy: 1 24	fair: 26 dark: 22 ruddy: 1 49	fair: 1 dark: 6 ruddy: 1 black: 1 9	fair: 2 2		
Grey 181	fair: 11 dark: 8 19	fair: 7 dark: 20 27	fair: 22 dark: 57 79	fair: 7 dark: 40 ruddy: 1 dark brown: 2 50	fair: 2 fair: 2 4	dark: 1 1	dark: 1 1
Brown 83	dark: 1 1	fair: 2 dark: 6 8	fair: 7 dark: 31 ruddy: 1 black: 1 40	fair: 2 dark: 28 black: 2 32			dark: 2 2
Black 43	fair: 1 1		fair: 3 dark: 11 black: 1 15	fair: 17 black: 8 mulatto: 1 26	fair: 1 1		
Red 1					fair: 1		
Total 440	69	59	183	117	8	1	3

The soldiers were recruited from the least privileged and least educated social class. Some 60 per cent were urban. Overall, the level of education among the people was low in the early 19th century, whether in Europe or America, and this is reflected in the numbers of signatures and Xs on the contracts. Of 466 recruits, 342 made an X. There were far fewer Anglophone Voltigeurs than Francophones -- 144 as compared with 431 -- yet more Anglophones signed than did not. The opposite was true for the Francophones.

Crafts or occupations were not always recorded on the enlistment contracts; in fact, Quebec district notaries never did so. Thus, the 112 Voltigeurs whose occupations are known were from the Montreal district, for a sampling of 43 per cent (112 of 260) of that area's non-commissioned officers and ordinary soldiers (see Table 15). That urban craftsmen and day-labourers were by far the biggest group and that most of the Voltigeurs from the district came from the city of Montreal (32 per cent) may indicate a job shortage in the urban area, which would account for the easy recruitment of Voltigeurs in that part of the district. The heavy percentage of Voltigeurs coming from Quebec City (27.8) would indicate a similar situation in that district.

An attempt was made to calculate the numbers of the two ethnic groups in the Voltigeurs. Names, of course, do not necessarily indicate ethnic origin. Even though in the 18th century the process of assimilation seems to have worked in favour of the Francophones, a number of them, especially in the noble class -- such as Charles-Michel de Salaberry, who almost always corresponded in English, even with his father -- had been given English educations. In the Voltigeurs 431 (75 per cent) had French names and 144 (25 per cent) had English names. Even given the reservations expressed above, the Voltigeur corps was unquestionably a military body in which

Table 14. Ability to Write Names, According to Enlistment Contracts

Francophones	No.	%
Signed	58	13.45
Did not sign	292	67.75
No data	81	18.80
Total	431	100.00

Anglophones	No.	%
Signed	66	45.83
Did not sign	50	34.72
No data	28	19.45
Total	144	100.00

Francophones predominated and Anglophones were represented in proportion to their numbers in the towns and their presence in the officer ranks of the province's militia.

To sum up, at the moment of the Battle of the Châteauguay the Voltigeurs counted 575 non-commissioned officers and fighting men. The urban centres — Quebec City, Montreal and Trois-Rivières — had provided 61.2 per cent of these effectives. The Montreal district alone accounted for 45.2 per cent of the Voltigeurs as against 31.5 per cent for the district of Quebec. The corps had drawn mainly young men, the average age being 24.8; 51.8 per cent were 24 or less. Information on their occupations (112 in all) gives the impression that the corps had attracted mainly craftsmen and labourers who could not find work in the urban centres. In physical terms, the Voltigeurs were relatively tall for the time, standing an average 1.65 m, with dark hair, dark complexions and light eyes. Illiteracy — one sign of the group's lower-class origins — ran very high (73.4 per cent). The names indicate a majority of Francophones (75 per cent). The Francophones were slightly under-represented in terms of their weight in the population (85 per cent), but the percentage reflects their presence in the cities. It is to be noted, finally, that the rules of enlistment did not exclude other ethnic groups, for the Voltigeurs included eight blacks and a mulatto.

Table 15. Occupations of Voltigeur Privates and Non-commissioned Officers

	No.	%
Liberal professions	0	
Businessmen	8	7.1
Butchers	5	
Bakers	2	
Tavernkeeper	1	
Craftsmen	53	47.3
Cook	1	
Carpenters	6	
Masons	4	
Weavers	2	
Worker	1	
Painters	2	
Roofer	1	
Carriage-builder	1	
Blacksmiths	4	
Cobblers	13	
Tinsmith	1	
Hatters	2	
Joiners	6	
Gunsmith	1	
Coopers	5	
Tailor	1	
Furrier	1	
Wheelwright	1	
Non-specialized workers	42	35.5
Rural day-labourers	11	
Urban day-labourers	29	
Servant	1	
Carter	1	
Farmers	4	3.6
Others	5	4.5
Printer	1	
Teacher	1	
Voyageur	1	
Soldiers	2	
Total	112	100.0

The Select Embodied Militia

The 3000 men of the battalions of the Select Embodied Militia, of whom 858 would be on the Châteauguay on 26 October 1813, were recruited by two different methods: voluntary enlistment and conscription. Conscripts were by far the more numerous in the corps.

Volunteers could sign up, taking their contracts to the notary, as the Voltigeurs did and on similar conditions; however, contracts were not compulsory in the Select Embodied Militia. So it was that in 1813, when the first group of conscripts were demobilized, the governor tried to recruit volunteers from their ranks. It is impossible to identify all these individuals, for whom only a few descriptive cards like those of the Voltigeurs could be compiled. There is such a small amount of information that it cannot constitute a valid sampling.

The conscript contingents were selected by the drawing of lots among the men of the Sedentary Militia. The militia adjutant general would order each Sedentary Militia division to provide the battalions of the Select Embodied Militia with a specific number of men aged 18 to 30. The number was proportional to the number of militiamen in the division. The first draft, ordered on 28 May 1812, called the Sedentary Militia into training on a rotational basis for a three-month period[79] as a preventive measure in case war broke out, which it did the month following. The militiamen who were drafted had to serve for at least one year. Of the 2000 men conscripted at that time, 1000 were to be replaced after a year and the rest at the end of two years. The choice of militiamen to be sent home after one year was also made by lot. Under the act as amended in 1812, conscripts did not have the right to replacement by substitutes;[80] however, the law was not obeyed and there were a number of substitutions. The militiaman would pay his substitute a sum of money and agree to leave him all his pay.

In early 1813 Prevost increased the effectives of the Select Embodied Militia. On 13 February he ordered a draft from the Quebec City Sedentary Militia to man a sixth battalion of Select Embodied Militia to replace the city's army garrison.[81] The Quebec-region conscripted militiamen who were headed for the other battalions were then replaced by a levy of 248 militiamen from north of Montreal.[82]

In levies for Select Embodied Militia battalions, militiamen would gather initially at designated rendezvous. The first four battalions were raised as follows: Colonel Louis de Salaberry mustered the first one at Pointe-aux-Trembles near Quebec City, Colonel Hertel de Rouville raised the second at Laprairie, Lieutenant Colonel Cuthbert took over the third at Berthier, and Lieutenant Colonel Taschereau met the fourth at St. Thomas, near Quebec.[83] Pointe-aux-Trembles and Laprairie were kept as rendezvous locations until the end of the war. The Sedentary Militia captain, with one or two sergeants, had to collect the conscripts and lead them to the rendezvous, from where the officers of the Select Embodied Militia responsible for new recruits would take them, usually by boat, to the battalion camp.

Compulsory levies of conscripted men were not always carried out with ease. Always and everywhere, conscription has been a form of coercion societies greet with reluctance. Though the Canadians' attitude was generally obliging, a number preferred to let the soldiers fight without them. It was no majority that refused the mobilization orders and an entire population cannot be judged on the basis of a small percentage of defaulters; however, a few incidents will show what a delicate operation conscription always was.

The best known incident is the Lachine riot. The defiance by 39 of 51 conscripts from the Pointe Claire Division was based on their challenge to the authenticity of the governor's order summoning them to arms. Fortified by this belief, a handful of dissidents, some of them armed, managed to attract a crowd of about 400 people. Fearing a general uprising, the civil and military authorities sent the army to restore order. The move was premature and inflamed an already overheated atmosphere. When the soldiers tried to frighten the demonstrators with a cannonshot above their heads, the demonstrators made instant reply with their rifles. After that it was a rout. The next day, 37 men were in prison. Only two were held for their part in the riot, but their punishment was an example. "Evidently, having been unable to take them, they at least want them to feel the lash. Let the Devil rock them; they will sleep better" [Translation.][84] This was the only conflict of

importance and yet its meaning is not easy to determine. Wallot offered this conclusion:

> This incident must be ascribed to anti-conscriptionism and to circumstance rather than to any special or general disaffection against the government in the populace. [Translation.][85]

The *Gazette de Québec* gave the riot muted coverage and seized the occasion to preach its moral:

> If there are folk ignorant enough not to know that the first duty of any man is to obey those with legal authority over them, they will have to be taught, and we fear that ignorance so coarse can be cured only by example. [Translation.][86]

Riots arising from resistance to the militia levy were not peculiar to Lower Canada. On several occasions since the mid-18th century the military in England had scuffled with resisters who were afraid, like the Canadian militiamen, of being sent abroad.[87] It is not surprising that the militiamen of Trois-Rivières should have feared being sent outside the country[88] and that Colonel de St. Ours had to fight the influence of the Trois-Rivières Division resisters in his St. Ours Division.[89]

To escape conscription, resisters hid in houses, barns or the bush. Others took work in the timber trade or with the supply contractors to the military. Still others, using the traditional route to avoid conscription at the beginning of a war, married. On 24 September 1812 the *Gazette de Québec* was noting such precipitate unions in the parish of St. Charles: "It is a certainty that since this time, the young people are marrying without thought or reflection" [translation].[90] There were also some who, barely conscripted, deserted to take up arms on the American side.

These few incidents, exaggerated in the reports of isolated deserters, may have helped the Americans make up their minds to invade the Canadas.[91]

However, all this is secondary in the whole picture. Most conscripts stepped into the ranks with more docility than the authorities expected.

> The gentlemen commanding the corps, like ourselves, seem not merely satisfied, but astonished to see the noble manner in which these young men move to the Service of their King. All the commanders of the Sedentary Militia are unanimous in saying that good will is evident everywhere. There are a few defaulters, however; but these are in such small numbers that it is not worth talking about. [Translation.][92]

The militiamen could have been encouraged to accept mobilization for economic considerations. Except for the enlistment bonus, their material conditions were the same as the Voltigeurs'. It is probably for these reasons that Hertel de Rouville could write that the militiamen seemed very satisfied.[93]

Following the draft, the men were divided among the different companies; the strongest, bravest and most capable formed the battalion's flank companies while the others went into the light companies, but even for these last companies good health was an essential criterion for the service. At the outset, the officers of the Sedentary Militia did not pay attention to this policy. They wanted to keep the best men in farm work and send the unproductive ones to the military; however, the weak and disabled were invalided out and replaced by men in good physical condition.

As mentioned, there are very few data on the soldiers of the Select Embodied Militia. On the Châteauguay that 26 October 1813 there were about 858 militiamen from this corps: 69 from the 1st Battalion, 556 from the 2nd, 77 from the 3rd and 156 from the 5th. These numbers are from the paymaster's lists. On the other hand, as with the Voltigeurs, it can rarely be stated with certainty that one particular militiaman or another was absent or present at the battle. It seems from the officers' correspondence that a number were absent, but how many? The only indication is the absence of 80 soldiers from the pay list of 24 November, but this does not necessarily mean that they were away on 26 October.

For these 858 soldiers of the Select Embodied Militia only 60 cards could be completed: age, height, hair and eye colour, complexion, occupation and place of origin. This may not be a valid sampling, but these militiamen are quite like the Voltigeurs. On average, the militiamen in this group was 22 years old, stood 1.65 metres tall and tended to have brown hair, grey or brown eyes and a dark complexion. Nothing indicates that a black was among them, but one soldier was described as having black hair, black eyes and a black complexion.

More information is available on the soldiers' occupations: 102 notations (Table 16).

Table 16. Occupations of Non-commissioned Officers and Men, Select Embodied Militia

	No.	%
Liberal professions	0	
Businessmen	3	2.0
Hotelkeeper	1	
Baker	1	
Tradesman	1	
Craftsmen	15	14.7
Coopers	2	
Tanners	3	
Masons	4	
Carpenters	2	
Furniture-makers	2	
Wheelwright	1	
Joiner	1	
Non-specialized workers	40	39.2
Rural day-labourers	33	
Urban day-labourers	4	
Carters	3	
Farmers	44	43.1
Others	2	1.9
Verger	1	
Letter-writer	1	
Total	102	100.0

Table 17. Places of Origin of Soldiers, Select Embodied Militia

	No.	%
Town	21	12.4
Montreal	9	
Quebec	5	
Trois-Rivières	7	
Country	148	87.6
Montreal District	82	48.5
Quebec District	48	28.4
Trois-Rivières District	14	8.3
Townships	4	2.4
Total	169	100.0

Table 17 shows a different group from the Voltigeurs. Whereas the latter were mainly townsmen (61.2 per cent), 87.6 per cent of those enlisted in the Select Embodied Militia were from the country. This is not surprising since the draft was carried out by the drawing of lots across the various parts of the province. Evidence on places of residence confirms a very strong rural representation: 148 of the 169 places were rural.

The men of the Select Embodied Militia, like the Voltigeurs, came mainly from the Montreal district, though from the country rather than the city. As with the Voltigeurs, this is probably because of the population concentration (about 54 per cent) in this district. Yet it must not be forgotten that militiamen were being kept at Quebec to do garrison duty and were replaced by Montreal district militia.

The soldiers of the Select Embodied Militia were extremely active throughout the war. Although they were recruited as auxiliaries to the regular army, they not only performed fatigue and garrison duties, but also took on many difficult and dangerous tasks of attack and defence. I have tried to describe what this Select Embodied Militia was, or at least give its main outlines, so that it will no longer be confused with the Sedentary Militia, which was simply incorporated from time to time.

The Sedentary Militia

All men aged 16 to 60 were officially members of the Sedentary Militia. Recruitment took place on a young man's 16th birthday. Before the war, lists of effectives were drawn up at the time of the annual parade. Beginning in 1812, parades were more frequent, as much to give the men more regular training as to prepare them for the levy, define the responsibilities of the various detachments and assess the companies' manpower and weaponry.

For training purposes the Sedentary Militia was called up in small groups at a time and only for a few days. More often than not on such occasions they would return to their own homes in the evenings. When danger was imminent the men of the Sedentary Militia

Table 18. Return for the Beauharnois Division, Sedentary Militia

Return for the month of August in the year Eighteen Hundred Thirteen, of the number of Militiamen in the Beauharnois Division, located in the District of Montreal, in the Province of Lower Canada, made by Edme Fleury, Major commanding the said division in the absence of Lieutenant Colonel Grant; to His Honour Major-General Glascow [*sic*], Presiding over and commanding the forces of the Province of Lower Canada; conformably with his Proclamation, dated at Quebec, the Nineteenth Day of the month of June last.

Return of the number of Militiamen in the Division of Beauharnois ...
to wit

17	Captains	
17	Lieutenants	
16	Ensigns	
50		
89	Sergeants	
	Ordinary Militiamen	
1109	Married men from the age of 16 to 50	Present
452	Bachelors from the age of 16 to 50	
236	Married men and bachelors from ... 50 to 60	
1936		
70	Married men ordered on duty	absent on the King's service
67	Bachelors embodied in the active militia	
280	Bachelors ordered up on duty	
2353		
47	Married men absent without permission	absent without permission
70	Bachelors absent without permission	
2470		
31	Married men - sick	sick
11	Bachelors D°	
9	Married men and bachelors exempt by law	exempted by law
2521	Total of Militiamen of the Beauharnois Division	

Given in the village of Laprairie the 7th September 1813. By E. Fleury, Major Commanding, in the absence of Lt. C. Grant, Beauharnois Division. [Translation.]

Source: Public Archives Canada, RG9, IA1, Vol. 6, Retour ... du nombre de Miliciens dans la division de Beauharnois...., 7 Sept. 1813.

were called up on a temporary basis and placed in a camp where they were kept busy working and drilling every day. There they lived like the Select Embodied Militia and received the same pay, though without being given uniforms or accoutrements.

During these alerts, men aged 18 to 30 were mobilized first, then those aged 30 to 40. This procedure was not part of a pre-established plan; however, in June 1813 Vassal de Monviel proposed an organizational plan for mobilizing and training the Sedentary Militia.[94] The plan was not implemented in 1813, but a renewed attempt by de Monviel secured its adoption at the end of that year.[95] The massive draft of Sedentary Militia, 11 293 militiamen,[96] for the defence of Montreal in the fall of 1813, had demonstrated the need for a better administrative structure so that the civilian population would not be left without services and the fields without labour. Major Henry's report told how profoundly the active population was affected: of 1897 militiamen present, 1561 were between 16 and 50 years old and thus had had to leave their jobs to serve in the militia.[97]

Some Sedentary Militia companies, led by active and dedicated captains, were trained and equipped like the enlisted volunteers. This was the case with the Châteauguay Chasseurs and Captain Turgeon's company from Terrebonne. The militiamen wore uniforms paid for by their captain and themselves. As far as possible, they were provided with equipment and firearms. They drilled every day, but did not live in a camp.[98]

Much has been said about how the Canadians readily submitted to the mobilization order, but such an assertion could only result from superficial analysis. In a number of cases, militiamen reported to camp only because they were afraid to disobey or because officers and others forced them to. If they did not go, they were jailed and then dispatched to their divisions, which is what happened to 19 militiamen of the Beauharnois Division in October 1813.[99] A number who wanted to evade mobilization in Chambly went off to the timber camps for a week and insisted afterwards that they had always been at the king's service, their absence owing to indisposition.[100] Avoiding service through various types of heavy work seems to have been a frequent strategy. One report, from 1812, was eloquent;

> Laprairie: of 380 militiamen, 200 said they were available.
> Blairfindie: of 665 militiamen, 400 said they were available.
> St. Philippe: of 370 militiamen, 200 said they were available.
> St. Constant: of 310 militiamen, 200 said they were available.
> Châteauguay: of 250 militiamen, 160 said they were available.[101]

Charles-Michel de Salaberry commented in the autumn of 1812 that the militiamen of St. Philippe and St. Pierre had not shown the proper enthusiasm in coming to collect their arms, but he saw this as largely due to the lack of zeal and enthusiasm among the officers.[102]

Such unwillingness was unnoticed by the military authorities, who pronounced themselves highly satisfied with the response of the population and heaped praises on the Sedentary Militia. Of course, their position was not that of the company officer who had to lead conscripts by the hand to their rendezvous. Thus there are two viewpoints on the mobilization of the Sedentary Militia: the distant view, of fairly easy recruiting with few problems, and the near view, of arduous recruiting calling for much dedication and attention from division officers. Behind the seeming general submissiveness to the law, individuals were spawning schemes to avoid service; however, these shows of reluctance by individuals had no polarizing effect or political reverberation, which is why they were not noted by the top military authorities.

Military historians have not dwelt on the role of the Sedentary Militia except to note fatigue duties performed with the regular forces; however, on the Châteauguay in 1813, to name only one occasion, militiamen from this corps saw actual combat. Would it not be to spur enlistment in the embryonic Canadian army that the historians invented the view that has persisted to the present day?

The Indians

It is hard to research Indian recruitment: primary sources are few and for Lower Canada the literature is virtually non-existent. There is some tendency to lump the Indians of Lower Canada together with those of Upper Canada; however, their political and cultural environ-

ments made them two quite different groups. Whereas those of Upper Canada still lived in their natural setting, with colonists taking up little space, those of Lower Canada were surrounded by whites. In Upper Canada the Indians were defending their hunting grounds and mode of subsistence, and therefore their involvement in the war had a political aspect that did not exist in Lower Canada. On the other hand, the Indians of both Canadas had lost their former ways and were almost completely dependent for their survival on presents and supplies from the whites.[103]

The different nations supplying warriors have already been listed in "The Militia in Lower Canada." Not all the 770 available Indians were taken on for military service. They were called on for reconnaissance, ambush and look-out duties. Given their disinclination for the battlefield or assaults on fortified positions, they were used chiefly as guerrillas[104] and to alarm the enemy.

An Indian detachment under Captain J.M. Lamothe was added to the Voltigeurs as soon as the corps was raised in 1812. In September of that year they counted from 120 to 130: Abenakis, Nipissings, Algonquins and Iroquois.[105] Integrating the Indians into the British military effort was a delicate business. They were trying to take advantage of the material benefits offered by both belligerents, the whites often regarded them arrogantly and, finally, they did not share the whites' sense of discipline and property. The officers had great difficulty training them (European tactics and drill were hardly consistent with their traditions), keeping them on certain duties and restraining them from larceny (which was not exclusive to the Indians). All this occasioned frequent conflict between officers and Indians under their command. Charles-Michel de Salaberry noted how much easier things would have been for him if the government had taken a little trouble to provide the necessities for his 200 Indians.[106] To help the officers impose discipline, tavern-keepers had been ordered to take down their signs and innkeepers were not to give an Indian one drop of liquor on pain of seeing all their stocks confiscated.[107] The difficulty of enforcing such an order may be imagined.

Given this background, maintaining the Indians' participation as British allies called for much adroitness and diplomacy. It was well known that a number of them were playing both ways, but admonishment was useless; no more could be done. In view of their apathy in military action, Sir George Prevost threatened them, telling them that they were like old women and that if they did not fight when ordered to, they would receive no provisions or presents from the government.[108] In 1813, to encourage the warriors who were loyal and active, and to get the most from their band leaders, the commander in chief ordered the officers of the Indian Department to heap extra gifts on Indians displaying bravery before the enemy.[109]

If the Indians were somewhat reluctant to take part in the white man's war, part of the reason must surely have been the whites' own attitude at that time. They wanted the Indians on their side, but did not much trust them and were afraid of them. The letters of Father Boucher display an attitude of trusting only those he knows: if there are traitors at Caughnawaga, "they really come from Ockoisasné [St. Régis]."[110] On another occasion, when he learned that the military were going to fetch the Indians from the upper country, he exaggerately exclaimed "That's the limit! They are quite capable of plundering us all, and killing people dead!" [Translation.][111]

In spite of these problems, Indians did signal service in the War of 1812. Their knowledge of the forests and their woodsmanship were highly valued by the militiamen of the outposts whose duties they often shared. In October 1813 they were on the Châteauguay with the militia: nine could be identified from a list of War of 1812 pensioners (Table 19).[112]

Table 19. Indians Known to have been Present at the Battle of the Châteauguay

Name	Age in 1813
Simon Annance	14
Ignace Kanintoton	26
Joseph Onaquatkawa	22
Jose Sakisatwastha	17
Natias Donorese	15
Jacques Sopario	22
Sarvatis Arnoken	18
Pierre Sakakenari	18
Francis Kasekete	18

In this study of the Battle of the Châteauguay, the human side, the everyday existence of the common soldier is of interest: his billeting, diet, dress, pay, work, discipline and military training. Sanitary conditions, women in the camps, religious observance and leisure are other dimensions studied. The documents give us a society and its attitudes, and my research has revealed a new militiaman's personality behind the abatis. On that basis, the portrait of the man on the Châteauguay in 1813 appears more human, less intellectual.

The Material Aspect

Billeting

More often than not, the militiaman's billet, like that of the regular soldier, was fairly uncomfortable in the War of 1812. When the war began, few army structures existed that could be used as barracks. As was the custom in wartime, they turned to large buildings, such as religious houses, that most readily lent themselves to such use. Thus the Récollets of Montreal had to allow part of their seminary to serve as barracks, and preparations were made in September 1813 to house 600 men. A captain's name was posted on each dormitory door along with the list of men of his company who would be staying there. The major saw to it that all necessities were in place before the men arrived.[1]

Apart from these buildings, some barracks had been constructed, as at Laprairie and Blairfindie. Barracks and a guardhouse, the latter with space for 100 men, were erected at St. Philippe.[2] The Laprairie barracks housed 436 men of the Select Embodied Militia. The Blairfindie post, called "Halfway House" because it stood midway between St. Jean and Chambly,[3] was used as a militia camp throughout the war although the barracks built there in 1814 were for the cavalry only,[4] not for infantry or militia.

When barracks were full, militiamen were billeted with local residents, whom the law obliged to accept them or risk a 20-shilling fine and, for a further offence, a five-pound fine or up to 15 days in jail.[5] The law said that no more than two soldiers were to be billeted in one house and only one in the less well-off houses,[6] but when in urgent situations this section was not observed. Several homeowners along the Châteauguay had to put up with large numbers of soldiers in the autumn of 1813. In some areas, such as the Beauharnois countryside, the people were so impoverished and in such straitened circumstances that officers changed the locations of their camps.[7] The law exempted no one from the duty of housing militiamen; however, the middle class — notaries, lawyers, doctors and the like — accepted only officers, who were often already known to their families. Thus two militiamen were refused shelter by a Verchères notary who forced his neighbour, a schoolmaster, to take them in.[8]

Sometimes houses were rented. Two in Berthier were leased at £2.16.8 a month,[9] but rates varied. A widow on the Châteauguay let her home to militiamen for ten shillings monthly.[10] The houses rented as billets or guardhouses or both were not always particularly spacious. In St. Constant the militia took Jean-Bte. Lancto's place, measuring about 15 feet by 24 feet and, according to the report, able to accommodate a family and one guard.[11] This house, the owner being absent, rented for four dollars a month.[12]

What would be the appearance of an ordinary habitant's home where soldiers were staying? Pierre de Sales Laterrière's 1830 description ought to be valid for 1813 as well: wooden floors, a chimney in the centre of the house, a partition between the kitchen and a large room having small bedrooms at either end.

> The main bed, enclosed by green woollen cloths hanging from an iron bar to the floor from the top of the big room, the holy-water basin and little crucifix at its head; the large dining table, children's crib on wooden casters under the big bed, the various chests for storing Sunday best; the ornamentation of the joists, the long pipe, the French *tulle*, or longbore musket, the powder horn, the shot pouch, etc. [Translation.][13]

When space in houses ran out, the soldiers were billeted in sheds or barns. When space

ran out in the outbuildings, the militiamen slept in tents, which was not so bad in summer, but not especially comfortable in spring and autumn when the weather was cold and rainy. Yet they may have had less difficulty protecting themselves from the elements than those who, lacking even tents, had to improvise huts with scavenged wood, cornstalks, fir boughs and hay. Such huts could protect them from the blazing sun and, to a lesser extent, wind, but were very little use against rain and the mosquitoes that found a thousand ways to get in.

In barracks, bedding was supplied. In private homes, according to the regulations, the residents had to provide a bed for two, with a straw mattress, covers and a pair of sheets to be changed every month, also a place by the fire with freedom to prepare meals.[14] Few details are available on amenities in the tents, but they were probably the same as in the sheds, barns and huts. Hay was used for mattresses. The men of the Sedentary Militia who had not brought blankets crawled between two bundles of hay to keep from freezing at night.[15]

Officers rarely shared the accommodation standards of their soldiers, yet did not always have the comforts to which some were accustomed. On passing through a parish, they would stay at the presbytery or the inn, or with someone they knew. In winter quarters they would rent a house in the camp area for themselves and their families. If they could not find houses, they were billeted with residents, who were obliged by law to provide "a room such as is found in the country, but which shall not be that of the master; a table, three chairs, and lodging for his servant, as for a soldier" [translation].[16] The officer had access to his host's fire, with the possibility of preparing meals. These requirements eliminated straight away the houses that were too small and thus the poorest inhabitants. In spite of this regulation, or because suitable billets were in short supply, officers often stayed in inns at their own expense. As the levy of the Select Embodied Militia began, Charles-Michel de Salaberry asked that the quartermaster general attend to officers' billeting right away, as inn accommodations would soon be beyond their means.[17] Most officers were not very well off and housing was often an unrefunded expense.

Even in places like Chambly, lodgings were scarce because of the surplus population due to the presence of the military. Jacques Viger spoke about this situation:

> up to now I have not been able to find lodgings near the Fort, so that I have had



3 A hut. (Drawing by Y. Larochelle.)

to take refuge with Dr. Laterrière, who has his house about a mile *(28 arpents)* from this place on the St. Jean road. The other officers are staying even farther out this way and in the Village, so that it is not very easy to visit back and forth. [Translation.][18]

Poor Viger's troubles were not over. The next month, when he arrived in St. Philippe, in what he termed the most accursed corner of the known world,[19] he was obliged to share his lodgings. He was crowded into two small rooms with de Rouville, Perrault, Herse and Prendergast.[20] Obviously, this could not last for the entire winter. When the order came to take up winter quarters in the concessions, Viger asked his wife to join him in a rented house in the St. André concession. As financial resources were limited, Madame Viger was forced, as others joining their husbands were, to part with her accommodations in town.[21]

For the officers, winter quarters meant a return to family life. De Salaberry wrote to his wife in October 1813: "I am still keeping the house in St. Philippe in the hope that we will go back there soon. I long for that happiness." [Translation.][22]

The most frequent hosts for staff officers were undoubtedly the parish priests. They were flattered indeed to be able to accommodate the governor in their presbyteries, but would gladly have let other officers go by. The most eloquent was Father Boucher of Laprairie, probably because his new presbytery was extensively damaged by the constant presence of a large number of soldiers. When the governor appeared at Father Bruguier's in the Châteauguay, it was pointless for him to ask that no large dinners or suppers be set,[23] for he was invariably accompanied by a number of people.

In the autumn of 1813, when Father Boucher was forced to abandon his new presbytery to 200 De Meurons and their band,[24] Father Bruguier was entertaining the military commanders. He wrote on 7 November:

> Sir George spent seven or eight days at this house on two different occasions, I have not seen him since the 27th last, Generals Stovin, De Watteville have always made their residence with me, either one or the other since 24 September, accompanied by their staff. Imagine what a life I have led.... [Translation.][25]

On 21 November the curate of Châteauguay informed his bishop that Major General de Watteville had set up his headquarters in the presbytery.[26] Father Boucher was growing ever more discouraged; he felt that his new presbytery looked like the Augean stables and quoted a corporal as remarking that they would have to send the St. Lawrence through it. To crown his misery, the governor seemed to want it for his winter quarters. "Bravo," wrote Boucher, philosophically adding that things would be even worse in the event of an invasion.[27]

During the alert in the autumn of 1813, officers' billeting standards were not enforced. Lieutenant Colonel de Léry was staying in a very low, smoke-filled little house which he shared with another officer.[28] At Baxter's, not far from their soldiers, they enjoyed some comfort at least.[29] On picket duty near the border, Captain Hertel de Rouville and his Voltigeurs were camping in tents in November 1813. Before the battle, de Salaberry was at Morrison's place with his soldiers camped around the house.[30] That autumn Joseph Primeau, a Châteauguay resident, was complaining that there were always about 30 men in his house.[31] De Watteville had installed his headquarters in the home of James Wright.[32] Baker's tavern at La Fourche saw a constant stream of troops of all sorts: the officers occupied the inn while ordinary soldiers were billeted at the farm in outbuildings and huts.[33]

Billeting troops on farms was bound to cause much destruction. Houses and furniture were damaged; outbuildings were altered for use as lodgings; animals, tools and farm equipment were exposed to bad weather, used by the soldiery, broken and frequently stolen. The presence of 500 fighting men in a cultivated field meant the destruction of the crop and a field to be retilled. To get settled, the militiamen often took saws, axes and hammers, which were rarely returned to their owner. When there were no tools, fences and stacked wood were used to make the huts. The farm's condition after the troops left may be imagined.

Diet

The militiamen relied on the population for their rations, which were procured both directly and indirectly. The direct mode was applied when the militia, through its quarter-

master, took or had the habitants deliver what was needed. The normal procedure was simply by purchase, but, very often, provisions were obtained by requisition or compulsory purchase with deferred payment. The Commissariat drew the necessary funds for the purchases on the provincial treasury, working through an assistant paymaster general appointed for that purpose.[34]

The Commissariat also placed calls to tender for food contracts in newspapers. A contractor had to deliver specific quantities of edibles to the various posts on a set date; he was paid the agreed amount on the 24th of each month.

At the beginning of the war, many contracts were awarded to a number of individuals for small quantities at a time, but in 1813, as food grew scarcer, it became more difficult to organize supplies. Since the Commissariat was wrestling with a number of supply problems other than that of food, the contracts were given to a big contractor who undertook to meet the different posts' needs through a network of subcontractors. Such was the agreement between Commissary General Robinson and William Johnson Holt of 7 August 1813.[35] Holt responded to a call to tender of 15 June 1813 and issued subcontracts (five of which have been examined). This way of working would not necessarily eliminate the previous contractors, for they could obtain subcontracts, as was the case with one Charpentier *dit* Sansfaçon, whose contract of 27 October 1812 had been renewed in March 1813. He had been paid fourpence per pound of beef in 1812, fivepence in March 1813, and with Holt he received 40 shillings per 100 pounds.[36] Contractual terms remained the same: delivery to the posts listed of a specific quantity of good-quality meat on agreed dates. These contracts were for supplying beef; the practice was the same for pork and flour.[37] Given the shortage of flour in Lower Canada, contracts were awarded to Upper Canada.[38]

Canada's own production was not adequate to feed the military, their families and the employees of the various administrative branches of the forces who were entitled to rations. De Rottenburg had to force people to sell to the army in Upper Canada. Lower Canada was in economic crisis and production had fallen enormously; however, in spite of everything, the food problem was much reduced by easy access to American supplies. Reginald Horseman has noted the bizarre situation in which the United States, instead of courting Canadians by fostering conflict between farmers and the British army, actually eased tension between these parties by mitigating the problems of supply.[39]



GOVERNMENT CONTRACT.

WANTED for the supply of His Majesty's Forces in Lower-Canada, FRESH BEFF, of a good quality, for the period of eight months, to commence on or before the 1st September next ensuing, and to be delivered at the following Posts, viz.

Quebec	about	2000	pounds daily.
Three-Rivers	do.	500	do.
Montreal	do.	2200	do.
William-Henry	do.	500	do.
Chambly	do.	1600	do.
Longueil	do.	500	do.
Boucherville	do	500	do.
St. Denis and Yamaska road	do.	500	do.
Pointe Claire, Cedars, and Coteau du Lac	do.	500	do.
La Prairie	do.	2000	do.
L'Acadie	do.	1500	do.
St. John's and Isle aux Noix	do.	1000	do.

The quantities liable to increase or diminution, to the strength of the Post as it may be during the period of the contract.

Proposals from persons willing to furnish the same for each Post separately, and for Quebec and Montreal, or any other Post, any part thereof in quantities not less than 500 pounds daily will be received at this Office, and at Acting Deputy Commissary-General Clarke's Office, on or before the 24th of July next

To be paid for on delivery on the 24th of every month.

Security will be required for the due perfotmance of the contract.

Commissary-General's Office, Quebec, 15th June, 1813. tf

4 A government contract. *(Gazette de Québec,* June, 1813).

American offers were well received by the British leaders, who saw them as a means of reducing the enemy's resources on his borders.[40] Buying from the enemy became fairly common practice and contractors like Joseph Baker of St. Armand would ask to be paid for their beef in army scrip and New York banknotes, which establishes the provenance of their purchases.[41] When militiamen ransacked the American border area, J. Manning asked Sheaffe to remind them that many of these Americans were suppliers of food, and harm to the Americans meant injury to themselves.[42]

Problems with maintaining the militiamen's rations began the day they left their homes. The captain had to obtain enough from local residents to keep the men fed until they reached the rendezvous, but the mass levy of militia made this method virtually inoperable. One lieutenant colonel suggested giving the recruit a sum of money with which to feed himself as best he could. This was an old

approach covered in the militia manual, but the allocation was only sixpence a day, and in 1812 that was not even half of what was needed, given the high price of food.[43] Once at the rendezvous, the militiamen usually began to draw the regulation rations that were theirs during the service:[44] flour, beef and pork. In times of intense military activity, for soldiers on advance picket duty and workers on Ile aux Noix, as well as when the weather turned cold and rainy, daily rations were enriched by two and a half ounces of rum.

The information on rations shows the changes caused by supply difficulties and perhaps also in part by varying client groups. Canadians consumed a lot of fat pork, while British soldiers preferred beef. In the first rations, pork was used only to round out other dishes. The general order of 12 September 1811 added 3/7 pint of peas, 1-1/7 ounces of rice and 6/7 ounce of butter, the butter being replaced in April 1812 by 1-3/7 ounces of pork. These last items were absent in the general order of 13 August 1813.

Ration quantities were the same for officers and men. They were absurdly small and the militiamen were loud in their complaints. It can be seen from their protests that the habitant took his soup without vegetables, but always added peas or barley and a bit of pork. The soup must have been basic to their diet for, faced with disgruntled recruits, leaders of the Select Embodied Militia undertook to supply the peas. The period of enlistment was then three months and the lieutenant colonels reckoned the peas' cost at 20 shillings per man for this time.[46]

Table 20. Rations[45]

General Order 12 September 1811	
flour	1 lb. per day
beef	1 lb. per day
pork	1-3/7 oz., changed to 9-1/7 oz.
General Order 13 August 1813	
flour or biscuit	1-1/2 lbs.
salt pork	10-1/2 oz.
or	
fresh or salt beef	1 lb.

Much could be said simply about bread. The flour allotment was to be used to make bread; however, some troop quarters had no ovens, especially at first, and bread had to be ordered from outside. In June 1812, 973 loaves were brought to Pointe-aux-Trembles in nine carts.[47] Thus transportation played an important role in supply. With the food shortage at Blairfindie in the early summer of 1812, Louis de Salaberry was glad to see the arrival of 300 loaves "to keep my people from dying of hunger" [translation].[48] On another occasion when bread could not be baked because of the lack of ovens, commanders gave the militiamen raw flour. What else could they have done? They had nothing more. A possible and even likely answer would have been to make pancakes of fat, water and flour, as hunters and timbermen did.[49]

Rations did not provide the full menu for three daily meals. Captains of the Select Embodied Militia advanced each man two shillings so he could buy salt, pepper, potatoes, cabbages and carrots.[50] Voltigeur captains had been given the same order (for sixpence) and if no vegetables were available, they were to have additional loaves baked.[51] Since rations did not include vegetables and seasonings, these had to be bought from the many sutlers who moved with the army camps. Judging from ration quantities, the portions seem small; however, to have more cash the militiamen broke the rules and sold some of their provisions.[52]

Vegetables could be found in season, but in the spring a meal would consist of bread, meat and soup.[53] Sometimes soldiers in remote posts did not get their provisions and stayed hungry until the next delivery was made. In these circumstances the soldiers often supplied themselves at the expense of local residents.

Along the Châteauguay in the autumn of 1813 the militiamen were often ill-housed, but the extremely high incidence of looting reported by local residents indicates that they at least had a reasonably varied diet. As well as carrying off fowls (never part of rations), pigs, lambs, a bullock and a calf, they cleared out several kitchen gardens. A garden of that period would have had carrots, cabbages,

beets, turnips, onions and pumpkins. Quantities given in references to potatoes, corn and peas imply that these were planted in fields like wheat, barley and oats. Beans and tobacco were less common as crops, at least in 1813.

What the militiamen could eat in the field seems not much different from their meals at home. Labadie made a soup for a passing works party with some pieces of fatty beef they had on hand and peas, cabbage, onions, carrots, parsley and chervil, cooking a most appetizing soup that the poor fellows savoured, saying they never knew the like.

Comparing these menus with the dietary habits of the habitants of the period is possible through the account of P. De Sales Laterrière. The only account to offer such information, it dates from 1830 but is still valuable. According to him, the French Canadians' diet expressed their traditions. It had less meat in it than that of the richer English, but was nutritious and copious. The undernourished were few, for though the diet was not sophisticated, it was balanced. On the other hand, a little effort would have meant much improvement. Cheese was virtually unknown, even though milk was better than elsewhere. Butter, except for the Kamouraska product, was tasteless. Still according to Laterrière, the absence of cheese and the poor quality of butter were due to the ignorance of the people. The bread was far from perfect because of the coarse, dark flour that was said to be more nutritious but made poorer loaves than the fine, white flour of the Americans.[54] Moreover, they used a yeast that made the bread universally sour. According to Laterrière, the problem could be solved by growing hops, superior in taste and quality. Hops were grown only for brewing beer in Montreal and Quebec; they were not generally available. As for alcohol, people were drinking mainly rum, whisky and gin, although in Laterrière's view, beer would have been greatly preferable.

Officers from the seigneurial class and the liberal professions had more sophisticated dietary habits. Chicken with fat pork was their preference.[55] They rounded out their rations with brown sugar, coffee, wine and rum ordered from their wives, unless there were preserves from mother as well.[56] L.M. Viger wrote his brother-in-law Papineau, to whom he was sending a cask of spirits, a cask of wine, a ham, a pound of tea and an unspecified number of pounds of sugar, that he had been unable to get beer from Molson's.[57] Eating well for persons of Viger's class meant white and red wine, fresh fish, good boiled beef, good roasts, abundant vegetables, fruit, cheese, fresh butter and coffee for dinner, and sausages, ground meat, etc., for breakfast and supper, all on an allowance of 16 dollars a month in 1808 at Quebec.[58] Obviously, meals were not universally excellent, and in Champlain Viger had a bad one at which, to top his other annoyances, he had to drink his tea with white sugar, not in lumps, but carefully pounded up like the brown sugar.[59] Evidently sugar tongs were not in style at that inn. Some foodstuffs, rare in the habitants' pantries, were sought by the more well-to-do who could afford them. Cheese, an import, is one example. Its value is evident from the story of a habitant who had hidden it in a chest with 14 or 15 dollars he had put aside.[60] Once the enemy had retreated on the Châteauguay, the officers paused to enjoy a few good meals. De Watteville routinely broached several bottles of wine with his dinner. Prevost had quite different habits; he stopped at Father Bruguier's to have a snack.[61] These accounts point up particular customs: the Canadians, while maintaining certain French habits — wines and big meals — took tea and lump sugar in the English style; Prevost ate a light midday meal; de Watteville, considered a Frenchman, drank wine in quantity and entertained for dinner at four o'clock in the latest Paris fashion.[62] This was quite different from the militiamen, who in normal times would have breakfast before nine o'clock, dinner at noon[63] and supper towards six.

Proprieties were to be observed even in wartime. A number of habitants lost utensils loaned for the officers' table. At Fort Chambly in August 1812 they had borrowed knives, forks, glasses, plates and so on to entertain de Rottenburg.[64] To avoid problems, the officers carried dishes and cutlery for themselves and their guests, especially when they were in winter quarters.

Food quality depended on time of year and sometimes on suppliers. One reference was made to poor-quality meat given to militiamen,[65] yet this does not necessarily mean that it was rotten. Meat was almost always salted. Flour was whole. As noted, vegetables, peas and barley were obtained when possible. Mention is sometimes made of the presence of molasses and brown sugar in the militiaman's

diet, but never of pastry or dairy products regardless of the time of year. Dairy products would have had to be for summer consumption in any case, but certainly did not have the importance assigned to them today. Cakes and pastries may have been rarities.

Setting aside food not included in the official rations, I attempted to establish the nutritional value of the official rations themselves (see Table 21). The daily requirement for a manual worker is 4800 calories. Taken into consideration here is that whole-wheat flour was used for baking bread. The militiaman's ration had 4793 calories. With vegetables added, the calorie count per day seems to have been adequate. Glancing briefly at the European research on diet, one notes that in 1759 a St. Malo militiaman's ration had 3450 calories (2909 without alcohol),[66] and that the ration in 16th-century England contained 3300 calories (2840 without alcohol).[67] In comparing the 1812 ration for Canada's militia with that of European soldiers and seamen in the 16th and 17th centuries, the lack of variety in the Canadian one is striking. Among other foods in addition to meat, European rations had cheese, fish, butter and biscuit; meat quantities were smaller, but were supplemented by other products containing protein.[68]

In Canadian militia rations, the pork, mainly salt pork, contained few vitamins, the main vitamin in the beef was B^2, useful for nutritional balance, and the chief ones in the bread were the B^1 vitamins that feed the nervous system. What is striking is the lack of Vitamin C and the A vitamins that fight against sickness. On the other hand, the common vegetables have these — the As in carrots and C in potatoes and cabbage — however, these vegetables were not always available. The dry vegetables (barley, peas, and so on) contain mainly Vitamin B^1. This badly balanced diet greatly influenced the militiamen's health when their duties obliged them to live in unhealthy conditions. Diet deficiencies were unquestionably widespread in the camps. Nonetheless, bearing in mind that the economic crisis was in full spate and, as all the correspondence confirms, harvests were lost because of the farmers' absence, bad weather or the poor quality of the soil, it might just be that a good number of the militiamen ate better in camp than they would have at home.

Conveniences

Another aspect of the militiaman's living conditions lay in the presence or absence of various conveniences. These objects can be used to see how a militiaman shifted for himself in an abnormal situation and which of them were indispensable in his daily life.

Since the topic has just been diet, let us begin with items needed for mealtimes. The militiaman's canteen (eating utensils) would usually be furnished by the quartermaster and kept in the militiaman's kitbag. They also used cooking pots for making soup, and any absence of these created all kinds of problems. The large numbers of soldiers necessitated many fires for the pots, leading Father Boucher to remark that they "could easily set us all on fire so long as we are in the village of Laprairie" [translation].[69]

Normally, firewood was furnished by the Commissariat, which obtained it, like foodstuffs, by contract. When in camp, militiamen would fetch their firewood allocations from the king's yard, but in the field, on picket duty

Table 21. Nutritional Value of Rations

	Calories	Vitamins
1-1/2 lbs. (678.24 g)	1900	B^1
1 lb. (452.16 g) salt beef	904	
1 lb. (452.16 g) fresh beef	904	B^2, B^1, E
10-1/2 oz (ca. 285 g) salt pork	1085	few vitamins
Total	4793	

or moving across country, they often had to take the wood at hand. Since axes were scarce, they frequently cooked over farmers' fenceposts and cordwood.[70]

The wood, generally referred to as "combustible," was supplied in various quantities depending on rank. What seems strange is that quantities were identified as "2 rooms of combustible," "1 room of combustible," "one-half room," and so on. An officer's right to two rooms of combustible probably reflected his space entitlement for himself and his servants. When a captain was billeted in a private home, he had the right to use his host's



5 Uniforms of the Select Embodied Militia in 1813. Left to right: officer of the grenadiers, 4th Battalion; soldier, 3rd Battalion; soldier, 2nd Battalion, and officer, 2nd Battalion. (Drawing by E. Manders.)

fire, but as well, if he wanted a fire in his room, he was supplied with wood according to his rank by the parish residents, shares being assigned by the parish militia captain.[71] It was probably for just such a fire in his room that J. Viger asked his wife to send him a small iron stove.[72]

In garrison the Voltigeurs and Select Embodied Militia were to have their bedding supplied; this meant a straw mattress, sheets and a blanket. However, the contrast between rules and reality prompted militiamen to take their bedding from camp to camp despite orders to the contrary. The practice originated in a bad initial experience: when war broke out, the military secretary had duly ordered blankets, palliasses, cooking pots, picks and shovels for each rendezvous,[73] but none were to be found in the camps where the *militiamen were taken next and it was afterwards* impossible to enforce the regulation.

Louis de Salaberry demanded "blankets, straw for my men who are sick of sleeping like dogs and going without the necessities" [translation].[74] Blankets were supposed to be supplied not only for the camps, but also to the men at the front, on picket or on reconnaissance.

On their occasional levies, the Sedentary militiamen were to bring blankets and utensils. If they did not -- and this applied to a number of them in 1813 -- they were given none. Several said there were no spare blankets at home,[75] which may indicate dire poverty among a substantial number of habitants.

Candles were government-supplied, quantities again being dependent on rank. They were handed out by the quartermaster's assistant on the same basis as firewood, by rooms.[76] Candlesticks were not included and officers carried these, along with snuffers, in their baggage.

Dress

The Voltigeurs and militiamen of the Select Embodied corps were supposed to receive a uniform and accoutrements on enlistment: a frock coat, pair of trousers, vest, greatcoat, cap, a pair of shoes, a blanket, a haversack and a kitbag.[77] The clothes were made in Lower Canada by tailors hired by the Commissariat. The tailors' payments were made out of the extraordinaries fund.[78] In the Voltigeurs regiment and the battalions of the

6 Uniform of the Voltigeurs. (Drawing by G.A. Embleton.)

7 Uniform of the 3rd Battalion, Select Embodied Militia. (Drawing by G.A. Embleton.)

Select Embodied Militia, orders for dress and accoutrements went through an adjutant to the militia adjutant general. He would lay them before the major general commanding the district, who approved them[79] before sending them on to the Commissariat.

Dress style for the light infantry was the same in all regiments. The British army had recently moved to wider trousers[80] known as "gunmouth trousers," and these are what militiamen wore in 1812-15. A regimental uniform was composed of a tunic, trousers, vest, overalls, hat, socks and a greatcoat. In addition, the militiaman would wear a shirt, shoes, stockings and, almost always, a black silk neckerchief to replace the collar as needed.

At the beginning of the war, the Voltigeurs wore this uniform with a white vest which was exchanged for a grey one for everyday, the white being kept for dress occasions. Non-commissioned officers' trimmings and fringes were of black silk, while the ordinary soldiers' were black cotton.[81] Staff sergeants wore silver braid.[82] In January 1813 the Voltigeurs obtained permission to wear "wings" on their uniforms.[83] All battalions of the Select Embodied Militia were supposed to wear red coats and blue trousers. Red cloth ran out in the spring of 1813 and they adopted olive-green tunics. That summer, when the Commissariat received new uniforms with red tunics, these were distributed to all flank companies. The 1st Battalion of Select Embodied Militia had managed to find red ones and thus never wore the green.[84] Most of the Select Embodied militiamen on the Châteauguay in October 1813 would have been wearing red coats and blue trousers, nearly all of them being in flank companies, except for some men of the 2nd Battalion of Select Embodied Militia who apparently had green tunics and blue trousers.

The outfitting of the militiamen was not rapid. Three months after the call-up, Louis de Salaberry was complaining that his men "are almost naked ... they have nothing but wretched, worn cloth trousers that are becoming useless in this season when, even were these any good, they have no shirts, shoes, no coats in fact lack everything" [translation].[85] This seems somewhat exaggerated, but no other document gainsays it. In the same letter, he reported that the 2nd and 3rd Select Embodied battalions had long since received their coats and trousers of broadcloth.[86] Colonel de Salaberry had the clothes his men needed a few days later.[87]

An infantryman's uniform cost £2.17.3-3/4.[88] This was what the Commissariat paid and did not include the cost of other clothes the militiaman wore and had to buy himself even though, given a soldier's indigence, it was often the captains who settled the bills. Table

Table 22. Clothing Prices

	Shillings	Pence	
Two pairs stockings	3	6	Aug. 1812
	6	0	Nov. 1812
Velour collar	1	0	Aug. 1812
Linen trousers	6	6	Sept. 1812
Gaiters	3	2-1/2	Sept. 1812
Gloves	2	3	Oct. 1812
Coat fasteners	2	6	Oct. 1812
Mittens	3	11-1/2	Nov. 1812
Oxhide shoes, unfinished	3	0	Dec. 1812
	3	6	May 1813
Earmuffs, bearskin	2	6	Dec. 1812
Two pairs wool socks	4	0	Feb. 1813
	2	0	March 1813
Bearskin for hat	4	0	March 1813
Leather shoes	7	6	Nov. 1812
Grey trousers	11	6	Dec. 1812
Two flannel shirts	11	0	Dec. 1812
Shoes	7	6	Sept. 1812
	3	9	Dec. 1812
Boots	17	6	
Boots, repaired	8	6	
Leather collar	2	0	Oct. and Dec. 1812
Grey waistcoats	17	6	Sept. 1812
White waistcoats	10	0	
Blue trousers	11	6	

22, based on the expense journal for Jacques Viger's company,[89] is informative about the various items of dress as well as their prices and how these varied for certain articles; it also confirms some comments in other documents that the grey vest and blue trousers were everyday wear.

The officers wore sashes bought from the Indians.[90] These were probably crimson and black. Some officers brought elaborate and extensive wardrobes, judging by that of Lieutenant Prendergast of the Voltigeurs. When he committed suicide, an inventory was made of his property before it was sent to his family.[91] The list (Table 23) includes not only clothing but also other personal items and is reproduced in full for it is eloquent of the officer's material situation. Lieutenant Prendergast was evidently quite well off.

Not all officers were that rich, as is clearly shown by the inventory for Lieutenant A. Méru Panet of the 5th Battalion, Select Embodied Militia (Fig. 11).[92]

The few possessions of the militiaman, compared with the lieutenants', reveal a significant gap between the comfort of the common soldier and that of his superiors. Inventories made after the deaths of two militiamen (Figs. 12, 13) give the impression that Toussaint Allard[93] and Jacob Galipeau[94] must have represented a fair average in terms of militiamen's assets.

One subject has not yielded a solution: the question of shoes. On a number of occasions, officers referred to their men as going barefoot. It is inconceivable that they could actually be doing this in the autumn woods or recently cleared areas. The officers must have meant that the men had moccasins or inadequate shoes. A number of orders were placed for soled cowhide shoes during the war, but not all the orders seem to have been filled.

Table 23. Inventory of Articles belonging to the late Lieutenant Edward Louis Prendergast

One Trunk of Sundries, Sealed
One Horse
One Silver Watch
One Gold Chain
Two Gold Seals
Two Mattresses
Four Blankets
One Rug
One Pillow and Two Pillow Cases
One Trunk of Crockery
Three Candle Sticks
Three Pairs of Snuffers with Stands
One Regimental Jacket
Seven Coats
Eleven Pairs of Trousers
Twenty Waistcoats
One Morning Gown
Eleven Shirts
Six Dickies
Eighteen Picket Handkerchiefs
Thirteen Cravatts
Four Curtains
Sixteen Pairs of Stockings
Two Pairs of Silk Ditto
Three Odd Ditto
Ten pairs of socks
Three Pairs of Gaiters
Three Towels
Five Pairs of Braces
One Umbarella
Three Yards of Grey Cloth
One Stock
Two Pairs of Gloves
Three odd ditto
One Pair of Boots
One Regimental Cap
One Otter Cap
One Yard of Corduroy
For Pairs of Over Socks
One Pocket Book
One Ditto with Papers
Thirty four Books
A Parcel of Loose papers
One Portrait of J.H. Craig
Eleven Portraits
Five Pictures with Frames and twelve ditto without frames
One Violin
Two Flutes
One Fife
One Flageolet
One Plume
One Comforter
One Bag of Balls and one Ditto of Powder
Two pairs of Galloe Shoes
One Gun
One Wash Stand
One Table
One Bridle
Two Powder Hornes
Two Great Coats
One Small Carpet
Four Wooden Pales
One Tea Kettle
One Large Canteen
One Port Folio
One Pocket Book
One Regimental Surtout
One Sabre
One Silk Sash
One Belt

Nowadays some people think the old-time clothes were extremely tough, but the fact is that the documents imply the opposite. Since army drill, work parties and forest exercises were hard on clothes, toughness was important. Although they were often fairly stout, the linens and woollen weaves lacked elasticity and tore easily during strenuous exercises and in the woods. Therefore, to protect their uniforms, the militiamen had work clothes, overalls, that could be put on over the uniform trousers but were usually worn on their own.[95]

Upkeep of dress fell to the militiaman himself, who carried the necessary thread and needles with him. He could get his mending and washing done; it cost him two shillings or one shilling ninepence for mending and from fourpence to two shillings for washing.[96] His haversack also contained shoe blacking, soap, clothesbrushes, a comb and a razor. Those with moustaches brought their own pomade.

A militiaman's accoutrements generally consisted of a breastplate, a shot pouch, belts and straps, kitbag, bayonet cover, musket


Inventaire des effets appartenant à feu Mr Méru Panet décédé le treize Mai mil huit cent treize.

Un coffre de bois peint en rouge fermé
Un Do plus petit peint en rouge fermé.
Une montre
Un vieux chapeau Rond
Un vieux Do militaire
Une Epée et ceinturon
Un hausse col
Une ceinture de laine rouge
Un matelat deux couvertes & couvre pied.
Un panier à vivres et son contenu
Une Sauce pann, une bouteille vuide, deux fioles d'encre
Une cafetière, trois cuillères, et une écuelle de fer-blanc.
Une Redingotte de drap gris
Une paire de Chenvals et leurs chaînes de cuivre
Trois tasses et soucoupes, et une théière de fayence
Une paire de bottes et une de claques
trois - assiettes d'étaim
Une paire d'une brosses [illegible]
Un capot de drap olive
trois vestes d'été huit chemises trois dickies
Neuf paires de bas & chaussons 1 paire de chaussons
Trois paires de culottes d'été.
Trois paires de [illegible]

Je reconnais avoir reçu de Mr Papineau les effets mentionés en l'état qu'il m'a donné des effets délaissés par feu Mr Méru Panet en datte du dix-neuf mai mil huit cent treize

Coteau Du Lac P. Proveux
le 12 juin 1813 —

8 Inventory, effects of Méru Panet. (Quebec [Province]. Archives Nationales, Quebec City, AP-G-417, Coll. Papineau, boîte 50.)


Toussaint Allard.

Un Knapsack No 30 contenant
Deux chemises de flanelle rouge
Une paire de culottes de drap bleu
Un col de cuir
Une paire de bretelles
Un gilet de cuirié blanc
(Slings) attaches pr. les couvertes
Deux bouquins d'étaim
Une paire de Souliers de chevreux
Une Do Chaussons de laine bleue
Des pièces de drap gris enveloppant un morceau de savon
Une boite de ferblanc, un chapelet.
Une paire de Chaussons de laine grise
Deux paires de Souliers de boeuf.
Un bonnet de laine, Tabac à fumer.
Un chapeau plumet et peau
Pièces de cuir et babiche.
Corde & ficelle fil à ligneux
Une paire de brosses et noir à souliers
Deux cuillères et une fourchette.
Deux petits morceaux de savon.
Un Pigre.

Je certifie avoir reçu du Capitaine Papineau du Cinquième Bataillon de Milice incorporée les effets cy-dessus Mentionnés.

P. Archambault

9 Inventory, effects of Toussaint Allard. (Quebec [Province]. Archives Nationales, Quebec City, AP-G-417, Coll. Papineau, boîte 50.)

touchole pick, haversack and canteen. Since supplies coming over from England were not adequate, the militia quartermaster general, Fleury Deschambault, ordered several articles in Montreal. One contract concerned the purchase of 1000 kitbags at 15s. apiece, 1000 haversacks at 2s.6d and 1000 wooden canteens at 6s.3d.[97]

Snowshoes were part of the gear as well. They were not issued to every soldier, but each military station was provided with numerous pairs for winter reconnoitring or trips in the forest. In December 1812, 790 pairs of snowshoes were distributed to various military posts in the district of Montreal.[98]

On demobilization, the soldier of the Select Embodied Militia had to turn in the dress his battalion had been given by the government. The regulation went by the boards, since a number would have had to go home in shirt, socks, vest and shoes.[99] The battalion kept only the coats.

The Sedentary Militia had no uniform. These militiamen generally wore local civilian dress or

> a coat or frock coat of fabric with long tails, dark grey in colour, with attached to it a hood that is placed over the head in winter or when it rains. The coat is caught at the waist by a belt of material braided in different colours and embellished with pieces of glass. Coat and trousers were cut from the same cloth. A pair of moccasins finishes the dress off at the bottom. [Translation.][100]


Jacob Galipeau.

Un Knapsack No. 29 contenant
Un vieille chemise de coton
Une paire de culottes de drap bleu
Un Essuie mains
Un mouchoir de poche
Une Chemise de coton
Un morceau de vieux linge
Une paire de culottes d'étoffe du pays
Brosses et noir à Soulier.
Un rasoir et deux morceaux de savon
Gilet militaire
Une paire de chaussons
Une paire de mitaines
Deux morceaux de tabac à fumer et tondre
Col de cuir, peau pr. sans chapeau
Un morceau de cheveux et babiche
Pieces de cuir
Attaches de cuir (Slings)

je Certifie avoir reçu de Monsieur Papineau Capitaine dans le cinquieme bataillon de milice en corps les effets cy dessus mentionnés.
St. Archambeault Sx Ptre

10 Inventory of the effects of Jacob Galipeau. (Quebec [Province]. Archives Nationales, Quebec City, AP-G-417. Coll. Papineau, boîte 50.)

To these must be added the flannel shirt, tuque and woollen stockings. In Montreal a number of men came with aprons that were banned from parade.[101]

Officers of the Sedentary Militia, on the other hand, did have uniforms. That of St. Ours' was scarlet with light-blue facings, changed in June 1813 to green velour broadcloth with epaulettes and gold braid on the collar and facings.[102] The officers of the St. Ours Battalion asked permission to exchange their blue uniforms with red facings for red ones with green facings and gold epaulettes, white waistcoat, Nankeen trousers, high boots, pillbox hat and rosette.[103] Unfortunately, a description of the uniform of the Boucherville officers who were at the Châteauguay is not available.

11 Uniform of the Sedentary Militia. (Drawing by G.A. Embleton.)

12 Habitant dress. (John Lambert, *Travels through Canada....* [London: Baldwin, Cradock and Joy, 1816], Vol. 1, p. 158.)



13 The rifle. (From "The New Manual and Platoon Exercises" in Hew Strachan, *British Military Uniforms, 1768-1796* [London: Arms and Armour Press, 1975], pl. 29.)

Arms and Equipment

Militiamen were supposed to receive their weapons on enlistment, but there were always problems of supply. Officers often used their personal arms. The militiamen sometimes brought theirs, but on the whole this was rare.

The militiaman's chief weapons were musket and bayonet. The muskets were usually Brown Besses, some with 46-inch, others with 42-inch and still others with 39-inch barrels. The Brown Bess was for use at short distances.

> A soldier's musket, if not exceedingly illbored (as many are), will strike the figure of a man at 80 yards; it may be even at a hundred; but a soldier must be very fortunate indeed who shall be wounded by a common musket at 150 yards, provided his antagonist aims at him; and as to firing at a man at 200 yards with a common musket, you may as well fire at the moon and have the same hopes of hitting your object. I do maintain and will prove, whenever called on, that no man was ever killed at 200 yards, by a common soldier's musket, by a person who aimed at him.[104]

Officers carried sabres or swords and a number were armed with pistols.[105] Sergeants and drummers carried no muskets, but a sword and pike instead.

Each firing piece needed a ramrod, a carrying sling, flints, balls and powder. Add to these the maintenance equipment, wadding stick, touch-hole pick and screwdriver. Even if a soldier was not carrying all of this at the same time, he still went off to fight with a heavy load on his back.

Soldiers were sometimes asked to make their own cartridges. To make the balls, they filled a ball-mould with lead that had been melted on a stove. Some muskets were primed with powder (coarse or fine grain) and with this type of weapon it was always necessary to ensure that the powder stayed dry or it was impossible to light. Problems in rainy weather may be imagined.

Weapons were often broken and repair required a gunsmith, not always an easy man to find. The colonels of the Sedentary Militia were given allocations for repairing their division's firearms, but it seems that the money was not always used for this purpose[106] because often no gunsmiths could be found.[107] Regular soldiers and Embodied Militia corps could send their arms to the royal arsenal for repair, but that took so much time that most commanders tried instead to engage gunsmiths for their regiments.

Amid the great preparations of the autumn of 1813, a shipment of arms from England allowed the Artillery Commissariat to distribute 2855 muskets with accoutrements and ammunition in the district of Montreal.[108] This was not much compared with the number of soldiers raised for defence, but several militia battalions had weapons already. This was the case with Lieutenant Colonel Léry of the Boucherville Division, who reported 200 muskets, 200 bayonets and 200 shot pouches for his command on 10 October 1813.[109]

When the militiaman took his rifle, he became responsible for it. All sorts of regulations covered the use and care of arms, including a ban on using bayonets as screwdrivers on rifles, which seems to have been standard practice.

Some items were part of battalion of company gear — for example, the whistles used in drill and the drums, fifes and bugles. The drums were not beaten once the weather turned cold or the leather would crack. Thus, returns and various other documents mention mainly the use of fifes and bugles. Militia bandsmen were not always ready for their new duties, though taken on as musicians all the same, which prompted Father Boucher to write that "the Battalion ... has again acquired a Bugle which no one knows how to blow" [translation].[110]

The acquisition of all these different articles of ongoing military life fell to the quartermaster — at the least a difficult task to carry on for he often had to spend his own money without being certain of reimbursement. This happened to the Voltigeur quartermaster, Charles McCarthy, who asked to be reimbursed for items that had been bought for the corps, left behind when they were ordered to advance on the Châteauguay on October 21, and later stolen.[111] Charles-Michel de Salaberry sent his recommendation to Prevost without hesitation, for the quartermaster's job, while a thankless one, was essential in a number of respects to the militiaman's standard of living.

Pay

Militia officers and soldiers received the same pay and allowances as officers and soldiers of the same ranks in the regular army. The money for paying the militia was drawn on the provincial treasury on the order of the governor by the assistant paymaster general who was appointed for this purpose.[112] This procedure did not concern the Voltigeurs, who were paid out of army extraordinaries.[113]

The Voltigeurs and Select Embodied Militia were supposed to be paid each month, with pay returns made every 24 months. The Sedentary Militia was paid at the same rate as the Select Embodied Militia when it was on active service — sixpence a day. It was usually paid every month as well, but there was often a big gap between theory and practice.

Various factors would hold up the militiamen's pay. One of the most important was the system of giving the officers $25 and $50 army bills to meet the payroll when it was not always easy to exchange this paper money.

Table 24. Rates of Pay[114]

Rank	Monthly (£)	Yearly (£)
Major general	-	350
Lieutenant colonel	-	300
Major commanding	-	250
Adjutant	-	200
Major	24.18. 8	299. 4. 0
Captain	16. 9. 4	100
Lieutenant	10. 1. 4	70
Ensign	8. 1. 4	50
Sergeant	2. 1. 4	24. 0.16
Corporal	1. 5.10	15.10. 0
Militiaman	0.15. 6	10

Lieutenant Colonel Mailhot wrote that since captains could not manage to change the army bills entirely, the troops had not been paid. On another occasion, Mailhot refused to sign



14 Pay day. (Drawing by E. Lelièpvre.)

the pay certificate for the companies, stating that he would continue to refuse as long as the men were paid with $25 and $50 bills, the most difficult to exchange — the men being forced to give a considerable discount to change them, which greatly reduced their pay.[115] This comment gives pause, for the army bills brought interest: "I send you this one for 100 dollars pointing out that the interest on this note up to today amounts to 36 cents" [translation].[116] By making it hard to exchange them, some were profiting from the army bills at the militiaman's expense. A $25 note was worth £6.5 in August 1813.[117] The interest was at current rates, and rates of exchange varied with those accepting the bills.

The officers of the various militia corps do not seem to have grown rich in the military. Most complained of heavy losses from having to abandon their usual employment, meet the social obligations of their rank in the militia and in society, and also spend vastly to provide for the militiamen's needs while waiting to be reinbursed from the men's pay. Captain Jacques Viger's case illustrates the embarrassment that dogged the poorest officers, but de Salaberry and many others lamented an officer's excessive responsibilities. In August 1812 the officers had not yet been paid and Jacques Viger was in debt for a number of bonuses for various of his recruits[118] as well as having borrowed money from L.-M. Viger to get on with the recruitment of his men.[119] In October the pay came in, but the officers had to provide the money militiamen needed for various articles, and this came in the end to substantial amounts. The company under Jacques Viger — who said that he was in the same situation as the other officers — owed him £32 in September and £29 in October, and then in November de Salaberry asked the officers to make another £30 immediately available to their men, which made Viger protest that it was completely unreasonable.[120] In May 1813 Viger was regretting his active participation in the war effort and, in the same letter, pointed out the burdens and difficulties felt by a number of officers.

> The condition of penury in which I left you at my departure, always present in my mind, made me heap a thousand curses on the day when I enlisted in the Voltigeurs, and tormented me to the point of making me ill. Arriving in Kingston, I hastened to set the affairs of my Company in order and pay whatever I owed it, to have you draw the balance of this money remaining to me and thus give myself a little peace of mind. But alas, the necessary costs of a long journey, the continual demands and needs of my Company, made me more and more fearful with each day of being unfit to set a single penny aside for you.... Seeing the difficulty our Captains were in to provide their Companies with the articles they lacked and that the reason arose from our want of money, our good Major made application to Gov^{r} Sheaffe, and he had us each advanced £25 reckoning from the next pay. [Translation.][121]

In these circumstances, officers would borrow money from relatives, friends or other military men. For example, Captain P.D. Desbartzch borrowed £1600, at six per cent interest, from a merchant in December 1812.[122] In January 1814 he borrowed £600 for two months from Charles-Michel de Salaberry at the same rate.[123] Yet Desbartzch should not have been one of the poorest officers; he was the seigneur of St. François Leneuf and part of St. Hyacinthe.

Beyond their pay, officers were entitled to various allowances already referred to: rations, forage, wood and candles. When the officers did not get these articles because of shortages or during a warranted absence, they received financial compensation. Like pay, allowances were often very late being remitted. Louis de Salaberry took his retirement from the 1st Battalion, Select Embodied Militia, in September 1812; he still had not been paid in January 1814 and in March had not received all his money from allowances.[124]

No more did the soldiers make their fortunes in military service. A good many of them escaped unemployment in that time of economic crisis, but most of the militiamen had left farms and families where their presence was essential. Their pay could not meet their needs, especially when they were obliged to buy food, utensils and clothing. To make up their deficits, soldiers performed various duties for their battalions and companies. One of the Voltigeurs, Gabriel Lapointe, deducted six shillings from his account for a month's wages as a servant,[125] while a fellow corpsman named Pierre Drapeau was able to deduct three shillings and tenpence for cutting the hair of 23 Voltigeurs at two pence apiece, sixpence for having made shoes for Lafleur,



15 The militiaman's unavoidable expenses. (Drawing by E. Lelièpvre.)



16 The militiaman gets into debt.
(Drawing by E. Lelièpvre.)

and three shillings and fourpence unspecified.[126] Militiamen could not leave their corps without reimbursing the captain, so that very few left richer at the end of their service.

For an idea of what the monthly wages of 15s.6d. was worth, it can be compared with some contemporary wages. In 1813 a carpenter would earn 8s. a day in Quebec.[127] In 1811 a day-labourer would get about 1s.8d. a day, board included, or 2s.6d. without meals; a servant girl was paid 7s.6d. a month.[128]

Table 25. Prices of Various Articles, 1812-13[129]

House rental:	£2.16./month
Tobacco:	11d.
Soap:	1s.
Shoe blacking:	6d.
Clothes brush:	2s.3d.
Razor:	1s.6d.
Thread:	2 1/2d.
Blanket:	10s.
Rifle-hammer screw:	10d.
Shoes:	8s.
Stockings:	3s.
Table utensils:	1s.10-1/2d.

On a wage of 15s.6d. a month, a militiaman would have had to be without a family or own his home; otherwise, his income would not even pay his rent. If he had brought nothing with him to the battalion, he was immediately plunged into debt simply to obtain his necessities. There was no question then of his sending money home. The expense book of Jacques Viger's company shows that of 41 Voltigeurs, only three had not borrowed money from him. The loans varied from 3d. to 30s.[130] Militiamen received rations of wood and candles, and, given his men's financial plight, Mailhot asked that the value of the wood not given to a militiaman because of absence or some other reason be deducted from his company debt.[131]

All this permits a glimpse of the militiaman's sad financial predicament. A man on active service who had no family or whose family joined him at the camp could survive, even if he was in debt. One who left his family in lodgings that he did not own could not manage to support it with his militiaman's pay. Knowing this makes understandable the numerous comments from priests and officers about the poverty of families whose men had left for the service. Housed and partly fed and clothed, the bachelor militiaman could succeed in living almost as well as if he was working as a labourer. The officers earned higher pay, but owed tax on this income and had other deductions from their pay[132] in addition to their heavy responsibilities and financial obligations. Thus, only those who had other sources of income were able to avoid losing too heavily during their active militia service.

Military Activities

Discipline

Discipline in a military camp is governed by multifarious regulations ranging from details of dress to the commitment to complete the full term of enlistment.

The Voltigeurs were noted for their high degree of discipline.[133] Charles-Michel de Salaberry was very stern and his soldiers had to be as disciplined in their standard of dress and the upkeep of their quarters as they were in military work and drill.

Officers had to obey the regulations just as the soldiers did. When they strayed, de Salaberry did not avoid telling them, as is shown, among other evidence, in a letter to Captain Perrault, who was slow in joining the regiment: "... you oblige me to speak to you, in a style that may appear too harsh, but Sir, put your hand on your heart, and try if you can deny to yourself, whether in a thousand instances you have not either neglected to follow my instructions [or] thwarted me in my measures...."[134] Those officers accustomed to a highly active social life found the discipline too harsh, which prompted J. Viger to say, "Ah, he's a man who knows how to keep his people busy, this Major de Salaberry. He understands -- the sly one ... I managed *once* to go and see Dr. Stubenger and no one else. Long live the Voltigeurs, eh?" [Translation.][135]

Officers and soldiers had to have tickets of leave, but those of the officers had to be approved by the major general in command of



17 Punishments. (Drawings by E. Lelièpvre.)

the district. Requests for sick leave had to be accompanied by a doctor's certificate.[136]

Whereas a subordinate officer would be cashiered for a disciplinary lapse, staff officers were asked to request retirement if their battalions lacked discipline or their personal lack of discipline grew too obvious. When a militiaman committed an infraction, he had to appear before a court martial. The militiaman had to plead his own case without benefit of a lawyer, unless to take advice.[137] Militia rules on punishments were reasonably vague and left the judge much latitude, but penalties were less severe than for regular soldiers. Death was the ultimate penalty, but to my knowledge it was never imposed on a militiaman, even for offences specified as calling for it:

> No sentence of a general Court Martial shall extend to death, unless this be for desertion to the enemy, for mutiny and sedition, for treasonable communication, or for having delivered to the enemy by treason any Garrison, Fortress, Post or Guard. [Translation.][138]

At the beginning of the war there were a few mutinies in the militia corps, prompted by the dearth of material organization more than anything else. The Voltigeur mutiny of 16 June 1812 seems to have been caused by Perrault's false promises of enlistment time.[139] Except for the Lachine riot, which resulted in two-year prison sentences and extremely heavy fines, defaulters and mutineers got off with about three months in jail and hard labour on the king's construction projects. Wrongdoers were often made to move through the battalion's ranks, hands tied behind their backs or in irons, and hear their names and crimes proclaimed to all. Desertion led to hard labour and jail terms that were often long; a deserter went through the ranks with hands tied and a log attached to his feet.[140] It was forbidden to accept a deserter in another militia or regular corps and any such were dealt with when found. One young deserter who had signed up for the cavalry was punished by being placed on a wooden horse.[141]

It was forbidden to be absent without permission. This offence was punished by eight days of detention on bread and water. Some were locked up in the brig which served as military prison at St. Jean and drilled separately from the rest of the soldiers for the time of their detention; others were held in the guardhouse and put to hard labour for eight days, one foot chained to a log. One man went to jail for a month.[142] Absenting oneself to visit the family was not allowed. Of this, Father Boucher commented that "deserting to his wife is deserting to the enemy" [translation].[143]

Authority and respect for officers was extremely important and anyone who, like one Voltigeur, rejected and insulted them was liable to 18 months in jail.[144] For missing drill or breaking certain rules (for instance, smoking near the powder magazine), a militiaman could be sent to spend 24 to 48 hours in straw in a windowless cell. Other men were forbidden to take the prisoner any drink or tobacco in that dark place.[145]

Sometimes there were fines to pay, usually for disobedience, which could cost ten shillings.[146] The standard penalty for misconduct was a longer period of service.

These penalties often seem very harsh, but frequently they were not applied. Most of the time, militiamen simply spent a few days in the guardhouse, afraid of what was going to be done with them.

Drill and Work

Militiamen's days were divided between work and various drills. In garrison posts they rose at five o'clock and washed and dressed to go on parade one hour later. The corps adjutant took attendance and read the general and regimental orders. The soldiers were reviewed by the officers and then drilled for about two hours until they returned to barracks, where everything had to be in order before breakfast.

When the war started, de Salaberry had to turn drill sergeant to teach the Voltigeurs their exercises. During the first summer, officers and non-commissioned officers trained for about two and a half hours in the morning. Then, after lunch, they drilled the soldiers for about an hour and a half.[147] Apart from drill and musket practice, the militiamen had to go on long and often exhausting marches. Even though the Voltigeurs had been better trained than the other militia corps, de Salaberry did not feel that they were on a par with the regular army. He wrote to his father in December 1813:

> but before peace comes I may lose my life, which I think is very likely when I consider the sorts of troops I have to

Reveille.

Inspection.





Reading the general
and regimental orders.

18 Starting the day.
(Drawings by E. Lelièpvre.)

Marching.

Target practice.



Forest exercise.

19 Drill. (Drawings by E. Lelièpvre.)

Sentry duty.

Construction.

Looking for deserters.

20 Various duties.
(Drawings by E. Lelièpvre.)

> command, in whose front I must always be, before I can expect them to do any good. The Militia are — will do well enough, but you must always be more exposed than them in order to show the example, with regular troops this is not the case so much....[148]

Drill commands in all militia corps had to be given in English, which created many problems for very often not only did the men not understand it, but a number of officers could not speak it. The commander in chief's concern for uniformity forced the officers to call their orders twice. In this context, it is interesting that de Salaberry ordered Daly to give his commands in French so that the enemy would not understand them.[149]

The Select Embodied Militia was also trained in military drill, but because of the large numbers of militiamen, the lack of organization, assignment of men to various work projects and, in the beginning, the officers' absence from drill, the Select Embodied Militia was less highly trained than the Voltigeurs even though the exercises were probably identical. The Sedentary Militia only had to drill once a week; however, when it was on active service it trained every day.

The various jobs called for in any military campaign were not assigned to any particular corps of militia. It cannot be said, for instance, that reconnaissance or picket duties were peculiar to the Voltigeurs, for these were also done by the Select Embodied Militia. On the other hand, I have seen no case of Voltigeurs being detailed for transport or construction, unless for an abatis or as punishment. These jobs were in fact very often given to detachments of the Select Embodied Militia. Captain Louis-Joseph Papineau's company at Côteau du Lac was doing almost nothing but conducting boats from one post to another. The future leader was not especially enraptured at this, but when he nearly was sent to the front and the order was countermanded, his sister commented:

> also, knowing you are in a safe place where we can hope to see you in the summer has revived our spirits, for I like you as a boatman better than a warrior, for this confession forgive the weakness of my sex, which prefers a fit and healthy body to a dismembered trunk even covered with laurels. Anyway, say what you will, I like to see you live on earth better than in history. [Translation.][150]

A few Voltigeurs, with a number of men from the Select Embodied Militia, served on the gunboats on the river and the Great Lakes to make up for the shortage of sailors. In garrison some militiamen stood watch while others guarded the arms and provisions depots, the majors' offices and the guardhouse where the unruly were kept. Militiamen were assigned to maintenance work on buildings, arms and clothing and to kitchen duty.

A "captain of the day" inspected all posts of the watch daily and nightly, and saw that all the garrison work was carried out. He was also supposed to pursue deserters in his sector even if they were not from his battalion. These treks over often considerable distances obliged the captain to buy himself a horse. It was an extra expense that Viger could not manage; Dr. Laterrière purchased him one.[151]

I have already mentioned the dearth of education among commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Thus, very often, if an NCO had some schooling, he was assigned to writing work and spent most of his service time in the offices of the military administration. It was very unremunerative, compared with militia life at the front, considering the inhuman working conditions, the extremely long hours, and virtually non-existent leave time.

During the War of 1812 there was much construction in the various military posts. A number of militiamen were employed as workmen and artificers, not taking part in the military exercises.

The Sedentary Militia was taken by detachments, companies and sometimes by battalions to carry out numerous duties, for widely varying periods, throughout the war. In Montreal and Quebec the Sedentary Militia often performed garrison duty. Boat duty has already been mentioned. There was also, on occasion, the work of transferring prisoners of war from place to place and guarding the jails. When the Select Embodied Militia and Voltigeurs were on a wartime footing, the Sedentary Militia baked the biscuits for the troops, transported the provisions and men, blocked and destroyed the enemy's access routes, and cleared lands favourable for defence. A few companies of the Sedentary Militia also did guard duty at advance posts. The best-trained companies were sent out on reconnaissance

and supported the troops as needed. Throughout the conflict, corps of Select Embodied Militia and Sedentary Militia were brigaded with the Voltigeurs for brief periods in order to carry out various duties and learn military exercises.

I do not believe that the Indians received any special training, even those attached to the Voltigeurs. They were mainly used to track, observe and frighten the enemy. Very often, a few Indians would be found with the sentinels at the advance posts. Their knowledge of the forest and their skills, developed in this natural environment, made them a reassuring support for the militia.

If the military effort of Lower Canada's militiamen is assessed in terms of numbers of enemies killed, it might seem not worth the trouble to spend any time on these temporary soldiers. If, on the other hand, the value in time and money and labour of their participation in terms of works and duties could be estimated accurately, it would be seen that in the political and military context of the Napoleonic Wars, it would not have been easy for Great Britain to hold its North American colony without them.

Aspects of the Environment

Hygiene

Hygiene in the military camps was not always propitious in terms of the men's health. In spite of the regulations on garrison standards, some officers were less strict and less diligent than others regarding cleanliness. Vassal de Monviel, the adjutant general of militia, was regularly forced to reprimand officers and have quarters inspected.

The physical organization of the military camps did not promote the practice of personal hygiene. The men were housed, large numbers at a time, in often limited spaces where privacy was impossible. In tents or huts, cold weather would discourage thorough washing. The fact is that washing oneself as is the custom now was not practical at that time; skin diseases caused by uncleanliness were not uncommon in Canada.[152]

In their haversacks the militiamen each kept a razor, soap and a square of sheet used, it seems, as a towel. Bath towels were expensive and only the officers had them. They washed right out of buckets, but these were always scarce. I have already indicated how few clothes the militiamen had; they could not change them as often as would have been necessary.

Generally, good health was required for acceptance by the service. Conscripts would often fake an illness or infirmity, or maim themselves in order to be sent home. A number of doctors did not need much more convincing to issue sickness certificates. When mobilization began in 1812, the divisions of Sedentary Militia tried to get around conscription by sending men of unsatisfactory health, but commanders were soon warned, personally and publicly, to replace them with sound men.

Given this cheating, a list of men rejected on grounds of illness would reveal little about the health of people of that day. On the other hand, the various pretexts the militiamen used can indicate the common diseases of the time. My data are for only a few years, but still indicate the diseases there were during the War of 1812.

Fractures were a general complaint, according to J.M. de Tonnancour.[153] At all times, conscripts were inflicting wounds on themselves, breaking fingers, toes and occasionally more crucial bones, in order not to leave their homes. Others went to camp but were invalided out for various health reasons. A report from the 5th Battalion, Select Embodied Militia, lists the problems of the men rejected for service (Table 26).

Table 26. Illnesses of Men Rejected for Service[154]

3	leg sores
5	epilepsy
1	general debility
5	hemoptysis: spitting blood, symptom of tuberculosis
2	hernias
1	prostrate gland disorder
4	asthmas
1	infected arm
1	foot wound
1	herpitis: skin infection caused by malnutrition
1	glandular infection
1	leg infection
1	deaf and weak
1	dislocated arm
2	weak and too short
1	broken thigh bone and weak
4	feeble gait
1	suffers continually in one ear
1	chronic rheumatism
1	hand wound
1	consumption
1	one-legged

Very frequently the men's health did not withstand the military life: the long marches, difficult exercises, sleeping on the ground in tents or in huts without fires and without blankets in all kinds of weather. Malnutrition alone caused more than one illness when it did not result in death. "The great sickness of the militiamen is hunger and they are treated in the hospital with diet," Father Boucher recorded in May 1813; "Tuesday I buried two at a shot" [translation].[155] It does not seem that many died of hunger, but a number were ill and malnutrition was the main reason.

The communal life of camps could be most influenza broke out. This happened at the Drummond camp on the Niagara where there were three Voltigeur companies, in September and October 1813. A number suffered from intermittent (trembling) and remittent fevers.[156] Contagious illness spread very quickly in the camps, given their poor hygiene and dietary deficiencies. Official statements of hospitalized soldiers provide information on types of illnesses contracted. Sickness has no favourites, of course; militiamen fell to the same diseases as regulars.

In March 1813, 69 sick were counted in a total of 3232 militiamen and in September of the same year, 62 sick were hospitalized out of 2583 militiamen. Since spring and autumn are seasons that can easily be unhealthy, these returns a fairly representative of the diseases common in the camps. However, it would have been interesting to compare them with a similar return for October-November 1813, for a number of militiamen were sick after the battle from having had to sleep on damp ground, often in soaking clothes and in an early November chill.

Table 27. Illnesses of Militiamen from Medical Records

February-March 1813[157]

16	fevers (simple combined)	6	venereal diseases
1	typhus	1	gonorrhea
1	aphtha (contagious ulcer)	1	jaundice
4	pneumonias	4	sick
4	measles	1	wounded
2	coughing blood	4	ulcers
5	catarrhs	3	[illegible]
3	consumptions	1	contusion
1	dysentery	1	fracture
1	rheumatism	9	various

Total: 69 sick

August-September 1813[158]

5	fevers (simple combined)	14	diarrhoeas
2	typhus	5	syphilis
2	aphthas	2	[illegible]
2	pneumonias	3	psoriasis
2	rheumatisms	1	ulcer
2	catarrhs	2	punishments
3	dysenteries	8	various

Total: 62 sick

Hospital records can serve only as an indication since they are silent about the sick at the garrison. As noted, 62 militiamen were hospitalized in August-September 1813. For the same period, a return of troops in garrison at Montreal shows 111 sick militiamen.[159]

Obviously, camps and battlefields were not invariably close to hospitals. Throughout the war the Commissariat rented private houses to meet this need. Their owners had to endure seeing them much damaged by unscrupulous soldiers and many others. On the Châteauguay in 1813 Jean Baptiste Primeau, tenant in Guillaume Néron's house, was obliged to hand it over to the troops to be used as a hospital; afterwards he found parts of it so burned and damaged that it was uninhabitable.[160]

Each militia corps had a regular doctor and surgeon's assistants. The doctors lacked the reputation and prestige they have now. Viger wrote in 1810 of the doctors in Boucherville Seigneury: "The number (between ourselves, thank God) is falling to only one" [translation].[161] But the work of the military was such that the surgeon's presence was indispensable.

The Select Embodied Militia employed nine doctors during the War of 1812.[162] The Voltigeurs engaged Dr. de Sales Laterrière and several surgeon's assistants who later became doctors.

The doctors went to the battlefields with the soldiers. There were a few on the Châteauguay on 26 October 1813 to care for the battle's wounded, who were very few. The general order of 27 October listed four wounded in the Voltigeurs, two dead, six wounded and four missing from the 3rd Battalion, Select Embodied Militia, and three dead and four wounded from the Fencibles. Lists sent to the adjutant general indicate that two militiamen of the 3rd Battalion succumbed to their wounds (see Appendix A).[163] Two other militiamen seem to have been forgotten in these records: Barthélémy Gagnon, Voltigeur, wounded in the thigh,[164] and Peter G. Robert La Fontaine, lieutenant of the 2nd Battalion, Select Embodied Militia, wounded while preparing an entrenchment.[165] The doctors had 13 soldiers wounded in combat to care for as well as one wounded in defence work. Seven combatants died.

The families of soldiers who were killed or wounded were often in great financial difficulty. The Royal Patriotic Society was founded in Lower Canada in 1813 to help such families. The Voltigeurs had some difficulties getting a share. From Upper Canada, Toussaint Casimir Truteau complained about the treatment given the Voltigeurs who were fighting there:

> You know that a subscription has been taken to relieve the wives of those who lost their lives for the country's defence in Upper Canada, and that the greater part of the amount subscribed comes from the inhabitants of Lower Canada. Well, we had two men killed at Sacket's Harbour who left two widows and some children. Our Major has made application again to the committee appointed to take care of this business, and the reply he received is that the Voltigeurs were not included in the public's generosity and are thus unworthy to share in the same benefits as the other corps. What a ghastly policy ! What shame for the citizens of Upper Canada.... [Translation.][166]

In the end, some money was distributed to Voltigeurs wounded at Chrysler's Farm and Sackett's Harbour; Châteauguay was not included. In February 1814 Louis de Salaberry was advising his son to press demands on behalf of the dead and wounded of the battle of 26 October; he believed that the neglect of the Châteauguay men was desired by those wanting to usurp the glory of combat.[167] It is not known whether the militiamen did receive donations from the patriotic society, but at the end of the war the government distributed pensions of nine pounds a month[168] to wounded militiamen provided that they could prove their incapacity with doctors' certificates and recommendations from their battalion commanders.[169]

The administration did not proceed very quickly. Some militiamen would wait many years, even 20, before collecting their pensions. The lateness of a few requests raised doubt as to their legitimacy. Rejected for this reason were those of Augustin Deguise, 2nd Battalion, Select Embodied Militia, and Benjamin Millet, both claiming wounds from the Châteauguay.[170]

If their requests were veracious, they must be added to the roster of wounded. Deguise is certainly on the muster rolls, but the only Millet listed was Jean-Baptiste, not Benjamin. In this uncertainty, it might be best not to include them among the wounded.



21 The sick and wounded. (Drawings by E. Lelièpvre.)

Since militiamen had to pay for hospital care, which cost ninepence a day, it may be imagined that the sick and wounded tried all sorts of means to get better before going for treatment.[171] A natural medicine, often mingled with superstition, perhaps, but not always bad, was practiced at this time.

To sum up, the militiamen, like regular soldiers, were in an environment that did not bode well for their continued health, and in accordance with the law of nature, only the strongest resisted illness. A number did long-term damage to their health, which was a gift to their country on the same basis as their lost time and income.

The Presence of Women

As in the regular British army, a certain number of militiamen were able to have wives and children live in camp with them. The women were set to various duties such as serving the officers, washing, sewing and making meals. In the Voltigeurs, de Salaberry required their help in making uniforms and performing other duties if they were to collect their rations. They were paid at the same rate as the tailor for doing the same work.[172] Officers' wives would follow their husbands to winter quarters, but usually spent the summers at home or with relatives.

The Select Embodied Militia was entitled to rations for wives and children from 12 November 1812 on. These were the same as soldiers' families' rations in the army: one-half measure for a woman and one-third for each child. Under this system there could be only six wives and three children in camp for every 100 men.[173]

It is hard to picture the lives of women and children amid the military; the work they were assigned and the rations they were given are known, but almost nothing of their family and social life is known. Officers' wives visited and entertained a lot, which gave them information for their husbands, families and friends. Whereas officers addressed soldiers' wives as "*la* Panquet" or "*la* Maid," their own wives were treated deferentially by everyone. Since most militiamen had to leave their wives at home, they kept up a voluminous correspondence which has yielded a host of details about camp life that are highly relevant to social research on the militia. The letters are usually tender but without passion; the heroes emerge as human, affectionate and concerned about their families.

Attitudes

I have already related some episodes, quoted some letters that reveal aspects of the Canadian mentality in the early 19th century. We have an idea of their political allegiance and the stratification of their society, less marked than in the European societies but still very much present. The lists of militiamen's material possessions have yielded much information on the living habits of officers and soldiers. I will now turn briefly to two other indicators of the attitudes of the day: religious observance and leisure pursuits.

The militiamen were not great churchgoers according to Father Boucher's letters to Monseigneur Plessis. The officers did not comply with the rule that they were to lead the men to Mass and very few attended services even at Christmas and Easter. Was this because they were away from their own parishes? Perhaps the responsibility lies with the fussiness of religious practice at that age. Some militiamen had not yet made their first communion,[174] and anyone desiring religious service in a different parish first had to have a confessional certificate from his home priest.[175] Since so few men had these documents, Father Boucher disregarded the regulation. What is more, curates, assistant priests and chaplains were not authorized to administer certain sacraments.[176] All these rules were hard to apply when there was a war on and a shortage of priests. Chaplain Pigeon complained that he did not have even a dozen Voltigeurs at Easter service in 1813.[177] For all his compliments to the 2nd Battalion of the Select Embodied Militia, Father Boucher found that "a number of them were becoming very free: and the 4th [Battalion] came in completely free; at least it was the most imprudent ones who revealed themselves first and the said Battalion did not gain by it" [translation].[178] The poor curate did not get much consolation from the arrival of the De Meurons, who spoke French: "there are several Wolves who hate the priests; who are bent on denigrating them to the habitants who are quite prepared to listen to them, especially when they talk about a stipend for any recruitment to be given to priests, who would have no more tithes or fees...." [translation].[179]

It might have been expected that the priests would benefit from the wartime population surplus, especially in the Montreal district, but this was not the case; on the contrary, with poverty deeper among the habitants and large numbers of men absent from their homes, the priests could not insist on the usual tithes. They had the greatest difficulty obtaining payment for funeral services, as the militiamen and officers would not or could not pay them. The militia provided nothing for divine service.

> For eleven months I have been saying the mass for the militia at the Crucifix and the parish has supplied the wine without charge and the six big candles I have caused to be lit ... it was not long before I suspended the collection that I caused to be taken during this Mass and on the collection for the Infant Jesus I had put in the orders to ask nothing of the officers and pass by their houses. We can expect neither reward nor recognition from those people; not even much politeness.... [Translation.][180]

All the same, it must not be thought that the militiamen were not believers. Non-believers were not numerous in the 19th century. When O'Sullivan wrote that Captain Longtin kneeled for a short prayer just before the battle and told his militiamen as he stood up that now they had done their duty to their God, they would do their duty to their king,[181] he was surely not making it up, for religious feeling was displayed at all life's important moments.

For militiamen, religious observance may have been less attractive in the field than at home because it was not the occasion for weekly social encounters where the latest parish and regional news circulated.

There were not many leisure activities at that time and they were limited to the Sunday meetings and visits to relatives and friends, but in camp the militiamen had lost even these. The need for training made de Salaberry especially stern and demanding at the beginning of the war. Once training had been completed, the officers could resume their Sunday excursions, in carriole in winter, and even if they had said they were sick for Mass,[182] they gave suppers for the various commanders and held evening dances to which the soldiers were not admitted. These amusements were not exclusive to military circles, for Pierre de Sales Laterrière described them in 1830 as the customs of the country,[183] and added that social activities took place mainly in winter, as in summer the people were constantly busy with work. In addition to Sundays, some religious and secular festivals occasioned celebrations. The officers held their own New Year's party[184] and Mardi Gras was feted as well.[185]

Father Boucher mentioned another popular celebration, the "Fête de la prairie," that took place in September. It was accompanied by the usual disorders and a drunk broke his arm falling off a horse.[186] In fact, the consumption of alcohol seems to have occupied most of the militiamen's leisure time. The sutlers' alcohol sales had to be regulated to offset the results of this pastime. Drinking was outlawed before certain exercises and the chorus of complaints show how widespread the phenomenon was; however, it was not necessarily peculiar to the military. De Sales Laterrière saw it rather as a social problem. It is not surprising, then, that the Voltigeurs "celebrated" their enlistment. William Berczy observed them at Chambly on 19 May 1812: "I amused myself to see passing at two thirty a party of Voltigeurs in carts and on foot, of whom a great number gave the appearance of having looked too deeply into the cup" [translation].[187]

The new recruits seemed to have quickly assumed the habits of regular soldiers, who, when they were given their bonuses, hastened to celebrate the event by consuming large quantities of alcohol. Provision had even been made for separating regulars from militiamen at such times, for the regulars used them to tease the citizen soldiers, whom they treated as children, with the points of their bayonets. These amusements invariably ended in battle.[188]

The militiamen also took great pleasure in firing their muskets at birds and various other objects. Their horseplay was not appreciated at all by the local residents who found balls in their window frames and walls. It was forbidden, of course, because of the danger. Shooting as a show of skill might have been allowed had it not been for the shortage of ammunition.

Sports were not played at this time and though hunting and fishing had their adherents, the war and military discipline did not encourage them. Cards and singing, of course, remained. The militiamen had a vast repertoire of folk songs that they changed and

adapted for various circumstances. It would take too long to quote these songs here, but an example is the refrain the Voltigeurs sang to de Salaberry:

Nous avons un Major
Qui a le diable au corps
Il nous caus'ra la mort
I g'nia ni diâb, ni tigre
Qui soit si rustique;
Sous la rondeur du ciel
I g'nia pas son pareil.[189]
[We have a Major
Who has the Devil in him
He'll be the death of us
There's no Devil, nor tiger
As hardy as this one;
Not under the sun
There's not one like this one.]

Which prompted Jacques Viger to remark:

Voilà bien des Français de
l'ancien régime ! --
Quand on l'opprime, il peste,
il crie,
Il s'agite en cent façons: --
Tout finit par des chansons.[190]
[These are certainly French of
the old regime ! --
When oppressed, they storm,
they yell,
They boil up in a hundred ways: --
It all ends with some songs.]

The Militia on the Battlefield

On 26 October 1813 the militiamen on the battlefield had spent some days under the chill early autumn rain. On arrival the Voltigeurs had had to sleep in the woods and then settled as best they could into buildings and huts. The Select Embodied Militia and Sedentary Militia, coming later, were no better housed. Leaving for the warning posts an hour before daybreak, the militiamen took their day's rations in their haversacks: a lunch cooked the previous day, a second meal of fat pork and biscuits, and a portion of rum. There were surely some other provisions, bought from the sutler or stolen from local residents. The director of fortification works had collected all available axes in the area and while one group mounted guard, the other worked on the entrenchments and the abatis, cutting trees.

At the approach of the enemy, entrenchment work stopped. The officers joined their troops, who had been in the defensive positions since before dawn. The corps assigned to the advance positions at once took the places indicated by de Salaberry. The canoes used until then to supply the front were immediately dispatched to the La Fourche camp to be at de Watteville's disposal.

I imagine the temporary militiaman in the excitement of the moment, acting in an impulsive surge of defence, not managing to think, but following orders from de Salaberry and his captain like a robot, all movements stretched to the limit by the action, held by the force of a common act and incapable, as much out of bravado as fear, to remain inactive or run away. Father Bruguier provided a glimpse of the militiamen's spirit when he wrote that he would believe them enchanted as long as they had de Salaberry at their head.[191] However, there is also the phenomenon described later by the French writer Roger Martin du Gard:

> that kind of miracle that always occurred, as soon as you entered the zone of fire: first, that feeling of supreme liberation given by absolute submission to chance, the interdiction of choice, the abdication of all individual will; and then ... the camaraderie, the fraternity that existed down there among all, in the threat of danger. [Translation.][192]

Battle over, the militia stayed on the field against the return of the enemy, who was thought to have made only a temporary retreat. They spent the night on damp ground in cold temperatures, weapons at the ready. The enemy did not reappear. On the next day, the abatis details retired to rest in the buildings behind the battlefield, while other companies left to set an advance guard beyond the abatis. The militia stayed in the woods until mid-November. The cold and wet had ill effects on the men's health. Charles-Michel de Salaberry, suffering enormously from arthritis, had to seek care at his own home for a few days. On 15 November Father Boucher wrote to Monseigneur Plessis that "the hospitals at Châteauguay they say are full of our sick -- it has snowed, blown, sifted, terrible weather all night long...." [translation].[193]

Thus, in a few words, were the living conditions of militiamen who were on the Châteauguay battlefield in the autumn of 1813. It is an outline of how life was lived in the War of 1812, with harsh and difficult conditions for these temporary soldiers in terms of today's standards, but perhaps not very far removed from the living conditions of

the farmers and labourers of that era. On the other hand, for a number of officers from the early 19th century's privileged class, accustomed to abundant food, comfort and social contact, military life was a tough test. The extrapolation of data on the militiaman's social life sheds light on many aspects of life in Lower Canadian society in the second decade of the last century.

MYTH AND THE BATTLE OF THE CHÂTEAUGUAY

It would be pointless to recount the story of the Battle of the Châteauguay yet again. A number of interpretations are already available; however, they rarely agree, which prompted me to verify the historians' statements about the effectives actually involved in the engagement, Macdonell's role in it and Prevost's presence in the theatre of operations. It was then easier to understand the reactions of combatants and people the day after the battle. Analysis of the documents, too, permits an understanding of how historians have used the battle story to nourish the ideologies of their own group or time.

I hoped to discover how the Battle of the Châteauguay has taken on mythic dimensions and how Charles-Michel de Salaberry has emerged as the hero of this feat of arms. I will deal first with what, in the present context, a myth and a hero are. A brief summary of the battle itself will then lead to the issues mentioned above.

The Myth and the Hero

The famous McCord of the museum of that name set as a letter heading, "When there is no Vision, the People Perish." With him, I believe in myth as vision; it is a way of perceiving an act or fact through which a people can find, in the subject's various aspects, values and ideologies essential to their development. For a feat of arms to attain mythic proportions, it must offer the extraordinary – here a few soldiers against a numerous enemy. This small band of soldiers consisted in large majority of French Canadians, new subjects of Britain, barely recognized as citizens by their conquerors. The myth also has to offer conflict between the forces of good and evil: on the Châteauguay, this was, on the one hand, monarchical values against the republican corruption and, on the other, the French Canadians' moral superiority over the Anglophone minority. As a society develops, it invariably finds the reasons for what it is or where it is going in a myth or exceptional event of history.

The hero, for his part, is the individual whose action in the mythic context secured the victory. In time and in reality, the man marked out as a hero has been prompted, according to his own character and experience, to do things that are seen as commonplace in the context of his usual occupation, but the consequences of his commonplace acts in the course of an extraordinary event invite observers to re-evaluate them. Charles-Michel de Salaberry's well-done work would have attracted no attention had the consequences of this victory not been as significant as they were.

Like any individual, the hero always has a certain number of qualities; however, these qualities are viewed from different perspectives and amplified or downplayed by those persons or groups who want to establish a way of acting or thinking as an example. The hero always incarnates an idea or ideology. Charles-Michel de Salaberry was an early 19th-century man who did his job conscientiously and whom circumstances brought into the spotlight. The act is not what makes a hero, but the interpretation of that act.

Summary of the Battle

On 26 October 1813 Charles-Michel de Salaberry, lieutenant colonel leading the British forces on the Châteauguay, was in charge of the defence of Lower Canada on this front. His troops consisted of 300 men on the line of fire under his personal command and, in reserve, 1400 men under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel George Macdonell. The American major general, Wade Hampton, had crossed the border to attack Montreal with about 3000 soldiers in two brigades.

In Ormstown about 1000 Americans were kept in reserve while Purdy crossed the Châteauguay River with some 1000 men to reach the right bank of the ford behind the Canadian positions, and Hampton and Izard continued along the left bank with a similar brigade. Their objective was to attack de Salaberry's soldiers from the front and rear

simultaneously. However, Purdy's troops became lost in the woods, then were stopped before they reached the ford by the company of Beauharnois Sedentary Militia under Captain Bruguière and Captain Daly's company from the 3rd Battalion, Select Embodied Militia. At the same time, Izard's brigade was continuing its march towards the Canadians entrenched behind an abatis at Allans Corners. The defence consisted of the Voltigeur company of the Captains M.-L. and J.-B. Juchereau Duchesnay, Captain Ferguson's company of Canadian Fencibles, Captain Longtin's of the Beauharnois Sedentary Militia, and 22 Indians. De Salaberry was with them when Izard's brigade made contact with the Canadians. By his good judgement and shrewd commands, de Salaberry roused his soldiers and discouraged the invader from continuing a fight that would possibly be disastrous for the Canadians. The enemy withdrew after sporadic engagements spread over some four hours, leaving the Canadians expecting a more determined offensive that never took place. In fact, just prior to the engagement, Hampton had received orders to return to the United States for the winter, and since Purdy had not been able to reach the ford, a prime objective in Hampton's view, he considered it impossible to vanquish de Salaberry's too well-stationed troops.[1] De Salaberry's superior, Major General de Watteville, arrived with the commander of the forces, Sir George Prevost, in time to witness the enemy's retreat. Thus, the concerted attack on Montreal had been defused by the militiamen of Lower Canada.

Three Aspects of the Myth

1. The Forces in the Field: American and Canadian

The first question asked about this event always concerns the exact numbers of effectives involved, both those of the enemy and those of the Canadian forces.

The American army commanded by Major General Hampton crossed the border on 21 October 1813. It was divided into two brigades, one led by Colonel Purdy and the other by Brigadier General Izard. On 16 September 1813, before crossing the border, Hampton had estimated his full effectives at 4359 men, taking into consideration the sick, prisoners, absentees and those on special assignments elsewhere. The figure included one brigadier general, one brigade major and an aide de camp, the 2182 men of Purdy's brigade and the 2173 of Izard's.[2]



22 The Châteauguay River. This map, drawn between November 1813 and February 1814 by J. Jebb, is the most exact. The entrenchments

Comparing this with Purdy's report of 25 October 1813 shows little change in the latter's effectives: 2151 men, officers and soldiers. Given Purdy's count, there is little possibility that Izard's brigade had become substantially bigger or smaller. A recruiting effort subsequent to 16 September had attracted only 28 men[3] and Purdy confirmed that there had been no material increase.[4] It is fair, then, to put Hampton's army at approximately 4350 men, or 4000 as Purdy reported.

However, not all these Americans crossed the border. As indicated above, a number were absent for various reasons. In addition, the American militia had refused to cross the border. In an attempt to estimate how many men entered Lower Canada, I turned to Purdy's report of 25 October 1813, the day before the battle.

Before crossing the border, Purdy estimated his brigade's effectives, including absentees, at 2151 men; however, on arrival at Ormstown on the Châteauguay, he had only 1393 officers and soldiers left. Verification of his figures results in a total of 1399 men. Of this number, marked as present, were 47 sick, one man under arrest, 18 "supplementaries," a doctor, four surgeon's assistants and two quartermasters, or 73 persons who would not usually go into combat. This left possibly 1326 soldiers available for the battle.[5]

Unfortunately, we do not have the report Izard made in Ormstown. However, Purdy accused Hampton of having sent half his army into the woods in dead of night with guides ignorant of the country.[6] Therefore, if his own brigade accounted for approximately half of the army, the second brigade, Izard's, must also have had around 2000 men. Various references to American forces along the border imply that about 500 men of the second brigade had remained in Four Corners in the United States. This brigade would then have counted about 1500 men in Ormstown. Adding Purdy's 1399 men, the American effectives in the Ormstown camp would have been nearly 3000.

The effectives of Hampton's army varied enormously in the statements of the time. Thus, on 14 October 1813 at the Pipers Road picket, Captain Archambault arrested two young American soldiers, one of whom thought that there were no more than 5000 to 6000 men at Four Corners.[7] Father Boucher of Laprairie had heard that the enemy amounted to 7000 soldiers on 28 September 1813.[8] A British spy reported on 24 October 1813, "they do not themselves rate their numbers at more than 6000 Regular Troops."[9] In 1818 the American historian James stated, "we have no American authority for supposing that the



are shown just as O'Sullivan described them. (Public Archives Canada, Albert H. Currie Estate.)



23 Châteauguay in 1813, by Hertel de Rouville. More entrenchments are shown than actually existed. The combatants may have been in the entrenchment zone. Note the ford just behind the abatis. (Quebec [Province]. Archives Nationales, Quebec City.)



24 Plan of the Battle of the Châteauguay; a modification of the Hertel de Rouville map. (Benjamin Sulte, *Histoire de la milice canadienne française, 1760-1897* [Montreal: Desbarats, 1897], p. 35.)



25 The Battle of the Châteauguay, by Joseph Bouchette. This map seems to have followed Jebb's. The information on it was obtained some time after the engagement. (Joseph Bouchette, *A Geographical Description of the Province of Lower Canada....* [London: W. Faden, 1815], facing p. 117.)



26 The Battle of the Châteauguay, by W.D. Lighthall, after Joseph Bouchette. Note Macdonell's position. (William Douw Lighthall, *Account of the Battle of Châteauguay*....[Montreal: W. Drysdale, 1889].)



27 The Battle of the Châteauguay by Jacques Viger. This is a copy of Bouchette's map to which Viger added a portrait of de Salaberry. (Quebec [Province]. Archives Nationales, Quebec City.)

latter dragoons exceeded 180 or the former infantry 5720, making a total of 5900."[10]

On the day of the battle, de Salaberry dispatched a report in which he said: "The Ennemy's forces appeared to me to have been at least 1500 men with 250 Dragoons and one piece of cannon,"[11] which would total about 1750 men. Did this figure include Purdy's men? De Salaberry noted in the same report that Daly's 50 had confronted a force ten times greater, implying that Purdy's effectives actually amounted to 500 fighting men.

On the evening of the battle de Salaberry did not believe that it was over; he saw the day's assault as only the beginning and decided to stay at the abatis in the expectation of taking up arms again the following day. He thus had no reason to inflate the numbers of the enemy facing him; he simply trusted in what he had seen. Moreover, this was not the first time de Salaberry had seen battle and as an experienced soldier he would normally be able to estimate the force he confronted. He may have been mistaken by 1000 men, but not to the extent of 4000 or 5000.

Another statement was made by Charles Pinguet of the Canadian Fencibles, who was also behind the abatis. He wrote his brother that they were fighting 2000 men on foot and 200 cavalrymen.[12] One has the impression that Pinguet was referring to the numbers of the enemy engaged at the spot where he himself was fighting, and indeed he later added that there were nearly 700 men with Purdy in the woods. According to him, then, 2900 Americans took part in the engagement. Yet another eyewitness, O'Sullivan, thought there were 3000 to 3500 men in the enemy camp, about 1500 of them with Purdy himself.[13] On 22 November, even after seeing the general order that followed, Father Boucher wrote to Monseigneur Plessis that the attack at Châteauguay had actually been made by 3500 Americans.[14]

The general order of 27 October giving the account of the battle put the enemy effectives

Quartiers Généraux, à La Fourche sur la Riviere Châteaugay,
27 Octobre, 1813.

ORDRES GENERAUX.

SON Excellence, le Gouverneur en Chef et Commandant des Forces, à reçu du Major Général De Watteville le rapport de l'affaire qui eut lieu, en front des positions avancées de son poste, Mardi, à 11 heures du matin, entre l'armée Américaine sous le commandement du Major Général Hampton, et les picquets avancés de la force Britannique, mis en avant pour couvrir les partis de travailleurs sous la direction du Lieutenant Colonel De Salaberry. Par la judicieuse position qu'a sû prendre cet officier, et l'excellente disposition qu'il a faite de sa petite troupe, composée de la compagnie légere des Fencibles Canadiens et de deux compagnies de Canadiens Voltigeurs, l'attaque de la principale colomne de l'ennemi, commandée par le Général Hampton en personne, à été repoussée avec perte ; et la Brigade légere des Américains sous le Colonel Mc Carty a été également arrêtée dans ses progrès au Sud de la Riviere par la marche pleine de bravoure et de courage de la compagnie de Flanc du 3e. Bataillon de Milice incorporée sous le Capt. Daly, soutenue par la Compagnie du Capt. Bruyers de la Milice Sédentaire. Les Capitaines Daly et Brugnier ayant été tous deux blessés, et leurs Compagnies ayant souffert quelque perte, elles ont été immédiatement remplacées par une Compagnie de Flanc du 1er. Bataillon de Milice incorporée. L'ennemi s'étant retiré, est retourné de nouveau à l'attaque, qui n'a fini qu'avec le jour par la défaite honteuse et complète de ses troupes, étant force par une poignée d'hommes dont le nombre ne montoit pas à la vingtieme partie de la force qu'ils avoient à combattre, mais qui, par leur bravoure déterminée ont maintenu leur position, et mis à l'abri de toute insulte les partis de travailleurs, qui ont ensuite continué leurs ouvrages sans inquiétude. Le Lt. Colonel De Salaberry témoigne qu'il a été fortement soutenu par le Capt. Ferguson dans le commandement de la Compagnie Légere des Fencibles Canadiens, par les Capitaines Jean Baptiste Duchesnay et Juchereau Duchesnay des deux Compagnies de Voltigeurs, par le Capt. Lamotte, les Adjudents Hebden et Sullivan, et par tous les officiers et soldats engagés dans l'action, qui ont montré un courage et une fermeté remarquables et dignes d'éloge.

SonExcellence, le Gouverneur en Chef et Commandant des Forces, ayant eu la satisfaction d'être lui même témoin de la conduite des Troupes en cette brillante occasion, se fait un devoir et un plaisir de payer le tribut d'éloge qui est si justement dû au Maj. Gén. De Watteville, et aux arrangements admirables qu'il a pris pour la défence de son poste ; aux Lt. Colonel De Salaberry pour sa conduite judicieuse et digne d'un officier, qu'il a montré dans le choix de sa position et dans la disposition de ses forces ; et à tous les officiers et guerriers engagés avec l'ennemi Outre ces témoignages de la plus vive reconnoissance qu'ont mérités les corps engagés, pour leur bravoure et leur fermeté, Son Excellence doit encore les plus grands éloges à toutes les troupes de cette station, pour leur constance, leur discipline, et leur patience à endurer les fatigues et les privations qu'elles ont éprouvées. Leur détermination à persévérer dans cette conduite honorable ne peut manquer d'assurer la victoire aux braves et loyaux Canadiens, et de jetter le trouble et la confusion dans le cœur de l'ennemi, s'il pensoit à souiller de sa présence cet heureux pays.

Par le rapport des prisonniers, la force de l'ennemi se montoit à 7500 hommes d'Infantrie, 400 de Cavalerie, et 10 pieces de campagne. La Force Britannique actuellement engagée n'excédoit pas 300 hommes, l'ennemi a beaucoup souffert de notre feu, aussi bien que du sien propre, quelques uns de leurs corps détachés ayant, par méprise, tiré les uns sur les autres dans le bois.

Il y a eu de la Compagnie Légere des Canadiens, 3 de Rang et file tués, 1 Sergeant et 3 de Rang et file blessés.
Des Voltigeurs, 4 de Rang et file blessés.
De la Compagnie de Flanc du 3e. Bataillon, 1 Capitaine blessé, 2 de Rang et file tués, 6 blessés, et 4 qui manquent.
Des Chasseurs de Châteaugay, 1 Capitaine blessé.
Total—5 de rang & file tués : 2 capt., 1 sergt., 11 de rang & file blessés, & 4 de rang et file qui manquent.
Le Capt. Daly, du 3e. Bat. de la Milice incorporée a reçu deux blessures considérables : mais pas dangéreusement. Le Capt. Bruyers, des Chasseurs de Châteaugay n'a été que légerement blessé.

Signé *EDOUARD BAYNES, Adjud. Général.*

28 General orders of 27 October 1813. (Public Archives Canada, Papiers de Salaberry.)

at 7500 men.[15] Nonetheless, the prisoners cited above had said 6000,[16] close to the number obtained by Manning the spy and also to James's figure, which included regulars and militia. Prevost, then, inflated the enemy effectives by 1500 men. The figure of 6000 to 7000 men very probably came from the question put to the prisoners: how many men are with Hampton in Lower Canada? In my view, this is the source of the error as to the strength of the enemy force in the Battle of the Châteauguay.

There are some other documents from which it can be inferred that only some of Hampton's effectives who crossed the border actually fought in the battle. According to these sources, a stretch of open country ended almost in a point in front of the abatis. A shallow ravine ran beside the abatis to finish in a swamp. Dense forest came almost up to the road beside the abatis and behind it, and covered the opposite riverbank completely. Thus, the American army marched in column formation across open ground[17] where the Canadians could see it and reckon with some accuracy the numbers of attackers.

In Purdy's sector, the density of the woods made it hard to judge the Americans' strength. Purdy reported that at the moment of the first volley, the adjutant general ordered him to fall back four miles and then rejoin Hampton. His soldiers heard the word "retreat," which spread confusion as some of them actually retreated before Purdy could restrain them. He added in giving his explanation, "A sufficient number, however, remained firm, and the enemy was soon compelled to retire."[18] Thus, at the time the first shots were fired from the abatis at Purdy's brigade marching level with Hampton — the moment when Daly's company was engaged — Purdy no longer had all his soldiers with him.

Another detail suggests that not all Hampton's army was in the battle. The Americans came over the border with at least nine cannons, a howitzer and a mortar,[19] whereas de Salaberry saw only one cannon.[20] This discrepancy raises the possibility that a good number of soldiers did not take part in the fighting. They would have been kept in reserve with the remainder of the equipment, since it is doubtful whether any army on the march would abandon its artillery in camp without adequate protection.

Taking all these documents into consideration, I believe that the effectives of the American army on the Châteauguay stood at about 2000 combatants and 1000 soldiers in reserve.

Turning to the Canadian forces, traditional historiography has always maintained that the victory of 26 October was the feat of 300 Canadians. The first reference to the strength of the Canadian effectives occurred in the general order of 27 October that the British force actually engaged did not exceed 300 men.[21] The phrase "actually engaged" needs to be stressed here. Historians have often mentioned the presence of various militia corps behind the entrenchments, but very few have offered an approximation or cited a specific number of militiamen. Robert Christie, relied on by a great many writing the battle story, reported the effectives as being barely 300 men.[22] Wood very cautiously mentions "a thousand men."[23] For his part, James reckoned the Canadians present at 300.[24]

French-Canadian historiography has followed the account of O'Sullivan, who assured his readers that there were not more than 300 Canadians. Sulte would repeat this figure at the end of the century.

Victor Suthren has counted 461 combatants and 1131 soldiers in reserve, a total of 1392 military men on the Châteauguay.[25] Hitsman's enumeration has given 300 men in combat and 1130 in reserve.[26] Both Suthren and Hitsman referred to Wood's data.[27]

All these figures on effectives were compared with ones arrived at through payrolls and various other documents, taking probable absences into account. The problem was considered first in terms of effectives on the entire battlefield, that is, front and reserve, and then as to whether the battle was really fought with 300 Canadians on the front.

The payrolls of the Select Embodied and Sedentary militias permit a fairly accurate estimate of the effectives serving on the Châteauguay. However, though some absentees were marked down as such on 26 October, not all of them were. The sick and those employed on the king's works elsewhere than the Châteauguay continued to be marked as present since they were paid with the company. Furthermore, in mid-October Prevost had allowed a certain number from the Sedentary Militia to leave for the harvest[28] and on the 26th some had still not returned to their companies.[29] Since the documents are not more specific, only those absentees declared

as such have been excluded from the calculations.

The absence of rolls for the Voltigeurs and Fencibles makes the task even harder. It is known that the Voltigeur companies consisted of about 50 to 55 soldiers and that there were 72 Fencibles at the abatis.[30] These are rough indications.

Similarly, no roll exists for the 22 Indians on the Fencibles' right. Were they part of the 150 Indians on the battlefield as a whole, or were they additional, for a total of 172? Because of this uncertainty, they have been counted separately.

With these shortcomings in the documentation taken into account, the probable presence of 1799 men on the Châteauguay can be calculated.

One company, 1st Battalion, Select Embodied Militia:	69
Eight companies, 2nd Battalion, Select Embodied Militia:	556
One company, 3rd Battalion, Select Embodied Militia:	77
Two companies, 5th Battalion, Select Embodied Militia:	156
Two companies, Beauharnois Sedentary Militia:	90
Five companies, Boucherville Sedentary Militia:	397
Four companies, Canadian Voltigeurs:	210
One Company, Canadian Fencibles:	72
22 Indians at the the abatis:	22
150 Indians around the 1st entrenchment:	150
Total	1799

A closer look at these effectives is required to establish how many men took part in the engagement. These combatants included two companies of Voltigeurs, one company of Fencibles, one company of the Select Embodied Militia and two companies of Sedentary Militia and Indians. The Voltigeurs and Fencibles would add up to about 100 and 72 men respectively. Daly's company of Select Embodied Militia was 77 strong, but apparently he had only 50 to 60 soldiers with him in the fighting.[31] Captain Longtin had experienced difficulty assembling his company of Sedentary Militia[32] and, according to Christie, would have had only 35 militiamen with him at the abatis.[33] Bruguière's picket (Sedentary Militia) was nearly 40 strong. The troops were accompanied by 22 Indians. This gives about 329 soldiers in all. Exact numbers are not available for the Voltigeurs, but, in my opinion, the combatant figure of 300 in O'Sullivan's estimate seems very close to the reality.[34]

The element that always distorts the figures for the forces in this battle is that two different things are being compared. Hampton's army, including regulars and militia, consisted of 5500 Americans. Prevost's army in Lower Canada was 12 500 strong, regulars and militia included.[35] On the Châteauguay, there were about 3000 Americans against about 1700 Canadians. In the fighting, 2000 Americans faced 300 Canadians. Seen thus, the battle was not so large-scale, but without de Salaberry's strategy, would the Americans have retreated so abruptly?

2. The Role of Macdonell

Lieutenant Colonel George Macdonell's presence on the Châteauguay was to be the centre of a protracted dispute at the end of the century about the "real" hero of the Battle of the Châteauguay. The controversy occurred in a context of inflamed English-French antagonism in the demographically and industrially changing Huntingdon County of the turn-of-the-century years. In an 1889 historical paper on the Battle of the Châteauguay, Lighthall stated that Macdonell had brought his Glengarrys, a recognized and exclusively English-speaking regular corps.[36] The next year, the historian Wood interviewed Mr. Morrison, an ardent anti-Francophone octogenarian living on the Châteauguay, and published the results of the interview without the appropriate critical balance. The interview was followed by numerous articles by Robert Sellar of the Huntingdon *Gleaner*, who engaged in a long war of words with Benjamin Sulte in an attempt to prove that the hero of the battle was Macdonell; according to Sellar, de Salaberry was not present and Macdonell's men were the only ones in the fighting. Sulte conceded that Macdonell had been close to the front line, but argued that he had taken no part in the combat.[37] The dispute with Sulte prompted Sellar to publish a highly partisan account of the battle in 1913; he conceded that Charles-Michel de Salaberry had been present, but refused him any of the credit and insisted that the engagement had been won by Macdonell's men.[38] This polemic has resulted in much confusion concerning Macdonell's role

and thus that of Charles-Michel de Salaberry. I have tried, therefore, to ascertain Macdonell's position during the battle.

It should be noted first that Macdonell was not with the Glengarrys. To be sure, he had raised the Glengarry corps, but since 14 June 1813 he had been lieutenant colonel in charge of the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry. This corps consisted of flank companies of the battalions of Select Embodied Militia. Captain Daly's company from the 3rd Battalion and Captain de Tonnancour's from the 1st were under his command.[39]

On 28 October 1813 the brigade major asked Charles-Michel de Salaberry to send two companies of the 2nd Battalion to continue to hold "the rear position formerly occupied by Lt. Col. Macdonell...."[40] Macdonell's position, then, had been as marked by Lighthall on Bouchette's map: by the last two entrenchments near the rear ford.[41]

It is clear from the various accounts that Macdonell did not stay at the rear entrenchments. Just as the Canadian forces were moving into combat position, Lieutenant Colonel Macdonell moved part of his light brigade from the third and fourth lines to the first and second.[42] He was at the first line when the Canadians shouted to confuse the enemy. It was at this moment that, from the first line, he had the bugles blown in all directions to further confuse the enemy. The fighting went on for a while and then, as the enemy had reached the right bank, the bugles sounded the advance to carry out certain manoeuvres. Macdonell responded to this signal by advancing "from the first and 2nd line with Capt. Lévesque's company, I think, and one other" [translation];[43] however, the signal was not for him and he returned to his former position where, according to de Salaberry's orders, he was to see that the reserves stopped the enemy from advancing on the right bank.

Macdonell, then, was extremely active during the fighting as commander of the reserves and performed to the satisfaction of de Salaberry, who relayed it to his superiors. However, Macdonell did not command on the front line and was under de Salaberry's orders during the battle. This being the case, it is surprising that Macdonell, who played a subordinate role, should have managed to loom so large in the historiography of the Battle of the Châteauguay. Despite the fact that he was not mentioned in the official reports and general orders on the battle, he would still receive a medal to commemorate it. The fact is that Macdonell, an ambitious man, won Prevost's favour.[44]

Thus any reference to Macdonell as commanding the Canadian forces arises out of the controversy of the late 19th century, and bears no relation to historical reality.

3. The Presence or Absence of Prevost

The honours of victory fall by right to the highest-ranking commander in the military action concerned. The presence of de Watteville and Prevost on the battlefield could mean fewer rewards to de Salaberry. The latter's bitterness at Prevost's pretensions has prompted an examination of the commander in chief's role in the battle.

Two letters supply details about Prevost's presence. He had left Baker's place in the forenoon. He arrived at the second line, where there was a ford across the Châteauguay River; there was some advance action at a wharf on the opposite bank. His aide de camp, P. de Boucherville, was ordered to the first line, but at that same moment news arrived that the enemy was in full retreat and he stayed with Prevost. "The first line was especially commanded by my countrymen and relative by marriage, Colonel de Salaberry" [translation], de Boucherville recorded.[45] Prevost would have arrived when the fighting between Daly and Purdy was going on near the riverbank, but had not gone to the abatis, a mile ahead of the first entrenchment.

Colonel de la Bruère, who said he had been about a mile immediately behind the Voltigeurs, went to tell Sir George Prevost, who was a short distance behind him, that Colonel de Salaberry had engaged the enemy. De la Bruère then returned at once to his post, from where he went to de Salaberry *"who was a few furlongs* [*arpents*] *from me* [my italics], and, following a conversation with him, he directed me to guard the river crossing, fordable in that place and with our left close against it" [translation].[46]

The two letters tell us that Prevost reached the first entrenchment when de Salaberry was with his troops, in T-shaped formation after the Daly-Purdy clash. When the aide de camp (de Boucherville) was ordered to the first line (where de Salaberry was), he learned that the enemy was fleeing and so stayed with Prevost. Thus, neither he nor

Prevost was present at the abatis during the fighting.

Louis de Watteville's diary sheds light on the whole situation. He wrote on 26 October 1813:

> General Prevost arrived at the Forks between 11 o'clock and noon. At 1 o'clock, mounted horses to take up to the advance posts. On the way, received the report that our posts had been engaged with the enemy since 11 o'clock. In consequence, I immediately went ahead. When I arrived, the firing had ceased and the enemy's attacks that he had made on the two sides of the river, had been discontinued.

The next day, he went on:

> In the night received the report from Colonel de Salaberry on the details of the action, which I sent to General Prevost with a letter from myself, in which I said that the success must be due as much to the gallantry of the troops as to the activity and judgement used by Lieutenant Colonel de Salaberry in selecting and fortifying the position in a few days. [Translation.][47]

There is thus no doubt that Prevost reached the battlefield after the fighting and that de Watteville credited the victory to Charles-Michel de Salaberry.

Why did the commander of the forces want to claim this success for himself? There is the possibility that after his humiliating defeat at Sackett's Harbour a few months earlier, Prevost saw the results of the fighting on the Châteauguay as a means of restoring his reputation with the authorities and the people. Another possibility is that inflating the enemy's effectives enabled him to justify the scale of defence measures under which a large part of the male population had been mobilized, and make the battle more significant because he had taken part in it. He seems to have sought in this way to win the gratitude of the military authorities and the Canadian population.

Echoes of Victory

In Contemporary Writings

Awareness of a victory gained did not dawn immediately after the battle. The fighting over, de Salaberry waited for the enemy to return the next day, but the reconnaissance patrol reported that the American army had returned to Spears's place at the mouth of the Outardes River.[48] The next morning, de Watteville wrote Prevost that "the general good conduct of the troops engaged cause the enemy to fail in this his *first* [my italics] attempt upon our advanced Posts on the Châteauguay River."[49] When he issued the general order of 27 October, Prevost made no mention of the enemy's withdrawal for he knew that they were at Spears's, but their retreat did allow it to be said that the attack had been successfully thwarted. To add to the glory of the occasion, he went on to state that the attack had ended that day in the shameful and utter defeat of the enemy's troops. News of the victory spread and exaggeration was soon snowballing.

Prevost wanted credit for this success for himself, but managed to convince virtually no one. Major General de Watteville wrote the letter already quoted, which was completely in Charles-Michel de Salaberry's favour. On the same day, de Watteville issued a brigade order to congratulate the troops in the front lines and, in accordance with the wishes of the commander of the forces, expressed approval of "the conduct of the several Corps engaged with the enemy in the affair of yesterday under the immediate command of lieut.-col. de Salaberry."[50]

The most interesting echo of the battle is unquestionably that expressed by Father Boucher to Monseigneur Plessis. On 28 October 1813 a parishioner of his arriving from the upper Châteauguay had spoken to him of the wounded and of Daly's possible death, and mentioned that there had been from 900 to 1000 Americans.[51] Eight days later Boucher was reporting to his bishop again: "I had written Your Grace that the number of the enemy who had attacked Châteauguay was only nine hundred to a thousand ... and here is the battle become glorious for the Canadians as that of Thermopylae for the Greeks, without my suspecting it." The effect of Prevost's general order was being

felt: 7500 Americans. "Hurrah, if it is true," Boucher wrote, "here the figure is going up to 250 they killed and flung into the Rivière aux Canards or Outardes, or the Indians robbed and tied up in the woods." [Translation.][52] Thus by hearsay a myth was born.

On 29 October 1813 de Salaberry wrote his wife: "The enemy began his retreat yesterday. I believe that we have saved Montreal for this year."[53] And, he added, "it is certain that we fought the whole American army. The losses have been considerable, much greater than we thought when I wrote to you." [Translation.][54] One has the impression that de Salaberry was realizing that if he did not get involved in the burnishing of the triumph, he was going to lose credit for it. To the praises of his euphoric father, he replied that he would be delighted too if the commander in chief were not trying to do him out of the credit of doing his duty, and giving two-thirds of it to other people.[55] At the beginning of November he complained about the way he was treated at headquarters, which only embittered the already very strained relations between himself and Prevost.

The 27 October general order and the comments on the battle did not appear in the *Gazette de Québec* until 4 November. It was pointed out that this was the first time the majority of defenders from commander to lowest were Canadians. The outcome of the encounter stood as proof of the "ancient character of the people, and the zeal they have shown on a number of occasions for the defence of their country," and the number of enemy deaths "is clear evidence that we have good officers and good soldiers" [translation]. On the same page, the journal published an unsigned letter from someone returning from de Salaberry's camp. This letter commands attention by describing Colonel de Salaberry "as one of the foremost Officers we have," giving credit for the defensive works to Colonel Hughes and to de Salaberry only the choice of location for the abatis, and ending with praise for Prevost high enough to make Charles-Michel de Salaberry beside himself:

> The ever-active and vigilant Knight was on the ground and seemed to set the crown on the great work that had just been wrought; his behaviour towards the Canadians is that of a father to his children, and his presence among them seems to make them forget the ills involved with the fate of the war. [Translation.][56]

The repercussions of the commander in chief's attitude are hard to ascertain as the sources were not numerous. Did this attitude influence the December 1813 resignations of captains Lévesque, Desbartzch and Papineau,[57] and that of Louis Juchereau Duchesnay in January 1814?[58] De Salaberry implied so.[59] Certainly the military did not approve of Prevost's methods. E. d'Aubreville wrote to de Salaberry on 26 March 1814 to congratulate him on the thanks bestowed by the provincial parliament, but added that he would not be satisfied until the lieutenant colonel's talents, virtues and services were rewarded in the most deserving manner "and when it will be said unanimously that justice has been done to the Hero of Châteauguay" [translation].[60]

For his part, the tired, sick soldier-hero was convinced at the end of 1813 that it was time to end a demanding career that was apparently not worth pursuing. He felt ever-increasing pressure from the commander in chief, who was dispatching him on arduous reconnoitring missions in which he sensed a kind of revenge for the glory he had won on the Châteauguay. In December de Salaberry wanted to leave military service. Unable to obtain a higher rank, he chose to keep what honour he had achieved rather than have a reverse of fortune take all he had in a single day.[61] At the end of January 1814, suffering greatly from rheumatism and prey to fatigue, he despaired of gaining London's notice so that he could retire from the army with certain benefits. At last, on 30 January, he received the thanks of the Lower Canadian House of Assembly,[62] a great satisfaction for the man who wrote: "I think the sequel pretty well shows that I am the only person who had any thing to do in the command in the action of Châteauguay."[63] At this time, feeling that he had done his share, he wanted nothing but "rest and a great deal of rest."[64] Following certain difficulties, in March he was made inspecting field officer of militia, a rank Prevost was going to ask London to approve,[65] but in a confidential report of 13 May 1814, Prevost wrote that if de Watteville had not had the opportunity of taking part in the fighting on the Châteauguay, it was because de Salaberry was guilty of not warning him or of having been taken by surprise.[66] Yet de

Watteville himself had no reproach to offer de Salaberry. In front of the Canadians Prevost seemed to acknowledge de Salaberry's merits, whereas in reality he was withdrawing all his support. The following autumn de Salaberry learned that his post of inspecting field officer had not been confirmed in London.[67] He then asked the military secretary to put him on the retired list with half-pay at his lieutenant colonel's rank.[68]

Almost nothing is known of the victory's reverberations among the ordinary people of the time. Only a few comments from private correspondence build any impression of it.

Returning from the battlefield, Father Bruguier wrote that "our Canadians behaved valiantly, I think them enchanted as long as they have Colonel de Salaberry at their head" [translation].[69] In Chambly, Hertel de Rouville got the details of the battle by word of mouth five days later:

> and so, as our people around here put it, seeing that everyone's mouth was flapping about a matter that interested me so much ... my dear friend, it is a craze, with the English in the lead — our colonel is a hero, he is the best officer in England's service, it is he who has saved the province &&& as you may well imagine, my dear cousin, I am gagging on all this. [Translation.][70]

In Beauport the senior de Salaberry heard his son proclaimed a hero by numerous people around him.[71] Among kin, of course, hero talk would be the natural thing. The broader society also considered the soldiers who won the victory. On 1 November at Quebec a senior civil servant, A. Cochran, heaped praise on the Canadians:

> The whole of the troops engaged in this occasion on our side have been Canadians; the fact is that the Canadians were competent to defend their own soil [and] they have the courage to do it. Few creatures can bear more hardships with less refraing [*sic*] than a Canadian -- none can render a more ready obedience to what is required of them — none will be more persevering in what he undertake — and none are better calculated for the partisan warfare & bush-fighting by which the progress of an enemy through that part of the country is to be checked than a Canadian farmer.[72]

Michael O'Sullivan reported in Montreal that on his arrival there "it was fairly generally believed that de Watteville had taken part in the fighting, but at present, I assure you that no one is of that opinion. The public are even indignant at the injustice that has been done to you." [Translation.][73]

In the Historiography

A number of historians have already interested themselves in the history of the Battle of the Châteauguay. The first and only basic account was that of the adjutant, Michael O'Sullivan. This eye-witness signed his article on 3 November and it was published in the *Gazette de Montréal* on 9 November 1813. O'Sullivan wrote to Charles-Michel de Salaberry that he had taken up the pen to give him the justice he deserved.[74] He had prepared his text in English and seemed to find the translation inadequate, for he advised de Salaberry to read it in the original. His opinion does seem to be expressed better in the English, where he wrote that "it is but common justice to Col. De Salaberry to state that to him alone praise is due for the 'admirable arrangement...' " which the major-general later approved.[75] The text praises de Salaberry, singling out his courage, abilities, talents as a commander and his shrewd judgement. O'Sullivan ended his account by saying that by repelling the enemy, Canadians commanded by a Canadian had prevented Hampton from joining Wilkinson and thus rescued Upper Canada from a precarious situation.[76]

Robert Christie included an account of the Battle of the Châteauguay in his 1818 history of Lower Canada. He repeated O'Sullivan's version, changing a few details on the basis of information that he seems to have drawn from either official correspondence or the de Salaberry family. According to him, Prevost and de Watteville arrived together at the end of the engagement to witness the judicious arrangements and the success of Lieutenant Colonel de Salaberry and his brave fellow-countrymen, "whose prowess on the occasion called forth warmest encomiums of the Commander of the Forces and gave them a just claim to the disinterested and impartial applause of history."[77]

Subsequent accounts are all based more or less on O'Sullivan and Christie. What differen-

tiates them are, first, interpretations that reflect the political interests of the various periods, and, secondly, a concern with making the course of the battle more definite. The latter motive is most understandable, with each writer trying to use common sense to fill the gaps persisting in the records; however, documentary support was lacking and these versions took on casts of interpretation that were not always consistent with reality.

For François-Xavier Garneau, the hero was an experienced officer of indomitable courage who therefore led his troops effectively. To challengers of the battle's importance, who cited its few deaths and soldiers involved, Garneau replied that although the victory of the Châteauguay was not very bloody, given the small number of Canadians, it had all the consequences of a great battle.[78] In 1862 Auchinleck relied on Christie's account and agreed that de Salaberry and his fellow citizens deserved the praises they received, for then "the bubble of Canadian conquest burst and evaporated, if not forever, at any rate for that war."[79] In 1864 Coffin repeated O'Sullivan's version, stressed the Canadians' good moral conduct and concluded that since de Salaberry was in sole command in that part of the field, he alone deserved the glory of the victory.[80]

Thus in the mid-19th century, interpretations focussed on the battle's importance as a historical fact. Charles-Michel de Salaberry was recognized as a soldier whose qualities earned him the glory of the victory. It was not the combat itself but its consequences that made it a great victory. Despite the importance assigned to it, however, there was no monograph on the subject until 1889.

In the late 19th century, opposition between ethnic groups was influencing the historians' interpretations. In the introduction to his 1889 lecture on the battle, Lighthall summed up the context of his era reasonably well, for Huntingdon County at least. In his speech, he gave the word "Canadian" a new meaning, no longer limited to Francophones, but embracing all Canadians whatever their origins. He remarked that it was a time when patriotic writings were very much in demand. Châteauguay had been an important historical event because it had shown that in the face of a common danger, all the country's nationalities had united to fight side by side in defence of their homes. The speaker's goal was to seize every opportunity to teach the new generation a proper concept of the grandeur of the heritage that was theirs. Those were the days of Mercier's autonomist government and the Riel Rebellion. Yet Lighthall's idea of the hero expressed an attitude that could only create antagonism: according to him, Charles-Michel de Salaberry had come from a class of men, the old French nobility, such as no longer existed in 1889 — noble, brave, active, intrepid and born soldiers — which amounted to a judgement on the Francophones of his own time. In addition, Lighthall created stereotypes: de Salaberry was a stout and vigorous officer dressed in dark grey, rushing from place to place to give orders; the enemy was slave-owning, elderly, impetuous, alcoholic, imposing in stature, revolutionary, impatient and proud. According to Lighthall, the Battle of the Châteauguay had been won by de Salaberry's astuteness and shrewd choice of positions, but the credit for the victory went to all the soldiers — French, English, Scots, Irish or Indian — united for the nation's defence.[81]

Not everyone agreed with this interpretation and a long argument started between Benjamin Sulte, representing Francophone opinion, and Robert Sellar, representing Anglophone opinion. Sulte rejected the notion of a multiplicity of nationalities in the battle, seeing this approach as a way of taking away from the French Canadians a victory that was their due. Sulte also argued that Macdonell was not present at the abatis, but rather in command of the reserves at the third and fourth entrenchments. Sellar retorted that de Salaberry was absent when the battle was joined and that in any case Macdonell's men were the only ones who fought because there had been no dead in the abatis sector — which was false.[82]

In *La bataille de Châteauguay* (1899), Sulte went over the details of the historical event and assigned all mistakes and failures to de Watteville and Prevost who, in his opinion, had tried to appropriate the honours of all the battles. He ended by saying that the engagement was all the more glorious for the Canadians in that there was no army to support them as the military authorities should have ordered, and that de Salaberry had the ability to make war sagely with modest means.[83]

Sellar waited until 1913, the centenary year, to publish his version of the Battle of the Châteauguay. According to him, the credit for the battlefield arrangements were due to

de Watteville. Again he insisted that Macdonell's men were the Glengarrys. He threw out everything that would give the slightest credit to the French Canadians. To minimize the battle's significance, he continued in the same publication with Chrysler Farm as "the decisive Battle of the War of 1812."[84]

Sellar's opinion was not shared by all English Canadians. In 1913 William Wood published *Canada in the War of 1812,* in the "Canada and its Provinces" series, in which he acknowledged the virtues of a good soldier in de Salaberry and saw the Battle of the Châteauguay as a victory won by French Canadians. Cruikshank, in his "Record of the Services of Canadian Regiments in the War of 1812," avoided any personal comments on the battle; however, he did quote at length from the general order of 26 March 1814 in which de Salaberry was most particularly congratulated by the Prince Regent, with the officers under his command and the Canadian soldiers, for merit and distinguished service.[85]

For Thomas Chapais, the victory of the Châteauguay was a French-Canadian triumph. One would have said he was addressing Sellar when he wrote:

> It is truly ours and no one can rob us of it.... Châteauguay was our response to the slanders of Craig, Ryland and Sewell. Châteauguay was our revenge. Châteauguay was the statement of our undeniable loyalism and ardent patriotism. Châteauguay was the heroic portrayal of our national thinking.... Salaberry and his gallant men gave English arms the uncommon glory of a French victory. [Translation.][86]

After 1960 the traditional heroes lost their trappings in our historiography. De Salaberry is now seen as a good soldier. The English-Canadian historians have kept Lighthall's reading of Châteauguay, but expressed it in vaguer terms. Hitsman has said: "Undoubtedly the most important thing to note about the Battle of Châteauguay is that all the successful defenders were Canadians whether they were English-speaking or French-speaking."[87] Victor Suthren, the latest to produce a monograph on the battle, presented de Salaberry as a conscientious and effective military officer who led a multi-cultural group to victory. These Canadians of diverse origins, even though they were often in conflict, showed that in the face of the threat to the country's independence they made common cause. These heroes -- for Suthren sets de Salaberry and Macdonell side by side -- were men who had succeeded in career and social terms. After a military career capped by his evaluation as a Companion of the Bath, de Salaberry was given political honours; after a comparable career that was also crowned by a Companionship of the Bath, Macdonell, by a fortunate marriage, joined the ranks of the English nobility.

The hero's importance has varied from era to era. At the outset he was recognized by his fellow countrymen but rejected by the authorities. Of political necessity the latter were moved to accord him public recognition even though they never delivered the earnests of military achievement he demanded. In the mid-19th century the hero was seen not in isolation, but with his Canadian troops. He was an experienced, courageous, intrepid officer who had the trust of his men, but the victory was due to all Canadians and here that meant French Canadians. At the turn of the century, English-French conflict had repercussions on the hero's literary image. Anglophones moved from the Lighthall-style epic hero to complete rejection of de Salaberry to his replacement by an English-speaking hero, either Macdonell or de Watteville. According to the opposing interpretation, de Salaberry was a valiant hero working in isolation and managing with modest means, but succeeding nonetheless marvellously in saving his own people when, for want of courage, his superiors dared not become involved. In that period the hero was the leader standing above his troops who followed him convinced of his superiority and his mission. After the First World War, attitudes changed and the hero became the prototype of all combatants; this was not de Salaberry of the old nobility, but the French Canadian who in the midst of his own people enacted the valour of his race. Then in the 1960s the hero's image was erased by one of a corps of militia, Anglophones and Francophones side by side, defending their country. Today the hero is seen as a man successful in terms of career and society, his victory the product of happy co-operation among the various groups against a common enemy.

There is no longer a single hero, but many heroes.

Types of Rewards

Governments are moved by brilliant actions like the Battle of the Châteauguay to reward the victorious soldiers. In all ages, military successes have been rewarded by honours, money or, often, both. The award is conferred for an acknowledged political reason: to encourage participation in the war effort and show how grateful a government can be. In Lower Canada, gratitude sometimes took the form of land grants as the colonial government tried to settle border areas with a population that had military training and demonstrated its loyalty to the king and used the opportunity to colonize virgin land.

Contratulations and thanks were first, on 27 October 1813, handed out to the chief militia officers, the corps of militia and the Canadian Fencibles regiment. In the general order on the battle, the governor made it "a duty and a pleasure to pay the tribute of praise that is so justly due to Maj. Gen. de Watteville, ... Lt. Colonel de Salaberry ... and all officers and soldiers engaged with the enemy" [translation].[1] On 24 December the Duke of York, commander in chief of the British forces, sent his own congratulations, but with much circumspection after receiving Prevost's report of 30 October 1813; his message was addressed in very general terms to all officers and men of regular troops and militia in action during the battle.[2]

The duke promised to lay the report before the Prince Regent, who congratulated the "officers and men making up the detachment of troops opposing General Hampton's army" [translation].[3] The prince's letter was not published until March 1814. In it he admitted being reassured about the Canadians' loyalty:

> His Royal Highness sees with special pleasure that His Majesty's Canadian Subjects have at least had occasion (which His Royal Highness has long desired should be given them) of refuting by their own glorious efforts for the defence of their Country, the calumnious accusations of disaffection and disloyalty which the Enemy had advanced before his first Invasion of the Province. [Translation.][4]

Charles-Michel de Salaberry appreciated being singled out in particular in this letter; however, he noted the promise to send flags to the battalions of Select Embodied Militia but no mention of the Voltigeurs. "Moreover," he added, "I begin to suspect that the pretended letter from Lord Bathurst [of 27 December 1813 conveying the regent's compliments] is not the genuine one, and that it has been given to the Governor himself and to Gen Watteville...."[5] He was convinced that the letter had to do with Upper Canada and the dispatch of troops.[6]

The battalions of Select Embodied Militia got their banners after their demobilization and seven years after the battle. The flags were entrusted in 1820 to the officers who were at battalion headquarters at the end of the war although not necessarily on the Châteauguay. The Voltigeurs received no banner; Prevost did not ask that they be rewarded for their services until Charles-Michel de Salaberry had left as corps commander. On 29 July 1814 Prevost asked Bathurst to put the corps' officers on the half-pay roll after their service as had been done with the provincial corps in the wake of the American War of Independence.[7] At that time the principal officers from the Battle of the Châteauguay had already resigned.

The Legislative Council offered officers of the Voltigeurs and Select Embodied Militia a gift of 24 days' salary over and above their normal pay at the end of the war[8] in thanks for their services, but also probably to help them readapt to civilian life and to offer partial reimbursement for their expenses in the cause of war.

The distribution of medals to reward officers who had been victorious on the battlefield was an institution going back to 1811-12. The gold medal of that time bore an inscription recording the site of victory and was given to officers commanding regiments; it commemorated their services generally. The system had first been devised for officers serving in Spain, but after the British successes in North America, medals were also given there.[9] De Salaberry and Macdonell each received one for



29 Flags received in 1820.
(Parks Canada Collection.)

30 Medal commemorating the Battle of the Châteauguay. (Parks Canada Collection.)

the victorious engagement on the Châteauguay.

In 1847 the policy regarding medals was changed. Soldiers, too, would have the right to this mark of gratitude for their services. Soldiers, militiamen and Indians who had taken part in the battles of Detroit, Châteauguay and Chrysler's Farm were notified to apply for the medals that were their due.[10] Some 247 veterans of the Battle of the Châteauguay, not counting Indians, lodged their requests.[11] I found seven who received the medal, their entitlement in no doubt;[12] as of May 1850, 30 militiamen had not come to claim theirs[13] and in 1879, 17 still remained.[14] At the end of the century, collectors[15] obtained the unclaimed medals from the storeroom of the Department of Defence, but promised in writing to return them to the department if they were asked to do so.

Like the flags, the medals had come too late to bring pleasure to most of the militiamen involved. This recognition, more political than honorific, is evidence of the British government's desire to encourage militia forces, or at least to put the population in a mood to defend the country in case the new American philosophy of "Manifest Destiny" should be applied to Canadian territory.[16]

The Sedentary Militia had no right to any reward and received only the compliments contained in general orders.

De Salaberry's Reward

Charles-Michel de Salaberry hoped to win the professional benefits from the victory on the Châteauguay. He had no difficulty getting recognition from his colleagues and his immediate superior, and was appreciated and praised by the people, but the only one with power in his hands, the commander in chief, tried to usurp his professional rewards. And since the commander in chief was also the country's governor, the Legislative Assembly and Council, afraid to displease him, took much time before thanking de Salaberry for his service to his native land. The first body expressed its gratitude on 25 January 1814, and the second on 2 February of that year.[17]

In the meantime, a number of accounts of the battle had reached England. Prevost's negative report and the positive ones from de Salaberry, his father and his friends, were laid before the Prince Regent, who on 27 December 1813 sent congratulations that were not published in Montreal until March 1814.[18]

Did these compliments, the hero's growing fame, the resignation of several militia officers in January 1814[19] and de Salaberry's attempts to retire move Prevost to offer the lieutenant colonel the post of inspecting field officer at the beginning of March 1814?[20] Was it also these "political" circumstances that prompted him to recommend de Salaberry for a gold medal commemorating the Battle of the Châteauguay?[21] I think so. For though an official letter recommended de Salaberry, there was always a "confidential" note not far behind to denigrate him.[22] De Salaberry was quite right to mistrust Prevost.

At first, the post of inspecting field officer looked to de Salaberry like the longed-for promotion; however, as he said, with him there was always a snag.[23] The appointment was not approved in London on the pretext that the existing number of posts of this rank were sufficient in North America, but this did not prevent de Salaberry from carrying out these duties until the war's end. When the refusal of his appointment was announced, de Salaberry learned that he was being given a rank of regimental lieutenant colonel.[24] He then submitted his resignation,[25] which was intercepted by the Duke of Kent,[26] who, knowing that the conflict was drawing to an end, wanted him to benefit from the advantages

31 Charles-Michel de Salaberry, wearing the Châteauguay medal and the insignia of the Order of the Bath. (Château de Ramezay, Montreal.)

(half-pay and various allowances) of not leaving his post before peace came.

De Salaberry thus obtained the rank he wanted after much perseverance and with the help of his friend the Duke of Kent, for the commander in chief in America did nothing to assist him. When de Salaberry received the medal commemorating the Battle of the Châteauguay in 1816,[27] Prevost was no longer there to harm him. In the following year, 1817, he was made a Companion of the Bath, an order stressing military merit.[28] Governor Sherbrooke asked him that same year for his military service record in order to appoint him to a seat on the Lower Canada Legislative Council, which was conferred on 14 December 1818.[29] De Salaberry was introduced to the council on 19 February 1819.[30]

When he was made inspecting field officer, the hero of the Voltigeurs abandoned his com-

mand of the corps he had raised and trained as strictly as a regular regiment. Like many others, he had hoped to see the Voltigeurs become a regular corps, but at the end of 1813 this possibility faded and, since he wanted a regimental promotion, he chose to sell his post as commander of the Voltigeurs. Major George Herriot bought it and succeeded him.[31]

De Salaberry left the Voltigeurs with deep regret, but was nevertheless glad of the change in routine when he thought of all his past difficulties and how his health had been affected in the time he commanded the corps. His officers offered him a sword or piece of silver plate as a token of thanks and de Salaberry chose the plate; had it been the offer of a king, he said, he would have taken the sword, but from the Voltigeurs he preferred the terrine, which had more chance of being handed on to posterity. This piece, not to be found today, bore the following inscription drafted by his father:[32]

> To Lt colonel Charles de Salaberry by the officers of the Canadian Voltigeurs As a Token of their Personal esteem for his private character as a proof of their gratitude for his spirit of justice and correct discipline while Lieutenant-colonel commanding their corps
>
> and
>
> As a feeble testimony of the high sense which they entertain of the coolness and intrepidity so often displayed by him in the field more particularly in the action of the 26th of October 1813, at Châteauguay.

The Voltigeurs and men of the Select Embodied Militia received land in reward for their service, and many other military men also had this right. Very surprisingly, Charles-Michel de Salaberry received none. The House of Assembly had made such a request for him to the Prince Regent in 1815 for his having repelled the American army, "thus disconcerting the Enemy's plans, diminishing his confidence and assuring the Safety of this Province," which mark of consideration, the assemblymen wanted to "arouse in future the emulation of our Compatriots for the defence of this Province" [translation].[33] In 1868 the heirs of the hero of Châteauguay were still asking for the reward the assembly had recommended in 1815.[34]

Thus, Charles-Michel de Salaberry received recognition of his professional effectiveness from numerous people including his immediate superior, but not from the commander of the forces in America, who had power on his side. The rewards he did receive appear to have been political gestures rather than acts of simple gratitude. In spite of everything, de Salaberry did obtain what he seems to have wanted the most: the rank of regimental lieutenant colonel and the resources to stay in Canada, that is, in Chambly.

Land Grants

In 1812 Prevost had told the Voltigeurs that they would be entitled to 50 acres *(arpents)* of crown land after their military service.[35] When he asked the British government to approve the grant, he was greeted with a certain reluctance, but won consent when he had explained that the land in Sherrington Township that he intended to allot was not very good. To this he added the argument, which must certainly have carried some weight, of the need to settle the border, too long to fortify, with loyal subjects. Bathurst warned Prevost that this type of grant must not become a habit.[36] It was not until December 1814 that the Executive Council knew that land in Sherrington Township could be given to the Voltigeurs.[37]

After the war the government decided to give the militiamen land in Grantham instead of Sherrington. The change was probably made as a result of the favourable reception given to Lieutenant Colonel Deschambault's project to establish a military post at the junction of the Craig Road and the St. François River, with lands granted to demobilized regular soldiers who wanted to stay in the country.[38] The plan interested the governments, but instead of planting regular soldiers there, the grants were given first to the Canadian Voltigeurs, the Glengarry Light Infantry and the Frontier Light Infantry.[39] Later, men from various regular regiments also obtained land grants in this place, already known as Drummondville in 1816.[40] In that year, Lieutenant Colonel George Herriot of the Voltigeurs was put in charge of the development of this new settlement. Assisted by Captain Adhémar, he made a considerable contribution to the founding of Drummond-

Table 28. Return of Crown Lands granted in each year from 31st Decr to 31st Decr 1833 inclusive under Location

Year	Number of acres granted to U.C. Loyalists	Number of acres granted to Militia Claimants	Number of acres granted discharged soldiers and pensioners	Number of acres granted to officers	Number of acres granted not coming within the previous descriptions	Conditions on which the majority of the grants were made
1824		51,810		4,100	34,859	Settlers Conditions, That he do clear twenty feet of road on his lot within the space of ninety days. Military & Militia Conditions; That he do within the space of three years clear & cultivate four acres of his lot & build a dwelling house thereon.
1825		32,620		1,000	16,274	
1826		3,525	5,500		48,224	
1827		7,460	6,300	800	38,378	
1828		7,300		4,504	9,036	
1829		3,200			5,282	
1830		81,425		2,000	10,670	
1831		8,700			8,500	
1832		9,616			3,100	
1833		2,700				
Total		208,356	11,800	12,404	174,323	

Source: Quebec (Province). Archives Nationales (Quebec [City]), QBC 15-33, No. 1026.



32 Lower Canada in 1814. (Public Archives Canada.)

ville, as much by his labours as by his personal expenditures.[41]

Little documentation was found on this military settlement, and whether the soldiers and militiamen of the corps mentioned above had to fulfil the same requirements that applied to the Select Embodied Militia is not known. In 1818 the Prince Regent ordered that land grants be made to men of the Select Embodied Militia.[42] After a number of steps were taken, the other corps of militia that had been drafted, such as the Provincial Artillery, the Corps of Artillery Drivers and the Provincial Dragoons, became entitled to the same reward. Only the men of the Sedentary Militia were excluded. It was agreed that the land area to be allotted to each according to rank would be as follows:

lieutenant colonel	1200 acres
captain	800 acres
major	800 acres
subaltern	500 acres
sergeant	200 acres
soldier	100 acres

Tenure was in free and common socage. The clergy reserves were to be distributed as usual pending permission to set them apart so that people would not be prevented from settling side by side.[43] At the outset it had been planned to set a stretch of land aside in each district for militia grants; however, in January 1820 the Executive Council decided to give free choice in crown lands.[44]

A veteran had to meet various conditions before becoming the owner of the land granted in reward for his services. First, he had to obtain a location certificate that entitled him to move in. He had to request the certificate in writing, stating the name of the corps to which he had belonged and including a certificate such as his demobilization paper or a recommendation from an officer of the corps. When he received his location ticket, he had three years in which to work or farm four acres of land and build a house or hut. With this proof of residence he could request the patent or title for his land. Land could not be sold without title. The costs of this process were 15s.6d. for the request, 17s.6d. for the location ticket, and £3.6.8 in title fees for each 1000 acres (or a proportional sum); subdivision survey costs were around £5 per 1000 acres.[45]

At the outset, the men of the Select Embodied and Sedentary militias were pushed towards the Eastern Townships, more particularly Weedon, Dudswell, Ham, Chester, Wolfstown, Ireland, Halifax, Inverness, Leeds, Tring, Broughton, Jersey and Shenley.[46] In 1829 seven other townships were opened to them: Cranbourne, Warwick, Brandon, Caxton, Harton, Kilkenny and Stanfold.[47] Gradually, lands were granted in all the townships.

In an 1818 return J. Bouchette estimated at 377 000 acres the available land in the townships around the fork of the Craig and Dudswell roads in Ireland Township.[48] According to registered settlement papers and reports from government agents, 208 356 acres were granted to militiamen in the years 1824-33 inclusively. In the same period, 174 323 acres were granted to non-military persons. Among the regular military, officers received 12 404 acres and soldiers 11 800 acres, a total of 24 204 acres. The survey consulted shows militiamen receiving the majority of lands granted.[49] Between 1817 and 1823 some 63 600 acres had already been occupied by militiamen.[50] To assess the significance of these grants in terms of demographic movements, the number of individuals sharing this acreage would have to be known. In addition, the location tickets indicated simply that land was granted by the government, not whether militiamen had benefited from the reward. It would be necessary to establish the number of land titles distributed in order to know how many actually received their land. Bouchette wrote for the governor that a total of 92 141 acres of 314 417 acres granted to the Embodied Militia were registered in the land patent office.[51]

According to these statistics, 271 956 acres were granted to militia veterans between 1817 and 1833. Vassal de Monviel had calculated that a total of 1 424 900 acres would be needed to reward all the eligible militiamen. The number of acres granted up to 1834 is low by comparison. Vassal de Monviel expected as much: "I am more than sure that there will not be perhaps the twentieth part of this number who will present themselves to get land" [translation].[52]

The level of demand must have been unsatisfactory for the government, which wanted to use settlement of the townships as a means of easing the population surpluses on the seigneuries and providing a partial solution to the economic problems created by the decline of agriculture and the fur trade. As the response to the first advertisement, published in 1822, was not what had been hoped for, the

Know all Men by these Presents, that Peter Stewart of the ... of Elizabethtown in the county of Leeds and Grenville District and Province of Canada, Labourer

have nominated, constituted and appointed, and by these presents do nominate, constitute and appoint Edward Preston ——— of the Town of Brockville in the said counties ~~District~~, and Province aforesaid, to be my true and lawful Attorney for me, and in and with my name to ask, demand, and receive from Her Majesty's Commissioner of Crown Lands for the said Province, all the Land Scrip to which I am entitled for my services during the late war with the United States in Captain Johnson's Company of Voltigeurs

and on receipt of the said Scrip, or of any part thereof, respectively, to give receipts and acquittances for the same, and to sign, seal and execute such writing or writings as shall be requisite in that behalf, and further to do and perform all things necessary to be done in and about the execution of these presents, as I might have done if personally present; I hereby ratifying, confirming and allowing, and promising and agreeing at all times, and from time to time, to ratify, confirm and allow all and whatsoever my said Attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be done, by virtue of these presents.

In witness whereof, I the above named Peter Stewart have hereunto set my hand and seal, this fifteenth day of February in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ~~forty~~ fifty at Brockville C.W.

Signed, sealed and delivered in presence of

Amasa Skinner

W. Walton

Peter his X mark Stewart

Then done and passed at the Town of Brockville C.W. on the fifteenth day of February One thousand eight hundred and fifty delivered original one year to him in presence of the witness.

A. Richards
Notary Public for that part of Canada formerly Upper Canada

3609-98


CROWN LANDS OFFICE,

MONTREAL, 8th October 1850.

RECEIVED From the COMMISSIONER OF CROWN LANDS, the sum of Twenty Pounds

in Scrip Notes, in Commutation of my claim for one hundred acres of Land as

having Signed Duplicate Receipts.

WITNESS,

Peter Stewart
by his Attorney

33 Land scrip. (Quebec [Province]. Archives Nationales, Quebec City.)

government issued another in 1829 to remind militiamen that their promised reward was still available. The period for making claims was intended to run from 24 June 1829 to 1 August 1831, but a typographical error brought the deadline back to 1830. With requests again falling far short of the government's goal, the procedure was modified a bit in 1838: the government would give either a grant of land or scrip. In 1844 the government of the United Province of Canada revived the policy of compensating militiamen, and the claims period ran from 1 March 1844 to 1 March 1845.[53] There were further proclamations, but this study does not extend beyond 1851, the terminus of the first group of this voluminous documentation. The recurrent need to revive the policy indicates its scant success.

In 1835 the assembly had formed a committee to examine the question of militia land grants. It concluded that this system of settlement was a complete failure because those who had devised it had not foreseen the difficulties of building a house or tilling a field in the middle of the forest, far from civilization and in places where there was no road or where it was nearly impossible to survey the ground.[54]

In fact, the militiaman claiming his reward met so many difficulties, including high expenses, that he was discouraged even before he reached his goal. As most could neither read nor write, they had to begin with intermediaries making their requests. A few went personally to various offices where they were advised to get agents, for oral requests were not accepted. These agents were mainly notaries, but a number of militia officers agreed to write on the militiamen's behalf, as did a few parish priests. Since the process was often long and fairly complicated, an agent's fees could be considerable. The costs for the request, location ticket and title have already been cited. Add to these the cost of travel to see the land before claiming it, then transportation and moving expenses to a place where there was very little often not even a path, and the journeys required for purchases of tools, food and various articles for family settlement on land distant from all civilization. Persons who would have agreed to part, not only from family and friends, but also

from society, were generally too poor to meet the basic expenses of a new venture. Only three years were allowed after the location ticket was issued for four acres to be cleared and a house built, and this important obligation forced a militiaman who was alone to hire help. The lots were supposed to be surveyed by the government, but often were not, and the survey became one more expense for the militiaman.

Conditions imposed on settlers:

to clear 20 feet of road on their land within 90 days;

Conditions imposed on military men and militiamen:

to clear and till four acres of their land and build a house within three years.

If the requirements of clearing, farming and housing were not met, the government had the right to repossess the land without compensating the militiaman. In 1835 few lots had been taken back.[55] Yet even though lands had not been officially repossessed, the many lots that had been granted but left fallow and uninhabited created an indescribable jumble in the claims office, such that several location tickets would be issued to various individuals for a single property. Lord Durham's proclamation of 11 September 1838 was probably intended to bring some order to such problems. It offered militiamen the choice of land or scrip, a temporary measure, having a monetary value equal to a number of acres of land. The miltiaman could cash his scrip with a government agent or sell it at its full value to another individual. He could also use it to buy crown land anywhere in the province. A number opted for the scrip, either for its cash value or to buy properties in places of their own choice rather than those designated by the government. Others who had already received lands asked that they be given their lands' value in scrip. The proclamation abolished residence and land-clearing requirements, leaving only those of public and common works.[56]

The revival of the militia land-grants programme is to be ascribed not only to problems of administration, but also, and especially, to the political and economic environment of the Rebellion of 1837. It was an attempt by government to resolve a number of problems that surfaced at the time of the rebellion, among them overpopulation of the seigneuries and difficulties of communication. In military terms the explosive situation prompted the government to restore the militiaman to his importance as defender of the mother country. The rebellion had had considerable impact and the government did not intend to hand out rewards to militiamen turned rebel. Beginning in January 1838, the government required militiamen to accompany requests with certificates, signed by the priests or ministers of their parishes or townships, that they had taken no part in the rebellion. It was one more document to collect.[57]

The main problems in obtaining land grants have been listed. A thorough examination of the issue would reveal many barely recognized problems, such as the exploitation of claims by cheating agents, the purchase of many scrips by people who resold them at a profit, and the illegal sale of land granted as compensation.

My aim was to see how the militiamen of the Battle of the Châteauguay had been rewarded and if the rewards had been received. In the area of land grants, documentation was too unwieldy to produce a definite answer within the context of the present work. Names could have been drawn from the card file and the requests searched to see whether any two names corresponded, but the job became impossible, first, because so many names were identical, and then because the now elderly militiaman, his widow or his heirs did not always supply complete information. A militiaman who was in the 3rd Battalion in 1813 could have ended the war in another battalion. We cannot be sure that the Joseph Lachance of Daly's company was the Joseph Lachance of the 4th Battalion demobilized in 1815. The heroes of the Châteauguay have therefore been included among the overall number of militiamen in the War of 1812. With this approach it could be seen that the militiamen of the Battle of the Châteauguay were in no special category.

Although in official terms the militiamen of the battle were rewarded, the present research shows chiefly how badly this was done. Only compliments were received. Flags and medals were sent too late, and land grants were distributed to all militiamen with no consideration for the combatants. Charles-Michel de Salaberry's only real rewards were his appointments to the Legislative Council and the Order of the Bath. Is glory the sole reward of heroes?

CONCLUSION

The story of the militiamen of the Battle of the Châteauguay was well deserving of the time spent. A thousand aspects of their military and civil lives became known.

The militia's structure and organization are evidence of the importance military activity had among the civilian population of the time. They also prompt a reassessment of the militia's role in the country's defence system and a differentiation among the various corps of militia, which represents a considerable advance in the study of this period. On the Châteauguay on 26 October 1813, four corps of militia were present: Voltigeurs, Select Embodied Militia, Sedentary Militia and Indians.

Studying militia recruitment, I was soon prompted to differentiate between methods for officers and men. Officer recruitment, done by commission, reveals the still perceptible social influence of the old Canadian nobility but also reveals the progressive erosion of this class in favour of men of the liberal professions and the business community whose economic and political power tended to be greater than that of the traditional elite. Using soldier recruitment to identify all the combatants on the Châteauguay proved impossible as far as the Voltigeurs were concerned. Yet since this corps is usually named as the defence on the Châteauguay and because the enlistment contracts offered the possibility learning its composition, it has been given special study. It emerged that the Canadian Voltigeurs were easily raised by voluntary enlistment of young men from urban centres where they were made available by job scarcity and economic crisis. The relatively easy enrolment of the conscripts of the Select Embodied Militia also speaks of the difficult economic conditions prevailing in the countryside as well as in the towns.

On the other hand, the logistical problems encountered in raising the Voltigeur battalions are eloquent of the lack of preparation for the country's defence when the war began. The permanent enrollment and occasional levy of the Sedentary Militia indicates the continuity in the use of human resources for military defence since the colony was founded; the basic organization had remained the same except that from the time the British régime began, militiamen on active service were paid, a fact that made it possible to identify those who were present in 1813 on the Châteauguay. The considerable number of militiamen from this corps summoned to arms in the autumn of 1813 reveals much about the shortage of regular army effectives in Canada and the important role assigned to the participation of the Canadian populace in the country's defence.

Very little information could be found on Indian recruitment. It is obvious that they were integrated with the military more to prevent them from moving into the enemy camp than to enlist them for active combat, although their knowledge of the forest and their abilities in that environment were highly valued by the military in reconnoitring expeditions and at advance look-out posts.

Investigation of the militiamen's living conditions provided information not only about military society, but also greatly about civilian life in the Lower Canada of that time. The militiamen's billeting situations, dress regulations, diet, pay, duties, hygiene and recreation present a picture of an extremely stratified society in which the elite enjoyed a degree of comfort while the masses barely survived. On the other hand, officers' personal expenditures played an important role. This aspect of the Canadian elite's contribution to the military cause would undoubtedly repay study in terms of the valorization of officers' titles. The presence of a considerable body of men living in conditions of deplorable poverty had repercussions for the population of the Montreal region that were often extremely unfortunate, for example, in economic terms from property damage. Further research would allow an assessment of the socio-economic consequences of the concentration of military strength in this region. Diet and hygiene, to which a lack of interest has so far been shown in historiography, are highly significant indicators of a society's economic state. Especially during the War of 1812 they reveal a rarely noted sacrifice to country: personal health. The training and duties of the militiamen, especially the Voltigeurs and Select Embodied Militia, differed little from those of the regular army, which challenges the traditional belief that the militia was used only for labour. As group mentality is very hard to define since it emerges through attitudes to all aspects of daily life, I have dwelt closely

on only two characteristics that illustrate the era's mentality: religious spirit and leisure pursuits. The militiamen's slackness in religious observance seems to have been caused chiefly by the internal administration of the Church, ill-adapted to the unstable conditions of military life. Indifference was rare and many documents speak of solidly anchored belief. Leisure time at the beginning of the 19th century centres around social exchange with friends or acquaintances, whether one came from the elite or the common people.

Knowing who the combatants were, I wanted to re-examine the interpretations of the Battle of the Châteauguay in order to understand what gave it the elements of a myth and how the myth has been a source of ideology. Among the diversity of interpretations three disputed topics can be isolated: the effectives of the two opposing camps, de Salaberry's authority on the battlefield, and the latter's right to the credit for the victory. Examination of the sources revealed that the Canadians' effectives were indeed 300, but that they faced not 6000 to 7000 Americans, but rather 2000. It is also proven that de Salaberry and not Macdonell commanded the Canadian troops in the battle. Prevost's attempt to claim credit for the victory met with scant success, for this credit finally falls to the real commander, de Salaberry. The manuscripts reveal the Canadians' pride and the birth of the legend. The literature shows two ideological tendencies: according to the first, the French Canadians proved their valour and loyalty by winning this battle on their own; according to the second, the fighting men on the Châteauguay were representative of Canadian multiculturalism, whatever the predominance of French Canadians.

From the day after the battle, Canadians showed great pride in "their " hero and his troops. Yet gratitude to the men, as indeed to de Salaberry himself, came at a discount. Except for the congratulations, most of the tokens of recognition were bestowed long after the combatants had been demobilized or died. Even de Salaberry had great difficulty in obtaining his regimental promotion. Though he was entitled to his commemorative medal, his Companionship of the Order of the Bath and his seat on the Legislative Council, he was never given the land the Legislative Assembly has requested for him in 1815. This may be, however, because he already owned part of the seigneury of Chambly and was not in a position to benefit from the government's settlement policy. This policy first took the form of compensation in land for the Voltigeurs, then for other volunteer corps and finally for all the Select Embodied Militia. It was an expensive present for the militiamen and though a number requested it, few profited from it. The Voltigeurs so rewarded could not be identified since the victory on the Châteauguay gave no special advantage to its heroes in the distribution of land.

Thus I went to the source of a myth to find not the medieval champions of imagination, but men of our own environment who laboured for three years in the country's defence. The glorification of the triumph on the Châteauguay is a way of lifting men from the sufferings of war, focussing on the winner's shining face while leaving in the mist those disfigured by distress, fear, hunger and anxiety. I have looked at all that is in the mist. Thus Châteauguay goes beyond the battle, beyond the hero; it is the story of our ancestors imprisoned in war.

APPENDIX A. MILITIAMEN WOUNDED OR KILLED.

Voltigeurs, Wounded
J.B. Durocher
Pierre Olivier
George Brisebois
Hyacinthe Prévost

3rd Battalion, Select Embodied Militia
Dead:
- Jean Languedoc
- Charles Gagnon
- Etienne Martineau
- Joseph Gagné

Wounded:
- Germain Courcy
- Régis Vaillant
- Joseph Renaud
- Augustin Rochon[1]

APPENDIX B. THE SELECT EMBODIED MILITIA.

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Alain, Pierre	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Alger, James	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Alie, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	First	Geo. I. Tonnancour
Allard, Baptiste	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Allard, Christophe	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Allard, François	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Allard, Jacques	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Allard, Jean	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Amelin, Abraham	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Amiotte, Jean	Soldier	Second	Cap. Lamothe
Arcan, Pierre	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Arcan, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Arcand, Charles	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Atkinson, James	Drum, bugle	Second	M. Curot
Aubertin, Antoine	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Aubertin, Edouard	Drum, bugle	Fifth	Desbartzch
Audet *dit* Lapointe, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Auduber, I.M.	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Augé, Jean	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Auger, Charles	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Auger, Joseph	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
B_ccan, Louis	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Bachant, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Bagin, Joseph	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Barbeau, Jean	Lieutenant	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Barbeau, Louis	Lieutenant	Second	P. Grisé
Baril, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Barman, Stephen	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Barette, Nicholas	Soldier	Third	Daly
Barrère, J. Bapt.	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Barrette, Joseph	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Bauchamp, Fran.	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Bean, Mark	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Beauchamp, Baptiste	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Beauchemin, J.B.	Soldier	Fifth	
Beauchemin, J. Bte.	Drum	Second	Stephen McKay
Beauchemin, Jos.	Soldier	Second	Desbartzch
Beauchesne, Charles	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Beaudoin, Fras.	Drum, bugle	Second	P. Byrne
Beaudoin, Fras.	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Beaulieu, Alarie	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Beaupré, Charles	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Bédard, Alexis	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Bédard, François	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Bédard, Jacques	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Bédard, Jacques	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Bédard, Jean	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Bédard, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Bédard, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Bédard, Pierre	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Bédard, Thomas	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Bédard, Thomas	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Béland, Jean	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Bélanger, André	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Bélanger, Michel	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Bélaudeau, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Beleau, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Bellan, Michel		Second	P. Byrne
Bellanger, Fras.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Bellanger, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Bellisle, Germain	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Beloin, Emery	Soldier	Fifth	Capt. Lévesque
Beloin, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Belouin, Pierre	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Benac, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Beneche	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Benoit, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Benoit, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Berham, Aug.	Soldier	Second	W. Porteous
Bernard, François	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Bertrand, Alexis	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Bertrand, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Bertrand, Louis	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Bérubé, André	Soldier	Third	Daly
Bérubé, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Third	Daly
Bérubé, Joseph	Soldier	Third	Daly
Biron, Augustin	Soldier	Fifth	Capt. L. Lévesque
Bissonnette, Antoine	Sergeant	Second	Steph. McKay
Bissonnette	Corporal	Second	Steph. McKay
Bitnaire, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Blais, André		First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Blais, Benoit	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Blais, Thomas	Drum, bugle	Second	W. Porteous
Blanchet, Benjamin	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Blay, Simon	Corporal	Second	Steph. McKay
Boche, Charles	Sergeant	Fifth	Desbartzch
Boismiers, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	Capt. L. Lévesque
Boissonneau, Jos.	Soldier	Fifth	Capt. L. Lévesque
Boisvers	Sergeant	First	Daly
Boisvert, Bapt.	Soldier	Fifth	Capt. L. Lévesque
Boisvert, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Boivin, Lisi	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Bolduc, Charles	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Bolduc, Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Bonhomme, Jac.	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Bonneau *dit* Labécasse, Augustin	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Bonnet, Charles	Soldier	Third	Daly
Bouchard, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Boucher, François	Soldier	Third	Daly
Boucher, Joseph	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Boucher, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Boudreau, Vital	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Bougie, Charles	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Bougie, Jean	Corporal	Second	Steph. McKay
Boulet, Pierre	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Bourdeau, François	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Bourgard, François	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Bourgeois, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Bourgeois, Michel	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Bourgeois, Pierre	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Bourier, Etienne	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Bourque, Léger	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Bouthiller, J.F.	Lieutenant	Second	M. Curot
Boutin, Abraham	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Boutin, Augustin	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Bouvie, George	Sergeant	Second	W. Porteous
Bowen, James	Sergeant	Second	W. Porteous
Bowen, Owen	Sergeant	Second	W. Porteous
Boyer, Jean Bapt.	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Boyer, Louis	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Bracket, Jacob	Drum, bugle	Second	P. Byrne
Brier, Augustin	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Brisbois, François	Corporal	Second	M. Curot
Brisset, Jacques	Sergeant	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Brissette, Xavier	Corporal	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Brodeur, Augustin	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Brooks, John	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Brousseau, Michel	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Brulé, Fran.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Brunelle, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Brunet, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	Capt. L. Lévesque
Brunette, Félix	Lieutenant	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Buck, Charles	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Burby, Georges	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Bureau, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Bussière, Marjolaine	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Byrne, Philippe	Captain	Second	
Cadorette, J.B.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Calkie, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Cameraire, Chas.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Cameron, Samuel	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Campion, Alexis	Ensign	Second	P. Byrne
Cantara, J. Bte.	Corporal	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Capeavent	Corporal	Third	Daly
Carle, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Caroud, Louis	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Carrier, Louis	Sergeant	First	Geo. de Tonnacour
Carrière, J. B. Jamme	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Cartier, Jacques-Antoine	Lieutenant	Fifth	Desbartzch
Cartuner, Barthey	Drum, bugle	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Casset, Hyacinte	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Cavalier, Joseph	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Cavette, Pascal	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Chabot, Jean	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Chaite, Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Chalifoux, Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Champagne, Bazil	Corporal	Second	P. Byrne
Champagne, Jos.	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Charbonneau, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Charette, Modeste	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Charlu, J.B.	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Chartier, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Chatigny, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Chestenay, François	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Chevalier, Jean-Bte.	Corporal	Second	Capt. Steph. McKay
Choinier, Jacques	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Chouinard, Pascal	Soldier	Third	Daly
Cimard, René	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Claude, Augustin	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Claude, Michel	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Clément, Albert	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Clément, Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Cloutier, Charles	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Cloutier, Jean	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Cloutier, Jean	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Cloutier, Joseph	Corporal	Second	M. Curot
Colette, Joseph	Sergeant	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Collins, Sylvain	Sergeant	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Cook, François	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Corveau, Christophe	Soldier	Third	Daly
Cosmartin, Charles	Soldier	Third	Daly
Côté, Gabriel	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Côté, Jean	Soldier	Third	Daly
Côté, Joseph	Soldier	Third	Daly
Cotté, Augustin	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Cotté, Charles	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Cotté, François	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Cotté, Joseph	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Cotté, Michel	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Coulombe, Louis	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Courcy, Germain	Soldier	Third	Daly
Cournoyer, Bazil	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Courtemanche, J.M.	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Courtois, Gabriel	Soldier	Third	Daly
Courval, Jacques	Sergeant	Fifth	Capt. L. Lévesque
Courville, Joseph	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Cousineau, Luc	Soldier	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Couteur, Antoine	Drum, bugle		
Couture, Alexis	Soldier	Fifth	Capt. L. Lévesque
Couturier, Antoine	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Crocker, Jesse	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Curot, Michel	Captain	Second	
Cuyerrier, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Cyr, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Dacquets, Joseph	Soldier	Third	Daly
Dagenais, Bte.	Soldier	Third	P. Weilbrenner
Dagenais, Joseph		Second	F.V. Malhiot
Dagenet, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Daique, Jean	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Daly, Charles	Captain	Third	
Damion, J. Bte.		Second	M. Curot
Danjou, Lambert	Soldier	Third	Daly
David, Joseph	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Davignon, Alexis	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
De Beaujeu, Louis-Joseph	Major	Second	
Dechamp, Jos.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Degneau, Fras.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Degneau, Toussaint	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Degourdelle, Antoine	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Degourdelle, Pierre	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Deguise, Augustin	Bugle	Second	W. Porteous
Deloyée, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Delorier, Jean	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Demers, Pierre	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Denis, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
De Repentigny, Luc	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Derousseau, Charly	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Desautelle, Gaspard	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Desbartzch, P. Dominique	Captain	Fifth	
Descari, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Deschamps, Jacques	Sergeant	Fifth	Desbartzch
Desforges, Antoine	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Desforges, Benjamin	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Desjardins, André	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Desjardins, Pierre	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Deslage, Alexis	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Desrocher, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Dessilais	Bugle	Third	Daly
De Tonnancour, George	Captain	First	
Dicker, Bernard	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Dinelle, Pierre	Corporal	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Dion, Jean-Baptiste	Corporal	Fifth	Desbartzch
Dofinet, Chas.	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Donais, Antoine	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Donaldson, Mark	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Doré, Augustin	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Doré, Jean-Bte.	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Doré, Pierre	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Drolet(te), André	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Drolet, Gabriel	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Drolet, Jacques	Soldier	Second	P. Curot
Drolet, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Drolette, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Dubé, Antoine	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Dubé, Baptiste	Soldier	Third	Daly
Dubé, Fermin	Soldier	Third	Daly
Dubeau, François	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Dubreuil, Michel	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Duchemin, François	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Dufort, Abraham	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Dufort, J. Bte.	Sergeant	Second	P. Grisé

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Dufresne, Flavien	Lieutenant	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Dufresne, François	Corporal	Second	P. Grisé
Dugas, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Duguay, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Dumaine, Laur.	Soldier	Fifth	Desartzch
Dumet, Luc	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Dumond, Fras.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Dumont, Alexis	Soldier	Third	Daly
Dumont, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Dumoulin, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Dupéré, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Duperon, François	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Dupille,Michel	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Dupré, André	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Dupré, Louis	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Dupuis, Antoine	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Durocher, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Dusault, Joseph	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Dutille, Antoine	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Dyon, Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Eavens, Will.	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Emond, Henry	Soldier	Third	Daly
Evans, Thomas	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Falardeau, Joseph	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Falardeau, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Falmar, Louis	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Faneuf,	Sergeant	Third	Daly
Faubert, François	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Faucher, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	Steph. McKay
Fegto, Alexandre	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Ferlan, Louis	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Feron, Louis	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Ferté, André	Corporal	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Filion, Antoine	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Filion, Joseph	Corporal	Second	P. Grisé
Fisette, Presque	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Fizette, Presque	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Foisie	Corporal	Third	Daly
Foises, François	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Fontaine, Amable	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Fontaine, François	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Forgette, Gabriel	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Forgue, François	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Forgue, François	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Fortier, Thomas	Lieutenant	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Fournal, Augustin	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Frenette, Michel	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Frenière, Narcisse	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Frost, Aaron	Sergeant	Second	M. Curot
Gaboriault, Jos.	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Gagné, Joseph	Soldier	Third	Daly
Gagnier, François	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Gagnier, Pierre	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Gagnon, Ambroise	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Gagnon, François	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Gagnon, Ignace	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Gagnon, Isidore	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Gagnon, Joseph	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Gagnon, Joseph	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Gaivin, Benjamin	Corporal	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Galarneau, Fras.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Ganier, J. Bte.	Drum, bugle	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Garand, Jean	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Gascon, Pierre	Drum, bugle	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Gaudbout, Antoine	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Gaudreau, Abraham	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Gausselin, A.	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Gauthier, Eustache	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Gauthier, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Gauthier, Joseph	Soldier	Third	Daly
Gauthier, Louis	Drum, bugle	Second	Steph. McKay
Gauthier, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Gauthier, Pierre	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Gauvin, Ignace	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Gauvrau, Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Genelle, Louis	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Germain, Charles	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Germain, Chrisologue	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Gerrac, Joseph	Corporal	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Gervais, Alexis	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Gervais, Michel	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Gervais, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Gillespie, Robert	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Gingras, Pierre	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Gingras, Zacharie	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Girard, Augustin	Soldier	Third	Daly
Girard, Michel	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Girard, Pierre	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Girard, Sevias	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Girou	Bugle	Third	Daly
Girouard, André	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Giroux, Louis	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Globensky, F.E.	Lieutenant	Second	Steph. McKay
Godbois, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Goddu, Toussaint	Lieutenant	Third	Daly
Goden, François	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Godon, Amable	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Gosselin, Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Goulette, J. Bte.	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Goulette, Louis	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Goyer, Toussaint	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Goyette, Jean	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Gradin, Pierre	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Graton, Nicolas	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Gravelle, Charles	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Gravelle, Martin	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Gravelle, Olivier	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Greig, Robert	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Grenier, Olivier	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Griffar, Louis	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Grignon, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Grisé, Pierre	Captain	Second	
Groleau, Michel	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Grondin, Joseph	Soldier	Third	Daly
Guérette, Joseph	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Guérin, Guillaume	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Guilbeau, Charles	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Guilbeau, Joseph	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Guillette, Charles	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Guillot(te), Joseph	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Guilmont, Jonathan	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Guimon, Jean	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Guimond, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Guimont, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Hade, Louis	Corporal	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Hains, Amable	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Halarie, Paul	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Hamelin, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Handleine, John	Corporal	Second	W. Porteous
Hay, George	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Heath, Sanburn	Corporal	Second	W. Porteous
Heywood, Thos.	Sergeant	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Hilton, John	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Hitchcock, Ephraim	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Hogue, François	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Houle, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Houle, Michel	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Huard, Chas.	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Huard, Julien	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Hubeau, Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Hubert, Charles	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Hughes, James	Soldier	Second	Capt. Curot
Huot, François	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Jacob, Pierre	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Jacque, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Jeandron, Antoine	Corporal	Second	M. Curot
Jeandron, Jean	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Jeunesse, François	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Jobin, Charles	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Jobin, Jacques	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Jollicoeur, Thos.	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Jourdonais, François	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Joyale, Michel	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Jubinville, Pierre	Soldier	Third	Daly
Julien, Jacques	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Kellerstine, John	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Keygle, Pierre	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Kimber, Louis-Edouard	Lieutenant	Second	W. Lamothe
Knight, William	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Labbé, Etienne	Corporal	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Labelle, Charles	Sergeant	Fifth	Desbartzch
Laberge, Pierre	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Labeuf, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Labonté, Aug.	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Labonté, Benjamin	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Labonté, Henry	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Labonté, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Labonté, Louis	Corporal	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Labrecque, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
La Bruère, René de	Major	Second	
Lacauf, Antoine	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Lachance, Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Lacourse, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Lacroix, Nicholas	Corporal	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Laferré, Antoine	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Laflamme, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Laflamme, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Lafleur, Basil	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Lafleur, Michel	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Lafontaine, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Lafrance, Jean	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Lagassé, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Lagorce, Jean	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Lahais, Pierre	Sergeant	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Lalonde, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Lalumière, Félix	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Lalumière, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Lamothe, William	Captain	Second	
Lamoureux, Charles	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Lamoureux, Jacques	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Landeman, Olivier	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Landry, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Langlais, François	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Langlais, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Langlois, Urbain	Soldier	Third	Daly
Laperrière, Charles	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Lapierre, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Laplante, Benoit	Soldier	Third	Daly
Laplante, Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Laplante, Pierre	Soldier	Third	Daly
Larabie, Michel	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
L' Arche, François	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Larivière, Bte.	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Larivière, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Laroche, François	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Larouche, Augustin	Soldier	Third	Daly
Larousse, Benjamin	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Larpenière, Michel	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Larrivée, John	Drum, bugle	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Lasirevais, Michel	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Lasseville, François	Corporal	Fifth	Desbartzch
Latour, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Laure, Alexis	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Laurent, Baptiste	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Laurent, François	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Laurier, Pierre	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Lavigne, Alexis	Sergeant	Second	W. Porteous
Laviolette, J.B.	Lieutenant	Second	P. Byrne
Lavoie, Jacques	Soldier	Third	Daly
Lavoie, Joseph	Soldier	Third	Daly
Lavoie, François	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Lavoie, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Lebrun, Michel	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Leclair, Ignace	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Leclaire, Alexis	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Leclerc, François	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Leclerc, Etienne	Soldier	Third	Daly
Leclerc, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Third	Daly
Lecloux, Charles	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Lecuyer, Amable	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Ledain, Joseph	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Ledoux	Sergeant	Third	Daly
Lefebvre, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Lefebvre, J. Bte. (2nd)	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Lefebvre, Joseph	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Lefebvre, Louis	Soldier	Third	Daly
Lefebvre, Raphaël	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Legarie, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Legault, Christophe	Soldier	Second	Geo. de Tonnancour
Legault, Jean-Bte.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Legault, Jouachim	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Legeau, Joseph		Fifth	L. Lévesque
Lelewvant, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Lemai, Hyacinthe-Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Lemai, Louis-Ambroise	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Lemmelain, Laurent	Major	Second	
Lemvron, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Lepage, Jacques	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Lepage, Louis	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Lepine, Joseph	Soldier	Third	Daly
Leplat, Chas.	Corporal	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Leprohon, Edouard Martial	Lieutenant	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Leroux, Dominique	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Letartes, Charles	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Letendre, J. Bte.	Sergeant	Second	P. Byrne
L' Etourneau, Antoine	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Levasser, Joseph	Soldier	Third	Daly
Leveiller, Aug.	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Levesque, Allarie	Soldier	Third	Daly
Levesque, Louis	Captain	Fifth	
Levesque, Pascal	Soldier	Third	Daly
Levesque, Pierre	Lieutenant	Second	W. Porteous
L' Heureux, Charles	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
L' Heureux, François-Xavier	Sergeant	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
L' Heureux, Ignace	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
L' Heureux, Jean	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
L' Heureux, Jos.	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Lierrette, Bte.	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Lievin, François	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Limoce, Vital	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
L' Italien, François	Soldier	Third	Daly
Locas, Medor	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Loisel, André	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Loiselle, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Longchamp, Abraham	Drum, bugle	Second	P. Grisé
Loof, Pierre	Soldier	Third	Daly
Louis, Charles	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Lucas, John	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Lussier,	Sergeant	Third	Daly
Maclure, André	Soldier	Third	Daly
McDonnough, John	Sergeant	Second	M. Curot
McDuff, Pierre	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
McKay, Stephen	Captain	Second	
McKey, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Major, Baptiste	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Mailhiotte, Magloire	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Malbeuf, Antoine	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Malboeuf, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Maleau	Corporal	Third	Daly
Malhiot, Pierre-Ignace	Lieutenant-colonel	Second	
Malhiot, François-Victoire	Captain	Second	
Manceau, Charles	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Marassé, Pierre	Lieutenant	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Marchand, Michel	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Marcot, Joseph	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Marcotte, Joseph	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Marcou, Joseph	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Mars, Jean	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Marsolet, Charles	Soldier	Third	Daly
Martel, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Martelle, Pierre	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Marthe, Laurent	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Martin	Corporal	Third	Daly
Martin, Toussaint	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Martineau, Etiennne	Soldier	Third	Daly
Mason, François	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Massé, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Mathieu, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Mathurin, F.	Ensign	Second	Steph. McKay
Matte, Jean	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Mattette, Joseph	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Maurissette, J.B.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Maurissette, Jean	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Maurissette, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Maurissette, Michel	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Mayet, Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Mayrand, Joseph	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Menard, François	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Ménard, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Menard, Toussaint	Corporal	Second	F.V. Malhiot

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Métra, François	Sergeant	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Meunier, François	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Meunier, Isaac	Sergeant	Second	W. Lamothe
Midette, François	Corporal	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Millar, William	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Millet, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Mingo, Michel	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Moisan, Joseph	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Moisan, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Moisan, Romain	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Moisand, Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Monette, Joseph	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Monk, François	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Monmarquet, François-Xavier	Sergeant	Second	Steph. McKay
Montpellier, François	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Morasse, Pierre	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Morets, Joseph	Soldier	Third	Daly
Morin, Etienne	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Morin, François	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Morin, Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Morin, Marc	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Morin, Nicholas	Soldier	Third	Daly
Morisset, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Morneau, Jean	Soldier	Third	Daly
Moyses, François	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Mulgroo, John	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Myer, John	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Nault, Jacques	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Neaux, Ignace	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Neveux, Hyacinthe	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Nicholas, Alex	Sergeant	Second	P. Byrne
Nicholas, Frédérick	Corporal	Second	W. Porteous
Normandeau *dit* Delorier, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Numaville, Baptiste	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Ouellet, André	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Ouellette, Antoine	Soldier	Third	Daly
Ouellette, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Oule, Charles	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Oulette, Louis	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Ouvrard, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Pacquet, Augustin	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Pacquet, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Pacquin, Paul	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Pagé, Gonzague Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Pagé, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Third	Daly
Pagé, Joseph	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Pagé, Joseph	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Pagoe, Joseph	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Pajeau, François	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Papin, David	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Pappillion, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Paquet, Noël	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Paquin, Antoine	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Paradis, Germ.	Corporal	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Paradis, Jean	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Paradis, Louis	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Paré, Augustin	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Paré, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Parent, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Parent, Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Parent, Paschal	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Parizeau, Martin	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Parkens, Martin	Sergeant	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Pary, Bazil	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Patenaude	Sergeant	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Patenaude, Jos.	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Payment, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Pelletier, Antoine	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Pelletier, Antoine	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Pelletier, Charles	Soldier	Third	Daly
Pelletier, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Third	Daly
Pépin, Alexis	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Pépin, Jacques	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Peron, Paul	Corporal	Second	P. Byrne
Peront, Antoine	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Perras, Pierre	Ensign	Second	P. Grisé
Perrier, J. Bte.	Drum, bugle	Second	P. Byrne
Petit, Jérôme	Soldier	Third	Daly
Petit, Louis	Ensign	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Petit, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Petit, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Petit Claire, Chas.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Piché, Jean	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Pilaire *dit* Lamothe, Antoine	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Pilon, Baptiste	Soldier	Third	Daly
Pilon, François	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Pilon, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Plamondon, François	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Plamondon, Pierre	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Plante, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Plourde, François	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Plourde, Prospère	Soldier	Third	Daly
Plourde, Vincent	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Poirier, André	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Poirier, Bte.	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Poisson, Marc	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Poliquin, Louis	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Porteous, William	Captain	Second	
Potvin, Archange	Soldier	Third	Daly
Poudrier, Alexis	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Poulin, Alexis	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Poulin, Charles	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Poulin, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Poupart, Joseph	Soldier	Second	M. Curot

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Poutre *dit* Lavigne, Fabien	Sergeant	Second	P. Byrne
Powell, J.H.	Lieutenant	Fifth	Desbartzch
Pratte, Théodore	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Précourt, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Predette, Bernard	Soldier	Third	Daly
Pregourt, Joseph	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Premorman, Conrad	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Prendergast, James	Lieutenant	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Prévost, Séraphin	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Proulx, François	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Proulx, Gabriel	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Proulx, Jacques	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Proulx, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Proulx, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Prunier, Bazil	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Quickly, George	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Racine, Chas.	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Racine, Ignace	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Racine, Jean	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Rancour, Jean	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Rappieux, Fras.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Ratté, Jean	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Ratté, Joseph	Sergeant	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Rattele, Etienne	Soldier	Third	Daly
Réaume, Pierre	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Regourt, Joseph	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Renaud, Joseph	Soldier	Third	Daly
Renault, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
René, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
René, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Reneau, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Richard, François	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Richard, Joseph	Corporal	Second	W. Lamothe
Richardson, Charles	Drum, bugle	Fifth	Desbartzch
Richardson, Ralph	Corporal	Fifth	Desbartzch
Riche, Jean	Soldier	Fifth	Lévesque
Richer, Jacques	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Rivet, Baptiste (J.B.)	Soldier	Third	Daly
Roberge, Eloir	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Roberge, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Roberge, Olivier	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Robert, Antoine	Corporal	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Robert, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Robert, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Robidoux, Augustin	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Robidoux, Régis	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Robillard, Claude	Soldier	Third	Daly
Robin, Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Robitaille, Chas.	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Robitaille, Louis	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Rocbrune, J. Bte.	Sergeant	Second	Steph. McKay
Roi, Norbert	Sergeant	Second	P. Grisé
Rolland, Pierre	Corporal	Second	W. Lamothe

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Rondeau, J.B.	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Rose, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Rouillard, Gabriel	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Rouillé, J. Bte.	Corporal	Second	P. Grisé
Rouleau, Mark	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Rousseau, François	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
Rousseau, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Routhier, Alexis	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Roy, Amable	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Roy, Augustin	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Roy, François	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Roy, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Ryan, John	Ensign	Second	F.V. Malhiot
St-Denis, J. Bte.	Sergeant	Second	F.V. Malhiot
St-Denis, Jacques	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
St-Germain, Fras.	Sergeant	Second	P. Weilbrenner
St-Germain, Louis	Corporal	Second	P. Weilbrenner
St-Germain, Modeste	Soldier	Fifth	Desbartzch
St-Glais, Saveur	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
St-Hilaire, Jean	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
St-Jean, Belonie	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
St-Laurent, Chas.	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
St-Onge, Baptiste	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
St-Onge, François	Soldier	Third	Daly
Sanfaçon,Joseph	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Sangster, Charles	Sergeant	Second	M. Curot
Sansfaçon, Pierre	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Sanson, Etienne	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Sansouci, Thomas	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Sansquartier, Sim.	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Sarrazin, Augustin	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Saumier, Paul	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Sauvé, Fras.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Sauvé, Joseph	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Savard, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Sauveur, Fras.	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Schiller, Benjamin	Lieutenant	Third	C. Daly
Scryer, Abraham	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Séguin, Laderoute Julien	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Seizor, Félix	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Sénécal, Amable	Drum, bugle	Second	M. Curot
Sénécal, Baptiste	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Sénécal, François	Corporal	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Sénécal, Laurent	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Sicard, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Silvestre, Joseph	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Silvin, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Simon, Hyacinthe	Soldier	Third	C. Daly
Simon, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Third	C. Daly
Sinclair, Colin	Bugle	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Sincler, John	Corporal	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Sirois, Hipolite	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Still, Pember, William	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Stolls, James	Corporal	Second	W. Porteous
Street, John	Corporal	Second	P. Byrne
Strothers, Benjamin	Sergeant	Fifth	D. Desbartzch
Sylvain, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Talbotte, Germain	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Telford, Samuel	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Terriault, Hyac.	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Terrien, Charles	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Terrien, Joseph	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Terrien, Louis	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Tessier, Jacques	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Tessier, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Fifth	D. Desbartzch
Tessier, Laurent	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Tessier, Louis	Sergeant	Second	P. Grisé
Thédard, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Themense, Noël	Corporal	Fifth	D. Desbartzch
Thérien, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Thibaudeau, Enselme	Sergeant	Second	Capt. Lamothe
Thibault, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Thibault, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Thibault, Louis	Corporal	Second	M. Curot
Thibault, Louis	Soldier	Fifth	D. Desbartzch
Thibeaudeau, Olivier	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Thibeault, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Thiber, Louis	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Tomassin, Nicolas	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Towell, Eliska	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Tremblay, Fras.	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Tremblé, Edouard	Soldier	Third	C. Daly
Tremblé, Flavien	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Tremblé, Pierre	Soldier	Third	C. Daly
Trotier, Louis	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Trudeau, Eustache	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Trudelle, Thomas	Soldier	Fifth	D. Desbartzch
Turcot, Antoine	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Turcot, Bapt.	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Turcotte, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Uneau, Jean-Baptiste	Corporal	Second	P. Byrne
Vaillancour, Charles	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Vaillant, Régis	Soldier	Third	C. Daly
Valin, Antoine	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Vallé, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	Steph. McKay
Vallée, Etienne	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Vallée, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Vanclette, J.M.	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Vandall, Bonin	Soldier	Second	Capt. Porteous
Vanier, J. Bte.	Corporal	Second	P. Grisé
Vanolette, William	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Verdon, Jean M.	Soldier	Fifth	D. Desbartzch
Verdon, Pierre	Soldier	Fifth	D. Desbartzch
Vézina, Antoine	Soldier	Fifth	L. Lévesque
Vézina, Bazil	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Viau, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Fifth	D. Desbartzch
Vigeard, Augustin	Soldier	Fifth	D. Desbartzch

Name	Rank	Battalion	Company
Vigeard, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier	Fifth	D. Desbartzch
Vigneau, Philip	Lieutenant	Second	W. Porteous
Villeneuve, Jacques	Soldier	Second	W. Lamothe
Vivier, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Vizette, Pierre	Soldier	Second	F.V. Malhiot
Vizina, J. Bte.	Soldier	Second	M. Curot
Walace, John	Ensign	Second	W. Lamothe
Wallace, J.	Ensign	Second	M. Curot
Wallace, Hugh	Sergeant	Second	W. Lamothe
Watson, Alexander	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Weilbrenner, Pierre	Captain	Second	
Wilson, J.T.	Sergeant	First	Geo. de Tonnancour
Woolscamp, John	Drum	Second	P. Weilbrenner
Yale, Joseph	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne
Yot, François	Soldier	Second	P. Grisé
Yvon, Pierre	Soldier	Second	P. Byrne

APPENDIX C. OFFICERS OF THE VOLTIGEURS.

Name	Rank
Adhémar, Jacques	Captain
Barbier, Ls.M. Raphaël	Surgeon's assistant
Bouthillier, Henri	Lieutenant
Buchannan, John	Lieutenant
Clarke, Simon	Lieutenant
Clarke, William	Lieutenant
Cramer, Ls.	Sergeant major, then lieutenant
D'Aubreville, Emmanuel	Captain
De Hertel, Daniel	Lieutenant
De Rouville, Hertel, J.B., Hon.	Captain
De Salaberry, Charles-Michel	Lieutenant colonel
De Sales La Terrière, Pierre	Doctor
D'Estimauville, Jean Chs. (de Beaumouchel)	Captain
Duchesnay, Narcisse A.	Lieutenant
Dumoulin, Charles	Lieutenant
Ecuyer, Benjamin	Captain
Germain, Augustin	Quartermaster
Globensky, Maximilien	Lieutenant
Green, James	Paymaster
Guy, Louis, Jr.	Lieutenant
Harvell, James	Lieutenant
Hebden, John	Adjutant
Henry, Thomas	Lieutenant
Herigault, J. Baptiste	Surgeon's assistant
Hériot, Fred. George	Lieutenant colonel
Herse, J. Clement	Lieutenant
Ivory, Robert	Doctor
Johnson, Wm.	Captain
Johnson, William David	Lieutenant
Juchereau Duchesnay, Jean-Baptiste	Major
Juchereau Duschesnay, Michel-Louis	Captain
Kittson, William	Lieutenant
Le Breton, John	Lieutenant
Lusignan, Chs. Alexander	Surgeon's assistant
Moorhead, John	Lieutenant (paymaster)
Mackay, John Francis	Captain
McCarthy, Charles	Quartermaster
McLean, Geo. Hicks	Lieutenant
Pambrun, Chrisologue	Lieutenant
Perrault, J. François	Captain
Place, Thomas	Lieutenant (paymaster)
Porter, John	Lieutenant
Prendergast, Edw. Lewis	Lieutenant
Prendergast, James	Lieutenant
Provencher, Louis	Lieutenant
St. Dizier, Etienne	Lieutenant

Name	Rank
Stean, Joseph or John	Lieutenant (paymaster)
Taché, Charles	Captain
Thomas, Henry J.	Lieutenant
Torrens, S.B.	Major
Truteau, Toussaint Casimir	Surgeon's assistant
Turgeon, Charles	Lieutenant
Viger, Jacques	Captain
Vigneau, Norbert	Lieutenant

APPENDIX D. OTHER RANKS OF THE VOLTIGEURS.

Name	Rank
Adrien *dit* Lamoureux, Joseph	Soldier
Ainslie, Michel	Soldier
Alboeuf, Pierre	Soldier
Alec, Pierre	Soldier
Allen, George	Soldier
Allgeo, John	Soldier
Anderson, Charles	Soldier
Archambault, Pierre	Soldier
Archambeault, Antoine	Soldier
Asmus, John	Soldier
Asnus, John	Soldier
Asselin, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier
Asselin, Philippe	Soldier
Aubée, Pierre	Soldier
Aubert, François	Soldier
Aubertin, Joseph	Soldier
Auclair, Antoine	Soldier
Audet *dit* Lapointe, Louis	Soldier
Audry, François	Soldier
Augé, Michel	Soldier
Ayotte, Abraham	Soldier
Baignais, Jacques	Soldier
Baillargeon, Charles	Soldier
Baille *dit* Printemps, François	Soldier
Bailly, Michel	Soldier
Bandon	Corporal
Barbeau, Charles	Soldier
Barbeau, Michel	Soldier
Baret, Antoine	Soldier
Barette, J. Bte.	Soldier
Barrows, Charles	Soldier
Barry, Richard	Soldier
Barthelemy, Boscony	Soldier
Bash, Antoine	
Baudin, Joseph	Soldier
Baudoin, Louis-Marie	Soldier
Bazinet, Jean Bte.	Soldier
Beauchamp, Antoine	Soldier
Beauchemin, Antoine,	Soldier
Beaudoin, Etienne	Soldier
Beaudoin, Jean Bte.	Soldier
Beaulieu *dit* Poudrie, Charles	Soldier
Beaulieu, Etienne	Soldier
Bédard, Alexis	Soldier
Bélanger, Antoine	Soldier
Bélanger, Basile	Soldier
Bélanger, Joseph	Soldier
Beleau, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier
Belhumeur, Joseph	Soldier
Bell, William	Soldier
Bellanger, Joseph	Soldier
Bellinge, Antoine	Soldier
Bérard, Joseph	Soldier
Bergeron, Presque	Soldier
Bernier, Féréol	Corporal
Berthiaume, Augustin	Soldier
Bertrand, François	Soldier
Bertrand, Joseph	Soldier
Bertrand, Noël	Soldier
Bigras, Joseph	Soldier
Bilan, Thomas	Soldier
Billard, Benjamin	Soldier
Bilodeau, Michel	Soldier
Bizaillon, André	Soldier
Blache, René	Soldier
Blondin, Louis	Soldier
Bocage, Joseph	Soldier
Boismier, François	Soldier
Bousseau *dit* SansCartier, Pierre	Sergeant
Boissy, Amable	Soldier
Boissy, Nicholas	Soldier
Boset, Jean Baptiste	Soldier
Bouchard, François	Soldier
Bouillet, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier
Boulé, Joseph	Soldier
Bourdignon, Joseph	Soldier
Bourguoin, Antoine	Soldier
Braley, Joseph	Soldier
Brander, James	Soldier
Bricaut, Nicolas	Soldier
Brindamour	Soldier
Brisbrown, George	Soldier
Brisset, Hypolite	Soldier
Britt, James	Soldier
Brousseau, François	Soldier
Brousseau, Pierre	Soldier
Broux, François	Soldier
Brown, William	Sergeant
Brunette, Toussaint	Soldier
Bucle (Boucle), Jean-Baptiste	Soldier
Burke, David	Soldier
Bussey, Henry	Soldier
Bussière, Jean Bte.	Soldier
Cabanac, Louis	Soldier

Name	Rank
Cailer	Soldier
Cain, Edward	Soldier
Campagna, Michel	Soldier
Campbell, Alexander	Soldier
Campbell, James	Soldier
Caouette, Amable	Soldier
Carle, François	Soldier
Carmel, Joseph	Soldier
Caron, Jean Baptiste	Soldier
Carpiet, Louis	Soldier
Carrière, Toussaint	Soldier
Carsonne, Pierre	Soldier
Cérat *dit* Coquillard, Antoine	Soldier
Chamberland, François	Soldier
Chambers, Frederick	Sergeant
Chambly, Jean-Marie	Soldier
Champagne, Louis	Soldier
Charais, Joseph	Corporal
Charland, Louis	Soldier
Charlesbois, Jacques	Soldier
Charon *dit* Cabana, Joseph André	Soldier
Chaurette, Jean	Soldier
Chipperhood, Louis	Soldier
Choret, Jean Baptiste	Soldier
Chrétien, Joseph	Corporal
Christ, Jacob	Soldier
Clark, James	Soldier
Clark, John	Soldier
Clarkson, John	Soldier
Clément, Augustin	Corporal
Clément, Pierre	Soldier
Cockburn, Thomas	Soldier
Collard, Alexandre	Soldier
Collins, John	Soldier
Content, Michel	Soldier
Content, Michel	Soldier
Contoir, Ambroise	Soldier
Cooley, Chancy	Soldier
Cornaud, Michel	Soldier
Couillard, Charles	Sergeant
Couture, Jean	Soldier
Craig, John	Sergeant
Croger, George	Soldier
Crooks	Soldier
Crotteau, J. Baptiste	Soldier
Cukburn, Thomas	Soldier
Dabatte, Joseph Chs.	Soldier
Daigneau, Charles	Soldier
Daigneaux, François	Soldier
Dailay, Daniel	Soldier
Darpentigny, Antoine	Soldier
Dasilva *dit* Portugais, Jacques	Soldier
Dasilva *dit* Portugais, Jean-Baptiste	Sergeant
Daunais, Antoine	Soldier
Dauphin, Berthelemy	Soldier
David, Pierre	Soldier
Day, Francis	Soldier
Decoyne	Soldier
Degane, Joseph	Soldier
Degneau, François	Soldier
Deguise, François	Soldier
Deguise, Michel	Soldier
Delaunay, Antoine	Soldier
Delaunay, Jean	Soldier
Delisle, Jean Baptiste	Soldier
Delisle, Joseph	Soldier
Delisle, Joseph	Soldier
Delisle, Joseph	Soldier
Delorier, Joseph	Soldier
Demerse, Raphaël	Soldier
Derome, Michel	Soldier
Derouselle, Louis	Soldier
Desautels, Joseph	Soldier
Descaut, Joseph	Soldier
Desjardins, François	Soldier
Desjardins, Jean	Soldier
Desjardins, P.	Soldier
Desmaisons, Pierre	Soldier
Desnoyers, Louis	Soldier
Després, Louis	Soldier
Desrivière, Louis	Soldier
Desrochers, François	Soldier
Dickson, Andrew	Sergeant
Dion, Charles	Soldier
Dion, Edouard	Soldier
Dion, François	Soldier
Divertissant, Alexis	Soldier
Dollar, Joseph	Soldier
Dolphin, John	Soldier
Dompierre, David	Soldier
Doré, Jean	Soldier
Dorion, Etienne	Soldier
Dorion, Pierre	Soldier
Dostie (or Dosty), Antoine	Soldier
Dostie, Jean	Soldier
Dostie, Pierre	Soldier
Drapeau, Pierre	Corporal
Dron, Johan	Soldier
Dubault, Charles	Soldier
Dubois, Antoine	Soldier
Dufaux, J. Baptiste	Soldier
Dufort, Charles	Soldier

Name	Rank
Dulare, Ch.	Soldier
Dumaine, Augustin	Soldier
Dupéré, Louis	Soldier
Dupuis, François	Soldier
Durocher, François	Soldier
Durocher, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier
Dusseau, B.	Corporal
Dusson, Louis	Soldier
Dutour, Jacques	Soldier
Dyon, François	Soldier
Else, Jacob	Soldier
Facette, Joseph	Soldier
Falstro, André	Soldier
Faten, Stephen	Soldier
Fauteux, Alexis	Soldier
Fenguer, Jean	Soldier
Filiatreau, Michel	Soldier
Flamand *dit* Deguise, J. Bte.	Soldier
Flamant *dit* Deguise, Benjamin	Soldier
Fleurant *dit* St. Amour, François	Soldier
Fluet, Edouard	Soldier
Foisy, Paul	Soldier
Fontaine, Charles	Soldier
Forcier, Modeste	Soldier
Foretier, Alexandre	Soldier
Fortin, Benjamin	Bugle
Fortin, François	Soldier
Fortin, Martin	Soldier
Frédérich, Joseph	Soldier
Frichette, Noël	Soldier
Friland, William	Soldier
Gadois, Jean Baptiste	Soldier
Gadouas, Joseph	Soldier
Gagné, Joseph	Soldier
Gagné, Louis	Soldier
Gagnon, Augustin	Soldier
Gagnon, Barthelem	Soldier
Gagnon, Louis	Soldier
Galarneau, J.B.	Soldier
Galerneau, Joseph	Soldier
Galloway, Robert	Soldier
Gareau, Louis	Soldier
Garvin, James	Soldier
Gaudreau, Pierre	Soldier
Gauthier, Joseph	Soldier
Gauthiez, Louis	Soldier
Gendron, Jean	Soldier
Gentil, Francis	Soldier
Gentles, John	Soldier
Gérard, Joseph	Soldier
Gervais, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier
Gibault, Michel	Soldier
Gibeau, François	Soldier
Gibeau, Joseph	Soldier
Gignac, Alexis	Soldier
Gillestien, Jean Bte.	Soldier
Gillestien, John	Soldier
Gilmour, John	Corporal
Gingras, Oliver	Soldier
Girard, André	Soldier
Girard, Joseph	Soldier
Girard, Pierre	Soldier
Giroux, André	Soldier
Giroux, Louis	Sergeant
Giroux, Louis	Soldier
Glass, Georges	Soldier
Gordon, Charles	Sergeant
Gosselin, Félix	Sergeant-gunsmith
Gosselin, François	Soldier
Gouge, Charles	Soldier
Goulet, François	Soldier
Grant, John	Sergeant
Gravelle, Jos.	Soldier
Gravelle, Pierre	Soldier
Grenier, Antoine	Soldier
Grenier, Pierre	Soldier
Griffard, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier
Guenet, François	Soldier
Guilmet, Louis	Soldier
Guimon, Raymond	Soldier
Guy, Jean Bte.	Soldier
Hall, Joseph	Soldier
Hardie, Joseph	Soldier
Harkness, André	Soldier
Harrow, William	Soldier
Hart, Job	Soldier
Hart, John	Soldier
Haubert, François	Soldier
Hayn, William	Soldier & Corporal
Hébert, Pierre	Soldier
Hise, Laurent	Soldier
Horton, Wm.	Soldier
Hoyle, James Rossister	Soldier
Hunter, William Tod	Soldier
Huster, François	Soldier
Ifland, Christopher	Soldier
Jalin, Michel	Soldier
Janson, Joseph	Soldier
Jay, Castor	Soldier
Jeanson, Michel	Soldier
Johnston, John	Soldier
Jones, John	Soldier
Jubb, Wm.	Corporal

Name	Rank
Julien, Joseph	Soldier
Kagele, Frederick	Soldier
Kane, Edward	Soldier
Kawett, Amable	Soldier
Kellerstein, John	Corporal
Knibbs, James	Soldier
Labbé, Louis	Soldier
Labé, Joseph	Soldier
Labelle, Charles	Soldier
Laberge, George	Soldier
Labranche, Antoine	Soldier
Labrecque, Victor	Soldier
Lacharité, François	Soldier
Lafleur *dit* Beyque, Jean Bte.	Soldier
Lafontaine, Charles	Soldier
Lafontaine, Jean Bte.	Soldier
Laframboise, Jean Bte.	Soldier
L' afriquain, Edouard	Soldier
Lagrave, François	Soldier
Lajeunesse, François	Soldier
Lajeunesse, Jean Bte.	Soldier
Lajoie	Soldier
Lamoureux, Joseph	Soldier
Landry, Paul	Soldier
Lang, John or James	Soldier
Langelier, Michel	Soldier
Langevin, Charles	Soldier
Langevin, Régis	Soldier
Lapierre, François	Soldier
Lapierre, Michel	Soldier
Lapointe, Gabriel	Soldier
Laporte, Michel	Soldier
Laporte *dit* Richelieu, Simon	Soldier
Larose, Pierre	Soldier
Larrivée, Joseph	Soldier
Larue, François	Soldier
Latulippe, Charles	Soldier
Launière, Joseph	Soldier
Laurencelle, François	Soldier
Lauriaux, François	Soldier
Lauzon, François	Soldier
Lavallée, Antoine	Soldier
Lavigne, Joseph	Soldier
Lavoye, René	Soldier
Leclaire, Joseph	Soldier
L' Ecuier, Joseph	Soldier
Leduc, Charles	Soldier
Leduc, Pierre	Soldier
Lefebvre, Charles	Soldier
Lefebvre, Pierre	
Lefour, Samuel	Soldier
LeGrain, Antoine	Soldier
Lehupe *dit* Latulippe, Charles	Soldier
Lemay, Pierre	Soldier
Lemoine, Jacques	Soldier
Leonard, Jacob	Soldier
Lessard, François	Soldier
Levaque, Martin	Soldier
Levigne, Joseph	Soldier
Levingston, John	Sergeant
Limoge, Jean	Soldier
Lindsay, Frederick	Sergeant
Little, Erastus	Soldier
Livingston, Neil	Sergeant
Louis, Pierre	Soldier
Lozeau, François	Soldier
Macès *dit* Sanscène, Pierre	Soldier
Maid, John	Soldier
Maid, Thomas	Soldier
Makié, Etienne	Soldier
Malette, Jean Bapt.	Soldier
Mann, John Oliver	Sentry
Marchand, Amable	Soldier
Marinier, Pierre	Soldier
Marion, Jean	Soldier
Marotte *dit* Labonté, François	Soldier
Martelle, Antoine	Soldier
Martin, Louis	Soldier
Martinette, François	Soldier
Mason, Deny	Soldier
Mégri, Jean Baptiste	Soldier
Mercier, Michel	Soldier
Miller, George	Soldier
Millet, Louis	Soldier
Millet, Pierre	Soldier
Mitchell, Jacques (James)	Sergeant
Mitchell, Samuel	Soldier
Moisan, François	Soldier
Moisson	Soldier
Molgrove, Edouard	Soldier
Mollins, James	Soldier
Montigny *dit* Ynet, François	Soldier
Montrau, Joseph	Soldier
Montrepas, Louis	Soldier
Moorehead, Josiah	Soldier
Morancy, Marcel	Soldier
Moreau, J. Bte.	Soldier
Morin, Louis	Soldier
Morris, John Craig	Corporal
Morrissette, Joseph	Soldier
Moses, Joseph	Soldier

Name	Rank
Mure, Josiah	Soldier
McCarthy, Edouard	Soldier
McCarthy, François	Soldier
McCarthy, Robert	Soldier
McDougall, Angus	Soldier
McDougall, Duncan	Soldier
McDougall, John	Sergeant
McFadien, Edouard	Soldier
McKlish, John	Soldier
McMillan, John	Soldier
McNall, Enus	Soldier
Nadeau, J.B.	Soldier
Nice, John (Roberson)	Sergeant
Noël, Joseph	Soldier
Noël, Louis	Soldier
Odett *dit* Lapointe, Jean Baptiste	Soldier
Olivier, Pierre	Soldier
Ouellet, Joseph	Soldier
Ouellet, Michel	Soldier
Ouellet, Th.	Soldier
Ouscamp, François	Soldier
Paillassio, Mathieu	Soldier
Pager, Joseph	Soldier
Palmer, John	Soldier
Paneton, Amable	Soldier
Panquet, Jacques	
Paquette, François	Soldier
Parent, Charles-Rémi	Soldier
Parent, Joseph	Soldier
Parent, Olivier	Soldier
Pascal, Augustin	Soldier
Patenaude, Michel	Soldier
Paterson, William	Soldier
Paul, Pierre	Soldier
Pearcy, John	Sergeant-major
Pearson, William	Soldier
Pelletier, Jean Bte.	Corporal
Pelletier, Joseph	Soldier
Peltier, Louis	Sergeant
Pépin, Etienne	Soldier
Perrault, Joseph	Soldier
Petitclair, Charles	Soldier
Petit-Jean *dit* Brequet, François	Soldier
Picard, Paul	Soldier
Pichée, Pierre	Soldier
Pigeon, Jean Baptiste	Soldier
Pillat, Martin	Soldier
Pilon, François	Soldier
Pilon, Louis	Soldier
Pland, Louis	Soldier
Plante, Jean B.	Soldier
Plante, Joseph	Soldier
Plante, Louis	Soldier
Plante, Presque	Soldier
Plouffe, Joseph	Soldier
Poirier, Louis	Soldier
Pollock, Robert	Soldier
Portugais, André	Soldier
Portugais *dit* Dassilva, Antoine	Soldier
Potier, Jacques	Soldier
Potvin, Pierre	Soldier
Powers, Jonathan	Soldier
Prévost, Pierre	Soldier
Proulx, Jacques	Soldier
Provendier, Louis-Charles	Soldier
Provost, Hyacinthe	Soldier
Prudhomme, Joseph	Soldier
Quintal, Antoine	Soldier
Racette, Joseph	Soldier
Ralston, Ballath	Soldier
Rangé, Antoine	Soldier
Rangé, Joachin	Soldier
Rangé, Joseph	Soldier
Rangeard, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier
Ratté, Ignace	Soldier
Ratté, Jean	Soldier
Raymond, Antoine	Soldier
Raymond, Dominique	Soldier
Raymond, Louis	Soldier
Rhaenfld, Edouard	Soldier
Richer, Joseph	Soldier
Riendeau, Simon	Soldier
Riopel, Ignace	Soldier
Ritchie, Charles	Soldier
Rivet, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier
Roberts, Millis	Soldier
Robitaille, Louis	Soldier
Rose, Laurent	Soldier
Houleau, Pierre	Soldier
Rouse, Joseph	Soldier
Rousse, Jean Bapt.	Soldier
Rousseau, Joseph	Soldier
Roy, François	Soldier
Roy, François	Soldier
Roy, Louis	Soldier
Russell, John	Soldier
Ryendau, Joseph	Soldier
Sabourin, Louis	Soldier
SansFaçon, André Mitresay	Soldier
Sauriat, François	Soldier
Sautte, Joseph	Soldier
Savard, Louis	Soldier

Name	Rank
Scalen, Charles	Soldier
Schamper, Jean	Soldier
Scnider, Pierre	Soldier
Senais (or Senet), Jean	Soldier
Senais (or Senet), J.B.	Soldier
Senecal *dit* Laframboise, J. Bte.	Soldier
Serrurier, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier
Sesson, Bernard	Soldier
Sevigné, Joseph	Soldier
Shiller, Edward	Soldier
Silvain, Etienne	Soldier
Simon *dit* Arpentignic, Antoine	Soldier
Sinclair, Henry	Soldier
Skelton, John	Soldier
Smith, Daniel	Soldier
Smith, John	Soldier
Smith, John Henry	Soldier
Smith, Jonathan	Soldier
Smith, Thomas	Corporal
Souschereau, Antoine	Soldier
Spencer, John	Soldier
Spilss, John	Soldier
St-Denis, André	Soldier
St-Etienne, Jean	Soldier
St-Germain, Charles	Soldier
St-Helois, Louis	Soldier
St-Pierre, François	Soldier
St-Pierre, Joseph	Soldier
St-Vincent, Jean Bte.	Soldier
Stezoche, Jacob	Soldier
Stuart, Peter	Bugle
Surprenant, Joseph	Soldier
Sutherland, Robert	Soldier
Sylvestre, Jean Bte.	Soldier
Terrien, François	Soldier
Tessier, François	Soldier
Tessier *dit* Lavigne, Louis	Soldier
Third, Jacques	Soldier
Thom, Jacques	Soldier
Thomas, Augustin	Soldier
Thomas, Thomas	Soldier
Thompson, Henry	Soldier
Tibault, Joseph	Soldier
Timmands, François	Soldier
Trescort, Joseph	Soldier
Tribote *dit* L'Afriquain, Édouard	Soldier
Trottier, Jean Bapt.	Soldier
Truchon *dit* Léveillé, François	Soldier
Trudel	Corporal
Trudel, Louis	Sergeant
Tullock, George	Soldier
Turcot, Amable	Soldier
Vachon, Etienne	Soldier
Vallée, Michel	Soldier
Vallier, Joseph	Soldier
Venais, François	Soldier
Verreault, Louis	Soldier
Vert, Matthew	Soldier
Vincent, Joseph	Soldier
Vincent, Louis, Jr.	Soldier
Vincent, Nicolas	Soldier
Villeneuve, Isaac	Soldier
Visco, Antoine	Soldier
Voisin, Joseph	Soldier
Voyer, Jean-Baptiste	Soldier
Volesko, Bazile	Soldier
Wagner, Frederick	Soldier
Wagner, John	Soldier
Walker, William	Soldier
Wallack, Joseph	Soldier
Wells, Joseph	Soldier
Wilcock, John	Soldier
Wilkinson, A.	Soldier
Willerofsky, Alexandre	Soldier
William, Brown	Soldier
William, Gordon	Soldier
Williamson, John	Sergeant
Wisenberg, Charles	Soldier
Wittman, Joseph	Soldier
Zimermen, Nicolas	Soldier

NOTES

Preface

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2 Yvon Desloges, "L'origine sociale des miliciens de 1812," manuscript on file, National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Ottawa, 1970.

3 J.-P. Aron, P. Dumont and E. LeRoy-Ladurie, Anthropologie du conscrit français (Paris: Mouton, 1972).

4 André Corvisier, Armées et sociétés en Europe de 1494 à 1789 (Paris: PUF, 1976).

Introduction

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The Militia in Lower Canada

1 Charles James, A Universal Military Dictionary.... (London: T. Egerton, 1816), p. 728.

2 André Corvisier, op. cit.

3 Richard Burn, The Justice of the Peace and Parish Officer (London: A. Strahan, 1830), Vol. 3, p. 471.

4 Charles M. Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown; their Administration and Government (London: John Murray, 1869), p. 344. The commander in chief was not under the secretary of state. The function was ill-defined at the time and it was the co-operation between these two officeholders that defined their respective activities.

5 Ibid., p. 344.

6 Glenn A. Steppler, "A Duty Troublesome Beyond Measure: Logistical Considerations in the Canadian War of 1812," MA thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 1976, p. 9.

7 Regiments of the regular army generally had colonels, as did divisions of Sedentary Militia; the Voltigeurs and the Select Embodied Militia were commanded by lieutenant colonels.

8 Charles James, op. cit., p. 123.

9 Lukin Homfray Irving, comp., Officers of the British Forces in Canada during the War of 1812 (Welland: Canadian Military Institute, 1908), p. 252.

10 Canada. Public Archives, Rapport sur les Archives publiques du Canada ... 1940 (Ottawa: King's Printer) (hereafter cited as RPAC) (1941), p. 7, "Ordre de M. D'Ailleboust à Pierre Boucher, Captaine dans le Bourg des Trois-Rivières, 6 juin 1651."

11 Ibid., p. 8, "Lettre du Roi à M. de Courcelles pour lui ordonner de diviser les habitans du Canada par companies de milice, Paris, 3 avril 1669."

12 André Corvisier, op. cit., pp. 138-9.

13 RPAC ... 1913, pp. 81-2, "Ordonnance pour faciliter et pour régler les Fournitures de Bois de Chauffage aux Troupes de sa Majesté en Garnison dans cette province, et pour déclarer que tout Pouvoir et Autorité de quelque Capitaine ou autre officier de Milice que ce soit établis en cette province avant la Conquête d'icelle et continuées ensuite jusques à l'épque de l'Etablissement du Gouvernement Civil Britannique en icelle, ont été abolis et anéantis par l'Etablissement du dit Gouvernement."

14 Fernand Ouellet, "Officiers de milice et structure sociale au Québec (1660-1815)," paper presented to the International Conference on Military History, Ottawa, Aug. 1978 (hereafter cited as "Officiers de milice"), pp. 27-9.

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26 Ibid., p. 831.
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28 Glenn A. Steppler, op. cit., pp. 139-40.
29 Lukin Homfray Irving, op. cit., pp. 111, 113.
30 ASQ, MSB, Vol. 2, p. 92.
31 Gazette de Québec, 17 Sept. 1812.
32 PAC, RG9, IA1, Vol. 6, pp. 3460-1, V. de Monviel to Prevost, Quebec, 18 Feb. 1813.
33 Lukin Homfray Irving, op. cit., p. 116.
34 Ibid., p. 109.
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37 PAC, RG1, E2, Vol. 3, 15 Dec. 1814.
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