A Campaign of Amateurs
The Siege of Louisbourg, 1745

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Studies in Archaeology, Architecture and History

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Looking southeast over the reconstructed fortress, one-fifth of the historical fortified town. The Dauphin Gate is in the foreground.
The following study of the 1745 siege of Louisbourg involved three months' research among the archival holdings of the Fortress of Louisbourg. It is not a comprehensive study, as time would not permit detailed examination of many phases of the siege deserving further investigation. The following are those phases which I feel are of particular significance, with the thought that subsequent research might be undertaken upon them: the New England vessels participating in the expedition; the provisions used by and the method of provisioning the New England forces during the siege; the relations between Warren and Pepperrell during the siege, as well as the nature and extent of army-navy co-operation; the state of the Louisbourg defences (both fortifications and armaments) prior to the siege; the extent of the disaffection of the Louisbourg garrison prior to the siege, and the influence the disaffection might have had on the final outcome and the provincial scouting parties sent out during the siege, with particular reference to the purposes intended, the results achieved, and the effect the scouting parties might have had on the final outcome of the campaign.

The fall of the Fortress of Louisbourg in 1745 was the culmination of events that began with another surrender 32 years before, in 1713, when France signed the Treaty of Utrecht ending Queen Anne's War. By the terms of that treaty, France lost most of her North American empire. Acadia (comprising the present provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and much of the state of Maine), the vast Hudson's Bay trading area and Newfoundland passed into English hands, leaving the rest of New France (Canada) virtually isolated and vulnerable to attack from the New England colonies. Louis XIV tried to retain Acadia and thus provide a buffer of sorts, but the best he could secure was Cape Breton, a rocky island off the coast of Nova Scotia. This was not much of a gain, but it did give France a toe-hold on the Atlantic frontier; and the island's strategic position at the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, "the natural highway into the heart of Canada," would, if defended by a large enough fleet, allow the French to maintain that vital lifeline to the interior.

To ensure control of the St. Lawrence and to protect her North American commerce and commercial fisheries, France spent the next 30 years and ten million dollars building the fortified naval station of Louisbourg at Havre à l'Anglais on Cape Breton's southeast coast. The fortifications were begun in 1719, based upon the principles of defence developed by the renowned French military engineer, Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban. They eventually enclosed a town area of some 57 acres with 30-foot-high masonry walls and a series of bastions. The most important of these, stretching south and east for three-quarters of a mile along the landward front, were, res-
pectively, the Dauphin Demi-Bastion on the harbour side, the
King's Bastion, the Queen's Bastion, and, butting against the
Atlantic, the Princess Demi-Bastion. A glacis, ditch, and
coverway afforded additional protection.

The main barracks building, located in the gorge of the
King's Bastion (together known as the Citadel), was Louis-
bourg's administrative and military centre and contained the
governor's apartments, a chapel, officers' rooms, and quarters
for the garrison. Most of the town of Louisbourg consisted of
stone and timber and "picquet" buildings.¹

Louisbourg Harbour runs roughly northeast by southwest,
and while the two peninsulas at the entrance are about a mile
apart, the actual roadway is reduced to less than half a mile
between Goat and Battery islands on one side and numerous
reefs off Lighthouse Point on the other. The harbour entrance
was protected by the Island Battery and by the Royal Battery
on the mainland, about a mile northeast of the town fronting
the harbour: the circular battery at the Dauphin Demi-Bastion,
the Maurepas Bastion at the neck of Rochefort Point, and an
artillery work called Pièce de la Grave near the quay.

Garrisoned by French regulars and militia and mounting
more than 100 cannon (mostly 24- and 42-pounders), Louis-
bourg, fortress and harbour, by 1745 presented an imposing
and formidable appearance. Some considered it impregnable.²

For 30 years after the Treaty of Utrecht, England and
France remained at uneasy peace. During this time, New
Englanders had looked upon Louisbourg's development with
growing interest and not a little concern. But it took the
outbreak of King George's War (part of the larger European
War of the Austrian Succession) in 1744 to underscore the
threat the fortress posed to their security. When word reached
North American waters that France and England had declared
war in April of that year, French privateers operating out of
Louisbourg began to prey on the New England coastal trade.

Between 31 May and 12 June, two French privateers armed
only with muskets captured at least ten Massachusetts fishing
vessels off the Sable Island and Canso banks. By July, French
raiders were operating off the coast of Massachusetts, threaten-
ing the trade routes to and from Boston.³

In late May French troops surprised and captured the poorly
defended English fishing village of Canso at the mouth of
Chedabucto Bay, carrying its garrison off to captivity at Louis-
bourg — a costly error, since this gave the English the
opportunity to scrutinize the French defences and note any
weaknesses. In August, another troop detachment sent out from
the fortress laid siege to Annapolis Royal, the British strong-
hold on the Bay of Fundy, but withdrew after three weeks of
desultory attacks when the defences proved too strong.⁴

The French gained little by attacking Canso and Annapolis
Royal and succeeded only in angering the New Englanders and
rousing them to action. Perhaps, as the anonymous habitant de
Louisbourg later claimed, "the English might never have troubled
us had we not affronted them first.... The inhabitants of new
England wanted to live in peace with us. They would no doubt
have done so had we not ill advisedly deprived them of that secu-
ritv they felt toward us."⁵ But attention had been forcibly drawn
to the dangers posed by the French naval base, and the clamour
for an expedition against the fortress would not be silenced.

The originator of the Louisbourg expedition has long been a
subject of controversy, but credit for promoting and gathering
support for it must go to Massachusetts' 50-year-old royal
governor, William Shirley. Born in England and trained for the
law, Shirley had come to Boston in 1731 when his meagre
London law practice proved inadequate to support a wife and
eight children. In the next ten years, his legal career had blos-
somed; so, too, had his popularity and reputation as a staunch
supporter of the king's interests, and in 1741 he became the
colony's governor.⁶
Shirley had long contemplated an expedition against Louisbourg, and when the Canso garrison returned to Boston from confinement at the fortress in late 1744, he listened attentively to reports that the “impregnable” French stronghold was far from impregnable — that the garrison was small, discontented, and mutinous; that the fortress was dominated by high hills to the west; that the Royal Battery had two unrepaired breaches, and that supplies and munitions were inadequate to withstand a long and determined siege. The longer Shirley listened, the more convinced he became that an attack on Louisbourg could succeed if it were launched before the French reinforced the garrison in the spring.

On 20 January 1745, Shirley went before the Massachusetts General Court seeking the authority to raise and fit out an expedition. After swearing the members to secrecy, he warned them of the threat Louisbourg presented to navigation and trade, to supply ships, to the New England fisheries, and to the general security of British settlements. Nothing, he argued, would more effectually promote the interests of Massachusetts ... than a reduction of that place.... From the best information that can be had of the circumstances of the Town and of the number of the soldiers and Militia within it, and of the situation of the Harbour, I have good reason to think that if Two Thousand men were landed upon the Island [Cape Breton] as soon as they may be conveniently got ready ... such a number of men would, with the blessing of Divine Providence upon their enterprise, be masters of the field at all events.

The court did not share Shirley’s optimism and voted down the proposition after several days’ debate. It was only after Boston merchants learned of the decision and petitioned the court to reconsider the governor’s proposal that the expedition was finally approved on 5 February by the narrow margin of one vote — occasioned, it is said, when one of the members of the court broke his leg while hurrying to cast a dissenting vote.

2 Governor William Shirley.
ballot. Shirley then notified the home government in London of the intended attack, drew up a “Scheme for Attacking Louisbourg” (see Appendix B), which he sent to the Admiralty, and appealed for volunteers from colonies as far south as Pennsylvania.

At the same time, Shirley requested naval assistance from Commodore Peter Warren, commanding British naval operations in American waters, then stationed in the Leeward Islands in the West Indies. Warren, 42 years old, had been on duty in North America since 1730. He had property holdings and family connections in New York (he was married to the sister of Chief Justice James De Lancey of the New York Supreme Court) and, like Shirley, had long favoured attacking Louisbourg. Indeed, as early as February 1743, Warren had recommended just that to the Admiralty, but nothing had come of it. Shirley, possibly with Warren’s outlook in mind, told the commodore that if he would release ships to assist in the expedition, they (along with the vessels the colonies furnished) would ensure the ultimate success of New England arms. The governor even offered Warren command of the expedition, writing that “if the service in which you are engaged would permit you to come yourself and take command of it, it would I doubt not be a most happy event for his Majesty’s service and your own honour.”

Warren’s reply, which reached Shirley in mid-March, was disappointing. The commodore wrote that he would have willingly complied with the governor’s request, but his fellow officers had met in council and decided that, without Admiralty instructions, Warren had no authority to send naval assistance

3 Sir Peter Warren by John Smibert. Photograph courtesy of the Portsmouth Athenaeum, New Hampshire.
for the expedition. He was, however, sending two warships to patrol New England waters and thus relieve those colonial vessels taking part in the campaign.  

In the meantime, Warren received orders from the Admiralty which, interpreted broadly, gave him authority to assist in the expedition. He immediately fitted out his 60-gun flagship Superbe, and on 24 March sailed from Antigua in company with two 40-gun ships of the line (the Mermaid and the Launceston) and a transport. He sent word to Shirley that, to save time, he would sail directly for Louisbourg, stopping at Canso for water and the latest intelligence. Warren also ordered two other battleships (one a captured French prize) to join him off Louisbourg.

The Louisbourg expedition has been called both “a mad scheme” and “a project of wild audacity,” fitting epithets when one considers that there were no experienced troops in the colonies to carry it out — no regular soldiers, no trained officers, no knowledgeable veterans, and no naval force. Few, indeed, could boast of more than a passing acquaintance with the rudiments of basic military drill, let alone the intricate art of siegcraft. This state of affairs led a skeptical Benjamin Franklin in Philadelphia to caution his brother in Boston: “Fortified towns are hard nuts to crack, and your teeth are not accustomed to it. Taking strong places is a particular trade, which you have taken up without serving an apprenticeship to it.... But some seem to think forts are as easy taken as snuff.”

Despite Franklin’s misgivings — and there were others who shared his concern — more than 4,000 men, all New Englanders, signed up to attack Louisbourg. Some 3,300 came from Massachusetts (which then included Maine), 500 from Connecticut, and 450 from New Hampshire (some of whom were paid by Massachusetts). New York supplied a few cannon of varying size and quality, and Pennsylvania and New Jersey sent food and clothing. Rhode Island voted to raise three companies of men, but, having second thoughts, cautiously withheld them until the campaign had ended. Other colonies sent their prayers and best wishes, but nothing else.

The army (if that name can be applied to such a heterogeneous and undisciplined body of men) was made up of fishermen, farmers, mechanics, merchants, and frontiersmen of all age and circumstance, all determined to see Louisbourg devastated because that place “was like to prove Detrimental if not Destroying to our Country.” So great was the enthusiasm to enlist in the expedition that Major John Storer of the Maine militia signed up a company of three score men in a single day, their ages running from 16 to 60.

The great religious revival that had so recently swept through New England also brought a large number of militant Protestant clergymen into the army’s ranks, all anxious to lay waste that “Stronghold of Satan” on Cape Breton Island. One, the Reverend Samuel Moody of York, Maine, and at 70 “the oldest man in the army,” reportedly brought his own ax to cut down the “idols” in the Louisbourg churches. English Methodist minister George Whitefield, who did not accompany the army to Louisbourg, supplied a motto: Nil desperandum Christo duce (Despair of nothing while Christ leads). The presence of the ministers gave the expedition an atmosphere of a crusade, causing a later writer to feel that the campaign was a “strangely combined muster and camp-meeting.”

The terms of service varied little from colony to colony, each man usually receiving a specified amount of money and a blanket. Those who could bring their own musket, sword, belt and cartridge box, blanket, and whatever else might be required, “to the acceptance of the military officer who shall enlist them,” received higher monthly stipends. To those unable to furnish such items, the colony would see to their needs, with the stipulation that each item furnished must be returned at the end of the campaign and that any item lost be
paid for. All enlistees would also have an equal share in all plunder, be free from the collection of debts until returning to the colony, and receive one month’s wages in advance before embarkation. The men were also promised such goodly portions of rum that Connecticut’s Governor Jonathan Law felt compelled to caution Captain John Prentis of the Connecticut sloop Defiance against allowing his men to indulge too heavily for fear they might be inebriated in time of danger.

Command of the army and expedition was given to 49-year-old William Pepperrell of Kittery, Maine. Pepperrell, who received the rank of lieutenant general, was president of the Massachusetts Council and a prosperous and influential merchant. He had no previous military experience beyond an occasional muster of the militia, of which he was colonel, but he was popular and possessed a marked degree of common sense — primary requisites for a leader of undisciplined citizen-soldiers. Pepperrell’s commission as commander of the army did not come from Massachusetts alone; he held simultaneous commissions from New Hampshire and Connecticut. Each of these colonies, therefore, possessed a degree of authority over his actions. Surprisingly, Pepperrell was not hampered by this and he maintained relative independence of command.

Second in command was Roger Wolcott, 67-year-old deputy governor of Connecticut, who received his appointment and rank of major general as a condition for that colony sending troops. The brigadiers were Samuel Waldo, prominent merchant and landowner, and Joseph Dwight, colonel of the artillery train actively commanded by Richard Gridley.

4 Sir William Pepperrell. In the background of this painting by John Smibert is a view of Pepperrell’s forces in action at Louisbourg.

Essex Institute, Salem, Massachusetts.
The provincial army was organized into nine regiments according to colony, as follows:

First Massachusetts Regiment, William Pepperrell, colonel. (Actively commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet.)

Second Massachusetts Regiment, Samuel Waldo, colonel. (Actively commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Noble of Georgetown, Massachusetts.)

Third Massachusetts Regiment, Jeremiah Moulton, colonel.

Fourth Massachusetts Regiment, Samuel Willard, colonel.

Fifth Massachusetts Regiment, Robert Hale, colonel.

Sixth Massachusetts Regiment, Sylvester Richmond, colonel.

Seventh Massachusetts Regiment, Shubael Gorham, colonel.

Connecticut Regiment, Andrew Burr, colonel.

New Hampshire Regiment, Samuel Moore, colonel.26

To carry the army to Canso, where it would rendezvous mmbefore sailing on to Louisbourg, Shirley had managed to assemble (exclusive of Warren’s squadron then on its way north from the Leewards) a fleet of 90 transports, 5 men-of-war, and 6 sloops. It was commanded by Commodore John Rous of the frigate Shirley. Captain Edward Tyng, of the frigate Massachusetts, was senior provincial naval officer present, acting under Shirley’s commission.27

The expedition sailed on 4 April. For the men, tightly packed into the holds of the transports, the trip to Canso was far from enjoyable. For many, it was their first time at sea. “Wee had’ent Sailed, above 3 or 4 Leagues, before Some were Sea Sick,” wrote one volunteer. The sickness increased and soon he was noting that “our Vessel was A Very Hospital, wee were all Sick, in a Greater or lesser Degree.” The gunsmith Seth Pomeroy of Northampton, Massachusetts, was among those distressed, writing that he was so sick “day & night that I have not words to set it forth.”28 The campaign was not off to a very auspicious beginning, but the sickness soon abated, and by the middle of April the fleet began to assemble at Canso.

At Canso, Pepperrell learned that Gabarus Bay, southwest of Louisbourg where the landing would take place, was still blocked with winter ice. The ships would have to wait until the ice packs cleared. The delay, however, was taken up by prayer-meetings and military training, with the preaching loud and long and the training far from elaborate. The New England soldiers were enthusiastic, but apparently a bit reckless. One man “Carelessly handling his Gun, Shot it off, and the Bullet went thro’ a Man’s Cap on his head.”29

Commodore Warren arrived off Canso with his little squadron on 4 May, sending word ashore to Pepperrell that he was proceeding immediately to Louisbourg to block the harbour against the entry of any French ships. He assured Pepperrell that “nothing shall be wanting, on our parts to promote the Success of the Expedition, which I think of the utmost Consequence to our King and Country.”30 Shirley had told Pepperrell that Warren, upon his arrival, was to take over command of the provincial naval force and that the cruiser officers were to take orders from the commodore. The governor urged Pepperrell to have no disagreements with Warren that might prejudice the success of the campaign.31

Early in May, after nearly four weeks at Canso, Pepperrell finally received word that Gabarus Bay was free of ice. Previously, on 16 April, a council of war decided to make Canso the base of operations. It was to serve as both a place of retreat (should it prove necessary) and a place to carry the sick and wounded.32 Two companies of 40 men each were detailed to remain at Canso to guard against any French attack. The remainder of the men (except for Jeremiah Moulton’s regiment, which had been sent to raid and burn the French settlement at St. Peters)33 were once again packed into the tight holds of the transports. On 9 May they sailed away on the enterprise which, if successful, “would be the most glorious and useful thing done in the war.”34
5 Fortifications of the town of Louisbourg in 1745, shown in a plan signed by the French engineer Verrier. Archives Nationales, France.
Preliminaries

It was after sunrise on 11 May 1745 when the first colonial vessels sailed across Gabarus Bay toward a small inlet known as Freshwater Cove, about four miles southwest of Louisbourg, where the landing would be made. From the ramparts of the fortress, French soldiers watched anxiously as, one by one, the tiny transports assembled in the bay between the cove and Flat Point. Upon the fleet’s appearance in the bay, the French rang bells and fired cannon in Louisbourg to alert the garrison and the inhabitants of the outlying settlements. Throughout the town, soldiers went to their posts. Almost at once, the men took measures to secure the low wall at the southeast part of the fortress, working hurriedly to erect a platform of thick planks, upon which, before the day was out, they had two 24-pounder cannon mounted and firing. At the same time, soldiers mounted a number of swivel guns along the quay wall next to the harbour.

The New England militiamen on board the transports in the bay heard the bells and the cannon and saw the defensive measures being taken against them. But, undismayed, they prepared to scramble into the landing boats as soon as the signal was given.

The Landing of 11 May

In the confusion and excitement of the moment, few of the New Englanders who kept diaries or journals during the campaign remembered the exact time the fleet came to anchor in Gabarus Bay. Some of them believed it was 9 o’clock, while others thought it was not until 10 o’clock. Benjamin Cleaves, a clerk in Captain Benjamin Ives’s company of Hale’s Fifth Massachusetts Regiment, wrote that the fleet “came in fair sight of Cape Breton about 9 o’clock; Came to anchor about 10.” The official account of the expedition, prepared by Pepperrell and four of his officers, places the time as between 9 and 10 o’clock. And Governor Shirley (who received his information from Pepperrell) gives the same time in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle in October 1745.

The diarists were less uncertain about the place of anchorage. Most of them agreed that it was about two miles below Flat Point or about four miles southwest of the fortress. “Here we saw the light house & ye steeples in the town,” noted Benjamin Green, Pepperrell’s secretary. If these observations are reliable, the place of anchorage would have been in the vicinity of Freshwater Cove, an inlet the French called Anse de la Cormorandière. Because of the many vessels involved (about 90), probably the whole area between the cove and Flat Point was occupied by the transports.

While the provincial army’s presence off the coast in Gabarus Bay was far from being a secret to the French, Governor Shirley seems initially to have entertained some hope that Louisbourg could be taken by surprise. Before the Massachusetts contingent sailed from Boston, he gave Pepperrell a lengthy letter with detailed instructions on how the campaign should best be conducted (see Appendix C). Many of these instructions appear naive and impossible to execute. An early New England historian, Dr. Jeremy Belknap, writing some 40 years after the Louisbourg expedition, concluded that Pepperrell would have needed seven years’ experience as a general, the power of a Joshua, and men with the eyes of owls to accomplish what Shirley suggested. And a noted British naval historian, Admiral Herbert Richmond, called them “a perfect model of the type of instructions to be avoided.”

But while Shirley’s tactical ideas were scarcely credible, his
6 Louisbourg and the New England positions.
Bibliothèque Nationale, France.
The fleet's arrival should be so timed that the landing could be made at night, "about nine of the clock." The men were to be put ashore immediately and as quickly as possible, all the while maintaining "a profound silence," lest they awaken the unsuspecting Frenchmen. After the men had been properly positioned around the fortress (all this to be done in the dark), at a prearranged signal they were to storm the walls. Because of the delay at Canso, however, and a contrary wind from Canso to Louisbourg, the fleet did not arrive until after daylight on 11 May, and whatever chance for surprise that might have existed had vanished.

The French probably would not have been taken completely by surprise in any case. Louis Duchambon, who had been military governor at Louisbourg a little over six months, reported that as early as 14 March, ships had been sighted cruising off the fortress. The number of these vessels steadily increased throughout March and April, and though still in doubt as to whether the ships were French or English (the ice in the harbour and bay keeping them at a distance), the governor arranged for the safety of the inhabitants of the outlying settlements should the ships prove to be English and a forewarning of attack. He told the residents of the coastal villages near the town to be ready to obey any signal he might give them. He also called together all the residents of the town and harbour, divided the former group into four companies for defensive purposes, and instructed the latter group to repair to the Royal Battery or the Island Battery upon a signal from him.

The anonymous habitant de Louisbourg asserted that for a considerable time before the provincials appeared in Gabarus Bay, the French were not unaware "that a secret enterprise was being devised against us, in New England. Every day we received secret information that they were arming all along the Coast." On 22 April, two men who had come overland from Port Toulouse told Duchambon of hearing cannon fire from Canso and that work was under way to restore the defences of that place. A third man told of witnessing a battle between French and English ships along the coast. By 8 May, Duchambon was certain that the ships off Louisbourg were English, and two days later, in the dark and fog of night, he despatched one of two ships prepared for the purpose through the blockade to France to inform the government of the colony's situation.

Despite the apparent knowledge that "a secret enterprise" was in preparation in New England, Duchambon seems to have made little effort to meet the impending attack. He had tried to provide a large number of faggots on the quay for the use of the fire ships; he had proposed a battery on Cap Noir; and he had asked the ministry in France to send more cannon, remarking that the cannon he did have were not "Sufficient to withstand a proper Siege." His request for the additional cannon had gone out in November 1744, much too late for the ministry to send them in time, for it often took as long as a year for such requests to be acted upon. So the French government had not responded and none of Duchambon's proposals was carried out. Even had he been able to take adequate defensive measures, it is unlikely that he would have been able to effect them satisfactorily because of the quality of the troops under his command.

Altogether, Duchambon's force amounted to some 1,500 men of the Compagnies Franches de la Marine and militia, plus several companies of the Swiss mercenary Regiment de Karrer. (The habitant stated that this number could have been increased by 300 or 400 men who were at Ingonish and vicinity, but that by the time Duchambon decided to send for them, communications with that place had been cut off.)
militia lacked training, and the Compagnies Franches, which constituted about one-third of the total force, were inexperienced and disgruntled over back pay and poor food and clothing. Duchambon had inherited this discontented garrison from his predecessor, Duquesnel, who had died in October 1744. Military discipline had been so poorly maintained by Duquesnel, and Duchambon had so little succeeded in controlling the disaffection, that in December 1744 the garrison mutinied. Since then it had been in open rebellion against Duchambon’s authority. Only after the provincial army appeared in the bay was he able to harangue them into obedience, with promises that all would be forgiven if they settled down and did their duty. Even so, the habitant later admitted, “we had no reason to rely on them.... Such poorly disciplined Troops could scarcely inspire confidence in us.... I decided that it was natural to mistrust them.”

The only measure Duchambon could offer when the provincial fleet appeared on 11 May was to send a detachment of about 80 men to oppose the landing. This force was made up of about 50 civilians (militia) commanded by Port Captain Pierre Morpain and about 30 soldiers under Mesillac Duchambon, the governor’s son. (Another force of 40 men was already somewhere in the woods around Gabarus Bay, where they had for several days been watching vessels from Warren’s fleet which anchored in the bay from time to time.) One of the militia captains, Girard La Croix, remarked that even this action by the governor was rather futile, since the provincials were already ashore before Morpain and Duchambon could arrive.

In Gabarus Bay the landing signal was given and the New England troops scrambled into the landing boats. According to Pepperrell’s instructions from Shirley, the landing would take place in four divisions, three of which were to go ashore at Flat Point and the fourth at White Point farther up the coast. A council of war held at Canso on 16 April had, in effect, confirmed these instructions and the army was divided into four sections. But the council decided against making the landings at Flat and White points, choosing instead to send the army ashore some three miles from the town and four miles from the Royal Battery; in effect, between Flat Point and Freshwater Cove. As the army prepared to disembark at this point, the French force sent out by Duchambon appeared on the beach, “marching towards the place where it was proposed to land our Troops.”

Seeing the enemy force approach, Pepperrell, instructed to keep any resistance away from the main landing area as long as possible, sent several boatloads of men to make a feint of landing at Flat Point Cove. This “diverted the Enemy from proceeding further till they saw the Boats put back and row up the Bay.” In the meantime, the main landing had started at Freshwater Cove. It was now almost 12 noon and a high surf had developed, “which made it difficult landing,” but pulling vigorously against the breakers, a force of nearly 100 men managed to get ashore. A few provincials disappeared into the woods in search of any concealed enemy force, while the rest of the men advanced along the shore to meet the French troops, who had discovered the deception and were now racing for Freshwater Cove.

After a brief but sharp skirmish, the French broke and ran for the woods. “These Scoundellus french Dogs,” wrote one New Englander, “they Dare not Stay to fite.” In the encounter the French suffered a loss of about six men killed, five wounded, and one civilian captured. Port Captain Morpain was also slightly wounded but managed to return to the town. The captured civilian was Le Poupet de la Boularderie, a retired officer of the Duke of Richelieu’s regiment in France. Several
"A view of the Landing the New England Forces in ye Expedition against CAPE BRETON, 1745. When after a Siege of 40 days the Town and Fortress of LOUISBOURG and the important Territories thereto belonging were recover'd to the British Empire...." The artist has put the New Englanders in British uniforms and has represented Louisbourg's geography and fortifications rather fancifully in this contemporary print published in London. Fortress of Louisbourg National Historic Site.
other Frenchmen were captured or killed in the woods before they could regain the fortress. The provincials' loss was two or three men slightly wounded.18

The French in Louisbourg, alarmed at the easy repulse of Morpain and Duchambon, set fire to the houses and outbuildings beyond the Dauphin Gate to deny their use to the enemy. The inhabitants with their personal effects were brought into the town.19

Throughout the fighting on the beach, the provincial army continued to come ashore along the coast between Flat Point and Freshwater Cove.20 The high surf that continued throughout the day increased the difficulties of landing, but by nightfall some 2,000 men were ashore. Toward evening most of the transports moved up to the head of the bay, where the riding was smoother and safer.21

On shore, the undisciplined volunteers succumbed to chaotic impulse, and "Indeed! wee fill'd the Country," noted one enthusiastic soldier. They had no specific orders as yet, but "Everyone Did what was Right in his own Eyes Among which I was one." The men took to the hills, and soon the French saw them ranging the heights in great numbers opposite the King's and Dauphin bastions. The provincials were within cannon shot and "at about two P.M. the cannon en barbette fired on several platoons which seemed to be marching without formation toward the far side of the bay." One of the New Englanders on the hills that day recorded (somewhat matter-of-factly) that "one of the Balls wee took Up while it was a roalling (wee Judg'd it to be A 24 Pounder)."22

The French saw still other men marching along the edge of the woods toward the Royal Battery. This was probably a detachment of 400 men under Colonel William Vaughan of Damariscotta, Maine, on its way to plunder and burn the storehouses and the northeast harbour.23 The provincials on the surrounding hills so alarmed Duchambon that "I had the Gates closed, and I provided straightway for The Safety of the Town and positioned some 1100 men there to defend It."24 Even more alarmed was Chassin de Thierry, commandant of the Royal Battery.

The Abandonment of the Royal Battery

The relationship between the appearance of the provincials on the hills around Louisbourg on the afternoon of 11 May and the abandonment of the Royal Battery has never been clearly defined. Many historians — those who bother to treat the subject at all — have attributed the abandonment directly to the burning of the northeast harbour storehouses on 12 May.25 The burning of the storehouses might well have hurried the men who had returned to complete the removal of the stores and ammunition, but the decision to abandon the Royal Battery was made on the evening of 11 May.

In the late afternoon on 11 May (probably sometime after 4 o'clock), Thierry wrote to Duchambon stressing the poor condition of the battery and stating that he did not believe it could be held if attacked. Thierry asked permission to withdraw the garrison, and he cautioned Duchambon not to let the Royal Battery fall into enemy hands. He advised that the cannon be spiked and the place blown up.26

Duchambon, upon receipt of Thierry's communication, hurriedly assembled a council of war to decide what should be done about the Royal Battery. Étienne Verrier, the chief engineer, was summoned. He reported that the battery was indeed in a poor defensive condition: that some of the épaulements of the left flank had been taken down the previous year and had not been replaced; that the covered ways were not fortified; and that without reinforcements the battery could not be held against an attack of 3,000 or 4,000 men.27 On the strength of
Verrier's report, the council voted unanimously to abandon the battery after spiking the cannon and removing all the stores and ammunition possible. Such stores and ammunition as could not be salvaged were to be dumped into the harbour. The council also wanted to have the battery blown up, as Thierry had urged, but Verrier apparently objected so strongly that the matter was dropped.

Duchambon ordered Thierry to withdraw the garrison and abandon the battery. Thierry had, at this time, probably 200 to 300 people at the Royal Battery to be transferred. Some of these may have been residents of outlying settlements who repaired to the battery when the alarm sounded. (One account indicates that the garrison there was made up of 300 soldiers and gunners, including 90 militia under a Captain Petitpas. But Duchambon, in his report to the minister written at Rochefort, implied that Thierry's company amounted to 200 men.) Thierry spent the remainder of the evening of 11 May attending to the cannon and arranging for the transfer of the supplies and ammunition. About midnight, he and his troops arrived in town by chaloupe.

In their apparent haste to abandon the Royal Battery, Thierry's men had spiked the cannon poorly, had left the gun-carriages mostly intact, and had not dumped the excess shot into the harbour as the council had ordered. So hurried was the withdrawal that a barrel of gunpowder, carelessly ignited, exploded, nearly killing several persons and burning the face and robes of a Récollet friar. Also in the haste, it seems that 12 men were left in each of the towers, Thierry apparently neglecting to alert them of his departure. These men found a chaloupe in a creek near the battery and arrived in town about two o'clock in the morning. The next day, 12 May, Duchambon sent Lieutenant St. Étienne and Ensign Souvigny, with about 20 men, to complete the removal of the stores and ammunition Thierry had left behind; “which they did,” wrote Duchambon, “with the exception of all the cannon balls and bombs, which remained because they could not carry them.”

The clean-up work was undoubtedly hurried by the burning that day of the northeast harbour storehouses.

The habitant de Louisbourg could not understand the decision to abandon the Royal Battery, “unless it was in a panic of terror, which did not leave us throughout the Siege.” He bemoaned that “there had not been a single shot fired on this battery, that the enemy could take only by making approaches to the Town, & besieging it, in, as it were, the regular way.” He acknowledged that a breach existed on the landward side, thus endangering the battery, but “the crime is greater still, because we had had more than enough time to put everything in order.”

Many Frenchmen undoubtedly sympathized with the habitant's view, but his argument that the battery could only have been taken “by making approaches in the regular way” is tenuous at best. The work was completely exposed to the heights behind it. Cannon placed on those heights by the provincials would have immediately commanded the position and rendered it indefensible regardless of breaches. In any case, by the morning of 13 May the Royal Battery stood empty.

**The Provincial Army Encamps**

The evening of 11 May was pleasant for the soldiers of the provincial army encamped before Louisbourg. The weather was fair, a fresh southwest wind rustled the grass and trees, and while the men had expected a greater resistance to their landing, they were pleased with the results of the day's activities. For hours, clusters of men had been straggling back from their first curious look at the great fortress they had come to conquer, bringing with them cows, sheep, horses, and whatever
8 The New England camps.
Public Record Office, Great Britain, WO55, "A Plan of the City and Harbour of Louisbourg with the French Batteries that defended it and those of the English, shewing that part of Gabarus Bay, in which they Landed, and the Ground on which they Encamped during the Siege in 1745," R. Gridley. By permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office.
else they could drive or carry. The expedition was a magnificent adventure for most of them, and many believed, as did Samuel Curwen, merchant turned warrior, that “our campaign will be short, and [we] expect the place will surrender without bloodshed.” In the morning, when the rest of the army landed, they would show the French how well New Englanders could fight; for the moment there was mainly “singing and Great Rejoicing.”

Their bivouac that first night was a makeshift affair, the men resting as best they could until the army could be assembled on shore. Major General Wolcott noted in his journal that “our men lay in the forest without any regular encampment.” There were as yet no tents on shore and shelters were improvised from whatever materials were at hand, one soldier writing that “wee Cut A few boughs to keep Us from the ground.” After the cramped holds of the transports, even this was a “most Comfortable Nights Lodging.”

The rest of the army came ashore unopposed on 12 May and about noon “proceeded toward the town & campt.” A more permanent encampment was then begun, its construction taking several days. The men laboured in the woods cutting timbers for storehouses, shelters, and fires, one New Englander admitting that there were “More Conveniences for our Living on the Island Than was Represented to Us.”

Much uncertainty exists about the location of this encampment. The instructions Shirley gave to Pepperrell stated that “the first thing to be observed [after all the troops have been landed], is to march on till you can find ... a proper spot to encamp them on; which must be as nigh as possible to some convenient brook, or watering place.” The encampment was probably located at, or near, Flat Point. Here Flat Point Brook (called “Freshwater Brook” on contemporary maps), flowing roughly north and south, empties into Gabarus Bay and offers a considerable source of fresh water. The official account of the campaign states that “the camp was formed about half a mile from the place where they [the troops] made a feint of landing,” and Benjamin Green, Pepperrell’s secretary, says that they camped “about 1 1/2 miles from the town.” This would put the encampment in the vicinity of Flat Point. Benjamin Cleaves, in his journal, also hints that the encampment might have been in this area.

There is some evidence to indicate that the camp might have been relocated soon after the army moved to the Flat Point area. Two contemporary maps show the location of the provincial camp. One map shows it on either side of Flat Point Brook; the other shows it directly on Flat Point itself. No explanation for the disparity between the two maps has been found, but Green noted that on 13 May the camp was moved, “the enemy’s balls having disturbed us the last night.” The distance from Louisbourg to Flat Point seems rather far for the provincials to have been greatly bothered by cannon shot, but Cleaves confirms Green’s statement and adds that in the night a new camp was built. It is therefore possible that two camps were started — one around Flat Point Brook, and when this camp proved to be within range of French cannon, another on Flat Point itself. We do not know where the provincials were when the French shot began to disturb them. They may have been beyond the Flat Point area and then fell back, and the disparity in the maps might be nothing more than two generalized representations of the same encampment.

The arrangement of the permanent encampment is equally uncertain. Shirley’s instructions as to the manner of laying out the camp specified that, as soon as [a proper spot to encamp the army has been found], and the ground marked by the Quarters-Masters, who should have, each, colours to distinguish each regiment, the tents must be pitched, in the usual form and distance, if possible; and at the front of every regiment, a guard with tents, which is
called the quarter guard, and mounts in the morning, as the picket guard turns out at sun set and lays on their arms.\textsuperscript{39}

Whether the encampment was established precisely on the lines Shirley envisioned has not been determined, but Colonel John Bradstreet, a regular army officer who was usually very critical of the provincial soldiers because they lacked proper military training and discipline, remarked that “with as much dispatch as could be expected, all the Troops, cannon, and Baggage were landed and properly Incamped [italics mine].”\textsuperscript{40}

Bradstreet’s statement offers a clue to the manner in which the encampment was laid out. To a regular officer like Bradstreet, being properly encamped would probably have meant encamping according to division (or, in this instance, regiment), with proper intervals between, and a protective picket line drawn up about the front and flanks to guard against a sudden attack by the enemy.\textsuperscript{41} This is the type of arrangement Shirley seems to have had in mind. There is, however, little direct evidence to substantiate that the encampment was so arranged. The official account merely states that at first the camp was formed “without throwing up [picket] Lines; depending only upon their Scouts and Guards [for protection]. But afterwards they encamped regularly [italics mine], and threw up Lines.”\textsuperscript{42}

The provincials maintained their encampment in the Flat Point area throughout the siege. While all of the regiments would have been initially assembled at the encampment, only five regiments appear to have been permanently headquartered there during the progress of the campaign. These were Pepperrell’s (including his personal headquarters), Burr’s (nominally Wolcott’s), Moulton’s (which returned from Port Toulouse on 16 May), Moore’s, and Willard’s.\textsuperscript{43} Soldiers from these regiments, however, were later posted to the ranks of the remaining four regiments (Hale’s, Richmond’s, Waldo’s, and Gorham’s, plus Dwight’s artillery train), which subsequently sustained the several batteries erected against Louisbourg.

These latter regiments encamped at or near the batteries they sustained. No information has been found concerning the location of Dwight’s artillery train during the siege; it, like the soldiers of certain of the regiments, probably was scattered among the various batteries.

**Duchambon Prepares for Defence**

While the provincials laboured to prepare a camp, Duchambon prepared for the ordeal ahead. He had all the entrances to the town secured; and the soldiers who had been completely out of hand for the past five months now swore resolutely to defend the fortress to the last man before they would allow it to fall into English hands.\textsuperscript{44} Duchambon posted them according to their individual commands.

Duviivier’s company, under the command of de la Vallière, was posted at the Maurepas Bastion with de La Rhonde’s company, which held the Maurepas Gate near the loopholes (meurtrières). Bonnaventure’s company was at the Brouillan Bastion and the crenellated wall. With Bonnaventure were Schoncher’s Swiss companies, guarding the loopholes of the Princess Demi-Bastion. At the Princess Demi-Bastion and as far as the Queen’s Gate was d’Espiet’s company. Duhaget’s company sustained the Queen’s Bastion, Villejoint’s company the King’s Bastion, and Thierry’s company the Dauphin Demi-Bastion.

De Gannes’s company held the Pièce de la Grave fronting the harbour. De Gannes retained command here until 23 June, when he transferred to the Island Battery to replace its commander, d’Ailleboust, who returned to the town because of illness. D’Ailleboust, when sufficiently recovered, would take over command at the Pièce de la Grave. Sainte-Marie, artillery
captain, was in charge of the cannon, while Port Captain Morpain was given the general supervision of all the posts.\textsuperscript{45}

On 12 May, Bigot and Duchambon decided to sink all the armed ships then in port to prevent them from being captured by the provincials. Accordingly, Ensign Verger, along with five soldiers and a number of sailors, was ordered to sink those which were opposite the town, and Ensign Bellemont was instructed to carry out a similar operation at the back of the bay. Bellemont was also ordered to retrieve the oil from the lighthouse tower. These orders seem to have been carried out by 16 May. It was probably at this time, if not earlier, that the casemate doorways were covered over with wood timbers in preparation to receive the women and children.\textsuperscript{46}

Duchambon, realizing that his present force was inadequate to hold out indefinitely against the provincial army, on 16 May sent an urgent despatch to Lieutenant Paul Marin in Acadia to come immediately with his detachment of French and Indians. Marin possibly could have reached the fortress in 20 to 25 days, but the messenger had such a difficult time locating him that by the time Marin eventually arrived, Louisbourg had fallen. Duchambon would later claim that had Marin arrived 15 or 20 days sooner, the New Englanders would have been forced to raise the siege.\textsuperscript{47}

### The Provincials Occupy the Royal Battery

The provincials took possession of the Royal Battery on 13 May. Governor Shirley had considered the capture of this battery to be of considerable importance to the success of the expedition. He called the work “the most galling Battery in the harbour” and felt that its capture would expose the whole harbour to attack by sea. Shirley believed the battery to be lightly defended and that with an attack upon a low part of the wall “that is unfinished at the east end” (i.e., the left flank where the épaulements had been taken down the previous year), “it is impossible to fail of taking [it].” Colonel John Bradstreet, “with 500 Chosen Men,” was to have made the attack the night following the landing, but the attack was never made and the Royal Battery was taken without firing a shot.\textsuperscript{48}

On the morning of 13 May, Colonel William Vaughan, with a small party of men, was returning from the northeast harbour (Vaughan himself said he was trying to find the “most commodious place” to erect a counter battery) when, passing behind the Royal Battery, he noticed that there was no flag flying from the staff and no smoke rising from the barracks’ chimney. His suspicions aroused, Vaughan (according to many subsequent accounts of the incident) bribed an inebriated Indian to crawl to the battery to determine the true state of affairs. Ascertaining that the work was indeed abandoned, Vaughan and his men took possession of it. He then wrote to Pepperrell that “with the Grace of God and the courage of about thirteen men I entered the Royal Battery about nine a clock and am waiting here for a reinforcement and a flag.”\textsuperscript{49}

The manner in which Vaughan reputedly determined that the French no longer occupied the Royal Battery is open to question. It smacks of legend. The story of the Indian is not confirmed by the diaries, journals, or testimonials of men who were there at the time. Lieutenant Daniel Giddings of Hale’s regiment, along with several men from his company, had gone to the Royal Battery out of curiosity (independent of Vaughan and his party) and had entered it at the same time as Vaughan.\textsuperscript{50} Giddings recorded the incident in his journal, but made no reference to an Indian, drunk or sober. The testimonial of another witness, one John Tufton Mason, likewise fails to mention an Indian, and Vaughan himself simply states that “by all Appearances [I] had Reason to judge that said Grand
Louisbourg harbour from the Royal Battery. The Island Battery and Lighthouse Point are in the background.

Bibliothèque Nationale, France.
Battery was deserted by the enemy," whereupon [we] "marched up and took Possession."
51 Until further documentation comes to light, the story must be regarded as a tale that adds interest but little enlightenment.

Before reinforcements could reach Vaughan, four boatloads (Vaughan says seven boatloads) of French troops put out from the town toward the Royal Battery. Leaving four men in the battery, Vaughan, with eight others, ran out along the shore for "near half a Mile," and, picking up another four men along the way, began to fire upon the French. According to Vaughan, his little group was "within point blank Shot" of the town, from which they were fired upon by cannon.
52 The French retired to the fortress.

That this encounter was the result of a French attempt to retake the Royal Battery, as Vaughan and other provincial diarists believed, is extremely unlikely. That it was meant to be an attack at all is doubtful. French sources make no mention of such an intended attack (and there is no reason why they should be silent about it). These men were probably part of a force sent out by Duchambon to assist in the destruction of those houses in the area of the barachois (a small bay) which were not destroyed at the time of the provincial landings. One party was already at work in the area. This force included all the militia as well as 80 French and Swiss soldiers under Captain De Gannes and a Swiss officer named Rosser. Armed with hatchets and other tools, they were to bring back for use in the town whatever salvageable wood they could collect, as the supply was low. As they were finishing, according to Governor Duchambon's report, a number of provincials "appeared at the Barachois and in the upper valleys" and fired upon the French, who returned to town.
53 Vaughan himself indicates, as does one David Woaster, then a captain of a company of volunteers, that the engagement took place some distance from the Royal Battery and "within point blank Shot" of the fortress. Since the French were approaching the "Battery-Side of the Harbour," as Vaughan and other observers admitted, it is understandable how the New Englanders might conclude that the enemy troops were trying to retake the Royal Battery, when actually they were going to assist the militia and soldiers in the clean-up operations around the barachois.

Returning to the Royal Battery, Vaughan waited for the reinforcements and flag he had asked Pepperrell to send. In the meantime, two English ships' flags had been found in one of the nearby houses, and these were hoisted on the staff. According to some chroniclers, one William Tufts climbed the pole and fastened his red coat to the staff to serve as a flag. (At least one account claims that it was another Indian who performed this act.) This story also seems spurious, despite an obituary notice of 3 June 1771 referring to such an exploit by Tufts at the Island Battery during the abortive 6 June attack.
55 Perhaps the story has its origins here.

According to at least one contemporary account, Captain Joshua Pierce of Willard's regiment was the first to raise the English colours over the Royal Battery on 13 May. Colonel Samuel Waldo, who soon moved into the battery with part of his regiment, supports Vaughan's statement that the flag raised that day belonged to a ship's ensign and was not Tufts's coat. In a letter to Pepperrell dated 14 May, Waldo asks for one of the Union flags, "as the fisherman's ensign gives a mean appearance." We do not know what this "fisherman's ensign" looked like, but a French militia officer who accompanied a number of men across the harbour to retrieve the oil from the lighthouse tower noticed the little flag and said that it resembled "an English Weathervane."
56

Colonel John Bradstreet soon arrived at the battery with a reinforcement and reported back to Pepperrell that the place was in bad condition but it could be repaired. Colonel Waldo, who arrived with five companies of his regiment later that day,
reported that the cannon (twenty-eight 42-pounders and two 18-pounders) were plugged up and most of the carriages damaged, "tho' with small repairs, all capable of service." Bradstreet requested smiths and armourers to drill open the vents of the cannon, and that "handpicks, ramers [sic], & sponges & a quantity of powder" would also be needed. Many balls and shells were found, and Bradstreet promised to have a 42-pounder ready to open fire on the town by noon of 14 May if his needs were speedily met.57

They seem to have been met quickly; by 10 a.m. on 14 May, the 42-pounder he promised to have ready was cleared and had opened fire. The first shot killed 14 of the enemy. Waldo reported that 40 shot were subsequently fired against the town, while the French return fire from the fortress and Island Battery amounted to 146 shot and 50 shells. Only four of the embrasures of the Royal Battery pointed against the town, and while the fire from the Island Battery was "troublesome," Waldo intended to concentrate his fire on the town rather than the island to aid Pepperrell's designs against the fortress.58

Despite Governor Shirley's efforts, supplies were deficient. At Canso, Pepperrell wrote Shirley that the provisions were inadequate, that they were far less than had been expected, and that he intended to write the war committee for additional stores. He also reported that the troops were deficient in necessary accoutrements, though the armourers were fitting for service what they could. Shirley promised to look into the matter and to send Pepperrell anything that it was in his power to send.60

Whether the deficiencies were remedied is not known, and the exact nature and extent of the provisions initially sent has not been determined. No invoices for these shipments have been found. From various references in journals and letters, however, we can be reasonably certain that the men had large quantities of rum, as well as bread, pork, rice, beans, peas, and molasses.61 Also, they apparently had a supply of fresh meat, since there are numerous references to cattle being butchered during the course of the siege. And the rations were supplemented by fresh lobster and trout.62

The provisions were brought ashore near the encampment at Flat Point. The landing "was attended with extreme Difficulty and Fatigue," the surf continually running high, and it was nearly two weeks before all the stores were landed. On some days "there was no landing any Thing at all" because of the high surf, and "many Boats and some Stores were lost."63 The work was even more difficult when the artillery was brought ashore the following day, 14 May; the men were "obliged to wade high into the water to save everything that would have been damaged by being wet." The soldiers who brought the guns ashore "had no Cloathes to shift themselves with, but poor Defence from the Weather, and at the same time the nights were very cold, and generally attended with thick heavy Fogs."64

Once ashore, the cannon still had to be moved over the difficult marshy ground stretching between Flat Point and the
A CAMPAIGN OF AMATEURS

fortress. While several roads ran out to the east and southeast from Flat Point (one of which roughly paralleled the coast to the southern extremity of the Green Hill range within a mile of the town), and while the provincials constructed additional roads after the landing, they proved of little use, as the official account of the siege testifies.

The transporting [of] the cannon was ... almost incredible labour and fatigue. For all the roads over which they were drawn, saving here and there small patches of rocky hills, were a deep morass; in which, whilst the cannon were upon wheels, they several times sunk, so as to bury not only the carriages, but the whole body of the cannon likewise. Horses and oxen could not be employed in this service; but the whole was to be done by the men themselves, up to the knees in mud.

The French had regarded the marshes and bogs to the west of the fortress as impassable, and so they might have been but for the ingenuity of Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel Meserve of Moore’s New Hampshire Regiment. Colonel Meserve believed that if the cannon were placed on flat sledges, they could be drawn across the marshes to the points where they would be required. He thereupon designed and had constructed several wooden sledges 16 feet long and 5 feet wide, by which the guns were hauled across the morass. The shot, shells, and powder, in the meantime, were transported on the soldiers’ backs.

The Erection of the
Green Hill Battery, 15 May

Meserve’s sledges would come later, however, and on 14 May it was the brawn of the soldiers that moved the heavy guns over the marshes and inadequate roads and onto the southern extremity of Green Hill, where the first provincial battery was to be erected. For nearly two days the men laboured in the wind and mud, dragging and pushing the cannon and mortars into position. By 15 May, two 9-pounder cannon, two falconets, one 13-inch mortar, one 11-inch mortar, and one 9-inch mortar had been mounted. Five hundred men (probably Colonel Sylvester Richmond’s Sixth Massachusetts Regiment) were ordered to support the battery.

The exact location of this work (referred to as the “battery on Green Hill” or the “Green Hill battery” in the documents) has not been determined. Duchambon, who watched as the guns were mounted, says it was “on the height behind the plains opposite the King’s Bastion” approximately 1,500 yards distant. Most probably it was situated on the hill mentioned by Governor Shirley in his instructions to Pepperrell.

About south-west from the citadel bastion, a large half-mile distance, is a rocky hill, which in attacking of the town, may be of great service, by covering a number of our men, and planting some cannon there, on the top; in such a manner as when you are on the spot, you may judge most advantageous; where you may keep the bombardiers, &c. continually employed, endeavouring principally to demolish their magazine, citadel, walls, &c. which are objects sufficiently in view.

The Green Hill battery opened fire on the fortress on 15 May. Shirley’s hope that the battery would inflict considerable damage on the town was disappointed however. Duchambon later reported that while this work “did not Cease firing here and there ... the firing achieved nothing ... and killed nor Injured no one.” The distance was too great. In turn, the Green Hill battery sustained little or no damage from French counterfire until 20 May, when a cannon shot fired from the town wounded five men, one of whom lost both legs and afterwards died.

With the fire from Green Hill proving ineffectual, a council of war on 16 May recommended that a battery be erected closer to the town’s west gate. Later that day the same council advised that the mortars, coehorns, and cannon at Green Hill
be moved to a hill northwest of the town and that the proposed new battery be erected there. It further recommended that eight 22-pounders, along with two 18-pounders and two 42-pounders removed from the Royal Battery, also be mounted there. While the men were in the process of transferring the guns, Pepperrell and Warren were preparing a surrender summons to send into Louisbourg.

The Summons to Surrender on 18 May

On 14 May, the day the Green Hill battery was begun, Pepperrell assembled a council of war and asked it to consider whether a surrender summons should be sent to the commanding officer in Louisbourg. But the council adjourned without making a decision. The same day, Colonel Waldo at the Royal Battery wrote to Pepperrell that both he and Colonel Bradstreet believed that the governor of Louisbourg would be justified in hanging any messenger sent with a summons, unless the army could present a more formidable appearance than it so far had shown.

In council the next day, the matter was again broached. The members of the council initially voted to send the summons as soon as the gunners at the Green Hill battery were ready to open fire. But at its afternoon session, the council, possibly with Waldo's communication in hand, decided that firing against the town should be commenced before any surrender demands were made. Finally, on 17 May, after two days of firing from the Green Hill and Royal batteries and over the objections of several senior officers who still considered it unjustified, the council voted to send the following summons to "the Commander in chief of the French King's Troops, in Louisbourg, on the Island of Cape Breton":

The Camp before Louisbourg, May 7, 1745 [Old Style date].
Whereas, there is now encamped on the island of Cape Breton, near the city of Louisbourg, a number of his Britannic Majesty's troops under the command of the Honble. Lieut. General Pepperrell, and also a squadron of his said Majesty's ships of war, under the command of the Honble. Peter Warren Esq. is now lying before the harbour of the said city, for the reduction thereof to the obedience of the crown of Great Britain.

We, the said William Pepperrell and Peter Warren, to prevent the effusion of Christian blood, do in the name of our sovereign lord, George the second, of Great Britain, France and Ireland, King &c. summon you to surrender to his obedience the said city, fortresses and territory, together with the artillery, arms and stores of war thereunto belonging. In consequence of which surrender, we the said William Pepperrell and Peter Warren, in the name of our said sovereign, do assure you that all the subjects of the French king now in said city and territory shall be treated with the utmost humanity, have their personal estate secured to them, and have leave to transport themselves and said effects to any part of the French king's dominions in Europe.

Your answere hereto is demanded at or before 5 o' the clock this afternoon.

W. Pepperrell
P. Warren

Early on the morning of 18 May, Pepperrell ordered a general cease-fire. The batteries fell silent, and as the provincial soldiers stood to arms, the walls of the fortress were crowded with women and children who joined their men to get a glimpse of the besieging army. From the provincial lines at about 11 o'clock appeared a Captain Agnue, accompanied by a drummer and a sergeant bearing a flag of truce. The captain carried the surrender summons. Entering the town through the Dauphin Gate, Agnue was met by Port Captain Morpain, who blindfolded and escorted him to the office of the commissaire-
ordonnateur, François Bigot, where the summons was delivered to Duchambon.76

Duchambon’s reply was firm, and vindicated the view of the provincial officers who considered the summons premature. He said that he would not consider any such proposition until the English army had made a decisive attack and until he was convinced that the fortress could not be held. Until then, the only answer he would offer would come from “The Mouths of our Cannons.”77

Duchambon’s refusal to surrender the fortress caused little disappointment among the soldiers of the provincial army. One volunteer happily wrote that “Seeing the Terms was not Complied with We Gave a Great Shout and Began to fire Upon the town Again.”78 They had come to fight and fight they would.

**French Sortie of 19 May and the Proposed Provincial Assault on Louisbourg of 20 May**

As the war council of 16 May had advised (since the fire from the Green Hill battery was ineffectual), a second battery was begun under the direction of Captain Joshua Pierce of Willard’s regiment. This work, called the Coehorn or Eight-Gun Battery, was situated approximately 900 yards northwest of the King’s Bastion. By 22 May it mounted four 22-pounder cannon, as well as the 9- and 11-inch mortars from the battery on Green Hill. Four more 22-pounders were added on 26 May, along with the 9-pounders and the 13-inch mortar from Green Hill. The provincials brought additional cannon from Flat Point, probably hauled at night on Meserve’s sledges.79

On the night of 19 May a French party made a sortie from the fortress with the possible intention of hindering the men transporting the guns to the Coehorn Battery. Very little is known about this sortie (its exact point of origin and its purpose), but it was repulsed and its failure seemed to dissuade Duchambon (at least for the moment) from making any more such attacks. Duchambon’s officers voted flatly against further sorties on the grounds that it was difficult enough to defend the ramparts with the 1300 men they did have. The did not wish to risk them in attacks that might prove futile at best. Besides, while the soldiers professed loyalty and submitted to authority now, they still faced charges of mutiny and insubordinate behaviour. Who could tell what they might do if they had the opportunity to escape from the punishment of a crime which was rarely pardoned?80

The morning after the sortie, 20 May, a decision of another sort was made in the provincial camp. Another council of war met and announced that Louisbourg would be attacked by storm that night. The soldiers learned of the attack about 10 a.m., and the subalterns objected strongly, preferring a longer bombardment of the town before considering such an assault. Great uneasiness pervaded the army as the men talked about the council’s decision. Commodore Warren, on shore with a number of his sailors who were to participate in the attack, noticed the general temper of the men and feared the consequences of an assault made by such unwilling soldiers. He talked with Pepperrell for some time, and afterward the company captains were asked to meet with the council in the afternoon and give their opinions on the proposed attack.81

Apparently the captains were as much opposed to the idea as the lieutenants and enlisted men, for after the meeting the council announced that the assault had been cancelled. The council advised officially that “as there appears a great dissatisfaction in many of the officers and soldiers at the designed attack on the town by storm this night, and as it may be attended with very ill consequences because of this dissatisfaction, the present attack is to be deferred for the present.”82 The army would wait for the cannon to open a breach in the walls.
The Siege

The provincial army made no regular approaches to Louisbourg by trenches, but bombarded the town at random from the Green Hill and Royal batteries, as well as from additional batteries erected between 18 and 31 May. Except for the Royal Battery, all of these works were fascine batteries, protected by faggots of various dimensions made of small tree branches or brush. In some cases, as with the Advanced Battery near the Dauphin Gate (see “The Advance Batteries” below), they also may have been protected by hogsheads filled with earth. The batteries were reinforced by earth banked against the fascines, but in only one instance — that of a trench dug at the Advanced Battery — were they entrenched works, in the sense of being dug below actual ground level. They were all sited to the northwest and north of the fortress, because the marshy ground to the southeast precluded the construction of works in that sector. Shirley was aware that several years previously the French had built a gallery toward Green Hill beneath the glacis opposite the flanked angle of the King’s Bastion. He instructed Pepperrell not to construct batteries and trenches between Green Hill and the King’s Bastion, “as the glacis that lies there before the works is to be blown up.” It is significant to note that no works were made in this vicinity through the entire siege, even though the gallery did not extend beyond the glacis itself.

The Provincial Batteries, their Effects, and French Countermeasures

Royal Battery

By 20 May the gunners at the Royal Battery had been trying for nearly a week to breach the walls of the fortress, but with little success. Through the efforts of Major Seth Pomeroy and 20 “smiths,” who were assigned the task on 16 May, some 20 cannon had now been cleared. While only four embrasures pointed against the town, Waldo reported that 241 shot had been fired from the Royal Battery between 14 and 20 May. The French return fire from the town and island batteries amounted to some 417 shot and shell.2

During this time, the fire from the Royal Battery had reportedly destroyed the roofs of three houses and knocked down several chimneys, as well as a number of embrasures of one of the bastions, probably the Dauphin. It was also reported that earlier, on 14 May, several shots had penetrated the roof of the barracks. Some of the shots fired from the Royal Battery struck short of the town, glanced off the water, and ricocheted over the walls.3

The French return fire against the Royal Battery during this period and throughout the siege, while at times heavy and on occasion continuing both day and night, lacked effect and caused comparatively little damage. The towers, however, did sustain heavy damage, but only one man was killed and only a few were wounded by the French fire.4

The greatest danger came not from the French counterfire but from the provincial gunners themselves, who, in moments of zealousness coupled with inexperience, overcharged the cannon and caused them to explode. On 16 May, one of the cannon was accidentally double-shotted, blew up, and severely
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wounded five men, including Captain Rhodes, the chief gunner. The next day two more cannon burst, probably from the same cause. And again on 27 May, two cannon exploded from double-shotting and wounded two men, one of them Captain Daniel Hale, the man upon whom, after Rhodes, Waldo was most dependent to work the guns.5

Waldo's great concern over this practice of double-shotting is revealed in his letter of 31 May to Pepperrell, in which he regretted the loss of the cannon but feared that all of the guns were in danger of the same fate "unless better regulation [is provided] than at present." The next attempt, he said, would probably be the "trying of three shott in each, which they will increase till they find their mistake...." Waldo was also plagued by food and powder shortages as well as lacking trained gunners, conditions that would persist and prove troublesome throughout the siege.6

(It might be noted here that the Royal Battery served several functions in addition to being a siege battery: it was a base supplying cannon to new batteries, a point from which, after 21 May, attacks on the Island Battery were launched, and a base from which scouting parties and patrols could operate.7)

Coehorn Battery

The Coehorn Battery had been erected by order of the 16 May war council and probably was sustained by men from Richmond's regiment. The gunners at this work were as zealous as those at the Royal Battery in trying to open a breach in the fortress wall. Located beyond a small pond northwest of the King's Bastion, the Coehorn Battery began to fire on 22 May, and until the day of the surrender "did not Cease firing Balls at The Barracks, The wall of the King's Bastion and On the town." The shot raked the streets as far as the Maurepas Gate and the crenellated wall, and damaged the barracks and the right flank of the King's Bastion. No one was safe, in either the street or the houses. The barracks were ruined by this fire, along with several houses.8

To counteract the fire from the Coehorn Battery, which Duchambon considered by far the most dangerous of the provincial batteries, the French placed two 18-pounders on a cavalier of the King's Bastion. Soldiers worked hurriedly and under fire to fill two wooden frames (coffres en planches) with fascines and earth to form embrasures for the guns and to afford a measure of protection to the gunners. At the same time, they opened two embrasures in the parapet of the right face of the King's Bastion, where two 24-pounders were mounted.9 When these measures were taken is not clear, but the work was probably done before the Advanced Battery on the heights opposite the Dauphin Demi-Bastion began to fire on 29 May.

These measures did little to hinder or reduce the fire from the Coehorn Battery; French counterfire proved equally ineffectual, and the damage it sustained from French shot was minor compared to the damage it inflicted on the walls and town. The damage suffered by the Coehorn Battery was the possibly accidental breaking of the trunnion on one of the mortars and the wounding of six men (one of whom died) on 24 May by the bursting of two 22-pounders. One man was killed and two were wounded by French fire. On 5 June the 13-inch mortar burst, "occasion'd by some Flaw in the Shell, which broke in the Mortar," and a gunner was wounded. Another 13-inch mortar was brought from Boston and mounted eight days later.10
The Advance Batteries

On 25 May the ring of provincial batteries around Louisbourg tightened further when the New Englanders raised a battery of four guns on a hill within 440 yards of the Dauphin Gate. The coehorns and the 9- and 11-inch mortars from the Coehorn Battery were removed to this work. Three days later, on 28 May, the provincials raised another battery in the same area, within approximately 250 yards of the Dauphin Gate. Although the New Englanders referred to both works as advance batteries, the latter was most commonly called the "Advanced" Battery. It was commanded by Captain Joseph Sherburne of Moore's New Hampshire Regiment. The work consisted of two 18-pounders and two 42-pounders brought from the Royal Battery, "upwards of two Miles, as the Road goes, over a rough, rocky, hilly way." The Advanced Battery, the more effective of the two works, was located on the rise of ground (known to the French as the Montagne à Francoeur) at the end of the glacis of the Dauphin Demi-Bastion. It began to fire on 29 May, although only one 18-pounder had as yet been mounted. Colonel Vaughan later stated that he "staked out the Ground [for the Advanced Battery] with his own Hands, & directed Trench to be thrown up sufficient to cover a thousand Men adjoining the Fascine [Advanced] Battery & fronting the City," and that here he "continued four successive Days and Nights doing Duty and undergoing excessive Fatigues, scarce allowing himself common Refreshments."11

Between 23 and 28 May, as a countermeasure against the advance batteries then in preparation on the heights, the French blocked up the Dauphin Gate and the adjoining guardhouses with about 18 to 20 feet of freestone, fascines, and earth. Duchambon later stated that had this not been done, the provincials could have entered through the gate immediately after the advance batteries opened fire, claiming that the walls of the gate were only about three feet thick and no stronger than a porte-cochère (carriage gate). Nor, he added, were the sides of the gate protected, the only defence consisting of créneaux on the guardhouse which could not be used once they had been reinforced with earth.12

To hinder further the preparation of the advance batteries, Duchambon ordered his men to construct some embrasures for the four cannon on the barbette of the Dauphin Demi-Bastion, on the soldiers' guardhouse. They made these embrasures of sod and earth, as there was no time to make them of stone. Duchambon also said that the flanks of all the bastions of the fortress were supplied with the cannon from privateers and any other ordnance that could be found in the town.13

Once the advance batteries opened fire, Duchambon reported, they never ceased firing until the surrender, despite continual French counterfire from the cannon on the barbette of the Dauphin Demi-Bastion and from those of the right flank of the King's Bastion. Captain Sherburne stated that his post, the Advanced Battery, was so poorly entrenched that "the most Shelter we had from the french fire (which was very hott) was Some hhds [hogsheads] filled with earth." The fire of the advance batteries was concentrated on the Dauphin Gate, in an attempt to open a breach in that section of the wall. A number of flakes (frames for drying fish) lay between the gate and the advance batteries, and the provincial gunners "was forst to Beat them away with our Shott to have a fair Sight at the Gate."14

The French soldiers at the Dauphin Demi-Bastion annoyed the gunners at the Advanced Battery with musket fire. That battery was so near the walls that "there was no safety in loading the Cannon, but under the fire of the Musquetry, which was very smart on both Sides." The French "generally open'd the Action in the Morning with the Fire of their Small-Arms for two hours; which we returned with Advantage on our Side."
Louisbourg under siege.
Bibliothèque Nationale, France.
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Five provincials were killed the first day, two by musket balls and three by cannon shot. One of those killed by cannon shot was Captain Joshua Pierce.15

The gunners at the advance batteries were “warmly entertained” by French cannon fire from a flank of the Pièce de la Grave, as well as from the cannon at the Dauphin Gate and the right flank of the King’s Bastion. To provide still more effective fire, the French cut three embrasures in the King’s-Dauphin curtain, where they mounted 36-pounder cannon. These embrasures were opened on 30 May. The guns, on the first day, demolished the embrasures of the Advanced Battery and dismounted one of its cannon, but the provincial fire went unabated and continued to wreak havoc on the buildings of the town. Among others, the houses of Messrs. Fautoux, Carrerot, Fizel, Gilbert, and Prevost were badly damaged or destroyed. A shot broke the fortress bell, and the chapel was so badly riddled that the Récollet friars abandoned it and thereafter held daily services in the hospital. When the powder magazine in the Dauphin Demi-Bastion became endangered, Duchambon ordered the powder removed to the postern in the curtain wall between the King’s and Queen’s bastions. He also ordered his men to destroy the drawbridge by cannon shot. The flag staff was shot away on 9 June.16

On 31 May the New Englanders dug a trench at the south end of the Advanced Battery and mounted an 18-pounder and two 9-pounders there. The fire from these guns and those of the Coehorn Battery was concentrated on the King’s Bastion (the fire from which flanked the Advanced Battery) where several cannon were dismounted and the cannoneers forced to abandon the guns. This fire so “annoyed” the French “that they were silent the rest of the day.” On 3 June the French mounted two new guns on the right flank of the King’s Bastion, but the shot from the advance batteries was so heavy that they abandoned them after only four hours.17

Because much damage was being done to the King’s Bastion, the French cut new embrasures in the parapet of the Dauphin Demi-Bastion near the gate on 17 June to provide increased counterfire. Two cannon were mounted there and “soon began to play with great Fury; and [the provincials] were obliged to turn Three Guns against them.” In three hours, reportedly, one of the French cannon was dismounted and the other silenced.18

Occasionally the fire would slacken and the men at the Advanced Battery, which was closest to the fortress walls, bantered with the French. One such incident occurred on the morning of 1 June. The New Englanders called out to the French soldiers at the Dauphin Demi-Bastion that it they would send out a flag of truce, they could have some of “King George’s bread” to eat. The French replied that they were not yet ready to surrender, nor did they wish any of the king’s bread. Other conversation followed, the provincials asking if there were any “Pritty girls” in the town; but the interlude was finished off “with 3 or 4 showers of bullets” on both sides.19

While the gunners at the advance batteries inflicted much damage on the town and fortifications, they sustained a minimum loss themselves, suffering a total of 10 men killed and 15 or 16 wounded, several by musket balls. The damage done to the entrenchments or the batteries during the day the New Englanders quickly repaired during the night.20

Titcomb’s Battery

On 31 May the provincials raised a fifth battery on the northwestern shore of the harbour (on what the French called the Hauteur de Martissans) across the barachois, approximately 800 yards from the Dauphin Gate. This battery, called Titcomb’s Battery after its commander, Major Moses Titcomb of
Hale’s regiment, whose men largely sustained the work, initially mounted two 42-pounders (three more 42-pounders were later added) drawn from the Royal Battery, and was designed expressly to bombard the Dauphin Gate and the circular battery of the Dauphin Demi-Bastion.\(^{21}\)

Titcomb’s Battery opened fire on 31 May. That same day its cannon knocked down the guerite and part of the salient angle of the Dauphin Demi-Bastion. The éperon near the gate, which the French had already repaired several times with freestone and earth, was demolished to the height of its embrasures. The cannon of the Advanced Battery were fired in support of Titcomb’s, and the shot soon smashed the embrasures as well and also broke through the quay wall and dismantled its embrasures. The concentrated fire from the two batteries completely demolished the Dauphin Gate, pounded a breach in the wall of the Dauphin Demi-Bastion to within ten feet of the bottom of the ditch, and severely damaged the circular battery. Major General Wolcott recorded that by 17 June, the shot had broken down the top of the West [Dauphin] gate and the wall nigh it, as low as the glacis, and dismounted the guns at that place, and dismounted all the guns in the circular battery except three, many of the embrasures being broken to pieces and the wall in a shattered condition below, and damaged a small battery below it: they had likewise dismounted the guns planted on [the King’s Bastion] at the north-west end of the citadel, the embrasures and wall being very much shattered and broken.\(^{22}\)

The fire from Titcomb’s and the advanced batteries demolished the embrasures on the right flank of the King’s Bastion (where the French had mounted six 18- and 24-pounders). Duchambon ordered his soldiers to construct some contre-merlons and wooden embrasures, and while this task was completed on 19 June and the cannon once more put to use, the embrasures were again soon smashed.\(^{23}\)

On 15 June the provincials had given the French defenders of Louisbourg an added terror by firing red-hot shot from their mortars. The French, using some type of fire-fighting device, acted swiftly to extinguish fires in several houses and otherwise managed to contain what might have proven a holocaust.\(^{24}\)

\textbf{Other Measures Taken by the French}

Despite constant counterfire from the cannon of the King’s Bastion, the Dauphin Demi-Bastion, and the Pièce de la Grave, plus musket fire from the walls and such places as the breach in the Dauphin Gate and the adjoining guardhouses, the provincial batteries continued to rain destruction on the fortress. Fearing the New Englanders would attack the town by landing in barges along the quay, Duchambon ordered his men to construct a floating barricade of masts (estacade de mâts) from the éperon of the Dauphin Demi-Bastion as far as the Pièce de la Grave. The French began the barricade about 31 May and completed it on 11 June. The soldiers who built it worked under constant fire from the provincial batteries.\(^{25}\)

Fearing an assault through the breach in the Dauphin Demi-Bastion, Duchambon ordered chief engineer Verrier to have an entrenchment built across the breach from which to defend it. This entrenchment, which stretched from the quay to the parapet at the front of the Dauphin, was finished on 24 June, the French doing much of the construction work at night.\(^{26}\)

Also, at some point during the siege, the French raised an épaulement of dry stone at the king’s bakery, and established a corps de garde for the militia.\(^{27}\)

But no matter what measures were taken, they were not enough. By 26 June, further resistance would seem useless. “Never was a place so mauled with cannon and shells,” Pepperrell would write after the capitulation. He estimated that the
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provincial batteries had fired into the town about 9,000 cannon shot and 600 mortar bombs. The destruction was tremendous. The streets were rent from end to end, and every building and all of the houses save one were damaged or destroyed and unfit for habitation. The right flank of the King's Bastion no longer existed, except as a pile of rubble, and the King's-Dauphin curtain was riddled with shot. The Dauphin Demi-Bastion had taken the brunt of the cannonade and was badly pummelled: the Dauphin Gate had been reduced to a gaping breach, the newly cut embrasures had been knocked to pieces, all but three of the guns at the circular battery had been dismounted, and the wall of the battery itself beaten down. The éperon was completely dismantled, as were the embrasures along the quay. The French powder supplies were nearing exhaustion, and the garrison waited anxiously for the attack that was sure to come through the breach at the Dauphin.

French Morale and the Capture of the Vigilant, 30 May

Despite the fatigues and devastation that each day brought, the garrison and residents of Louisbourg displayed a remarkable determination to withstand the onslaught made against them. They worked untiringly to clear the debris from the ramparts so the cannon might still be used. Children, 10 and 12 years of age, bore arms and stood to the walls with the soldiers, “exposing themselves with a courage beyond their years.” There were exceptions, however, and deserters reported to the provincials that some of the regular soldiers were succumbing to the mounting pressures. They desired to surrender and would often refuse their duties; these disagreements, it was said, even led to frequent duels, one of which some provincial soldiers saw from a tower of the Royal Battery. Several Swiss soldiers managed to escape, and on 19 June a French soldier attempted to get out of the town with a letter from a captured provincial to his friends, but was discovered and immediately hanged. Yet most of the soldiers and residents seem to have resolved to hold out to the last extremity, this despite fitful and sleepless nights on the ramparts and in the casemates with, reportedly, no meat left in the town and a diet of fish, bread, and peas; with their powder nearly exhausted, and their last hope of succour gone with the capture of the Vigilant.

The spirits of the defenders of Louisbourg were badly shaken by the capture of the 64-gun French man-of-war, the Vigilant, upon which they had relied heavily for relief. The Vigilant, manned by 500 sailors and commanded by Captain de La Maisonfort, sailed from Brest on 26 April with orders to get into Louisbourg harbour and help defend the place. Word had been received that the English were going to attack. (Only one French ship, a snow, had been able to get into the harbour since the provincial landing, and she carried only supplies for the fishermen.) Should Louisbourg be blockaded, La Maisonfort was instructed to do what he could to help without needlessly endangering his ship. The Vigilant was laden with stores for the garrison, a large number of cannon, and a great quantity of much-needed powder. She also, reportedly, carried 20 chests of small-arms, as well as stores and rigging for a privateer then being fitted out at Quebec.

According to the habitant de Louisbourg, the Vigilant came in view of the fortress on 28 or 29 May, about a league and a half distant from Scatarie Island, with a good northeast wind for her destination. The British blockading squadron was at least two and a half leagues to leeward, and it seemed the Vigilant would be able to slip into Louisbourg harbour without difficulty. But about noon on 30 May, La Maisonfort spotted the English ship Mermaid (40 guns), Captain Douglass commanding, close in-shore and gave chase, hoisting the French
11 French cannon crew on the right flank of the King's Bastion, firing toward the New Englanders' advanced battery.

Photo by A. Fennell.
flag and pennant as he closed. The *Mermaid*’s stern gun opened on the *Vigilant*, and Douglass signalled the rest of the fleet that he had sighted a strange ship. The *Vigilant* replied to the *Mermaid* with a shot from her bow cannon, and the fight was on. At 2 o’clock, La Maisonfort discovered the remainder of Warren’s squadron closing from the northward and, giving the *Mermaid* a broadside in passing, hoisted full sail and bore off to the southward. Douglass gave chase and for the next four hours gave broadside for broadside. At about 6 o’clock, Captain Rous in the *Shirley* galley joined the *Mermaid* and gave the *Vigilant* a shot from his bow gun. The *Eltham* joined at 7 o’clock, and Warren in the *Superbe* fell in an hour later. At 9 o’clock, La Maisonfort asked for quarter. The *Vigilant*’s rigging, masts, and yards were badly damaged, and the ship itself was unserviceable. Sixty of her crew of 500 were killed or wounded. The French were transferred to the British ships.

The next day, 31 May, Warren notified Pepperrell of the capture, advising him that he intended “to Commission [the ship] for his Majesty,” and hoped that Pepperrell would be able to furnish a crew to man her. He also told Pepperrell that as the *Vigilant* had been “much shattered” in the engagement, he was sending her into Gabarus Bay for repairs and refitting, “and beg that you will direct vessels to come to take the Prisoners from us ... [as] otherwise the Cruizers will be useless, with such numbers on board.” Warren hoped that the capture of the *Vigilant* “will be a very happy event, for our further success.”

The *Vigilant*’s fate was far from a “happy event” for the French. “Witnessing his manoeuvre,” wrote the habitant, “there was not one of us who did not curse such a poorly planned & imprudent manoeuvre.” La Maisonfort had displayed great courage in the engagement, but he would have been better advised to continue to his destination, which was all the King’s interest demanded. The Minister had not sent him to pursue any enemy Vessel: loaded with munitions & stores, his Vessel was intended solely to resupply our unfortunate Place, which would never have been taken had we received such great succour; but we were the devout victims of God’s wrath, which willed that even our own forces should be used against us.

The loss of the *Vigilant* “daunted those who had remained most resolute ... and many people were of the opinion that the time had come to request terms of surrender.” But the fortress held out.

To say that Louisbourg would not have fallen had the *Vigilant* passed through Warren’s blockade is debatable. There are arguments for both sides of the question. The siege would have been prolonged in any case. La Maisonfort’s spirited sailors would have greatly cheered the defenders and perhaps have instilled in them added determination to resist; the cannon and powder the *Vigilant* carried would have been of great use to the garrison; and the broadsides of her 64 guns would have made it very uncomfortable for the provincial gunners at the Royal and advance batteries. But the key to the Louisbourg defences was still the Island Battery, and it would probably have been only a matter of time before the provincials erected a battery to counter the fire from that work. Then Warren’s fleet could enter the harbour and, though the British squadron would have to come one at a time through the narrow north channel, neither the *Vigilant*’s 64 guns nor the determination of seamen would have much effect against the broadsides of 11 battleships, each averaging from 40 to 60 cannon.

The supply of powder on board the *Vigilant* would now be used by the besiegers, however, and, noted the habitant, “we perceived that their fire had since become much heavier.”
The Attacks on the Island Battery, 18 May-6 June

French spirits were raised temporarily on 6 June, when the garrison of the Island Battery aborted a provincial attack on that post. The Island Battery, a strong fortification defended by about 200 men and 36 cannon under command of d'Ailleboust stood defiantly in the middle of the harbour entrance and was the only obstacle preventing Warren's squadron from entering and raking the fortress from the harbour. The provincial commanders feared that the town might not be taken unless the fleet could get into the harbour and the fortress be bombarded from land and sea.\(^{38}\) The abortive assault of 6 June was the culminating effort of several planned attacks on the island stronghold.

As early as 18 May, immediately following Duchambon's refusal to surrender the town, a council of war advised that an attack be made on the Island Battery. Commodore Warren brought a number of seamen ashore to assist, and that night about 800 men, including Colonel Gorham's regiment, were to set out for Gabarus Bay. The whaleboats, however, were late in coming and because of high surf and approaching daylight, the attempt was cancelled. Similar attempts were planned on 19 and 20 May, but these were also cancelled, probably because of high surf. The New Englanders apparently wearied of trying to attack the island by sea, believing that the waters of the harbour afforded a safer approach, because on 21 May the whaleboats were carried overland from Gabarus Bay to the Royal Battery, whence an attack was planned for that night. Warren and his seamen were still on shore to participate, but again the attack was called off.\(^{39}\)

On 22 May, Colonel Vaughan proposed that he be allowed to organize an attempt, but nothing came of his proposal. Warren, who for several days had been on shore to participate in the proposed attacks, ordered his seamen back on the ships on 23 May. The Commodore himself returned to the Superbe "not a little dissatisfied."\(^{40}\)

Not until 2 June were plans again made for attacking the Island Battery, and the whaleboats were again prepared for use. About 150 men carried additional boats from Gabarus Bay, "which was the Hardest Service I've Ever Undergone in all my Life," wrote one soldier, "(and So Said they all) but having a Prospect thereby to take the Island Battery made us Cheerfully Endure our burden." Despite the men's exertions, the attempt was cancelled, "owing to the moon & the northern lights," and because the men who showed up for the attack were without officers and "in liquor."\(^{41}\)

Yet another attack, this one much better organized, was prepared for the night of 3 June. That day, Colonel Waldo sent two of his captains to visit other regiments to find suitable volunteers for the project. In a letter to Pepperrell, Waldo said that Major Thatcher of Gorham's regiment had 15 men, including himself, willing to take part, but that he was having difficulty obtaining cooperation from Hale's regiment. Hale's men were using their work on the new Titcomb's Battery as an excuse for not taking part. Waldo, however, did manage to "detach" several unwilling volunteers from Hale and wanted to get 50 or 100 more. He also felt that the services of Captain John Card's company (of Moulton's regiment), Elder Harnar's company (of Pepperrell's regiment), and Captain Terry's men (of Willard's regiment) would be particularly useful. Commodore Warren wrote Pepperrell that he hoped to be able to provide upwards of 200 seamen for the attempt.\(^{42}\)

Exactly which units took part in the 3 June attempt has not been determined, but all day a great number of men were busy preparing paddles and ladders for "near fifty" whaleboats, and at about midnight some 500 men of the army and fleet embarked for the island. They were commanded by Lieutenant
An artilleryman of the Canoniers bombardiers unit and two infantrymen of the Compagnies franches de la Marine stationed at Louisbourg.

Photo by A. Fennell.
Colonel Arthur Noble of Waldo’s regiment and Colonel John Gorham.^

When the provincials set off from the Royal Battery, their course was illuminated by a “Remarkable Northern Twilight,” but by the time they drew near the island a dense fog had rolled in and they could not see where to land. The assault was then called off. Colonel Noble’s conduct in the affair was called into question, and Seth Pomeroy, the gunsmith, claimed that Noble could not be found at the time the attack got under way. Pomeroy implied that the volunteers went without him and that “For want of an officer the Soldiers Return’d.” The rumour of Noble’s negligence persisted, and the next day a council of war examined the charges. The council, however, found no grounds to accuse either Noble or Gorham of misconduct in the affair.^

The council also announced “that if a number of men to the amount of three or four hundred appear as volunteers for [another] attack of the Island Battery, they be allowed to choose their own officers and be entitled to the plunder found there.” The prospect of plunder brought about 400 men together on 6 June. They selected Captain (Edward?) Brooks to lead them. Pepperrell’s secretary, Green, directed that all pistols in Hale’s regiment be turned over to the men volunteering for the attack. As the men assembled at the Royal Battery, Captain Sherburne at the Advanced Battery prepared to support them with diversionary fire from his cannon. The night was cool and foggy and there was a very high surf. At midnight the men climbed into the boats and rowed toward the island but, Seth Pomeroy wrote, “Providence Seemed Remarkable to Frown upon the affair.” They were discovered before all the troops could be landed.^

As the provincials began to disembark at the island, somebody yelled “Hurrah!” and the alarm went up. Some New Englanders later believed that the French had been warned of the attack and were waiting in ambush. The French gunners loaded their cannon with langrange (like grapeshot), pointed them toward the whaleboats, and opened fire, causing much disorder and confusion among the provincials but apparently doing little damage. Many of the boats were cut off by the cannon fire and turned back, but four or five beached on the island and the men scrambled ashore, firing their muskets and pistols at the shadowy figures on the walls above them. Some of the small arms misfired, the powder being soaked by the mist and by the high surf as the men jumped ashore. Several of the provincials hauled ladders from the boats and placed them against the walls, the men all the while under heavy musket fire from the ramparts above. Duchambon reported later that the commandant, d’Ailleboust, along with the governor’s son and an ensign, de La Pérelle, were the first to climb upon the ramparts to fire on the New Englanders, and that their men urged them to get back from the walls and not expose themselves.^

For two hours, the small-arms fighting continued at close quarters. Then, the situation hopeless, the provincials broke and ran for the boats. But the tide had carried off many of the boats and there were not enough left to accommodate all of the men. The remaining boats were soon filled, probably overloaded. Cannon shot cut one of them in half as it was pushed off from the island, the men drowning in the surf. The provincials in the other boats would not come to their rescue for fear they too would be sunk by cannon fire.^

Some of the men went ashore at Lighthouse Point, while others made it back to the Royal Battery to carry news of the debacle to Pepperrell. “Now things looke something dark,” wrote Green. The provincial losses were about 60 men killed and from 112 to 119 captured. Some of the dead washed up on shore at the lighthouse; some of the wounded had to have limbs amputated.^

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"Wee have great Reason to be humble'd before God," wrote one diarist, and the next day the batteries for a time were strangely silent. "From all accounts," wrote the Reverend Joseph Emerson, "we learn the men are prodigiously discouraged."49

The French, however, were cheered by the result of this encounter. They had only three men killed or wounded, and the repulse of the provincials at the Island Battery was the only real success they had experienced since the siege began. Duchambon, perhaps unwittingly, exaggerated the numbers of the provincials, reporting that 1,000 soldiers in 35 barges, with 800 reinforcements, had been driven in panic from the island that night.50

To Pepperrell, the repulse at the Island Battery was doubly unfortunate, for he could ill afford the loss of so many soldiers. His army was sick with dysentery, or what was then called the "bloody fluxes," brought on by fatigue, lack of proper food, and poor and unsanitary living conditions. During this period at least 1,500 men were unfit for duty. For days Pepperrell had been appealing to Shirley and the other New England governors to send more men, but he could not count on their arriving for some time yet. The troops were becoming demoralized, and the defeat at the Island Battery only added to the general despair. One volunteer wrote to his father that "I am sorry to find our New England troops ... want to go home, home, is all ye cry & [they all say] if I was well at home I'd engage they should never find me such a fool again — this is the language of those who are as well used as can be." It is hardly surprising that Pepperrell wrote on 13 June that "I apprehend no further attempts will be made on [the Island Battery] by boats."51

**Friction Grows Between the Provincial Commanders**

The Island Battery had to be silenced if Warren's squadron was to help, and Warren himself was growing impatient. He was far from satisfied with the seemingly inactive role the navy had played blocking the harbour against French ships, and he complained that he was tired of doing nothing.

On 4 June, Warren had sent a plan ashore for Pepperrell's review and approval. The plan had already been approved by Warren's ships' captains. It proposed that the *Vigilant* be fitted out and manned by 600 landsmen, that 1,000 men from the army embark on the other vessels of the squadron, that the harbour be forced, and that a vigorous attack on the town be made by boats from the ships. A council of war called on 5 June "maturely considered" Warren's plan and, in effect, rejected it on several grounds: there was too much sickness in the army and the men could not be spared; Pepperrell had learned that Duchambon had sent for Marin's detachment of French and Indians, and the men must be kept at hand to meet that contingent when it arrived; the men, being unused to the sea, would soon be unfit for service by being kept on board the ships. In time, the council advised, a concerted action would be arranged, but not at the present.52

The council's decision did little to alleviate Warren's impatience, and on 6 June he wrote brusquely to Pepperrell: *For God's sake, let us do something and not waste our time in indolence. I sincerely wish you all the honour and success imaginable and only beg to know in what manner I can be more serviceable, than in cruising, to prevent the introduction of succours to the garrison. I fear that if that be all that is expected from the ships, or that they can do, Louisbourg will be safe for some time, for my part I have proposed all that I*
think can be done already, and only wait for your answer thereto.53

Pepperrell’s reply, which did not come until 8 June, was hardly calculated to placate the anxious Warren for it dealt, at some length, only with the army and its condition. The troops, Pepperrell wrote, had in just 29 days erected five fascine batteries, and ... with 16 pieces of cannon, and our mortars mounted at said batteries, and with our cannon from the royal battery, we have been playing on the town, by which we have greatly distrest the inhabitants, made some breaches in the wall, especially at the west gate, which we have beat down, and made a considerable breach there, and doubt not but shall soon reduce the circular battery. That in this time we have made five unsuccessful attempts upon the island battery, in the last of which we lost about 189 men, and many of our boats were shot to pieces, and many of our men drowned before they could land; that we have also kept out scouts to destroy any settlements of the enemy near us, and prevent a surprise in our camp ... that by the services aforesaid and the constant guards kept night and day around the camp, at our batteries, the army is very much fatigued, and sickness prevails among us, to that degree that we now have but 2100 effective men, six hundred of which are gone in the quest of two bodies of French and Indians [one of which was thought to be that of Marin's] we are informed are gathering, one to the eastward, and the other to the westward.54

The commodore would have to wait. The council had decided not to make any more attacks against the Island Battery, and Warren’s officers advised that it was not practicable for the fleet to try to enter the harbour until that battery was silenced.55

The Erection of the Lighthouse Battery, 12–21 June

On 12 June the provincials decided to erect a battery at Lighthouse Point opposite the Island Battery about 3,400 feet distant. The final decision to erect the battery came only after the repeated failures to take the Island Battery pointed up the need for such a work. Waldo on 6 June had urged Pepperell to erect a work there, and Warren on 12 June likewise pressed Pepperell to “hasten the battery at the lighthouse” because the pilots thought it “impossible to go in [to the harbour] till [the Island Battery] can be silenced.”56

Pepperrell told Warren that the battery would soon be completed, that “there are three embrasures facing the Island Battery, and six facing the sea,” and that he hoped to have the cannon mounted there in two days. Transporting the cannon must have proved more of a difficulty than Pepperrell had anticipated, because it was nearly eight days before the guns were mounted. The New Englanders carried them by boat from Gabarus Bay to a point about a mile and a quarter east of the lighthouse, where they dragged them up the steep cliffs along the shoreline. By 21 June they had mounted two 18-pounders (four were mounted on 25 June). The “great mortar” was also carried to the lighthouse and mounted. The battery was sustained by 320 men of Gorham’s regiment.57

A number of provincials (possibly Gorham’s regiment) had been stationed for some time on the lighthouse side of the harbour in anticipation of erecting a battery there. Duchambon knew of their presence, and a Lieutenant Vallée of the artillery company had informed him that several 18- and 24-pounders, some still serviceable, had been buried at the careening wharf near the lighthouse some ten years previously to serve as piles (corps-morts). Duchambon feared that the provincials would find the guns and use them to equip a battery against the
island. Unknown to the French, the New Englanders had already found these cannon. But on the night of 27 May the French commander set a detachment of about 100 local men and militia, as well as some privateers under Beaubassin, to try to prevent the provincials from setting up a battery on that side of the harbour.\textsuperscript{58}

Beaubassin and his men set out in three \textit{chaloupes}, with food for 10 to 12 days and 30 to 50 rounds of ammunition. They reached Grande Lorembec that night, came ashore, and the following morning encountered about 40 provincial soldiers near the lighthouse. The New Englanders were prepared (Bigot asserted they had been warned by a fisherman who had deserted from Beaubassin), and a sharp skirmish resulted. The French failed to press their numerical advantage, panicked, and retreated into the woods. Many, being near their homes and not wishing to be confined again inside the fortress, deserted. Others in the rush threw their supplies away and returned to the town, hungry and tired, several days later. The provincials reportedly suffered no casualties in the fight, and the French loss was three men killed and several wounded. Dudley Bradstreet recorded that a French captain who was mortally wounded and taken prisoner offered 10,000 pounds (livres?) for a priest to pardon his sins. Mockingly, Bradstreet asserted that he would have been willing to do this himself, and for half the money.\textsuperscript{59}

The Lighthouse Battery was finished and opened fire on the Island Battery on 21 June. The shot swept the west platform of the French fortification and prevented the gunners from working the cannon. When the large mortar began to fire, 17 out of 19 shells reportedly fell within the work, one of them upon the magazine. “And this together with the Fire from our Cannon, to which the enemy was very much exposed, they having but little to shelter ‘em from the Shott, which rang’d quite thro’ their Line of Barracks, so terrified ‘em that many left the Fort and ran into the Water for Refuge.” The provincial fire soon knocked holes in the barracks and the bakery (both of which had been reinforced with wood from the store of a M. Dacarrette), nearly ruining these buildings. The French responded to the bombardment, but the Lighthouse Battery was so placed that they could not bring an effective counterfire against it.\textsuperscript{60} The Island Battery was rapidly becoming untenable, and it was only a matter of time before Warren’s fleet would be free to enter the harbour.

\textbf{The Proposed Assault of 26 June and the Surrender of Louisbourg}

The time was not long in coming. By 26 June the New Englanders had readied a general assault by land and sea. Between 21 and 26 June Warren and Pepperrell had been in constant correspondence with each other and had held numerous joint councils. The records of the correspondence and councils between the two commanders indicate that, of the two, Warren was the more anxious for the attack, while Pepperrell, mindful of the disastrous results of the 6 June attack on the Island Battery, relied more upon the siege guns to gradually wear

\textsuperscript{13} Marine Captain James M’Donald entered Louisbourg on 19 June under a flag of truce. He carried a letter from Maisonneuve, the captured captain of the French warship \textit{Vigilant}, to Commandant Duchambon, requesting that Duchambon ensure that British prisoners of the Mi’kmaq were treated as well as the British were treating their French prisoners. Photo by A. Fennell.
down the French defences. The Lighthouse Battery was effectively reducing the Island Battery, and Warren was able to win Pepperrell over to the scheme for a combined attack on the fortress. The preparations for the attack had been completed. The fleet, now numbering 11 warships and several armed New England vessels, had been cleared for action; the spare timbers and masts had been removed, and the decks barricaded with moss as protection against small-arms fire. Six hundred men of the army supplemented the crews of the warships. Provision for three large beacon fires had been made on three hills west of the fortress. When ignited, these fires would serve as guides for Warren’s ships as they entered the harbour, possibly indicating that a night attack had been planned. Ladders and fascines for filling the ditch and scaling the walls had been carried to the Advanced Battery, where Captain Sherburne by 12 noon had “got all our platforms Laid, ambrazures mended, Guns in Order, Stock of Cartridges, Shot in Place, Gunners Quartered, Dined, & matches Lit,” ready for the signal to attack. Commodore Warren was on shore, and the troops drawn up on parade heard him proclaim that “He’d Rather Leave his Body at Louisbourg, than not take the Citty.” Everyone was ready; all that was needed now was a favourable wind.

The French in Louisbourg looked apprehensively on the preparations for the assault they knew they could not withstand. By 26 June they were dispirited and fatigued from the rigorous defence they had made, from much work and no sleep. Now they began to question whether further resistance was justified. The Island Battery was a shambles; its fire was slack and ineffective and would no longer keep the enemy fleet out of the harbour. The town was in ruins, the fortifications were

14 French cannoneers in the heat of battle.
Photo by A. Fennell.
The Siege

breached, and of the 1,300 men who had undertaken the
defence of the fortress, nearly 50 had been killed, another 80 to
95 had been severely wounded, and several had succumbed to
utter exhaustion. Reportedly the French had not changed their
clothes since the day the provincials landed in Gabarus Bay.63
The capture of the Vigilant had removed all hope of succour,
and Duchambon had heard nothing from Marin's detachment,
which he had sent for on 16 May. It was a time of great des­
pair, and the habitant wrote that “the Councils were more
frequent than ever ...; we gathered together without knowing
why, for no one knew what was to be decided.” He continued,
*I often laughed at these assemblies, where everything that
happened was ridiculous & which heralded trouble and
indecision. Our defence was no longer what concerned us. If
the English knew how to take advantage of our fear, they would
have taken us long hence, sword in hand. But it must be said to
their credit that they were just as afraid as us.*54

Now it seemed that the English were no longer afraid, and
while the soldiers might be willing to fight on, the residents
had had enough. On the morning of 26 June they petitioned
Duchambon to surrender. They pointed out that since the
enemy force both on land and on sea was increasing daily, and
since the French had obtained no aid and could not hope to
defeat the New Englanders, Duchambon and his officers should
ask for terms so the residents might keep what little property
remained to them. Duchambon asked Verrier to report on the
state of the fortifications; he made a similar request of Sainte-
Marie about the status of the ammunition. These reports were
rendered and a council of war was called, the members voting
unanimously that, because of the growing enemy force and the
condition of the fortifications, ammunition, and town, it would
be best to capitulate.65 After the council’s decision, Ducham­
bon composed the following note to Pepperrell and Warren:

Desirous of putting a stop to acts of hostility; and prevent the
effusion of blood on one side and on the other, I send you an
officer of our garrison to deliver you the present [letter], in
order to desire on you a suspension of arms, for so long a time
as shall be needful for me to make proposals to you, upon the
conditions of which I shall determine to deliver up to you, the
place which the King my master has entrusted me with.66

Ensign de La Pérelle, who had recovered from a wound
received during the 6 June attack on the Island Battery, was
designated to carry the letter to the provincial commanders. At
4 o’clock in the afternoon, the ensign appeared at the Dauphin
Gate under a flag of truce. He was met halfway between the
gate and the Advanced Battery by Captain Sherburne, who then
escorted him to Colonel Richmond at Green Hill. There he was
either met by or taken to Pepperrell and Warren, to whom he
handed over Duchambon’s letter. The provincial commanders
granted Duchambon until 8 o’clock the next morning (27 June)
to present the terms upon which he would surrender the for­
tress.67 A general cessation of hostilities was called.

Duchambon submitted his terms between 8 and 9 o’clock on
the morning of 27 June. These terms, carried to the provincial
lines by Bonnavearture, were not accepted by Pepperrell and
Warren, who then sent in their own terms for the capitulation
(see Appendix D). The articles were basically the same as
those contained in the summons of 18 May: that the inhabitants
and their effects would be transported to France and, if needed,
vessels would be provided for the purpose; that the officers
and inhabitants would be permitted to remain in their houses
and enjoy freedom of religion without molestation; that the
non-commissioned officers and soldiers would be placed on
board British ships and transported to France; that the sick and
wounded would be cared for; that two covered wagons could
be sent off under the inspection of only one provincial officer
who would search only for warlike stores; and that anyone who
so desired might go off masked. This last condition was one that Duchambon initially asked for and raises the suspicion that, for various reasons, there were persons in the fortress who wanted to leave without being seen — perhaps a New Englander who had deserted to the French, or a privateer or contraband merchant who might have been recognized by certain members of the provincial army.

In return for these terms, the governor was to see that the surrender took place as soon as possible, that the Island Battery or some other battery, along with all its artillery and ammunition, was turned over to provincial soldiers that day, that Warren’s fleet was permitted to enter the harbour unmolested, that officers, soldiers, and residents of the fortress would not take up arms against the English for 12 months, and that all British subjects then in the town were immediately delivered up. These conditions were to be met by 6 o’clock that evening, or the provincials threatened to “decide the matter with our arms.”

The terms made no allowance for the “honours of war,” that is, the troops being permitted to march out bearing arms, with drums beating and flags unfurled, and Duchambon refused to consider them unless that provision was included. He wrote two letters, one to Pepperrell and another to Warren, saying that he could not allow the troops to leave the fortress without these honours, that they were honours due to soldiers who had done their duty, and that once the provincial commanders agreed to that provision, he would agree to the rest.

On 28 June Pepperrell informed Duchambon that both he and Warren would allow the French troops to march out with the honours of war. The officers and other inhabitants, he wrote, should repair to their houses where they would be safe, and the arms should be put in a safe magazine and would be turned over to the French soldiers the day they marched out of town. With this, Duchambon accepted the terms and formally ended the siege of Louisbourg.

The siege had lasted 47 days, and the number of casualties sustained on either side seems incredibly low. The French claimed that 50 men had been killed and from 80 to 95 severely wounded, while the provincial losses were estimated at 100 men killed by the French and 30 others who had died of sickness. No mention of the number of wounded has been found.

The Island Battery was delivered up to Warren by M. de Gannes on the morning of 28 June, and the English colours were raised on the flagstaff. At 2 o’clock that afternoon, Warren entered Louisbourg harbour at the head of his squadron, “which made a beautiful Appearance.” When the ships were sufficiently moored, a broadside salute was fired and the soldiers and sailors gave three cheers.

At 4 o’clock, several regiments of the army advanced toward the town to take possession. At the head of the column marched Colonel John Bradstreet, followed by Pepperrell and his officers. They entered through the Queen’s Gate and, as the New Englanders moved toward the parade ground where the French were drawn up in order, Girard La Croix noted the flags flying, the drums beating, and the odd combination of sound offered by the trumpets, flutes, and violins that accompanied the tread of the victorious provincials. The French men and women who watched “looked very sorrowful,” one witness remarked. At the parade ground, the officers of the two armies exchanged the usual salutes, “every Part being performed with all the Decency and Decorum imaginable,” and the town was officially surrendered.

Guards were posted to prevent looting, but they had little effect. The New Englanders, decried the habitant, “contrary to the pledge given at our capitulation ... fell upon our Houses & Took whatever they fancied.” Bigot also accused the provincials of “much pillaging and many affronts” to the inhabitants.
after the surrender. But there was no recourse against the violators.

Conclusions

The outcome of the siege both surprised and shocked French officials in Paris who found it difficult to understand how an amateur army of undisciplined volunteers could capture the “strongest” French fortress in North America. The New Englanders, however, who from the beginning were supremely confident of success, were not at all surprised at the outcome. They had come to capture Louisbourg and this they had done; it was as simple as that. If asked for specific reasons for their success, however, most of them probably would not have been able to respond adequately. Many attributed success to the will of God, of whom they were the instrument designed to rid the continent of a great “Stronghold of Satan.” Others would not know why they had succeeded, but thought it was “the most glorious and useful thing done in the war.”

Obviously, the reasons for the New England victory at Louisbourg go far beyond the simple explanation that it was the “will of God,” and, indeed, beyond any single factor. In searching for answers to the question it is useful to recall the words of Captain H.F. Thullier, R.E., who, in his book *The Principles of Land Defence* (1902), cautioned:

*Nothing is more difficult than to correctly analyse the causes of success or failure in the attack and defence of fortresses in past times. The reason of this is that the causes are, as a rule, very complex.... There are a great number of conditions which enter into each case, and many, or all of them, may have had a bearing on the result. The activity of the garrison, the organization of the defence, the ability and resolution of the commander, the relative power of the ordnance, the sufficiency of the supplies, all these and many other causes may have important effects upon the results of sieges; and also the fate of the fortresses is often influenced by the tactical methods and energy of the attackers, as well as by external strategic considerations, such as the movements of other bodies of troops elsewhere. It is seldom too that complete data on these heads are available, so wrong conclusions are often arrived at on this account. It therefore often happens that a false importance is given to one or other of the conditions in a particular case, and wrong deductions are made from the erroneous premise thus set up. It is thus seldom safe to seize upon particular events and deduce therefrom particular theories.*

With this admonition in mind, a few of the more patent factors that contributed to the provincial success might be suggested. Among these factors must be placed the provincial occupation of the Royal Battery early in the siege. Possession of this battery not only gave the New Englanders effective control of the inner harbour, but it also provided them with a much-needed supply of serviceable heavy-calibre cannon, left behind when the French abandoned the battery. The New Englanders never adequately utilized their control of the harbour to launch an attack by water against the town (although several attacks were directed against the Island Battery), but the surplus cannon were used to strengthen the armament of the several batteries raised against the fortress.

Other factors were, first, the erection of the Advanced and Titcomb's batteries, and then, near the close of the siege, the erection of the Lighthouse Battery. Pepperrell and his officers, though ignorant of the fine points in the art of siegework, clearly realized the necessity of effecting a breach in the fortress walls before the place could be taken. The Green Hill Battery, raised soon after the landing, was of little use in this respect because of the excessive range. The Coehorn Battery,
composed mostly of mortars, proved equally ineffective on the fortifications, although it did cause great destruction to the interior of the town. Not until the Advanced and Titcomb's batteries were formed, mainly of cannon removed from the Royal Battery, were the New Englanders able to greatly neutralize the French defence and breach the walls, thus preparing the way for a land assault.

Perhaps the French could have withstood a land assault. The erection of the Lighthouse Battery, however, soon added another dimension to the threat — an attack by sea. One of the key works in the French defence system was the Island Battery, standing athwart the harbour entrance and effectively barring the entry of the British fleet. Both Warren and Pepperrell feared that success would not be assured until the Island Battery was rendered impotent and the ships were permitted to enter the harbour for a combined land and sea assault on the town. Pepperrell was slow to realize the need for the Lighthouse Battery, preferring initially to launch boat attacks against the island stronghold. Not until the abortive attack of 6 June did he concede the folly of such strategy and push forward the completion of the Lighthouse Battery.

The New Englanders soon realized the value of that battery. After only two days of firing, it effectively silenced the Island Battery. Duchambon must have known that while a land attack might be repulsed, a combined land and sea assault could prove disastrous. He could not risk subjecting the inhabitants and garrison to the destruction such an attack would bring. Surrender seemed the only course open to him.

The importance of the Advanced, Titcomb's, and Lighthouse batteries cannot be over-emphasized. Without them, ultimate success would surely have been delayed and perhaps lost. Samuel Waldo was forcibly impressed by the contribution these works made to the reduction of Louisbourg, and on 7 November 1757 he advised Secretary of State William Pitt of the great benefits to be derived from the erection of similar batteries, should England contemplate another attack on the fortress.  

Of equal, if not greater, significance was Louisbourg's very poor defensive position. Surrounded on the landward side by dominating heights, its security would be threatened by an enemy occupying those heights. The French seem to have given little serious consideration to the dangers thus posed, nor, indeed, to the prospect of an enemy attack at all. It they had given serious thought to preparing an adequate defence, they might have constructed outworks to retard or prevent an enemy from occupying the high ground north and west of the fortress. Although some works apparently were projected, none was constructed.

The French should have been particularly concerned about the rise of ground located about 250 yards northwest of the glacis at the Dauphin Demi-Bastion and known to them as the Montagne à Francoeur. This height was a very commanding position and posed great dangers to the fortifications in this sector. An enemy battery situated on this hill could quite easily breach the walls. The French should have placed an outwork on this height to prevent it being occupied, or, at the very least, should have levelled it to diminish the advantage it would afford an enemy. Neither of these expedients was taken. The provincials soon raised here the Advanced Battery and effected the breach in the Dauphin Demi-Bastion that opened the way for a land assault.

Duchambon recognized early that to withstand a siege he would have to have some form of external relief. With very few exceptions, as the history of siege warfare reveals, no fortress has been able to resist a resolute besieging army indefinitely without some form of external aid. To quote Captain Thullier again:
However strong the works and powerful the armament, however complete the organization and ample the supplies, a fortress will never, if invested by superior and resolute forces, be able to achieve its own deliverance without external help. This external help may take the form of an army advancing to its relief by driving off the besiegers, or it may be the effect of successful strategical action in other parts of the theatre of war, which results in the withdrawal of the assailing force; but failing these it is absolutely necessary that the external communications of the fortress should be kept open so that fresh supplies and munitions can be received. Without this it is a mere question of time till the garrison are forced to lay down their arms from starvation or lack of cartridges. On the other hand, with open communications there is no reason why a properly defended fortress should not be able to hold out for an indefinite time against a greatly superior force.  

Early in the siege Duchambon doubted his ability to withstand a siege with the force under his immediate command and sent for Marin’s detachment to come and drive off the New Englanders. Marin, however, failed to arrive in time. With supplies of food and powder dwindling rapidly and the situation looking bleaker each day, the French attached great hope to the arrival of the *Vigilant* for the much-needed relief. But Warren’s fleet had effectively blockaded Louisbourg’s sea communications and captured the *Vigilant* before she reached her destination. Her capture doomed Louisbourg’s chances for relief. With no hope for a successful outcome of the contest, the inhabitants petitioned Duchambon to surrender.

The war between Britain and France did not end with the capture of Louisbourg; it continued for another three years. But the Louisbourg campaign was the most significant and dramatic event of the war in the North American theatre of operations. At the peace conference in 1748 England returned Louisbourg to France, much to the anger and protests of the New England colonies. In 1758, during the Seven Years’ War, the French fortress was again besieged, this time by regular troops of the British army. It is significant that the pattern of operations during the siege of 1758 very closely paralleled those carried out 13 years earlier. Perhaps the provincials were not such amateurs after all.
Appendix A. Chronology of the Siege of Louisbourg, 1745.

May 11 (Tuesday)
Fair and pleasant; high surf about 11 a.m. Between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. the provincial transports anchor in Gabarus Bay. French force sent from town to oppose landing. The provincials make a feint of landing at Flat Point while actual landing begins at Freshwater Cove. A brief skirmish ensues with small losses on both sides. About 2,000 provincial soldiers are landed by nightfall. The Royal Battery is ordered abandoned and in the early morning of May 12, Thierry transfers his troops to the town.

May 12 (Wednesday)
Wind southwest; fair. Remainder of provincial troops landed, and the army marches to the general area of Flat Point and begins to encamp. A detachment of men advances to the Northeast Harbour and burns French houses and storehouses. Lt. Saint-Étienne and a group of Frenchmen return to the Royal Battery to complete the removal of stores.

May 13 (Thursday)
North by west wind; cool. Royal Battery occupied in the morning by small group of provincials. French burn houses in the barachois area. The landing of provisions begun at Flat Point area. Surf still running high.

May 14 (Friday)
Southwest wind in the morning; limited visibility: “Look’t like dirt.” The provincials begin to land artillery at Flat Point area in the high surf and to transport it to the Green Hill range, where they begin to erect their first battery against the fortress. Several of the guns at the Royal Battery, which were hurriedly spiked by the French when they withdrew, are cleared and fire against the town.

May 15 (Saturday)
Fair; wind southwest. Green Hill Battery completed and begins to fire. Fire continues between fortress and Royal Battery.

May 16 (Sunday)
Southwest wind; fair. Provincials continue to transport artillery. The fire from the Green Hill Battery proves ineffective, and council orders another battery erected closer to the town. A cannon at the Royal Battery bursts due to accidental over-charging — the first of many such mishaps. The guns at the Royal Battery still being cleared.

May 17 (Monday)
Fair and warm. Transporting of artillery continues. Coehorn Battery begun approximately 900 yards from the King’s bastion. Two more guns burst at Royal Battery. Scouting party goes to Northeast Harbour from Royal Battery.

May 18 (Tuesday)
Cloudy, dry, and warm; east wind. Summons to surrender sent into Louisbourg. Surrender refused. Provincials plan attack on Island Battery but plan is cancelled. Guns still being transferred to Coehorn Battery.

May 19 (Wednesday)
Foggy with south wind. Cannon bursts at Royal Battery. French make a sortie in the afternoon with possible intention of hindering the transfer of cannon to Coehorn Battery. Sortie is repulsed.
May 20 (Thursday)
Foggy with south wind. Provincials plan assault on town, but it is called off when officers and soldiers appear unwilling and voice disapproval.

May 21 (Friday)
Fog cleared off; wind hard and cool west by north. Whaleboats carried overland from Gabarus Bay to Royal Battery, from whence attack is to be made on Island Battery. Attack is cancelled. Party of provincials attacked by Indians about six miles from Royal Battery.

May 22 (Saturday)
Morning cool with northwest by north wind; cloudy. Coehorn Battery begins to fire.

May 23 (Sunday)
Wind from north; cool. Another fascine battery begun approximately 440 yards from Dauphin Gate. French fire is light this day.

May 24 (Monday)
Cloudy, cold; strong east wind. More cannon burst at Royal Battery. Dysentery among provincial soldiers begins to increase. French ship runs past blockade into the harbour. Attempt by provincials to destroy the ship in the afternoon by using a fire ship fails.

May 25 (Tuesday)
Snow, hail, and rain; north wind. Fascine Battery begun May 23 is finished. Cannon fire light. Small-arms fire concentrated by French against the fascine battery. Royal Battery fires on the French ship that came in May 24 in attempt to sink her, but fire has little effect.

May 26 (Wednesday)
Cool overnight; ground frozen; morning fair. Another fascine battery (to be called Advanced Battery) is begun approximately 250 yards from Dauphin Gate.

May 27 (Thursday)
Fair, raw, and cold; south wind. More guns burst at Royal Battery. Island Battery silent. A number of French cannon found near the lighthouse by the provincials.

May 28 (Friday)

May 29 (Saturday)
Wind northeast; fresh and cool but fair. Musket fire between French and provincials in area of Dauphin Demi-Bastion. Fascine and Green Hill batteries under heavy French fire.

May 30 (Sunday)
Northeast wind in the morning; east wind and foggy in the afternoon. Much cannonading of both sides. Also small-arms fire. The French man-of-war Vigilant is captured after a fight at sea.

May 31 (Monday)
Cold, easterly fog. Titcomb's Battery erected to fire on the Dauphin Gate and circular battery. Fire from this battery and the Advanced Battery soon opens a breach in the Dauphin Demi-Bastion.

June 1 (Tuesday)
Southwest wind; foggy and very cool. Much firing from the fortress batteries.
Appendix A

June 2 (Wednesday)
Southwest wind in the morning; afternoon west wind; warm and calm. Heavy firing in morning hours from both sides. In the afternoon firing decreases. Attack on Island Battery planned but not carried out because the men lacked officers and some were also “in liquor.”

June 3 (Thursday)
Moderate and fair with southeast wind. Another attempt on the Island Battery fails to be put into effect. Charges of misconduct laid against Captain Noble, the officer commanding the force making the attempt.

June 4 (Friday)
North wind; brisk gale and cool. Council of war clears Captain Noble of misconduct charges. Fire ship sent into harbour by provincials in the afternoon.

June 5 (Saturday)
Warm. Woods on fire. Scouting party brings in a number of French prisoners. Brisk cannon and small-arms fire.

June 6 (Sunday)
Southwest wind; warm in the morning; evening cool and foggy. Providentials attack Island Battery but are repulsed with heavy losses.

June 7 (Monday)
Foggy with southwest wind; some rain. Powder short at some provincial batteries. French prisoners brought in.

June 8 (Tuesday)
Southwest wind in morning; foggy and cool; evening fair with west wind; moderate. A scouting party sent out from Royal Battery encounters large party of French and Indians. Skirmish of several hours. French retreat. Heavy cannonading from provincial batteries.

June 9 (Wednesday)
Southeast wind; fair and moderate. Scout sent to Scatarie. French flagstaff shot down.

June 10 (Thursday)
Foggy with southwest wind. Vigilant sent to Gabarus Bay to be refitted. Diminished fire from provincial batteries due to want of powder.

June 11 (Friday)
Foggy with south wind in the morning; west wind with fog cleared off in the afternoon. Many provincial soldiers sick with dysentery. Two cannon planted by French during the night on new works at Dauphin Gate are knocked out by provincial fire.

June 12 (Saturday)
Foggy with east wind. Small-arms fire between provincials and French at Dauphin Gate. Heavy cannon fire from provincial batteries. French fire declines.

June 13 (Sunday)
Cloudy, cool with north wind; evening rain and fog. New battery being raised at the lighthouse by provincials. Island Battery gives heavy but ineffective counterfire.

June 14 (Monday)
Wind north by east; cool and cloudy. Provisions and powder arrive from Boston. “This put new life and spirits into all of us.”

June 15 (Tuesday)
Southwest wind; fair and warm. Red-hot shot used by provincials. More French prisoners brought in. Provincial camp
security tightened as parties of French and Indians are expected.

**June 16 (Wednesday)**
Fair with north wind in the morning; cloudy in the afternoon.

**June 17 (Thursday)**
Fair and pleasant with northwest wind. French fire two newly erected cannon from right flank of King’s Bastion. Sailors taken on board *Vigilant* are transported to Boston.

**June 18 (Friday)**
South wind; calm and moderate. Royal and other batteries “fired smartly” against the town.

**June 19 (Saturday)**
Southeast wind; heavy rain. Flag of truce sent into the fortress with letter from the captain of the *Vigilant*, about treatment of English captives.

**June 20 (Sunday)**
West wind; scattered showers. Little firing on either side. Two Swiss deserters.

**June 21 (Monday)**
Northwest wind; fair, warm, and pleasant. Lighthouse Battery begins to fire against Island Battery.

**June 22 (Tuesday)**
Northwest wind; pleasant. Island Battery returns the fire of the Lighthouse Battery but proves ineffectual. The provincials hold celebrations, with violin, flute, and vocal music, plus a generous allowance of rum, in honour of the birthday of King George II.

**June 23 (Wednesday)**
Cool but pleasant, with northeast wind. Preparations under way for a combined land and sea attack on the town. Heavy firing from French batteries but with little effect.

**June 24 (Thursday)**
Fair, pleasant, and moderate; southwest wind. Ships being cleared for entering the harbour. Soldiers are enlisted to go on board ships for the attack. Ships barricaded with moss.

**June 25 (Friday)**
Southeast wind and fog; southwest wind in the afternoon. Heavy fire from provincial batteries. Beacon fires erected on hills west of the city to serve as guides for Warren’s fleet. Ladders and fascines being taken to Advanced Battery to storm the walls the following day if wind permits the fleet to force the harbour. French return a heavy fire on Advanced Battery but with little effect.

**June 26 (Saturday)**
Fair with southwest wind. Flag of truce from fortress asking for time to consider surrender terms. All firing ceases.

**June 27 (Sunday)**
Foggy and cool with east wind. Surrender terms agreed upon and siege officially ended.

**June 28 (Monday)**
Hard rain in the afternoon. Provincial army takes possession of town and Island Battery.
Appendix B. William Shirley to the Lords of the Admiralty: Scheme for Attacking Louisbourg.

MEMO. In order for the attacking of Louisbourg this Spring by surprise it is propos'd that 3000 Troops should Embark from hence in Sloops & Schooners and proceed for Canso, well armed which should be the place of Rendezvous it being within 20 Leagues of Louisbourg; and its being uncertain that so many vessels should be able to keep Company together when they are arrived at said Port, to take a favourable opportunity to sail from thence in order to be at Gaberus Point by Dusk, from whence it is but 3 Leagues from Louisbourg, then to push into the Bay, and as soon as said vessels are at an anchor to man as many whaleboats as they have & send them along the shore as near as possible, which will make it the more difficult for them to be discovered, & when they come to the cove which faces the low part of the wall, there to land if the sea will permit and scale that place if possible, & if otherwise as the Wall breaks off a little on the other side of the East [Maurepas] gate, not far from that there are picketts put for a considerable distance across a pond over to the Wall on the Beach on the other side of the Pond, and as this Pond is frozen all the month of March it is not very difficult to get over them: but if the weather will not permit their landing in the above place, let them proceed along the shore till they come to a long Range of Rocks that goes towards the Island, at the End of which is a Passage where the shallows go through, let them go in there and follow the Ledge of Rocks right back again, then they will land right against the East gate on a point [Rochefort Point], and as there are some Houses there, it will hinder their being seen, but one Boat ought to go first & surprise the People in those Houses a little time before the others come up. Each whale boat must have two ladders in them of fifteen foot long which may be put in the middle of the Boat without hindrance to the men; but the Boatmen must lay still at this Point till they think the main body is got near the Town, & that a party of as many men as shall be judg'd proper shall be ready to attack the Grand Battery, its necessary it should be low water if no Drift Ice aground along the Shore.

The remainder of the men are to go round the Picketts by the north gate [Porte Frédéric], and when they get round with Ladders of 15 feet long, they can scale the Wall facing the Harbour which is a Quarter of a mile round, and it will be absolutely necessary to appoint a Time to strike the blow all at once, which can be done by agreeing upon a certain hour just before Day, which is the Sleepiest Time, and the Commanding officer of each Detachment to know the time, and when the Time comes by his Watch to begin without further ceremony; The Enemy finding themselves attacked at so many different places at once its probable it will breed such confusion among them that our men will have time to get in unmolested; & it is to be observ'd that as the men march from the above point the low wall is on the left hand of the gate, and the Picketts on the right hand; as all the enemy's troops are in the citadel except a small guard or two it will be a considerable time before the men are drest & got ready to march out, and even then it is quite in the other end of the town.

This is what probably may succeed, but least any accident should happen to prevent it, it will be necessary to provide accordingly & in case our People should be discovered & Repuls'd the above number of men being sufficient to command the field, it will be necessary in order to reduce the place to have what shipping can possibly be got to cruise off the Harbour's Mouth in order to intercept their Provision vessels
which they expect early being at this time very short of Provisions, as likewise to take any transports with men if any should come, and that our men may not be discourag'd at being repuls'd once, it will be necessary to send 12 nine pounders & two small mortars with shells, &c. and a Quantity of Provisions; so to bombard them & endeavor to make Breaches in their Walls & then storm them; and should the shipping be so lucky to take their Provisions and the Land forces take all their cattle & keep them constantly employed, it will be impossible for them to hold the place till the last of July for want of provisions.

In order the better to secure the Retreat in case a superior naval Force to ours should come from France & drive ours off the Coast, it will be necessary to have two small vessels with about Two hundred men at Canso, & the day after the Fleet is sail'd for Louisbourg for them to sail so as to get in by night, and it being but six Leagues from Canso to St. Peters they can get there before day & surprise that place, which is an exceeding good harbour for small vessels, but has not Water sufficient for vessels of that size which will be able to drive ours off the Coast, so that the vessels for the Retreat will lay there safe, and the Troops be able to go to them by Land; there will be an advantage beside this in surprising this place as there is always a number of Indians with their Families which keep with the French Priest at a small Distance from the French Inhabitants, and the Booty taken there will pay the Expense & more in taking it. It is to be observed that during the time our Troops lay siege to the Town, it will be in their power to send parties and destroy all their Fishery on the Island as well as the north side of the Harbour which would ruin their Fishery for four or five years; and as it is impossible to fail of taking the Royal Battery at least, that would in a great measure lay open their Harbour exposed unto an attack by Sea from England, as the new Batterys in the Town in the greatest part of the Ambra-
Appendix C. "Instructions given by William Shirley, Governour of Massachusetts, to William Pepperell, Lieutenant General of the forces raised in New-England, for an expedition against the French settlements on the Island of Cape Breton."

SIR

The officers and men, intended for the expedition against the French settlements on Cape Breton, under your command, being embarked, and the necessary artillery, ammunition, arms, provision, &c. shipped for that purpose; you are hereby directed to repair on board the snow Shirley Galley, Captain John Rouse commander, and by virtue of the commission you have received from me, take upon you the command of all and every the ships and other vessels, whether transports or cruisers of this and the neighbouring provinces that are appointed for this service; and of all the troops raised for the same service, by this or any other of the neighbouring governments; and to proceed with the said vessels and forces, wind and weather permitting, to Canso, which place it is absolutely necessary should be appointed a rendezvous for the fleet. On your arrival there, you are to order two companies, consisting of forty men each with their proper officers, on shore, to take possession of the place and keep it; appointing one of the two Captains commandant of the whole; which party is to have orders, without delay to land and erect a block house frame on the hill of Canso, where the old one stood, and hoist English colours upon it; enclosing it with pickets and pallisadoes, so that the sides of the square may extend about one hundred feet, for which it is presumed there are garden pickets enough there left standing. This party is also to plant there eight nine pounders, for the security of the harbour; and build a sod battery, where it shall be judged most convenient; keeping the stores, &c. in the block house, or some shed, or other conveniency, built for that purpose, within the pickets: And must have necessary tools left with them; as also a carpenter or two, and a mason, if none among themselves, to build a chimney and other conveniences. An Captain Donahew and Captain Becket, with their vessels, to attend them; who are to have directions, to follow from time to time the commandant's orders, unless countermanded by yourself, after they have been, with an additional party of two hundred men more, and the transports they are on board of, to St. Peter's, on the island of Cape Breton, and destroy that settlement in which place you will be pleased to note, for your government, there are about two hundred inhabitants, and a number of Indians, all in straggling houses, without any regular defence: which additional party, having completed your orders, at St. Peter's, are to follow and join the fleet at Chappeaurouge [Gabarus] bay, to which place you are to proceed, with the fleet from Canso, in order to attack the town of Louisbourg, which has been thought may be surprized, if they have no advice of your coming. To prevent which, Captain Donahew and Captain Becket are gone before you, to cruise from Cape Canso to Whitehead and thereabouts; that no shallop or other vessel, either fishing or fowling, may be on that coast, to discover the approach of your fleet, and escape with intelligence; and if you have good reason to think you are hitherto undiscovered, and you prosecute the design of surprize; to effect it, your proceedings from Canso must be such as to time your arrival at Chappeaurouge bay, about nine of the
clock in the evening, or sooner, or later, as you can best rely on
the wind, weather, and darkness of the night; taking care, that
the fleet be sure of their distance eastward, and at the same
time far enough in the offing, to prevent their being seen from
the town in the day time; and in the evening they are to push
into the bay, as far at least as to be able to land at a cove called
Anse du Point Plat, or Flat Point Cove; in four separate
divisions; each division if possible together, to prevent
disorder; and as soon as the transports are at an anchor, the
troops who must be ready with their accoutrements, are to be
immediately, by the whale boats, landed in the best manner
that the necessary haste can allow; so as to keep the four
detachments each together, in a separate corps; who are to be
marched on as soon as may be in this manner. — Three divi­sions, consisting two of six hundred men each, and one of four
hundred men, are to march as near as they can guess, to the
back of a range of hills, about west from the town, about one
mile and a half; and here the two detachments of six hundred
each are to halt, and keep a profound silence; while the other
detachment of four hundred men pursue their march, following
the range and under cover of the said hills, round to the north
west and north, &c. till they come to the back of the grand
battery; where they are also to halt, till a signal agreed on be
given, for them to march immediately to the said battery, and
attack it; at which signal the other two parties are to march on,
as fast as they can, towards the west gate of the town; till they
come up to the houses, and then one party is to proceed
without regard to the houses, to the said gate, and attack there;
while the other marches on to a hill, about south west from the
town wall (securing such of the inhabitants as will fly that way
from the houses when they find our party betwixt them and the
gate) and there post themselves behind said hill, to secure, if
need be, the retreat of the attacking party. In the interim, the
fourth party proposed is to consist of six hundred men, who are
in the whale boats, to be landed at a point of land, called Point
Blanche or White Point; from thence they are to proceed along
shore, till they come to the low wall of the town, that is close
into the sea on the south easterly part of the town, which if
possible should be first attempted. Here this party are to scale
the wall, and enter the town if possible; proceeding as fast as
can be towards the citadel; securing a guard house, between
them and the citadel guard house, and so on to the citadel
guard house; and here if the enemy’s troops are not drawn out,
they are to secure the avenue from the citadel, by placing
themselves on the glacis, on each side; securing the windows
of the Governour’s apartments, that open on the ramparts, at
the south east end of the citadel; while a party goes to the west
gate guard, and secures that; which done, the wicket at least, it
not the gate, must be got open, for the party posted there to
enter. If they fail of their attempt in scaling at that place,
which they are to endeavour by getting round the works at the
west gate, by the water’s edge, to the [quay] wall on the north
side of the city, fronting the harbour; where they are to scale as
nigh the guard house battery, as possible; to prevent annoyance
from the north east [Maurepas] bastion, who by firing on our
men there will endanger their own guard and gate. Here, if they
enter, they are to secure the guard, and open the wicket or gate;
and give signal of their success, so far, to the party marching
on towards the hill, and proceed towards the citadel, &c. as
before directed, to the other party. The difficulty here will be,
in getting round a number of pickets, or over, or through them,
which run from the angle of the work, into the harbour, and
may be cut down with ease, if low water; or hauled down by
main strength, with such grappings and hooks as are sent for
that purpose; and if either of these parties are lucky enough to
get into the town; it may be secured; but if they both fail, they
are to retreat to the back of the hill, where the other party is
posted to cover and receive them.
The attack at the grand [Royal] battery you must order, Sir, to be, by entering at a low part of the wall, that is unfinished at the east end; for which fascines and ladders are sent on purpose, though they may perhaps not be wanted; as also longer ladders for scaling the dead wall, or back of the barracks of said battery, if occasion; which must be transported by the party, ordered on the attack, as the necessary ladders for scaling, &c. must be by the other two parties. For your government here be pleased to note there are in this battery a Captain and fifty men at least.

If you attempt this surprise, you must by all means secure the out inhabitants in the suburbs, from reinforcing the city (women and children excepted, who may be all sent in, if the enemy will receive them) whether the attempt to surprise be successful or not; and if it is not, you must then secure the troops in the best manner the ground will admit of, till you can get the artillery, bombs, &c. transported from Chappeaurouge bay to the army: to expedite which, as much force as can be spared must be there left to secure the landing of what is necessary, and assist the officers, &c. of the train of artillery, and an immediate reinforcement sent them from the main body, as soon as you give up the surprise of the town, that you may be the sooner enabled to annoy the enemy’s works, &c.

If the situation of affairs be such, that intelligence or discovery influence you not to attempt the surprise; and you find the enemy alarmed; you will doubtless think it necessary, to prevent any accident before the troops are landed, to send out a proper number of scouts; who, if they discover any ambuscade, or preparation to receive you, must give you due notice thereof, either by signals or by not returning; which will have its due weight with you; and if there be no opposition in landing, it will be best, for order sake, to land the men, regiment by regiment; who may be formed and drawn up into order, at proper distances, as they land, till the whole is completed. But if you should meet with opposition, and the landing be disputed, or difficult, you must then make a false descent, in order to draw off the enemy from the spot, designed for landing, or at least to divide their force; and then, according to the depth of the water, some of the vessels, either by riding broad side to the place, or by bringing a spring on their cables, will cover the landing, both by the execution they may do on the enemy, and the smoke of their powder.

If it be impracticable to think of surprising the town, and you resolve on the surprise of the grand battery; let the party designed for attacking the grand battery be first landed, and next the party to cover them, agreeable to directions for that purpose particularly, which you have with you; and march on to the hill, at the west of the town, before mentioned; where the covering party is to halt, and observe the motion of the enemy; who, if they make a sally from the town, are to be suffered to get so far as that this party then may get between the town and them; and keep them between two fires, and cut off their return; or if no such necessity, may serve as a defence from any sally from the town, towards Chappeaurouge to hinder our landing: In this case the grand battery is to be attacked as before directed, if the night should so favourably concur as to incline you to order an attack of the island battery also, (which would be an affair of the utmost consequence to us to carry) you must let this be attempted by a number of whale boats; who must land a party of three hundred men, on the back of the island; or in a little well known beachy cove at the south-easterly point, just within the breaking point of rocks, which runs off; from either of which places, in a very calm time they may enter successfully, and if so, immediately order a bomb, &c. there to play on the town, and garrison the battery, with as many
men as you can spare, and will be wanted there to fight the
guns, in case any enemy should approach afterwards by sea.

When you have all the troops on shore, the first thing to
be observed, is to march on till you can find out and secure
a proper spot to encamp them on; which must be as nigh as
possible to some convenient brook, or watering place; and as
soon as this is done, and the ground marked by the Quarter-
Masters, who should have, each, colours to distinguish each
regiment, the tents must be pitched, in the usual form and
distance, if possible; and at the front of every regiment, a
guard with tents, which is called the quarter guard, and
mounts in the morning, as the picket guard turns out at sun
set and lays on their arms. The captains of the artillery and
Commissaries of provisions, must be supposed to be all this
time employed, in getting ready to land what is under their
charge, or such part as they have your orders for; which
must be, first of all, the field pieces, by help of gin triangles
and other necessary purchases, which they have with them;
the cohorn mortars and their appertunances, to keep the
enemy off, and prevent their reconnoitering your camp near.
And when you are settled in your camp, the first thing that
will naturally offer itself to the consideration of you and
your council, will be on what operation, or design to pro­
ceed, and the proper steps to accomplish it; and as at this
time your enemy will be on their guard, if the grand battery
be not already taken, that must at all hazards be now effected;
and when so, you will be soon able to judge if it be tenable,
by a party of our men’s being secure there or not; and if the
guns from the town render our men’s holding impracticable,
and the men are not safe there, you must order what
immediate damage can be done with it, to be effected, by
firing on the town, and island battery, as long as may be;
and then demolish the back of it, that at least we may have
at times, these guns, to command the entry of the harbour,
open to a party posted on the back of the hill, behind it, out of
reach from the town, so as to give them occasionally some
diversion; or else, if it cannot be kept in one shape or the other
servicable to you, demolish the whole; burning the carriages,
nailing up the guns, and knocking off the trunnions, &c. But as
this battery will be of infinite service, in case it can be held,
keep it as long as possible. Your destroying their fishing
vessels, houses, stages, flakes, &c. (N.B. These last may serve
for fascines, if wanted, and therefore should not be burned
immediately) must require your next attention. In doing which,
you must take care to keep your flying parties as well covered
as possible, or as the nature of their enterprises for this effect
may require; and as this will throw into your hands some
prisoners, from whom you may possibly gather some informa­
tion, to be relied on (although you must in this case, use all
necessary caution) this may lead you to undertake things of
greater consequence so as to block up the town by land. In
order to which it will be absolutely necessary to bring your
camp as near the besieged as you can, without exposing it to
their random shot; the consequences of which you will be able
to judge of in your approaches. And it is the general opinion,
the hill before the west gate will be the best place to fix on;
but then let it be so far at least beyond the hill, as not to let
the besieged know the particular spot. About south-west from
the citadel bastion, a large half mile distance, is a rocky hill,
which in attacking of the town, may be of great service, by
covering a number of our men, and planting some cannon
there, on the top; in such manner as when you are on the spot,
you may judge most advantageous; when you may keep the
bombardiers, &c. continually employed, endeavouring princi­
pally, to demolish their magazine, citadel, walls &c. which are
objects sufficiently in view. But by all means you are to forbid
any approaches between the wall of the city and that hill, as
the glacis that lies there before the works is to be blown up;
Appendix C

but if you can, under cover of the houses, rubbish, &c. get a small battery to play on the west gate, you may hope for success; as the wall there is weak, and a breach may be made, of which when you come to view the place, you will better judge of its practicableness and consequence.

As it is not doubted but that the party which goes to St. Peter's will be successful, you may rely on it, that a number of French and Indians, as many at least as escape here, will fly towards Louisbourg for shelter; for whom you will be pleased to order a good look out, by all parties abroad, as well as for a number of inhabitants and soldiers, who it is reasonable to expect are in the woods, cutting timber, palisadoes, &c. to the north-west of the grand battery.

When the transports are discharged at Chappeaurouge bay, at which place it will be proper to detain them as long as they can lay in safety; and it is necessary for them to put out of the bay, they must have your orders to repair to Canso; there to lay in the pond for your farther commands; and there they must be under inspection of a cruizer, who must cruize in such manner, as to be sometimes off the harbour of Louisbourg, with the others; and as the wind will permit, go there and look at them.

As it will be of the utmost consequence that I should be advised of your proceedings, and the situation of your camp, you must employ three or four of the best going transports, in running backwards and forwards calling upon the commanding officer of Canso, for his intelligence also; ordering the masters of said advice boats or packets from time to time, on arrival here, to stop at the castle, and forward his packets to me, by the castle boat; and keep himself ready to depart again, as soon as he has his dispatches from hence, for you; which I shall take care to have sent him, without loss of time. By this means, you will have it in your power to let me know what materials, ammunition, &c. you may have occasion for, more than you have with you; and the troops will remain the better satisfied, when they are sensible their situation is known here. Suitable men for this packet service will be captain Joseph Smith, captain Michael Hodge, and captain Moses Bennett, with such other as you may think best.

Whether the transports quit Chappeaurouge bay or not, let them have your positive orders to refit all their empty water casks; and if they do, and go to Canso, to assist in carrying on the works there, always holding themselves in readiness to sail as soon as your orders reach them.

Immediately on your arrival at Chappeaurouge bay, and have a transport discharged, send her away express to St. John's in Newfoundland, with my packets for the captains of men of war, that may be on that station; and as soon as the grand battery is taken, order an express here, with the news, and if you are likely to succeed, send another with an express to England; directing your packet to his Grace the Duke of Newcastle; ordering the master to call upon Christopher Kilby, Esq. agent for the Province, with it, as soon as he arrives in London; and in case of Mr. Kilby's absence, let him go directly to the Duke of Newcastle's office.

As to what prisoners you take at Louisbourg, &c. you must forward them up here, in the best manner you can, as soon as may be, that they may not be an unnecessary trouble to you, as well as to keep what provisions you have for the troops only.

On all emergencies it will be necessary for you to convene a council of war; and most expedient to act agreeably to their advice; and this council is to consist of yourself (as President) and the other general officers, the colonels of the several regiments, their lieutenant colonels, and the captain of the train of artillery, under your command, five of whom to make a quorum of said council. A register to be kept by your secretary of all the proceedings of such councils of war.
Wishing you all success in his Majesty's service,
I am Sir, your assured friend and servant, W. SHIRLEY.

Boston, March 19, 1744–5 [O.S.]
To the Hon. William Pepperell, Esq.
Lieutenant-General of the forces raised in this and the
neighbouring governments, for the expedition against the
French settlements on Cape Breton.

Appendix D. Terms for the Surrender
of Louisbourg, 27 June 1745.

Camp before Louisbourg, June 16, 1745 [O.S.]
SIR
We have before us yours of this date together with the
several articles of capitulation on which you have proposed
to surrender the town & fortifications of Louisbourg with
the territories adjacent under your government to his
Britannic Majesty's obedience to be delivered up to his said
Majesty's Forces now besieging said place under our
command which articles we can by no means concede to but
as we are desirous to treat you in a generous manner, we
again make you an offer of the terms of surrender proposed
by us in our summons sent you 7th May last, and do further
consent to allow and promise you the following articles,

First that if your own vessels shall be found insufficient for the
transportation of your persons and proposed Effects to
France, we will provide such a further number of vessels as
may be sufficient for that purpose, also any provisions for
the voyage that you cannot furnish yourselves with
Secondly that all the commissioned officers belonging to the
garrison and the inhabitants of the town may remain in their
houses with their families and enjoy the free exercise of
their religion and no person shall be suffered to misuse or
molest any of them till such time as they can be convenient­ly
transported to France
Thirdly that the non-commissioned officers and soldiers shall
immediately upon the surrender of the town and fortresses
Appendix D

be sent on board some of his Britanic Majestys ships till they can also be transported to France

Fourthly That all your sick & wounded shall be taken tender care of in the same manner with our own

Fifth That the commander in chief now in the garrison shall have liberty to send off two covered wagons to be inspected only by one officers of our that nô warlike stores may be contained therein.

Sixth That if there are any persons in the town or garrison which you shall desire may not be seen by us, they shall be permitted to go off masked.

The above we do consent to & promise upon your compliance with the following conditions, viz —

First That if said surrender & due performance of every part of aforesaid premises be made & completed as soon as possible

Second That as a security for the punctual performance of the same the Island Battery or one of the Batteries of the town shall be delivered with all the artillery & warlike stores thereunto belonging into the possession of his Britanic Majestys troops at six o'clock this afternoon.

Third that his Britanic Majestys ships of war now lying before the port shall be permitted to enter the harbour of Louisbourg without any molestation as soon after six o'clock this afternoon as the commander in chief of the ships shall think fit.

Fourth That none of the officers, soldiers nor inhabitants in Louisbourg who are subjects of the French king shall take up arms against his Britanic Majesty nor any of his allies until after the expiration of the full term of 12 months from this time.

Fifth That all subjects of his Britanic Majesty who are now prisoner with you shall be immediately delivered up to us; in case of your non-compliance with these conditions, we decline any further treaty with you on the affairs & shall decide the matter by our arms.

W. Pepperrell
P. Warren
Mons Du Chambon

* * *

Camp before Louisbourg, June 16, 1745 [O.S.]

SIR
I have yours by an hostage signifying your consent to the surrender of the town & fortresses of Louisbourg & territories adjacent, &c. on the terms this day proposed to you by Commodore Warren & myself excepting only that you desire that your troops may march out of the garrison with their arms and colours — to be them delivered into our custody till said troops arrival in France at which time to have them returned to them which I consent to & send you an hostage for the performance of what we have promised & have sent to Commodore Warren that if he consents to it also he should send a detachment on shore to take possession of the Island Battery.

Wm Pepperrell
Mons Du Chambon
Endnotes

Preface

1 With regard to dating, throughout the text New Style dates are used even though England and the American Colonies did not adopt the Gregorian calendar until 1752.

Background

1 Timber in this context refers to charpente construction. “Picquet” or piquet buildings were constructed of vertical posts set side by side and placed in the ground or on wooden sills.

2 For a detailed discussion of the establishment and early history of Louisbourg, see John Stewart McLennan, Louisbourg From Its Foundation to Its Fall, 1713–1758 (London: Macmillan, 1918), pp. 1–127. Walter L. Dorn, Competition for Empire, 1740–1763 (New York: Harper and Bros., 1940), p. 165, writes that “Louisbourg, more useful as a naval base than as a fortress..., was admirably placed for raids on the American coastal trade, but its great importance lay in the fact that it stood at the gate of the St, Lawrence, the natural highway into the heart of Canada.” Gerald S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1950), p. 116, says Louisbourg promised to be “a natural base for the protection of the profitable French fisheries, a distributing centre to rival New England’s Boston, and a springboard for the oft-dreamed recovery of Nova Scotia.”


5 George M. Wrong, ed., Louisbourg in 1745: The Anonymous “Lettre d’un Habitant de Louisbourg” (Cape Breton), Containing a Narrative by an Eye-witness of the Siege in 1745 (Toronto: Warwick & Rutter, 1897), p. 15. French quotations have been translated by the Department of the Secretary of State.


9 John Stewart McLennan, op. cit. p. 133.


16 Louis Effingham de Forest, ed., Louisbourg Journals, 1745 (New York: Society of Colonial Wars, 1932), p. 110. This journal appears to be a slightly different copy of the original report of the campaign, dated 20 October 1745 (O.S.) sent by Governor Shirley to England, found in NA, MG 11, PRO, CO5, Vol. 900, pp. 248ff. See also Seth Pomeroy,
Notes to pages 9-13


18 Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 2.


28 Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., pp. 2–3; Seth Pomeroy, op. cit., p. 15.

29 Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 6.

30 Ibid., p. 185.


32 Ibid., Series 6, Vol. 10, p. 4.


Preliminaries

1 William Pepperrell, op. cit., p. 149; Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., pp. 68, 75, 112; William Pepperrell and others, op. cit., p. 10; NA, MG1, Dépôt des Fortifications des Colonies (hereafter cited as DFC), Ordre 216, fol. 5(v), "Rapport de Girard La Croix."


3 William Pepperrell, op. cit., p. 149; a contemporary map of the Gabarus Bay area found in the Louisbourg project archives shows the transports at anchor between Freshwater Cove and Flat Point.

4 MHSC, Series 5, Vol. 2 (1833), p. 126, Dr. Jeremy Belknap to Ebenezer Hazard, 10 May 1782; Herbert Richmond, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 211. Shirley himself seems to have had reservations about the efficacy of his instructions, and in a subsequent letter to Pepperrell authorized the general to act according to his own discretion in an emergency. See

6 NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fol. 272, “Duchambon au Ministre.”

7 NA, MG1, DFC, Ordre 218, Bigot, “Relation du Siège de Louisbourg,” 1745.


9 George M. Wrong, op. cit., pp. 11–12; NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fols. 273(v), 274(v)–5, “Duchambon au Ministre.”


11 George M. Wrong, op. cit., p. 31; NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fol. 293, “Duchambon au Ministre”; NA, MG1, DFC, Ordre 218; Bigot “Relation du Siège de Louisbourg,” 1745.

12 John Stewart McLennan, op. cit., pp. 116, 123, 148; George M. Wrong, op. cit., pp. 21–2, 33; NA, MG1, DFC, Ordre 218, Bigot, “Relation du Siège de Louisbourg,” 1745; “When we received the first intelligence of the preparations making in Boston last Spring, we were informed by our spies that the [provincial] fleet was intended, in the first place for Louisbourg, and that the English would come next to Quebec. We had the more cause to apprehend this, as according to what Messrs. du Chambon and Bigot had written us on the 13th of April respecting the disorders amongst the garrison of Isle Royale, that place was, through the defection of the troops, untenable.” Edmund B. O’Callaghan, éd., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (Albany: Weed, Parsons, 1853–87), Vol. 10, p. 15, de Beauharnois and Hocquart to Maurepas, 12 September 1745.

13 George M. Wrong, op. cit., pp. 32, 35.

14 NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fols. 275(v)–6, “Duchambon au Ministre”; NA, MG1, DFC, Ordre 218, Bigot “Relation du Siège de Louisbourg,” 1745; ibid., Ordre 216, fol. 5, “Rapport de Girard La Croix.”


17 Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 84.


19 NA, MG1, DFC, Ordre 216, fol. 5, “Rapport de Girard La Croix.”

20 While there is no explicit written evidence to substantiate this view, it is unlikely that all the troops went ashore only at Freshwater Cove; the cove is too small to accommodate that many men. A contemporary French map of the Louisbourg–Gabarus Bay area, however, does indicate that the provincials came ashore at several places between the cove and Flat Point (see Figs. 6, 9, and 10).

21 William Pepperrell, op. cit., p. 149; Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 112; William Shirley, Correspondence, Vol. 1, p. 274, Shirley to Newcastle, 28 October 1745 (O.S.).

22 Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., pp. 10 and 11; NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fols. 276(v)–7, “Duchambon au Ministre.”

23 NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fol. 276(v); Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 75; John Stewart McLennan, op. cit., Appendix I, pp. 362–3. “Many that was there ... [at the northeast harbour] was much blamed for destroying so much of what we had got in possession and I think very justly — for I can’t suppose they had any prospect of doing good thereby, altho we generally thou’t afterwards it was a means of the French’s deserting the Grand Battery and if so, was to us gain”; Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 11.

24 NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fols. 276(v)–7, “Duchambon au Ministre.”

25 This was not true of Francis Parkman, who did understand the sequence of events. (See Francis Parkman, A Half–Century of Conflict [Boston: Little, Brown, 1903], Vol. 2, p. 100.) It has been suggested that William Wood, The Great Fortress: A Chronicle of Louisbourg, 1720–1760 (Toronto: Glasgow, Brook, 1915), is the source of the misunderstanding, but this is not necessarily the case. Wood certainly failed to grasp the actual sequence of events and contributed little to clear up the matter. He claimed that the smoke of the burning houses in the northeast harbour drifting over the Royal Battery precipitated its abandonment.
Wood, however, merely repeats an account that appeared in the February 1864 issue of Harper's New Monthly Magazine, p. 358. The possible source of the misinterpretation of the sequence of events can be traced to "A poetical essay on the reduction of Cape Breton ... 1745," appearing in the April 1864 issue of Gentlemen's Magazine, p. 214, n.(m).

28 NA, MG1, F3, Vol. 50, fols. 417-417(v); ibid., fols. 277-277(v), "Duchambon au Ministre"; NA, MG1, DFC, Ordre 216, fols. 6-6(v), "Rapport de Girard La Croix"; ibid., Ordre 218, Bigot, "Relation du Siège de Louisbourg," 1745.
29 Ibid., fols. 6(v)-7; George M. Wrong, op. cit., p. 40; NA, MG1, F3, Vol. 50, fols. 277(v)-281(v), "Duchambon au Ministre."
56 Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 18; MHSC, Series 6, Vol. 10 (1899), pp. 139-40, Waldo to Pepperrell, 3 May 1745 (O.S.); NA, MG1, DFC, Ordre 216, fol. 8, “Rapport de Girard La Croix.”


60 MHSC, Series 1, Vol. 1 (1806), pp. 15-6, Pepperrell to Shirley, 10 April 1745 (O.S.). Whether Pepperrell meant that the provisions sent were less than had been promised or were less than had been thought sufficient is not certain, due to the lack of relevant documentary material relating to the entire matter of provisioning the army; ibid., Series 6, Vol. 10 (1899), p. 128, Shirley to Pepperrell, 26 April 1745 (O.S.).

61 Ibid., pp. 141-5, Waldo to Pepperrell, 3 May 1745 (O.S.); Dudley Bradstreet, op. cit., pp. 427, 429, 432; Benjamin Cleaves, op. cit., p. 124. Cleaves is the only diarist found who attempted to record what the men were eating. He provides the following inventory: “an Account of what our men has Rec’d since we Came ashore the Last Day of april [11 May NS] 1745 in may: 3 Days of meat Due Rec’d in our Company 40 Pound of Rice one Peck 1/2 of Beens one Bushel of Peas eight gallons molas[ses] eight gallons of molas[ses]

June 1 [12 June NS]: 1745 Rec’d one Bushell of Peas 8 gallons of molases 49 Pound of Rice John grovers mes had no Rice willm Leech & Samll Harris had it”

An additional notation by Cleaves states: “May 1745 Rec’d of [Commisary]; walldo Rum 3 gallons Rec’d of C. walldo 9 gallons June Rec’d of C. Prout 79 Pou[n]d of Rice

240 Pound of Bread one Bushel of Peas
8 gall of Molases for Captn Ives Company”

62 Ibid., p. 120.

63 I have found no written contemporary evidence stating exactly where the provisions were brought ashore, but William Pepperrell and others, op. cit., p. 13, indicate that they were brought ashore near the encampment. The artillery also seems to have been landed at the same place. Assuming the encampment to have been in the Flat Point vicinity, the provisions and artillery probably were landed at Flat Point Cove; ibid., pp. 11-2.

64 Ibid., see also MHSC, Series 1, Vol. 1 (1806), p. 27, Pepperrell to Shirley, 11 May 1745 (O.S.).


66 William Pepperrell and others, op. cit., p. 15.


68 Ibid., p. 14; see also William Douglass, A Summary, Historical and Political, of the First Planting, Progressive Improvements, and Present State of the British Settlements in North America (London: n.p., 1755); Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 60.


73 Ibid., pp. 11-2; ibid., p. 141, Waldo to Pepperrell, 3 May 1745 (O.S.).

74 Ibid., Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 13.

75 MHSC, Series 6, Vol. 10 (1899), p. 14; see also Roger Wolcott, op. cit., p. 137.

76 Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 14; William Pepperrell, op. cit., p. 152; NA, MG1, DFC, Ordre 216, fol. 8(v), “Rapport de Girard La Croix.”

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81 MHSC, Series 6, Vol. 10 (1899), p. 16; Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 15.
82 MHSC, Series 6, Vol. 10 (1899), p. 17.

The Siege

1 Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 56; William Shirley, “Instructions,” p. 10.
3 James Gibson, op. cit., p. 13; NA, MG11, PRO, CO5, Vol. 900, fols. 183–5, Pepperrell to Shirley, 12 May 1745 (O.S.), as found in John Humphreys, op. cit., p. 78; Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 12.
6 MHSC, Series 6, Vol. 10 (1899), p. 194, Waldo to Pepperrell, 20 May 1745 (O.S.); ibid., pp. 141–5, Waldo to Pepperrell, 3 May 1745 (O.S.); ibid., pp. 157–9, Waldo to Pepperrell, 8 May 1745 (O.S.); ibid., pp. 166–8, Waldo to Pepperrell, 13 May 1745 (O.S.); ibid., pp. 190–1, Waldo to Pepperrell, 20 May 1745 (O.S.).
7 For a more detailed discussion of these functions, see John Humphreys, op. cit.
10 Ibid., pp. 14–5. See also Roger Wolcott, op. cit., p. 151.
11 William Pepperrell and others, op. cit., pp. 17–8; Benjamin Cleaves, op. cit., p. 118; Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., pp. 18, 55–6, 71; MHSC; Series 6, Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., pp. 18, 217, Pepperrell to Warren, 19 May 1745 (O.S.); William Pepperrell, op. cit., p. 155; John Stewart McLennan, op. cit., Appendix I, p. 363, “Memorial of William Vaughan.” The testimonial of Captain Daniel Woaster, 28 October 1745 (O.S.), in ibid., p. 367, further states that Vaughan “was the Director of the advance Trenches & most indefatigable in Duty with common Soldiers almost Day & Night.”
14 Ibid., fol. 282; Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 56.
15 William Pepperrell and others, op. cit., p. 18; Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., pp. 19 and 56.
17 William Pepperrell and others, op. cit., pp. 18–9; Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 57.
18 William Pepperrell and others, op. cit., p. 19; Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 79; NA, MG1, F 2, Vol. 50, fol. 287, “Duchambon au Ministre.”
21 Ibid., fol. 287(v); William Pepperrell, op. cit., pp. 156–7.
Notes to pages 37-44

26 NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fol. 291, “Duchambon au Ministre.”
27 NA, MG1, C¹¹, Vol. 12, fols. 191, 193(v).
28 MHSC, Series 1, Vol. 1 (1806), p. 52, Pepperrell to Shirley, 4 July 1745 (O.S.); ibid., p. 46. Pepperrell to Shirley, 18 June 1745 (O.S.); the habitant believed that “More than three thousand five hundred [shots] must have been fired against us” (George M. Wrong, ed., op. cit., p. 68); Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 120; NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fols. 291(v)-292(v), “Duchambon au Ministre”; Roger Wolcott, op. cit., pp. 152–3.
30 James Gibson, op. cit., p. 30. Bigot (NA, MG1, DFC, Ordre 218) reported that the following foodstuffs remained in storehouses at the end of the siege: 2,500 cwt. of flour, 200 cwt. of bread, 300 cwt. of bacon, 500 cwt. of vegetables, 300 barrels of molasses, 100 or more barrels of wine. These were possibly consigned goods left locked up to protect some merchant(s)’s interest, and therefore not meant to be used.
31 Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., pp. 19, 196, Warren to Pepperrell, 20 May 1745 (O.S.); George M. Wrong, op. cit., p. 47; NA, MG1, C¹¹, Vol. 82, pp. 111, 131; William Pepperrell, op. cit., p. 153; James Gibson, op. cit., pp. 14, 18; William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Mich., Louisbourg Siege, 1745, Papers, W. Waldron to Richard Waldron, 7 June 1745 (O.S.). In the night of 24 May the New Englanders caulked up a French schooner that had sunk in the harbour the previous year, filled it with combustibles, set them on fire, and sent the schooner across the water between the Island Battery and the town in an attempt to destroy the French snow. The schooner was sunk by French cannon fire before it reached the snow. (NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fol. 282(v), “Duchambon au Ministre”; James Gibson, op. cit., pp. 14–5.)
32 George M. Wrong, op. cit., p. 46; John Stewart McLennan, op. cit., Appendix A, p. 177.
33 Ibid., pp. 156, 177–8.
35 George M. Wrong, op. cit., p. 48.
36 Ibid., p. 49.
37 Ibid., p. 48.
38 Ibid., p. 30; NA, MG1, DFC, Ordre 218, Bigot, “Relation du Siège de Louisbourg,” 1745; Roger Wolcott, op. cit., p. 152.
43 James Gibson, op. cit., p. 20; MHSC, Series 1, Vol. 8, p. 121, Waldo to Noble, 23 May 1745 (O.S.); ibid., Series 6, Vol. 10 (1899), pp. 20–1, Council of War, 24 May 1745 (O.S.); Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 77.
44 Ibid., p. 21; James Gibson, op. cit., p. 20; Seth Pomeroy, op. cit., p. 27; MHSC, Series 6, Vol. 10 (1899), pp. 20–1.
45 Ibid., p. 21; William Shirley, Correspondence, Vol. 1, pp. 277–8, Shirley to Newcastle, 28 October 1745 (O.S.); William Pepperrell, op. cit., p. 158; Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 58; John Stewart McLennan, op. cit., p. 158; Seth Pomeroy, op. cit., p. 28.
47 William Pepperrell, op. cit., p. 159; Seth Pomeroy, op. cit., p. 28; Louis Effingham de Forest, op. cit., pp. 29, 77–8.
50 George M. Wrong, op. cit., p. 51; NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fol. 288, “Duchambon au Ministre.”
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54 Ibid., p. 35, Pepperrell to Warren, 28 May 1745 (O.S.). See also John Stewart McLennan, op. cit., p. 160.

55 Ibid., p. 41.


57 Ibid., p. 38; William Pepperrell and others, op. cit., pp. 22–3; Roger Wolcott, op. cit., pp. 132, 152.


62 James Gibson, op. cit., pp. 32–3; William Pepperrell, op. cit., p. 164; LouisEffingham de Forest, op. cit., pp. 25–6, 60, 72, 78–9; Seth Pomeroy, op. cit., p. 35.


65 NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fols. 317–8, 321–2; ibid., fols. 293(v)–4, “Duchambon au Ministre.”


67 NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fol. 294, “Duchambon au Ministre”; LouisEffingham de Forest, op. cit., p. 60; Roger Wolcott, op. cit., p. 139.


70 NA, MG1, F³, Vol. 50, fols. 294(v)–5, “Duchambon au Ministre.”

71 MHSC, Series 1, Vol. 1 (1806), p. 45, Pepperrell to Duchambon, 17 June 1745 (O.S.); William Pepperrell and others, op. cit., p. 4.

72 James Gibson, op. cit., p. 36.

73 Dudley Bradstreet, op. cit., p. 435; James Gibson, op. cit., p. 36; NA, MG1, DFC, Ordre 216, fol. 22, “Rapport de Girard La Croix.”

74 James Gibson, op. cit., p. 36; George M. Wrong, op. cit., p. 65; NA, MG1, DFC, Ordre 218, Bigot, “Relation du Siège de Louisbourg,” 1745.


Appendix B


Appendix C

1 MHSC, Series 1, Vol. 1 (1806), pp. 5–11.

Appendix D

1 William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Mich., Louisbourg Siege, 1745, Papers. The more obvious spelling errors and word abbreviations, as copied by W. Waldron, have been corrected.
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On the morning of 11 May 1745 a British naval squadron escorted some 90 transport vessels into Gabarus Bay on Cape Breton Island. Nine regiments of hastily raised citizen soldiers from the colonies of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut had come to conquer the French fortified town of Louisbourg. In 47 days they were to do just that, shattering the myth of invincibility that had begun to surround the "great fortress."