FORT CHAMBLY: INTERPRETATION THEMES

by

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October 1966
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This report has been prepared to guide the museologist in the selection of themes and material to be interpreted in the Fort Chambly museum. For a general, narrative history of this National Historic Site see Pierre Nadon: Fort Chambly, A Narrative History, (Ottawa 1965) M.R.S. #17.

David Lee October 1966
Le Régiment Carignan-Salières  
by Pierre Nadon
1. Narrative

The Carignan-Salières Regiment was formed in 1659, with the integration of two regiments, that of Carignan and that of Balthazar. The Carignan Regiment had been raised around 1614, by Thomas Francois de Savoie, Prince of Carignan, while the Balthazar Regiment dated back to 1636. When Colonel Balthazar retired, he was replaced by M. de Salières. In 1664, the Carignan-Salières Regiment took part in the French campaign against the Turks, in Austria. (1)

In December 1664, the Regiment received at Marsal, Lorraine, orders to proceed to La Rochelle. It was being sent to New France. Between June 17 and September 11, 1665, twenty companies of the Carignan-Salières Regiment arrived in Canada. Four infantry companies from the Regiments of Chambelle, Poitou, Orleans, and Lallier, arrived with le sieur de Tracy, on the 30th of June, 1665. (2)

The first four companies of the Carignan Regiment to arrive were ordered, under the command of Captain Jacques de Chambly, to proceed to the Richelieu River. They were to begin work on a series of forts that would serve as a depot for provisions and a refuge for the sick in the coming expeditions.

1. The history of the Regiment is in B. Suite, Le Régiment de Carignan, (Ducharme, Montreal, 1922). One of Suite's sources, Colonel L.A. Victor Susane: Histoire de l'ancienne infanterie française, 8 vol. (Paris 1849-1853) has been consulted. Another of Suite's sources, F.G. Daniel: Histoire de la Milice, 2 vol. (Paris 1729) is in the St. Sulpice library in Montreal, and consequently has not yet been examined. Further research can be done in the books appearing in the list of suggested readings. The Carignan Regiment later became known as the 17th Infantry Regiment (France).

against the Iroquois. They were assisted by a company of Canadian
volunteers, commanded by le Sieur de Repentigny. At the end of August,
during the week in which the feast of St. Louis is celebrated, (on the 25th),
the construction of Fort St.Louis (later Fort Chambly) was begun. By
September it was finished. It was also in August that M. de Sorel went with
his company to the mouth of the Richelieu river and built Fort Richelieu.
In September, Salières led seven companies up the Richelieu, and built
Fort Ste. Thérèse. (3)

In January 1666, an expedition was launched against the Mohawks,
the most warlike of the Iroquois nation. Over 500 men including some
Canadian volunteers, assembled at Fort St.Louis. They came from Montreal,
Trois Rivières and Quebec, and were commanded by Governor Courcelles who had
been in Canada since September 1665. Without waiting for his Algonquian
guides, Courcelles, on the 30th of January, left Fort Ste Thérèse, a few
miles upstream from Fort St.Louis. The detachment lost its way, and
arrived at the British-Dutch settlement of Corlar (now Schenectady).
Except for a small enemy scout party, Courcelles did not make any contact
with the enemy. He returned to Quebec with hungry and harried troops.(4)

While two more forts were being built on the Richelieu river,
Fort St-Jean and Fort Ste Anne, a second expedition was organized in the
summer. However, the French force returned to Quebec after it had met Iroquois
ambassadors coming to Quebec with peace offerings. Despite these overtures
the Mohawks' true intentions remained unpredictable. Consequently in September

3. For a biographical sketch of Jacques de Chambly, see R.P. Le Jeune:
Dictionnaire Général du Canada, (U.d'Ottawa,1931) vol.2, p.137; also, B.R.H.,
1917; Relations des Jésuites 1661-1665, ed. Thwaites, vol. 49, pp.237,
252-254; vol. 50, pp 80-82; Mémoire de M. de Salières,B.N.F.F.,4569. The
movement of each company during that time is available from the above sources.
According to Roy, 6 carpenters arrived with the first companies to work on
the forts, (p.26).
des Jésuites, pp.340-342; Dollier de Casson, Histoire de Montréal 1610-1672,
(Mémoire de la Soc. hist. de Montreal, 1868) p.101.
1666, de Tracy prepared another expedition against the Iroquois. It was composed of over six hundred soldiers, six hundred Canadians, and one hundred Indians. When the French arrived at the Mohawk villages, the Iroquois had fled to the woods. The army burned the villages and the crops. Though the Mohawks had not been annihilated, the expedition had made an impression on the Iroquois. In the summer of 1667, following the example of the other four nations, the Mohawks made peace with the French. (5)

In August, Tracy returned to France with part of the troops but about four companies remained behind to garrison the forts. In 1669, Captain Chambly's company of 50 men was still in New France. In 1670, six infantry companies of another regiment arrived in Canada. They were probably integrated to what was left of the Carignan troops. Between 1666 and 1670, a good number of the Carignan troops were demobilised, and became settlers, tradesmen, and coureurs-de-bois. Many of the officers received seigneuries, and the more important villages of the Richelieu valley date from that period. (6)


2. Interpretation

General:

Abundant information is available on the military organization of the 17th century. The Carignan-Salières Regiment was sent to Canada at about the time the French army was being reorganized. Furthermore a distinction can be made in the armament, dress, etc., between the Carignan Regiment and other infantry units, such as those that came with de Tracy. At that time some regiments belonged to the King, for example the Regiments of Chambelle, Poitou, Orleans, Lallier, while others such as the Carignan Regiment belonged to their Colonel.

The Canadian militia was officially formed in 1669. However, Montreal had had a volunteer militia since 1663, and Trois-Rivières, a compulsory militia since 1651. Both settlements supplied men for the military expeditions of 1666. All three documents creating these militia groups are available. (7)

We have two maps of the 1666 campaigns, including the forts that were built. (8)

Formation of units:

Primary sources have given us the name of the officers, the number of men in each company, and the number of companies in the Carignan Regiment. (9) The composition of the other units can only be established from contemporary military organization.

Equipment:

Secondary sources have given us a description of the armament, viz.

8. P.A.C., Picture Division, C 16145, C 16144; available in Manuscript Report Series, #17.
musket, saber, pistol. (10) Further research will be needed to establish if there were any "grenadiers" and artillery with the regiment. (11)

Primary sources have given us information about the soldiers' equipment in Canada, viz., snowshoes, rations, tobogans, etc. (12) There is a document available with a list of all the equipment used by the troops, and its cost. (13)

Dress:

We have colored pictures of the soldiers in the Carignan Regiment, and the other four regiments that came to Canada, in 1665. (14) Roy described these uniforms using these pictures. (15) However, there is some doubt about the authenticity of these pictures, for at the time the soldiers' dress were not uniform. A patch of ribbons over the right shoulder, and around the knee, was a favourite way of distinguishing one regiment from the other. (16) Further research might determine dress conclusively.

Pictures are also available of the probable dress of the Canadians who accompanied the troops during the expedition. (17)

Flags:

The colours of the King's Regiments were white. (18) The Carignan Regiment's flag was dark, (brown or black ?), with a white cross over it. (19) Further research might establish this conclusively.

11. The "grenadier" in the French army, see Susane, op.cit., p.237. There are references to artillery pieces in the two following documents dealing with the expeditions; Marie de l'Incarnation: Lettres, p.324; C11A, vol.3, p.36
Jacques de Chambly:

As yet no picture has been found of the officer who built the fort. Copies of dispatches referring to Captain Chambly, and a copy of the document granting him a seigneury are available. (20)


15. d'oy, op. cit., p.20; document suggesting that the Carignan troops were better dressed and equipped than the average, C11A, vol. 2, p. 133.


Further Research

If further research is necessary, for example, perhaps for a model soldier, the following sources might be helpful. Those marked with an asterisk have been consulted.

-A. The French military organization:

There are a number of contemporary documents dealing with the French army and New France between 1650 and 1670 in the Public Archives; see FM 2, B 1; FM 4, A 1, vol. 131, 157, 181, 191, 195; FM 5, B 1, vol. 5.


Desjardins: Recherches sur les drapeaux, (Paris, 1874).


-B. Manuscripts on the Carignan-Salières Regiment, P.A.C., FM 4, A 1:

Commandement du régiment accordé à Henri de Chastelard, de Salières, 1659. (v.156)

Lettre du roi à de Salières sur les affaires du régiment, 1665, (v. 191)

Correspondance concernant le régiment de Carignan-Salières, et son départ pour le Canada, 1665, (v. 192)

Document se rapportant au régiment de Carignan, (v. 199)

Lettres se rapportant à l'administration du régiment de Carignan, 1665, (v. 192)
Document concernant le régiment de Carignan et l'expédition contre les Iroquois, 1666, (v. 197)

Au sujet des salaires et de l'entretien du régiment de Carignan, 1668, (v. 220)

Trois lettres concernant les armes destinées au régiment de Carignan, 1669, (v. 335)
Indian Attack on Fort Chambly, 1687 by David Lee
In the 1680's New France was just beginning to get on its feet: both the fur trade and settlement were expanding - but this was only because peace with the Iroquois allowed expansion. The Iroquois had almost brought New France to its knees by 1660 but in 1663 the young Louis XIV took control of the colony from the Company of One Hundred and in the next few years sent the military means\textsuperscript{1} to bring the Iroquois into peaceful accord with the French (1667). However, as the fur trade expanded westward the Algonquins and Ottawa, acting as middle-men between the French and the tribes further west, came into conflict once again with the Iroquois acting as middle-men for the English and competing for the same trade.

The Iroquois Confederacy counted far fewer braves than the tribes with which they competed (economically and militarily) but they made up for war losses by adopting prisoners from other tribes and, of course, they were more united and organized than the others. They had to be: they were surrounded by hostile tribes (including the Andastes and Mohicans to the south and the Ottawas and others to the west). Moreover, they were a sedentary tribe dependent on the agriculture of their permanent villages: they could not just withdraw and re-establish elsewhere like their nomadic enemies. The trader de la Chesnaye believed that they tried to compensate for their disadvantageous position by ferocity in warfare:\textsuperscript{2} by cannibalism and exemplarily horrible torture they terrified their foes into submission.

\textsuperscript{1} See Pierre Nadon, "Le Régiment Carignan-Salières," pp. 2-9.

\textsuperscript{2} de la Chesnaye à de Laguy, 4 novembre 1695, P.A.C., Archives Nationales, F3, Collection Moreau de St. Mery, II, p.6.
By 1686 the prospect of an Indian-English-French conflict in the fur-bearing Great Lakes region seemed quite possible. Closer to home the Governor of New France, Jacques René de Brisay, Marquis de Denonville, felt that the peace with the Iroquois was untrustworthy because the English seemed to be arming them for war. The result was that Denonville decided on a preventative and intimidatory war: in July 1687 he chose the Senecas (the most westerly Iroquois nation) and led an expedition against them. Several villages were destroyed and French sovereignty declared again over all the western territories explored by La Salle but which had lately been entered by English fur traders. The Senecas, the strongest of the Five Nations, were disabled (temporarily at least) but the expedition failed to intimidate the Confederacy and, instead of preventing war, led to a renewed series of attritional Indian wars.

One of the first acts of the new Indian war was an Iroquois attack on Fort Chambly in October of the same year. Very little is known about this attack. The Abbé François de Belmont says only that:

Le 4 octobre, 150 Agniers assiègent Chambly où commandoit M. Du Plessis. Ils prirent un soldat, sa femme et son enfant. 3

Governor Dongan wrote Denonville indicating that four children may have been captured and Denonville's reply accused Dongan of fomenting the Indians' attack on the fort. 4

In 1687 Chambly was a tiny frontier settlement still working to clear the land: the census of New France taken six years earlier reported only 78 persons including children. The year before the attack a garrison of 18 men and a

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3 Belmont: Histoire du Canada, P. 27, in Collection des Mémoires et de Relations sur l'histoire Ancienne de Canada, Québec, 1840. (Trans: "The fourth of October 150 Mohawks besieged Chambly where M. Du Plessis was commanding. They captured one soldier, his wife and child.") See also CIIA, 10, pp. 160-162, Mémoire Instructif, 30 octobre 1688.
4 Dongan à Denonville, 12 octobre 1687, CIIA, 9, fo. 164, p. 234; Denonville à Dongan, 12 mai 1688, CIIA, 10, (partie 1), fo. 46, p. 84.
lieutenant (probably marine troops) were sent to reoccupy the fort which had been empty since the late 1660's. Presumably the small number of settlers could and did take refuge inside the fort during the attack and perhaps in the years following when the Iroquois terrorized the countryside during the Indian and English wars which continued for more than a decade.

The Summer of 1688 bands of Mohawks swept down the Richelieu burning houses and killing livestock at Contrecœur, Sorel, St. Ours, and St. Francois. War between England and France (beginning in 1689) worsened the situation and for several years New France was disturbed by both English and Indian raids. For example, in 1689 occurred the infamous Lachine Massacre, in 1690 the unsuccessful invasion of New France by Admiral William Phipps and, in 1692, raids along the south shore of the St. Lawrence including the Seigneurie defended by Madeleine de Vershères. Peace was declared between England and France in 1697 but it was not until 1701 that an Indian peace allowed New France to get back to the full-time task of developing a colony.

Around 1688 Raymond Blaise de Bergères, (commandant 1688-96) brought to the fort a young dog from his previous command (Niagara). The garrison trained the dog to carry messages through the Iroquois-infested forests to LaPrairie Madeleine and other nearby posts. The dog was placed on the army rolls under the name "Monsieur de Niagara" and thereby qualified to receive army rations like any other soldier. This practise was continued for several years and even after his death for, when the accounts were being reviewed, it was always possible to say that the dog was "en course." The dog could have been a real asset for

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Governor Frontenac reported in 1692 that de Bergères had to keep his garrison at Chambly ever alert because "les ennemis sont presque tous les jours au pied de ses palissades."  

Settlement at Fort Chambly, 1670-1700 by Antonio Jurkovich
Seigneurs and Seigneury

The fort of Chambly was built in 1665 as a base for the offensive expedition against the Iroquois conducted by the Carignan-Salières Regiment (1665-1666). Jacques de Chambly was the commander of the fort (1665-1666) and it is possible that he took care of it between 1667 and 1672 - the years when settlement began. \(^1\)

On the 29th of October 1672, Louis XIV granted the seigneury of Chambly to Chambly, at the same time as St-Ours and Saurel received their military settlement. The seigneury had: "Six lieues de terre de front sur une lieue de profondeur à prendre sur la rivière St-Louis scavoir trois lieues au nord de ladite rivière, (deux lieues en deçà du fort qui y est basty et une lieue au-delà) et trois lieues au sud de la rivière." (See Translation below). \(^2\)

On 22 October 1673, the seigneury was sold to a man named Jean de Lau-Lamotte because of de Chambly's transfer to Acadie. \(^3\)

However, the seigneury reverted to Chambly because Lau-Lamotte was not able to pay for it. Between 1673 and 1679, the history of the seigneury, is obscure. However, on the 11th May 1679, Jacques de Chambly donated the seigneury to Marie-Francoise Tavanet, who is believed to be a close relative of his. \(^4\)

"Damoiselle Tavanet" died in 1691 and left the seigneury to Marguerite-Joseph Thavenet (who also received the part of Elisabeth de Masselin who held a part of Chambly seigneury); Marguerite-Joseph Thavenet was the wife of Joseph Hertel, sieur de La Fresnière, who became the seigneur of Chambly the 11th October 1691, by act of fealty and hommage in Quebec. \(^5\) He remained seigneur until 1723.

Translation:

Six leagues of frontage on the river St. Louis by one league deep; that is to say, three leagues on the north shore of the said river, two leagues on this side of the fort and one league above, and three leagues on the south shore of the said river.
The settlement

The settlement around Chambly was slow developing and not very propitious in its location. The Richelieu River was the normal invasion route from the south. The Intendant Jean Talon, however, encouraged the settlement considering it a military necessity (this point is certain since he compares the situation to the Roman Empire), the key to the interior.  

The progress of the settlement may be seen by comparing census figures. The first complete census took place in 1661 and shows a total of 78 persons (adults and children) and 133 arpents developed. Gédéon de Catalogne, Ingénieur du Roy, describes Chambly as poor and neglected in 1712-1715.

The Seigneurie of Chambly, belongs to Sieur de Hertel, "Lieutenant réformé dans les troupes", by the testament of the late Sieur de Chambly. A Recollet father, missionary to the garrison of the fort which has been built there, serves as parish priest to the Seigneur... Most of the land in the Seigneurie is good for growing all kinds of grains and vegetables but the Seigneur's neglect of his property has resulted in retarded development. Timber for construction, especially pine, is finer and more abundant there than anywhere else in the colony. The whole Richelieu River area, then, although rich in land and forest, has been badly neglected.  

The 1712 census showed little progress since 1661.

The way of life of the settlers is nowhere described in detail, but from the description of New France, we may infer that Chambly's situation was not better, or worse, than elsewhere. The settlers were poor, worked hard for their living, enjoyed very little security and always had to be ready to fight against Indians. The Intendant Duchesneau said that those settlers who work assiduously on the land live very well, and incomparably better than what are called "les bons paysans" in France; but the climate of this country gives them a much more carefree, inconstant temperament, hostile to hard work;
and, seeing the carefree life of the "coureur de bois", they too go astray and enter the fur trade - a much easier life; because of this the land is not being cleared, cattle are not multiplying and no industries are being established.\textsuperscript{10}

The soil was certainly fertile, but the settlers were not able to exploit it to the fullest extent.\textsuperscript{11} They lived mainly by fishing and hunting.\textsuperscript{12} Beyond any doubt they were much engaged in fur trading, since Chambly is known as the second most important smuggling passage towards English traders\textsuperscript{13} on the Hudson waterway. This was also a cause of the slow progress of the settlement, since fur trading was less difficult and more rewarding and glamorous than agriculture.

The communications with other villages of the colony was assured by three routes. Between Chambly and Laprairie, a narrow footpath was unusable because of the Indian threat. The Chambly-Longueuil road was wider and ran for four leagues. The third road was the waterway and it was used extensively. On the river travel was by flat bottom boat or by brigs constructed for local use.\textsuperscript{14}
REFERENCES


3. This sale is believed to be registered in Antoine Adhemar's papers, 12 and 17 October 1674, Archives Judiciaires de Montréal.


   PAC, FM 8, A 9, vol. 1, p. 342-345. This document is transcript from Les Archives de Québec. It is very descriptive for the history of the seigneury and seigneurs of Chambly.

6. See Appendix A.


7. See Appendix B.

8. Munro, W.B., op. cit., pp. 117-118.

9. PAC, FM 1, G 1, vol. 461, recensement de 1712.


11. CHAAR, 1944, p. 61.

   PAC, FM 1, C 11 A, vol. 5, Duchesneau au ministre. 10 novembre 1679.


13. PAC, FM 1, C 11 A, vol. 5, Lettre de Frontenac. 6 novembre 1699.  
vol. 6, Extraits de Lettres de 1682.

Mémoire concernant le village de Chambly. Levasseur de Néré. 1704.  
In: Nadon, Pierre, Fort Chambly..., MRS #17, pp. 84-95.

APPENDIX A

Extract from the Draft of Regulations relating to the Administration of Justice and the Distribution of Lands in Canada, submitted by H. Talon to Messieurs de Tracy and de Courcelle, January 24, 1667.

Soldiers serving in the Carignan-Salière regiment or in the garrisons of the Québec, Trois-Rivières and Montréal forts are by rights and by deed lieged to the King by dint of the pay they have drawn; their services are, for the time being as well as the future, indispensable to His Majesty for the purposes of ensuring the defence of the country, participating in public affairs and guaranteeing the commonweal, as much as to vouch for the successful outcome of all ventures deemed useful and profitable for both Old and New France. Thus is it not objectionable to grant them lands to clear, firstly because this will be quite agreeable to them inasmuch as they would not thence have to leave those lands on which they are now settled, and also because, since they cannot establish themselves solely by their own work, they must be helped during the first years. It seems to be at once profitable for His Majesty and just to grant them some succour in victuals and whatever tools are necessary for their labour, as well as to pay them for the tilling of the first two acres of land they will clear and burn, albeit they will be doing so for their own account and profit; in return, they will be called upon, during the next three or four years, to till two more acres of land for the benefit of the families arriving from France, and this without remuneration, this being a means whereby they are allowed to stock their own food supplies for the coming winter and to prepare the lands intended for the families whom the King seems willing to establish thereon at his expense.
This policy of giving out a newly conquered land has its precedent in 
Roman times and may correspond somewhat to the antique practice, then 
called "proedia militaria", whereby these same Romans of old donated fields 
in the provinces held under sway; this practice used by peoples versed in 
politics and warfare can, in my opinion, be judiciously introduced within 
a country distant by thousands of leagues from its monarch and the corporate 
State of which it is but a quite removed member and which may often find 
itself reduced to self-subsistence. It is, in my opinion, (a policy) all 
the more estimable in that it will one day provide the King with a corps 
of seasoned troops no longer on His Majesty's stipend but still able to 
protect the body of that nascent state of Canada, with all extensions which 
may accrue thereto, against attacks by savages or violent invasions by 
Europeans, and which may even provide His Majesty with valuable assistance 
in times of pressing needs for Old France.

Apart from these foregoing motives, it is advisable to stress the conditions 
conducive to peace and public order; every means of human caution must be 
exerted to maintain such conditions. Indeed, the most precious goods worth 
preserving in civil life are those which guarantee the unity and security of 
the people and these prized values rest particularly upon fealty to the sovereign, 
since on this very fealty depends the preservation of newly discovered 
provinces in remote lands and (province) subdued through their allegiance 
to and domination by that same sovereign. That is the reason why our former 
kings, who were greater statesmen than they were once held to be, would
introduce in newly subdued lands soldiery whose loyalty was patent and who had been born their subjects; thus did they (the kings) intend to keep the people obedient within the country whilst keeping without their common foe; in order to provide for their upkeep and subsistence, they granted them lands in those (new) countries, for farming and producing therefrom all staples of life; it was a policy at once economically and politically sound since, on the one hand, it was easy on the public treasury and, on the other hand, it led either the officer or the soldier involved to take an interest in the country's weal while, by the same token, ensuring his own estate.

The old wintering settlers who will apply for homesteads might find less convenient than the soldiery this conditional service to be rendered His Majesty. Therefore, should they not feel sufficiently willing to agree to it (that condition) either through those natural rights which compell them to set out to war when so ordered, or through their sense of honour when appealed to, or as against their exemption from other onerous rights ordinarily attendant upon concessions of lands, said compulsory service may then be stipulated in the contracts allotted to them.

And since His Majesty seems willing to assume all the costs necessary for the establishment of settlers (clearing, farming and the sowing of two acres of land, advancing a certain quantity of wheat flour to the newcomers), it may first be required of those new families what was demanded of the old
winterers, i.e. that having received two acres of cropped and sown land, they in turn farm two more acres during the three or four years following their arrival; such re-imbursement should not be claimed for the first nor the second year because this would hinder overmuch their improvement work about their own homestead and at a time when it calls for a new family's whole concern. And in return for the benefit which these families obtain through the land ceded them, in lieu of the royalties which concessions of land usually carry in this country (Canada), they will be obliged to engage in the King's service their first-born son at the age of sixteen, the latter then beginning his training in one of the fort garrisons, yet without claiming any other pay than the cost of his upkeep, or carrying out whatever duties may be ordered him by the rolls of His Majesty for the duration of his service. This obligation adds practically nothing to that which naturally befalls any true subject by reason of his birth but it seems that, once that condition is stipulated, it is less arduous when required than if there is no reference to it in the land concession deeds, under which policy all lands of Canada are given out.

Through all this land distribution policy, nothing is reserved for the benefit of La Compagnie des Indes Occidentales, but as His Majesty is willing to gratify whoever is entitled to seigniorial rights in such instances, it follows that homesteads will be directly responsible to it, in which case high, medium and petty justice may be done by it; furthermore, it will hold the right to rent and sell, to seize and fine, and even to levy a light tax,
should it (the Company) deem it advisable. Yet should His Majesty find that it would be more advantageous for Him to have in vassalage the officers of his troops, who would exercise over commoners the power of useful demesne, he may create on their behalf a few minor levies but more by way of bestowing symbolic honours than of providing valuable revenues for them, and have them render medium and petty justice, reserving the privilege of high justice for a sovereign court presided by feoffees or by some officers entrusted with the preservation of the rights incumbent upon the office of suzerain or "dominantissime" overlord.

TALON and TRACY
# APPENDIX B

## Habitants de Chambly Recensement de 1681

PAC, FM 1, G 1, vol. 460, partie 3.

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Résumé: 32 adultes 46 enfants
11 familles 10 célibataires
1 déclare avoir un métier
20 fusils 2 pistolets
43 bêtes à corne
133 arpents en valeur
The Fur Trade and Fort Chambly

by Pierre Nadon
The fur trade was an influential factor in shaping New France's economy. For two centuries it remained the principal commodity exported from the country. It determined in large part the exploration of the continent and strained the country's productive forces.

Until the 1660's the French confined themselves to the St. Lawrence Valley. In 1664 the Dutch were replaced along the Mohawk and Hudson River by the English. The French began moving inland partly because the Iroquois had become middlemen to the English traders and partly because their own middlemen, the Hurons, had been forcibly dispersed by the Iroquois. The building of Fort Frontenac in 1673 was a French attempt to block the Iroquois on Lake Ontario, and prevent them from trading with the western tribes, Sioux, Miamis and Illinois. French expansion continued into the hinterland as posts were built closer to the fur sources.

What inevitably followed was a rise in the number of men leaving the settlements and looking for a quick profit in the fur trade. Many soon realised that their furs were worth more at the British posts than at Montreal: at British posts they could get more trade goods of better quality for fewer furs.

8 pounds of powder sold for 1 beaver at Orange and Boston; 4 in Montreal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Price in Orange/Boston</th>
<th>Price in Montreal</th>
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<tr>
<td>One gun</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Forty pounds of lead</td>
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<td>Red blanket</td>
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<td>White blanket</td>
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<td>Four shirts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ten pairs of sox</td>
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Furthermore there was no tax of 25% to pay on the beaver pelts as was the case in New France. Since this 25% was made by the "fermiers royaux" enjoying the monopoly of the sale in the mother country, many Canadian officials were only too willing to participate in the quick profits resulting from the illicit fur trade.  

The contraband fur trade centered mostly around Montreal from where the furs were carried down the Richelieu River past Chambly to Albany. The chief intermediaries between the French merchants on one end, and the English on the other were the Caughnawaga group of Iroquois near Montreal, recently converted to Catholicism and the French cause.  

Under pressure from the mother country the government of New France had to do something to curb illicit trading which, by 1714, totalled one half or two thirds of the entire quantity of beaver peltry produced in Canada each year.  

Starting in 1676 ordnances had been passed to limit the number of coureur de bois. In 1681 a royal decree threatened the offenders with the galleys. In 1696 another royal decree made the illicit fur trade also punishable by the galleys. By the first quarter of the eighteen century all Englishmen were barred from the country. However, due to the use of Indian middlemen and to the complicity of many government officials, the only really effective means left to check smuggling was to patrol the Richelieu. Until 1731, when Fort St. Frederic was built on Lake Champlain, Fort Chambly played a leading role as a barrier between Montreal and Albany.  

In 1679 Frontenac sent de St. Ours to Chambly "to observe what was going on...." It seems that Frontenac's decision followed
de La Chesnaye's, (then holder of the monopoly of the fur trade), who had ordered men there to check the smuggling. The fort was actually not garrisoned permanently, however, when the Iroquois wars resumed; Denonville sent some men to Chambly under the command of Sieur du Plessy.

It would be unwise to accuse Fort Chambly's commanders of being involved in the illicit fur trade. Harang Tiercin, in his book, La police de l'alcool et la course des bois au Canada sous le régime français, states that St. Ours was prosecuted in 1681 for engaging in illicit fur trade. While it is true that he was at Chambly then, and that he was summoned to appear before the Conseil souverain, it is not certain whether he was appearing as an offender or as a witness.

It is however more than probable that people around Chambly helped the contraband goods pass through. A memoir of 1683 describes Chambly as a refuge for those who have nothing else in mind than the trade with Manhattan or Orange. In 1686 a local resident was arrested for inducing young men of good families to engage in smuggling with the English. As well, we have documentary evidence that the Hertels, the seigneurs of Chambly, were corresponding with Livingstone, an English fur trader at Fort Orange, and sending him merchandise.

The system of the illicit fur trade itself necessitated the cooperation of the local people. Merchandise was brought to the head of the Chambly rapids and hidden there, where intermediaries would pick them up and complete the transactions.

Most of the seizures which were recorded are the results of patrol activities or informers coming upon a cache, and reporting it to the commander at Fort Chambly. The merchandise was seized, tagged with
the Company's seal and then brought to the fort. It was then sold at a public auction, the profits divided equally between l'Hotel Dieu at Quebec, the fur Company, and the informer if there was one. These seizures were in some cases impressive. In 1719, 85 pieces of cloth were seized in a cache by members of the garrison at Chambly.

After 1731 Fort St. Frederic became New France's most important post along the Richelieu. Nevertheless in 1750 the commander at Fort Chambly was still instructed by his commission to seize beaver-skins going to New York or English merchandise entering New France.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. Difference des traites, Collection de documents, vol. 1, p. 476

2. For the organisation of the fur trade in New France, see J. Hamelin, Economic et société en Nouvelle-France, (Presse Universitaires Praval, 1960) p. 47-57


4. Vaudreuil et Bégon au Ministre, 20 sep. 1714, C11A, 34, p. 92

5. Edit du 2 mai 1681, C11A, vol. 5, p. 335

6. Arrêt du Conseil d'état, 18 mai 1703, F3, vol. 6, f°334

7. Nevertheless patrols had been sent on Lake Champlain before 1731. See lettre à M. le marquis de Vaudreuil, 15 juin 1716, FMI, B 38-2, p. 378; lettre à Beauharnois, 14 mai 1728 B52-1, p. 92.

8. Aubert de La Chesnoye had purchased the monopoly in 1675, see Lanctot, G., Histoire du Canada, vol. 2, p. 83; for relationship between La Chesnoye and St. Ours, see Memoire, 1683, C11A, 6, p. 351; Frontenac au roi, 2 nov. 1681, C11A, 5, p. 383.


12. In MG 25/18: 40. See Appendix B.

13. See the "Proces verbal d'une saisie, 3 juin 1715, C11A, vol. 35, p. 311. See Appendix A.

14. Lettre du 5 juin 1719, C11A, 40, p. 74

15. MG 23, G 5, 7, Carton 10, p. 127
Ce Jourd'hui, 3 Juin 1715, a quatre heures après midy Laroshé
Soldat de la Compagnie de M. d'Esgly Revenant de la Chasse Et
nous ayant assuréz avoir vu proche St-Therese des marchandizes
angloises cachéz dans le bois, Je soussigné Lieutent. d'une
compagnie du détachement de la marine Commandant pour le Roy au
fort de Chambly, En l'absance de M. d'Esgly J ay en Vertu des
ordres de M. le gouverneur sur le champ détache La Croyère
Sergent, le Sr. La durantaye cadet et le susd. La Rozié sous
trois de cette garnison et de la susd. compagnie avec le Sieur
La force garde magazin du Roy pour Sallé Saisir desd. effets
Lesquels Ils ont amenez au fort. La visite en ayant Esté
faitte en notre Presence En presence du R Père Pierre du blaron
Recollet Et aumonié dud. fort du Sr. de la force, dud. Sergent
avons trouvéz que le tout consistoit En trois pièces desquelles
deux sont Ecarlatines Rouges, Et la troisième Ecarlatine
Bleue, ny Lune ny les autres point mésurés ny armées que nous
avons Remis à la garde dud. Sieur La force pour les representés
quand Il en sera ordonné aussi bien qu'un canot d'Ecorce de six
places. en foy de quoy nous avons sous signés le présent
procès verbail, a Chambly ce jour Et an que dessus,
de Bragelongue p. pierre du Blaron Recolet Laforce
La Croyère Sergent signés a l'original
Monsieur de livingston
le jeune comisire et tresorie
du fort d'orange

De Chambly ce 17 juin 1700

Monsieur

Jay reçu celle qui vous a plu me suive
par monsieur david laquel ma fait baukop
de plaisir et dont ie vousuis tres oblige. ie
souhete ardaman de frenner quelques androits
de mennanger [?]. ie le ferai avec plus de zele
que ia [j'ai?]. mes [mais] ne pouvant a se reconnoitre
toutes nos onestetes [honnêtetés] iesper du ciel quelques
aucasions ou ie vous faiay coignoistre
combiien ie suis devoue a vottre service.
an atandan ce bonheur ie pran la liberté
de me dire avec toute la sincerité possible.
Monsieur

Votre tres humble
serviteur

[Heret] de Chambly

ie vous avoit anvoie un de nos casnos si
ces messieurs san [s'en] fussent voulu charge
mes il les on trouve tropetit.
mon père et tous mes frères vous presa-
nt leurs salu.
Salue ie vous prie de m'a part monsieur
bourque [?] et tous nos messieurs.ie tacherai
de vous aler voir avan que letta [l'été] se pase.
adieu

MG 25/18: 40.
Fort Chambly, 1679-1714

by Antonio Jurkovich
Introduction

Fort Chambly must be studied as a border post evolving to control smuggling to, and invasion from, the English colonies to the south.

There are three steps in this evolution: the first fort, of pickets, built by de Chambly, and used until the 1702 fire; the second fort, also of pickets, named Pontchartrain; and finally the third fort, of stone, completed in 1711, whose walls still stand today. In each of these phases we deal with a post, more or less fortified, according to the circumstances and epoch, protecting the colony and especially Montreal.
1-1679-1702

The fort built by Jacques de Chambly at the Bassin de Chambly even though it was small and in poor condition was still the most important establishment in the area. We know the plan of the first fort only by a mere drawing representing a square building with redans incorporated in three of the walls and a tambour protecting the gate. After 1667 no document mentions any garrison at the fort until 1679. But a letter from Frontenac, in 1679, says that he had sent the Sieur de St-Ours and some men there to stop the smuggling of furs. Frontenac also underlined that it was past Chambly that "almost all communication takes place between Canada and New England". In 1681, Frontenac again pointed out the importance of Chambly and mentioned that smuggling was still active. St-Ours had been there for two years and now Frontenac recommended him to be the head of a proposed new regional government. This is the germ of the idea of making Chambly a great fortified post with a permanent garrison. To make of Chambly a "rampart of the colony" was a point stressed by every Governor until the building of the stone fort.

What happened at Chambly between 1681 and 1686 is unknown as nothing seems to have attracted the attention of the Governors or Intendants. With the return of Iroquois war in 1686, Denonville, the Governor,

1 Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents (Ed. Thwaites) vol. 69, p. 277.
pointed out the immediate need to protect Chambly, and to strengthen the fort as part of a general plan of defence to protect the French colony.\(^4\) Firstly, however, Denonville ordered a lieutenant and eighteen men to Chambly to stop the smuggling of furs.\(^5\)

It is probable that this lieutenant was François Lefebre, sieur du Plessy, because in 1687, he mentioned that he had paid from his own money for "the transportation (to Fort Chambly) of four hundred posts, twenty to twenty-four inches in diameter".\(^6\) The fort needed repair because there was probably no garrison in it between 1681 and 1686. Also, under the supervision of du Plessy, a tower was built at Chambly in 1687:

"A tower was built as a powder magasin, a grain store, from which the dam [barrage-barrier, rapids]\(^7\) on the lake and the boats may be watched".\(^7\) In October of the same year, however, a group of Iroquois raided the Richelieu River and attacked Chambly but little is known of this attack. A letter from Champigny, dated November 5, 1687, mentioned the fact that some fortifications were being built at Chambly, but he gave no details of the kind of works,\(^8\) thus providing no hint of the damage done by the Indians.

The next year requests were still being made to strengthen the fort.\(^9\) In 1692 France gave an answer by sending money for fortifications, from which a part was to be taken for Chambly: "His Majesty has provided some money for the fortifications of Quebec, the forts of Chambly ...".\(^10\)

\(^4\) PAC, FM 1, C 11 A, vol 8, Mémoire de l'état présent des affaires du Canada... par Denonville, 8 novembre 1686.
\(^5\) C 11 A, vol 8, p. 16, fo 6, Denonville au Ministre, 8 mai 1686.
\(^6\) Bibliothèque Nationale, Coll. Clairambault, vol 893, fo 208, p. 11.
\(^7\) C 11 A, vol 9, p. 105, Lettre de Denonville au Ministre, 22 août 1687.
\(^8\) C 11 A, vol 9, Lettre de Champigny au Ministre, 5 novembre 1687.
\(^9\) C 11 A, vol 10, part. 1, p. 192, Mémoire présent des affaires de ce pays...du 10 août au dernier jour d'octobre 1688.
\(^10\) RAPQ, 1927, p. 89 Mémoire du Roy au gouverneur Frontenac et a l'intendant Bochart de Champigny.
But again that year, Frontenac wrote that the stockade of the fort was rotten and needed to be replaced.\textsuperscript{11} In 1692 Peter Schuyler gathered an invasion army at head of Lake Champlain and Chambly prepared for attack. Schuyler did not get to Chambly and his invasion failed, but it hastened the strengthening of the fort. In 1693, Frontenac wrote: "the forts of Chambly and Sorel have been enclosed with new pickets; the old ones were rotten and sufficiently open to allow entry in a number of places".\textsuperscript{12} The repairs were probably done under the direction of Blaise des Bergères, Commanding Officer at the fort from 1688 to 1696.\textsuperscript{13}

This offensive was the last of this war, ended in 1697 by the treaty of Ryswick signed between the two metropolis: London and Paris. Chambly remained merely as a sentry along the Richelieu to control smuggling and stop the Indians, who did not sue for peace until 1701.\textsuperscript{14}

In March 1702, this first fort burned down overnight. A Recollet father, who had been at Chambly since 1702 and burned with the fort, was held responsible for the fire.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{11}RAPQ, 1928, p. 106. Lettre de Frontenac et de Champigny au Ministre, 15 septembre 1692.
\textsuperscript{12}RAPQ, 1927, p. 168. Lettre de Frontenac et Champigny au Ministre.
\textsuperscript{13}BRH, vol 22, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{15}C 11 A, vol 20, MM de Callieres et Beauharnois au Ministre, 3 novembre 1702.
2- 1702-1709

With the 1702 fire begins a second period for Chambly. France and England fought again in the War of the Spanish Succession, and so did the English and French colonies, but with less vehemence. Only in 1709 was the Richelieu border threatened again.

In 1702 the burnt fort was rebuilt and named Pontchartrain in honour of the Minister of Marine. This second fort was still of pickets despite numerous demands of the Governors. We know of no plan for this fort but maybe this fact implies that the new fort was built in the same way and on the same place as the first one. For its description, we have the Levasseur de Néré's testimony in a memoir he submitted in 1704. Levasseur de Néré, then Ingénieur du Roy in New France, echoed de Vaudreuil's thoughts. The latter proposed to set up Chambly as a regional Government under the direction of Montreal in order to lighten the burden of the Government of Trois-Rivières.

At the same time the Intendant Beauharnois and Governor de Vaudreuil proposed a road between Chambly and Montreal for which permission was granted by the King in 1704. In the Memoir of Levasseur de Néré, mentioned above, the author says that at this time (1704) the garrison numbered twenty-three men. In 1707 Levasseur de Néré wrote the Minister again recommending a separate Government for the Chambly area with himself as Governor. At the same time he described the fortifications at Chambly:

16 PAC, MG 1, D.F.C., carton 9, #495.
17 RAPQ, 1939, p. 17. Lettre de MM de Vaudreuil et de Beauharnois au Ministre, 15 novembre 1703.
18 RAPQ, 1941, p. 371. Lettre de Beauharnois et de Vaudreuil à M. le comte Jérôme de Pontchartrain, 15 novembre 1703.
19 RAPQ, 1939, p. 31. Mémoire du Roy à MM de Vaudreuil et de Beauharnois, 14 juin 1704.
"Chambly is without doubt the most useful and the most exposed post in Canada... This post serves also to prevent smuggling of beaver to the English. It is besides a warehouse for all French and allied Indians who go or come back from war expeditions against the enemies of His Majesty, and added to this it gives shelter to the people of this place and from the neighboring area, who, without this refuge, would be in a pitiful way and we can say with truth that it has saved many lives. By enlarging this place, it strengthens and extends the colony and at the same time keeps our enemies away... ."20

The Intendant Raudot opposed strengthening the fort because of the high costs and because they did not believe it was as important as anyone else said.21 Raudot's case was strengthened by M. d'Aigremont, who, as contrôleur-des-fortifications, visited all the colony's military establishments in 1709 and did not even mention Fort Chambly in his report.22 However, Raudot's opposition did not last long after Nicholson's attempted invasion of 1709.

In the Spring of 1709, Nicholson gathered an army at Lake Champlain for the purpose of once again invading the French colony. De Vaudreuil sent 1,500 men under the command of de Ramezay to Chambly to guard the colony against any attack.

The threat of Nicholson's invasion speeded things up. Vaudreuil and Raudot wrote to the Minister:

"We had the honour previously to point out the necessity of erecting a stone fort at Chambly. This need has been determined after consultation with M. de Ramezay and le Sr d'Aigremont to have construction begin as soon as Spring comes on the outline of the fort and, in 1711, on the interior. We ask your pardon, Monseigneur, for having to begin construction without receiving your instructions..."²³

For this construction they demanded twenty thousand pounds. Two days later, on November 16th, Raudot issued an ordinance prescribing that the people of Montreal carry to Chambly, as soon as possible the stone, lime and wood which would be needed for the construction of the new Fort Chambly.²⁴ From 1709 to 1711 the correspondence of the Governor and the Intendant does not mention anything more than that the fort was under construction and that the soldiers were working at it under the direction of the Sr de Beaucours, ingénieur du Roy.²⁵

The plans for the stone fort at Chambly were drawn by Beaucours, and he left a very complete document concerning this fort²⁶. A study of the fort indicates a style much more characteristic of Middle Age fortification than of the Vauban style generally used

²³RAPC, 1943, p. 424. Lettre de M de Vaudreuil et Raudot au Ministre, 14 novembre 1709.
²⁵RAPC, 1947, Lettre de Vaudreuil au Ministre, juin 1710.
C ll A, vol 31, Lettre de Ramezay au Ministre, 29 octobre 1710.
²⁶PAC, Dépôt des Fortifications, Dévis du Fort de Chambly, 1710.
at this period. We may believe that Fort Chambly is unique in its style in Canada for a 16th century fortification: note the height of the walls, the thickness of the walls (not enough thick, though, to sustain a siege with heavy artillery), the elevation of the bastions (higher than the curtains), the lack of such earthworks outside the walls as a fosse or glacis and the machiculation over the gate and the bastions (added a few years later). The Vauban style of fortifications are characterized especially by lower walls and defensive earthworks outside the walls. No document mentioned the location of the officers and soldiers quarters.

In 1711, a British report on New France says of Chambly: "upon ye River Shamblee is a stone fort / about 16 foot hight, and as I guess about 80 yards one way and fifty ye other, each corner a bastion, about twenty foot Out, six great guns, 100 soldiers".28

After completion of the fort, Vaudreuil recommended: "The Sr de Vaudreuil and Begon think that it would be convenient to garrison at Fort Pontchartrain de Chambly two complete companies with their officers and to have a permanent commandant who would be the oldest captain of the two companies ...".29

Speaking of the strength of the new fort, de Vaudreuil says in the same letter that Chambly is a most useful work, that it can hold from 700 to 800 men, and that it has room for 40 pieces of cannon

29 RAPQ, 1948, n. 182. MM de Vaudreuil et Begon au Ministre, 12 novembre 1712.
and 36 canisters; the Governor concludes by saying "that this fort must be considered the rampart of Canada on the southern frontier".  

An Arret du Conseil Superieur, dated 5th December 1712, provided for ordnance land around the fort measuring 600 toises along the river front and 300 toises deep.  

Minor additions and improvements took place later: for example, machicolation over the gate and guerites on the bastions in 1718.

Conclusion:

Main dates in the evolution of Fort Chambly:

1665-6: Chambly is built by soldiers of the Carignan-Salières regiment.

1667-79: Unknown, probably empty.

1679-81: St-Ours sent at Chambly by Frontenac to prevent furs smuggling.

1681-6: Unknown, probably empty.

1686-7: Reoccupied and repaired.

1693: Repaired.

1702: Burnt and rebuilt.

1709: Demolished and rebuilt in stone.

1718: Machicolation and guerites added.
The history of Fort Chambly during the ancien régime can be divided into three periods:

1665 - 1666
1686 - 1731
1732 - 1759

The following is an attempt to illustrate these historical periods cartographically as well as textually.
In 1665 and 1666 Fort Chambly (or St. Louis) was one of a series of small posts along the Richelieu River built expressly as bases for expeditions against the Iroquois. Fort Chambly's particular function was to serve as a hospital and storehouse and as a protection for goods being portaged around the rapids.

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1 On 29 January 1666, Governor Courcelles, "part du St. Louys avec 500 a 600 hommes en tout." (R.C. Thwaites, ed.: Jesuit Relations, vol. 50, p. 150.)
From A Map Drawn For
The Campaign Of 1666.
Period Two:

When peace with the Iroquois ended it was necessary to protect the Richelieu River invasion route again but this time only Chambly was garrisoned: Forts Ste.-Anne, St. Jean and Ste.-Thérèse were not re-occupied and repaired. Chambly, then, entered its most important period in 1686 - the most southerly post on the Iroquois and English frontier.

From 1686 to 1731, then, its function was as headquarters for troops going out on patrols or sorties against infiltrating raiders. In 1709, for example, it was from Chambly that Claude de Ramezay, Governor of Montréal, set out about 1000 French and Indians to meet an English invasion force under Col. Francis Nicholson. A brief skirmish at Pointe-à-la-Chevelure in early August caused some of Nicholson's Indian allies to desert from his force. In Autumn Vaudreuil brought more troops to Chambly but invasion never came (for a number of reasons). In 1711, when Nicholson threatened invasion again, Vaudreuil again made Chambly the collection point for troops in his defense of the colony. These threats led to the reconstruction of Fort Chambly in stone beginning in 1710.

However, after the construction of Fort St.-Frédéric (1731) on Lake Champlain, Chambly was no longer the most southerly post of New France on this frontier.

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1 It was also responsible for checking fur smuggling to the English colonies.


Period Three:

From 1732 to 1760 Chambly was just a minor, rear-guard post assisting the new Fort St.-Frédéric in the control of smuggling but having little military significance. Although the stone fort could accommodate 500 men, by 1742 its garrison consisted of only six men, one serjeant, and one officer.\(^1\) By the Seven Years War new forts had been built on the invasion route between the English frontier and Chambly - Carillon, farther south than St.-Frédéric and the nearby posts of St.-Jean and Ile-aux-Noix. By 1759 Chambly was subordinate to the commander of Fort St.-Jean.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Hocquart au Ministre, 22 septembre, 1742, CLlA, 77, p. 379.

Fort Chambly and the Seven Years War  

by Antonio Jurkovich
-Introduction.

The Seven Years War has a particular figure in America. The colonial interests, more than in the previous wars, were exasperated by growing opposition. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, did not settle the important frontier question.

New France's attitude was in opposition to the growing English colonies who wished to expand beyond the Alleghanys. The problem was one of search for "Lebensraum". To this was added New England's desire for the fisheries along the Acadian coast, and control of the fur trade, in the west, mostly under New France's influence.

This is why English and French came to war in America, without even waiting for the signal from the metropolis, as in the three previous wars: 1689-1697, 1702-1713, 1744-1748. Finally, the Seven Years War was, in America, the fourth phase to end a fight concerning colonial interests, completely independent from those, continental, of the metropolis.¹
The Fort Chambly.

After the erection of the stone fort at Chambly in 1711 the government put all its hopes in it. It was considered a sure rampart. And the confidence was stronger since now they had a strong fort on the Richelieu frontier, this river being a well known invasion route.

But in 1731 Fort Saint-Frédéric was erected at the head of Lake Champlain. At the same time Fort Chambly lost its importance as bridge-head on the Richelieu, becoming merely a refuge of second line. The building of Fort Saint-Jean made this more obvious. Finally Carillon (1755) and Ile-aux-Noix (1759) will take away the little strategical importance that Fort Chambly still had. But even under this aspect, the garrison, in 1751, is fair for the little importance given to the fort: there were 51 men under the command of De Muy. Louis Franquet, engineer, though, in his *Voyages et Mémoires sur le Canada*, did not hide the confidence he had, despite the government's intention to abandon the fort, because of maintenance's high cost. Franquet, wrote in 1752:

Since the erection of Fort Saint-Frédéric (1731) Chambly's is now back up from the head of our territories and this has given idea to demolish it. We must beware to do so. It sustains navigation on River Richelieu, serves as a refuge to the inhabitants along the river, provides a sure retreat to troops posted ahead, and, in a word, even if in second line, we can take as much advantage of it as if it were on first line...

Nevertheless, Franquet concludes: "We may consider this post as dead".
Everybody, though, did not reflect Franquet's optimism. It was with discouragement that Montcalm wrote, in 1756, after an inspection tour in the Richelieu valley: "Carillon is a bad place; Saint-Frédéric, Saint-Jean and Chambly do not even deserve the name of bad forts. They are, though, the only barriers closing the way to Montreal and Trois-Rivières to the enemy." Commissaire Doreil echoed Montcalm thoughts and wrote: "Forts Saint-Jean and Chambly are misérables bicoques, especially the latter..."

-The use of Fort Chambly.

Despite those evidences against the strategical importance of Fort Chambly during the Seven Years War, the government used it in a way that has its importance: the fort served firstly as a warehouse from which were supplied the soldiers fighting on the Richelieu front. Being in second line, Chambly could, without danger, be used for this purpose. Testimony from Bigot, the Intendant, Lévis, Montcalm are numerous concerning this use of Chambly.

Lévis wrote: "From Quebec, boats go up the St-Lawrence river and enter the Sorel river, which they follow to Fort Chambly, our first warehouse." Bigot also underlines the fact, in a letter from 1756: "I am back from an inspection tour to Chambly river and at Saint-Jean, to accelerate the transports;... the warehouses are full." A month later Bigot repeated: "I strongly advise M. de Vaudreuil to assign more people to the boats travelling from Chambly to Sainte-Thérèse. This former fort is full of supplies."
To assure transportation from Chambly to the front, navigation on the Richelieu was the most efficient solution. It was not surprising then to notice that Chambly had a good number of boats to transport supplies and ammunition. In 1757, M. Péan, in charge of everything concerning supplying, counted 142 boats between Chambly and Saint-Jean.9 It is permitted to imply, as Bigot leaves it to believe, that Fort Chambly was also, during the Seven Years War, a repair centre for these boats.10

A letter from Bourlamaque leaves also to believe that Chambly had to provide lumber for construction of fortifications on the Richelieu, because there was, in the village, one of the few saw mills of the area. Bourlamaque wrote from Ile-aux-Noix, in 1759: "No boards; the Chambly's mills provide almost nothing".11

Finally, to protect Chambly, and its warehouses, from a surprise attack, Bourlamaque proposed, on September 21, 1759, the erection of a wooden palissade around the fort, and two weeks later, he announced: "In concern to the winter quarters, I am building a stakes palissade around fort Chambly and Saint-Jean".12 But major Rogers said nothing in his Journal of these palissades after taking fort Chambly.

-Troops at Chambly.

During the whole period of the Seven Years War, no source gives any hint as to the number of men garrisoned at the fort-warehouse of Chambly. With regards to the little importance spared
to Chambly, we may suppose that it ran under a hundred men, this is speaking of a permanent garrison. But Chambly served as winter quarters for the troops back from the front. But no document gives any figure related to the number of soldiers quartering at Chambly. It is possible that a certain number were lodging in the fort, while others were distributed in homes in the village. It is possible, though, to describe, with fair precision, the succession of the troops at Chambly:

-Winter 1755-56: the Languedoc regiment was at Chambly.¹³

-Winter 1756-57: the regiment Royal Roussillon, returning from Carillon, stopped for the winter at Chambly.¹⁴

-1757: the documents for this year are clear enough concerning the troops moving to Chambly. A source says that "Lt. de Lusignan was left at Chambly with a garrison of 80 men".¹⁵ But we don't know what regiment this was or how long it stayed there.

M. de LaPause wrote that on the 28th of April, 1757, he received orders to proceed with his regiment (Guienne) toward Chambly to work on the road that would link Chambly to Sainte-Thérèse and Saint-Jean.¹⁶ This regiment left from Quebec, where it had spent the winter, on the 13th day of May, according to Montcalm,¹⁷ and arrived at Chambly on May 22.¹⁸ M. de LaPause reported to Chambly and started on the road, which was important
to forward supplies and ammunition to Lake Saint-Sacrament.

The summer period is obscure, concerning the regiment. But we find in Instructions de Montcalm à Lévis, dated from August 27, the order: "The regiment of Guienne will return to Chambly in order to encamp nearer to its works".\(^{19}\) We may suppose that the regiment was called to reinforce the front lines on Lake Saint-Sacrament.

"September 8, the Guienne regiment went to Chambly and resumed work to October 29, which day it entered in its assigned winter quarters, from Chambly to Sorel..."\(^{20}\)

\(^{1758}\): no document gives anything in connection with troops at Chambly.\(^{21}\)

\(^{1759}\): We pick up the thread of events again in September, 1759, in an order issued by Montcalm in which he said that Chambly and Saint-Jean should be provided with large garrisons. He proposed to replace Rouville, commanding at Chambly, by Fontbonne, but to leave Rouville as lieutenant. An ambiguous passage from a document leads us to believe that Guienne regiment is still there.\(^{22}\) In November, arrangements were taken for the winter quarters and LaReine was sent along the Richelieu, from Chambly to St-Ours, and two companies were to stay at Chambly.\(^{23}\) M. de Roquemaure, lieutenant-colonel from LaReine regiment, was the superior commander for the Richelieu front for the winter 1759-60. We know that he stayed at Chambly, without being able
to state precisely how long. It is believed that he had one thousand men under his command, distributed between Ile-aux-Noix, Saint-Jean and Chambly. A letter from Lévis to Bourlamaque says that Roquemaure left Chambly to Rouville, for a certain time, with one sergeant, 15 men from LaReine, and four soldiers from the Marine troops.

-1760: Following evidences are dated from August 1760. It appears that LaReine is still at Chambly, or at least a certain number from the regiment. There is also a letter written from Chambly by Roquemaure, he complains: "I do not have more than 400 men around the flag, counting the grenadiers." The next day, August 20, Roquemaure left Chambly, leading his troops toward l'Ile-aux-Noix, leaving "20 soldiers at Chambly, with 10 from Marine troops and 20 militiamen under the command of a lieutenant." The events hastened as the English troops prepared to attack Ile-aux-Noix. A plan of retreat is worked out. M. de LaPause mentioned, in a letter to Lévis, that the regiments of Berry and LaSarre "have their baggage at Chambly." Those regiments were, possibly, sent to Ile-aux-Noix earlier in the year and had passed through Chambly. In the same letter, M. de LaPause said also that "M. de Roquemaure intends to send, tomorrow, M. de Lusignan at Chambly". M. de Lusignan surrendered Chambly to Col. Darby and Major Rogers a few days later.
-The capture of Fort Chambly: First September 1760.

After the capture of Ile-aux-Noix, the taking of Chambly had a very secondary importance. A first attempt had taken place in June 1760, when Major Rogers received orders to proceed toward Saint-Jean and Chambly, with a small party, in order to burn those forts, cutting the supplies to the troops defending Ile-aux-Noix. But he stopped at Sainte-Thérèse, which he burnt, where he learned from his prisoners that in Chambly fort are about one hundred and fifty men, including workmen; and the remnant of the Queen's regiment in the village, 12 cannons.32

Later in August, Bougainville was besieged by Col. Haviland's army. On the 27th of August, during the night, he evacuated Ile-aux-Noix, leaving LeBorgne and a few men on the island. On the day before, 26 August, he had sent fifty men at Chambly, from Marine troops.33 The retreating troops from Ile-aux-Noix proceeded to Fort Saint-Jean, which they left on August 29, after setting it on fire. They were going to Montreal, and Col. Haviland pursued them. Rogers, at this point, received orders to join Col. Darby who was going to take Chambly, which was believed to be the last pocket of resistance. The capture of Fort Chambly is related, by the French and the English, as one among many other happenings. In a French relation from 1760, it is written: "After the evacuation of Fort Saint-Jean, the army which had besieged Ile-aux-Noix, encamped a little below from the place where was standing this fort (Saint-Jean) and sent a detachment to capture Chambly."34
Major Rogers is just as brief in his report of the event: "I joined Col. Darby at Chambly, who came there to take the fort, and had brought with him some light cannon. It soon surrendered, as the garrison consisted only of about fifty men. This happened on the first of September." It seems that not a single shot was fired and Lusignan surrendered as soon as the English troops were ready for the attack, considering that any resistance would be useless. A later report, dated from the 18th October, 1760, showed that there were 71 persons in the fort, under Lusignan's command.

Finally, Chambly, which was built to protect Montreal, did not play its part, at the last moment. The fall of Montreal was only a matter of days.
REFERENCES.


2- FM I, C 11A (Documents spéciaux), vol. 120, part. 2.

It is believed that during the 18th Century, the fort was garrisoned by troops from Les Compagnies franches de la Marine.
(Procès verbal d'une saisie, 3 juin 1715, près de Sainte-Thérèse. C.11 A, vol 35, p 311)


7- Id. op. cit. vol 9, p. 9, Lettre de Bigot, 26 juillet 1756.

8- Id. Ibid. p. 20. Lettre de Bigot, 25 août 1756.

9- Id. op. cit. vol 7, p. 219. Journal de Montcalm, 21 juin 1757.

10- Id. op. cit. vol 9, p. 85. Lettre de Bigot, 22 avril 1760.

11- Id. op. cit. vol 5, p. 75. Lettre de Bourlamaque à Lévis, 1er novembre 1759.

12- Id. op. cit. vol 5, p. 45-6; 55. Lettre de Bourlamaque à Lévis, 21 septembre 1759; Lettre du même au même, 7 octobre 1759.


14- Id. Ibid. p. 44.

15- RAPQ, 1932-33, p. 369.

16- RAPQ, 1931-32, p. 49.


18- Id. Ibid. pp. 207 et 209.

19- Id. op. cit. vol 4, p. 20.

20- RAPQ, 1931-32, p. 73. Mémoires de M. de LaPause.
21- We have the role of the troops in the colony in 1756, from: RAPQ, 1944-45. Lettre de Doreil, 30 avril 1756.

"Voici la notte de l'Effectif actuel
La Reine 465
La Sarre 499
Royal Roussillon 508
Languedoc 3781
Guiprue 508
Berry 2e bataillon 409
3e Bon 402 811
Béarn 516


23- RAPQ, 1931-32, p. 100.
Casgrain, H.-R.- op. cit. vol 4, p. 296.

24- Casgrain, H.-R. op. cit. vol 11, p. 221.

25- Id. op. cit. vol 2, p. 246.


28- Id. op. cit. vol 10, p. 124. Bourlamaque à Lévis, 19 août, 1760.

29- Id. Ibid. p. 151. Lettre de LaPause à Lévis.

30- Id. Ibid. p. 156. La Pause à Lévis, 22 août, 1760.

31- At the surrender, the Fort held men of the Marines and of the Berry and Guienne regiments.


Concerning the real estimate of the artillery, there is a document, 20 October 1749, that states for this year (1749):
1 iron 3 pounder gun broken in the bore
3 swivels.


33- MG 16, K 9, vol 3, p. 405.


35- Rogers, Robert, op. cit. p. 173.

36- W.O. 34, vol 6, p. 249.
Fort Chambly During the Revolutionary War

by Margaret Duffett
At the outbreak of the American Revolution in April, 1775, Governor Sir Guy Carleton did not have an impressive number of troops at his disposal in Canada. In September 1775, Gage had requested Carleton to send the 10th and 52nd Regiments for his use in Boston and Carleton had complied with the request. This left him with only the 26th and 7th Regiments and a detachment of the Royal Artillery—a force inadequate for the defence of the various towns and posts in the province of Quebec. This was soon demonstrated when on May 18, Benedict Arnold and a group of armed men were able to surprise and capture the small detachment of the 26th Regiment which was at that time guarding St. John's. The garrison was made prisoner and its supplies loaded up and taken off. A larger group under Ethan Allan occupied the fort that evening but escaped when warned by a Montreal merchant named Bindon that Major Preston with 100 men were on their way.

The Richelieu River route to Canada was a strategic one and Carleton was well aware that he did not have the troops to guard it effectively. He wrote somewhat plaintively to Drummond that he had "not been able to assemble five hundred men, Artillery included, at St. John's and Chambly, leaving out very slender Guards indeed at the Towns, Magazines, and Inlets to the Province by the Chaudière and River St. Francis." Records show that on June 24, 1775 there were at Chambly one hundred and fourteen officers and men of the 7th and 26th Regiments, an Adjutant and a Surgeon and five of the Royal Artillery at Chambly—this out of a total of 859 in the Province of Quebec.
It had been observed before the outbreak of war that Fort Chambly was not strong. Lieutenant Marr in his description in 1773 of fortified places in Quebec said that the Barracks were such that "120 men and their Officers would be crowded". The fort "would be impregnable to Musketery but cannot make any resistance against cannon." In July 1775 Governor Trumbull sent Major-General Philip Schuyler an account which he had received of Chambly being "strong, both by nature and art". This indicates the American opinion of the fort - but, the author added, it was defended by only a small garrison.

Carleton's problems were compounded by the fact that the inhabitants of the Chambly area were not solidly behind the British. It was reported to the authorities in June 1775 that they were "confused" - that they had been ordered by both the British and the "Bostonians" to take up arms with them. If, however, the "Bostonians" came, the local residents were ready to help them. John Brown, an agent of the Boston Committee of Correspondence, had been active in spreading the Gospel of the American Revolution throughout Quebec in 1774-5, and had "had the impudence to venture himself into Chamblee Parish". His efforts had apparently had some success - a number of Canadians from the Chambly area were involved in Ethan Allen's attempt to take Montreal in September and in the American capture of Fort Chambly in October. In November Carleton wrote Lord Dartmouth that "the entrenched Camps that might have been formed near Chambly and St. John's, were effectively prevented by the corruption, and I may add, by the stupid baseness of the Canadian Peasantry, who not only deserted their duty, but numbers of them have taken up arms against the Crown."
When the American invasion of Canada began in an organized fashion early in September 1775 the main route to Montreal was up the Richelieu from Lake Champlain; St. John's and Fort Chambly twelve miles down the river thus found themselves in a strategic location. On September 4 the Americans under Brigadier General Richard Montgomery took over Isle aux Noix and established a camp there. By mid-September they had advanced to the St. John's area.

Ethan Allen reported to Schuyler on September 6, 1775 that he had arrived at Chambly and had "found the Canadians in the vicinity friendly", guarding him, helping him through the woods, and showing him "every courtesy". On September 25th he, with thirty compatriots and about 100 Canadians from the Chambly area, made a daring attack on Montreal but were beaten off by a small number of soldiers helped by both French and English citizens. Allen was taken prisoner.

The American Attack on Chambly

On September 15, Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery at Isle aux Noix received word that James Livingstone, an American merchant who had settled at Chambly, and Jeremiah Duggan, a former barber from Sorel, had been stirring up the Chambly neighbourhood in American favour. After dark that night Major John Brown of Massachusetts left for Chambly with about 100 Americans and thirty or forty Canadians. By September 1, Lieutenant Governor Cramahé was writing to Dartmouth that all communication between Chambly and St. John's had been cut off. This was particularly serious for St. John's because they had been receiving supplies from Chambly.

In late September Livingstone, Duggan and a blacksmith called Loizeau had set up a camp of 40 or 50 men at Point Oliver, now St. Mathias,
to the East of the Fort on the Chambly Basin. Inside the fort were seven officers and seventy men of the 7th Regiment of Royal Fusileers, one officer and three men of the Royal Artillery, thirty women and fifty one children. There were two small cannon but it was not possible to mount heavy ordnance. Justin Smith compared the fort with all the women and children to a summer hotel rather than a fortress.

Outside the fort were two or three pieces of cannon sent from St. John by Montgomery, aided by Livingstone and Duggan. These had been set up along with a few colonial 9-pounders facing the residence of one Noel Darche. On the 17th Major Brown and fifty men and Livingstone, now at the head of about three hundred troops, began the attack on Fort Chambly. Major Joseph Stopford, commanding inside the fort, capitulated after only a day and a half of siege, when a breach was made in the walls and no one had been wounded except a drum major who had received a scratch on his thigh.

Stopford proposed as terms of surrender that the officers and men be allowed to march with their women, children and baggage, to Montreal or any other place in Quebec. Major Brown, however, replied that the garrison must surrender itself prisoners of war, but that the women, children and baggage might accompany them. Stopford agreed. He then applied to Major Preston at St. John's to allow the bateaux to pass by the fort to carry the women, children and baggage to Montgomery's camp.

Besides the officers and men of the garrison taken at Chambly there were 30 women and 51 children. The men were marched to Reading, Pennsylvania to live in that town and Lancaster and York, while the officers were conducted to Trenton, New Jersey. The officers appear
to have had a certain amount of freedom to come and go as they wished as long as they stayed within 6 miles of their residences and engaged in no political correspondence. In fact we have an extract of a letter written by an officer taken at Chambly who said, "From Chambly hither we have marched three hundred miles; and ever since we were taken, I have the pleasure and satisfaction to acquaint you, that we have been treated with the greatest civility and politeness."30

The colours of the 7th Regiment were taken and, according to the historian Justin Smith, eventually found their way into Mistress John Hancock's chamber at Philadelphia "with great splendor and elegance."31 Also taken was a relatively large amount of stores: 80 barrels of flour, 11 of rice, 7 of peas, 6 firkins of butter, 141 barrels of pork, 7 of which were damaged, 121 barrels of gunpowder, 300 swivel shot, 1 box musket shot, 6564 musket cartridges, 150 stand of French arms, 3 royal mortars, 61 shells, 500 hand grenades, Royal Fusileer's muskets, 83, accoutrements, 83, rigging for at least three vessels.32 These supplies were of great use to the American forces. Schuyler had written earlier in October that Montgomery was doing as well as he could when "Every species of artillery stores are in some measure wanted."33 Now Montgomery could write "Major Brown assures me we have gotten six tons of powder, which, with the blessing of God will finish our business here" and that "the troops are in high spirits."34 With the supplies taken at Chambly the Americans could step up the siege at St. John's. As Charles Carroll, one of the Commissioners from Congress, wrote in May, 1776, "The taking of Chambly occasioned the taking of St. John's; against the latter we should not have succeeded without the six tons of gunpowder taken in the former."35
The surrender may have given the American troops a boost in morale and power but it had the opposite effect on the British. It was disastrous for those inside Fort St. John who were forced to surrender on November 2, and M. de Sanguinet says in his "Temoin Oculaire de la Guerre des Bastonnais au Canada" that the surrender of Chambly "affligea toute la ville de Montreal". On October 25, 1775, Carleton wrote in consternation to Dartmouth that desertion among the men had already been a serious problem and that he feared the affair at Chambly would "sink their Spirits still more."

Stopford's behaviour in surrendering the fort when he had there such a large supply of food and ammunition has often been criticized. Lieutenant Haddon of the Royal Artillery serving with Burgoyne's expedition in 1776 wrote that Chambly was surrender'd by Major Stopford (last year) to the rebels (who brought 1 gun & a horse load of powder against it,) after firing a few shot: and he Major Stopford neglecting to destroy a large quantity of powder then in the Fort, they were enabled to return and attack Fort St. John. The powder might have been thrown into the rapids as the fort is immediately above them. There was also a well in the fort. Timidity and folly in this instance seems to have been the cause of all the succeeding misfortunes in Canada. I did not learn that any men were killed or wounded in the fort, and it certainly might have held out long enough for the enemy to have expended all their ammunition, in which case they must have abandoned their enterprise. On the contrary with the above supplies they besieged and took St. John's in about six weeks.

In March 1777, Lord Barrington, Secretary of War, directed General Howe to investigate the surrender of Chambly. Carleton, however, wrote that he had nothing to complain about in connection with the surrender of St. John's and Chambly and that "officers may be unfortunate in the service they are employed upon and still be irreproachable." As a result of
this the enquiry was not carried out. Burt suggests that Carleton may have nipped the investigation in the bud because it would have involved an investigation into why such a valuable store of provisions had been at Chambly instead of at St. John's.

1776

During the winter of 1775–76 the Americans occupied Chambly. There cannot, however, have been a very large garrison there. Brigadier General David Wooster, who assumed command of the Canadian forces after the death of Montgomery on December 31, 1775 at Quebec, had available only 500 troops to garrison Montreal, St. Jean and Chambly. Moses Hazen, a New Englander who had settled on the Richelieu and who had subsequently gone over to the Americans, commanded at Chambly that winter. Several new gondolas were built at Chambly that spring.

During the winter of 1776 Chambly was apparently used as a place of detention for unco-operative Canadians. Wooster in February sent there Major Edward William Gray, Colonel Dufee and St. George Dupree because they refused to give up their commissions as officers in the militia and were regarded as dangerous influences in Montreal.

With the year 1776, however, fortune turned against the Americans in Canada. The attack on Quebec on New Year's Eve and the long siege which followed were unsuccessful. Early in May British ships carrying reinforcements were sighted coming up the St. Lawrence towards Quebec and on May 5 the retreat from Quebec began under General John Thomas who had succeeded Wooster who had been recalled for incompetence. The army moved down the river as far as Three Rivers, then evacuated it on the 21st because of a lack of supplies. Confusion and sickness among the American forces was great. At Sorel on June 2 there were 1100
effectives and about three times as many sick. General Thomas himself
died at Chambly on June 249 and at St. John's and Chambly smallpox was
rampant.50 Further retreat from Sorel was stopped for a time by the
arrival of Major General John Sullivan with 2500 reinforcements. Sullivan
took over command after Thomas' death. His forces had come up by way of
Chambly and had reported that the country was in a great state of con-
fusion.51

Meanwhile at Chambly on May 30th a council of war was held
presided over by Wooster and attended by Arnold and the commissioners
of the Continental Congress who had been sent to Canada. At that time
it was resolved to attempt to hold the territory between the St. Lawrence
and the Richelieu and in particular that Chambly be kept.52

An American attempt under Brigadier General Thompson to take
Three Rivers in early June was a total failure. On the morning of the
14th Sullivan began his retreat from Sorel while 60 British vessels
approached. By late Sunday night the 16th they had arrived at Chambly.53
Monday was spent loading bateaux with supplies and cannon and towing them
over the Chambly rapids. Before he left late Monday night Sullivan burned
part of the fort and the saw mill along with four schooners and some
gondolas.54

In the meantime the British were following behind the retreating
Americans. On the morning of the 15th Major General John Burgoyne who
had come to Canada with the British reinforcements left Sorel with about
four thousand men. By the night of Monday the 17th they had reached
Beloeil and at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 18th they marched to Chambly,
arriving there at 9.00 A.M. to find the Americans gone and the fort burned.55
The Americans had not destroyed any bridges between Sorel and Chambly but
between Chambly and St. John's most of the main bridges were out.

This considerably slowed down the British - it was not until evening that they arrived at St. John's to find that once again the Americans had left. On the 19th the army returned to Chambly after arranging for a detachment of 200 men to garrison St. John's.

On June 26th Guy Carleton transferred his headquarters to Chambly. His staff consisted of Lt. Gen. Burgoyne, Major Generals Phillips of the Artillery who after July 1 also had the Engineers under his command, and General Friedrich Riedesel, and four colonels, Nesbitt of the 47th, Fraser of the 24th, Powell of the 53rd and Gordon of the 29th.

Carleton himself was at Chambly between June 26 and July 20, when he went to Quebec, and again between about August 21 and September 28. During his absence Burgoyne assumed command.

At various times during the summer and early autumn of 1776 companies of several regiments were camped at Chambly - the 20th, 21st, 24th, 29th, 31st, 34th, 47th and 53rd as well as the Brunswick battalions of Rhetz and Specht.

One of the first orders given at Chambly concerned the arrangements for the local residents to bring produce to market. It appears that the market had been poorly stocked recently because produce had been bought from the people at their homes and because women bringing "refreshment" to market had been "insulted and discountenanced by men bathing". To solve this problem it was ordered that markets were to be held at the Chambly Church on Monday, Wednesday and Friday between six and nine in the morning, and guards were to be posted along the road for one mile "to prevent molestation or forestallers". Bathing, to be "encouraged as
highly beneficial to health was to take place at specified hours under the supervision of an officer.  

During the summer Carleton made preparations for further pursuit of the Americans. One hundred habitants were called out at once to repair the roads between St. John's and Chambly; these were to be furnished with Provisions, and relieved every fortnight. This use of the local citizenry continued throughout the summer except during harvest season when they were exempted from corvees and military service. Bateaux were also constructed at Chambly. All British soldiers who were also sawyers or carpenters were called in to work at Chambly and St. John's and were to be paid an extra shilling per day. Boats were also procured from elsewhere. Carleton sent to Montreal and Three Rivers for flat-bottomed boats for the use of the army. He was anxious to have larger ships available for use on Lake Champlain. Lieutenant William Digby of the 53rd recorded that in June 1776 there were at Chambly two "sloops of war" of 12 guns each which had to be dismantled and taken over the rapids between Chambly and St. John's and reassembled at St. John's, where others were building the Carleton and the Inflexible. The Inflexible had been started at Quebec then carried to Chambly and thence to St. John's where it was finished. General Riedesel reported that on July 15 there were at Chambly four armed vessels carrying eighteen to twenty cannon each.

Chambly in the summer of 1776 seems to have also been a hospital centre. Major General Phillips on July 8 ordered the Surgeon "to bring the sick up to Chambly in the Bateaux provided they can be removed without danger, and that the itchy patients are perfectly recovered, otherwise
he is to remain with them at St. Charles till they are so. On July 21 one Dr. Kennedy was appointed Inspector of Regimental Infirmaries and in August the surgeons of the various Regiments were required to send in to Dr. Kennedy at Chambly the names and diseases of their sick.

Troops were also trained at Chambly. The troops camped along the Richelieu were warned on July 5 "not to be alarmed at the firing of Cannon, as the Artillery will practise with Powder at Chambly." It is uncertain how much building took place at Chambly that summer. On July 22 we find an order for "A four Gun Battery and a Battery for four Mortars to be constructed immediately." On August 14 any British Regiment having Brickmakers was ordered to send them to Chambly. There is no evidence, however, that this construction was carried out.

A Court Martial was held at Chambly in late August at which were tried deserters and "persons guilty of capital crimes." Carleton wrote to the Provost Martial Jones who was in Montreal that if he was "desirous of continuing in the office, he must repair forthwith to the head quarters there to reside while the army remains here, and upon its removal to follow it. It will likewise be necessary in that case that he provide himself with an Executioner." It appears that the four men tried were, however, acquitted. Carleton summoned the Provost Martial again to Chambly on September 8th and ordered him to send to Chambly all the handcuffs he could find for use in conducting deserters then at Chambly to Quebec.

On September 24th a court of enquiry was held to investigate a fire which destroyed a barn in Chambly and a robbery of rum which occurred the same night at the fort. It was held that the barn and stable had been set on fire accidentally. The rum had been taken by a soldier of the 20th
Regiment who, seeing that the cask was running, caught the rum in his canteen. This was not the only occasion on which rum was stolen. In March 1781 someone crept "underneath the lower floor of the store (it standing on stone pillars) and had pierced through the plank of the floor and into the cask with a gimblet, in order to steal the rum."

Throughout the summer of 1776 preparations were being made for the pursuit of the American forces on Lake Champlain. Early in October the forces leapt Chambly, St. John's and Isle aux Noix and chased the enemy as far as Crown Point. On November 2 Carleton headed north to quarter his troops in Canada for the winter. The Deputy Barrack Master had been warned on September 21, 1776 to make preparations for the accommodation of 150 or 200 men at Chambly over the winter. Companies of the 21st, 31st, 47th and 53rd Regiments wintered there.

After 1776 the importance of Chambly as a military post seems to have declined. It was on the route to St. John's, the assembly point for Burgoyne's expedition of 1777, and as such the road to St. John's was patrolled constantly to keep communication safe between the St. Lawrence and the latter fort. The Canadians in the area were ordered on corvée to help move the army to St. John's but difficulties arose in keeping them at work. It seems that they were continually going home, "alleging that they [had] been dismissed by officers at Chambly or St. John's." As a result "the transport of provisions [was] near stopit" and Burgoyne's army threatened with a shortage of provisions. For this reason Brigadier General Maclean and a detachment of the Royal Emigrants were sent out to investigate.

Chambly became largely a supply depot serving the troops which were quartered in the area. A Company of the 31st Regiment were sent
there in June 1777 "for the purpose of guarding the stores lodged there
and the provisions landed there from time to time..." In August,
Captain Marr of the Engineers was ordered to see to the construction
of sheds for provisions "which must be lodged there from time to time in
order to be forwarded to General Burgoyne’s army, besides what may be
necessary to keep at the places for the troops there." 87

The failure of Burgoyne’s expedition of the fall of 1777 left
the Richelieu particularly vulnerable and it was not considered safe
for the storage of important supplies. 88 For this reason the heavy
ordnance from St. John’s and Chambly was sent to Sorel in the latter
part of September 1778 as soon as adequate landing stages for bateaux
were erected at Chambly. 89 Haldimand in fact wrote to Lord St. Germain
on October 15 that:

"Chambly is only a fortified Barrack, affords even no
shelter against cannon; & is entirely surrounded by high
ground at a small musket shot.
I judge it unsafe, in our present defensive plan, to have
any stores so high up as any of the places above mentioned,
or at Montreal and have withdrawn them therefore except
as were required to this Post. [Sorel]." 90

Armament

There is no record of exactly how much heavy ordnance was
removed from Chambly in September 1778. However, on October 27, 1777,
there were at Chambly two light brass dismounted 2½ pounders, 4 medium
brass dismounted 2½ pounders and two eight inch Howitzers. 91 On May 1,
1778 there were besides these one iron 2½ pounder and four iron 9 pounders. 92
It appears that the heavy ordnance was never brought back to Chambly after
1778. 93 No brass ordnance was ever recorded as being at Chambly during
the remainder of the period of the American Revolutionary War; the only
piece of iron ordnance recorded is a 9 pounder in August 1783. 94 There
were, however, some small arms at Chambly.

Reports on the distribution of small arms at the posts in Canada continually list for Chambly 60 English and 94 French muskets. Large quantities of shot were also stored at Chambly. Twiss inspected the fort as a storehouse for powder in January 1781 and reported that "The Provision Store at Chambly, is much exposed to every kind of accident." He suggested that all supplies not required for the fort be sent to St. John's, but this does not appear to have been done, as the number of barrels of powder at Chambly seems to have increased after 1781 rather than decreased. In August 1783 he reported to Haldimand that there were 502 barrels of powder at Chambly and room for 30 or 40 more, and that he was preparing immediately to put a new roof over the magazine.

After 1777

Quantities of food were also stored at Chambly. Twiss recorded in January 1781 that 20,000 bushels could be stored at Chambly, whereas 50,000 could be kept at Sorel.

After the American retreat of 1776 no further action took place along the Richelieu. The main occupation of troops based at Chambly seems to have been to guard the stores and the prisoners who were sent there and to work on the roads in the area. The roads seem to have required continual attention, judging from the frequency with which reports on their conditions changed. For example in January 1781 the road between Chambly and St. John was considered good. On April 24, 1782 Haldimand wrote that transport of provisions was "much retarded by the badness of the road". On May 5 considered it "fort bon"
and on May 23 Haldimand wrote that transportation from Chambly was backward and that the rain of the previous three days might further complicate the problem.105

In July 1779 Twiss recommended to Haldimand that a saw mill to carry one set of 16 saws to be constructed at "that part of the Rapids of Chambly which are on the Kings Dam, and very near the Fort".106 However, it was not until February 26, 1781 that he reported that work had begun on "the Damn[sic] for the new Saw Mill on Chambly Rapids".107 After the completion of the mill Chambly seems to have been a supply post for timber, planks and boards. On October 21, 1781 a return of Horses lists three at Chambly and mentions that "some" are used for the saw mill.108

The Prisons

In June 1777 a Company of the 31st Regiment was sent to guard the stores at Chambly.109 In October 1777 four companies of the 29th Regiment were sent to Chambly.110 The 53rd Regiment appears to have been the principal one in charge of stores and prisoners, but the total numbers at the Fort of both this Regiment and others had decreased until in March 1779 there were only 147.111 In May of the previous year there had been 612.112 In April 1779 four prisoners escaped; this occasioned the withdrawal of the 53rd Regiment to St. John's113 and the arrival in early June of a detachment of the 34th Regiment, "one Captain, one Subaltern & thirty-two Privates, with a proper proportion of non-commissioned officers."114 Haldimand wrote Lieutenant Colonel St. Léger that those chosen were to be men "whose steadiness you can depend upon, and who at the same time are not able to make long marches, so as to weaken your Regiment for the Field as little as possible."115

Between the summer of 1779 and the autumn of 1781 Chambly was a major centre for the detention of American prisoners. Before and after
that period prisoners were occasionally held there but there were not many nor were they held for long periods of time. Guarding prisoners was one of the prime occupations of the Chambly garrison. In early April 1779, however, four rebel prisoners escaped while the sentry slept at his post. Following this episode Haldimand ordered two rooms to be fitted out "in such a manner in Fort Chambly as to make it impractical for prisoners to effect their escape." The escape also resulted in a change of Regiments at Chambly: the 53rd was withdrawn to St. John's while a company of the 34th was transferred to Chambly. Throughout the spring of 1779 work was carried out to prepare the rooms for the "reception of prisoners". By June they were ready, and rebel prisoners from Montreal were transferred to that place. On July 1 Major Robert Hoyes of the 34th Regiment and commander at Chambly at the time reported to the Deputy Adjutant General that there were at Chambly 25 Rebel Prisoners. It appears that officers were not kept at Chambly when other arrangements could be made. Powell at St. John's wrote to Haldimand on July 24, 1779 after a group of Americans had been taken at Fourteen Hills Island that the men had been sent to Chambly whereas the officers had gone to Montreal, "as they must have been put into the same room with their men, had they been sent with them." And on August 5 Haldimand ordered all officers held prisoner at Chambly to be conducted to Quebec. This does not mean, however, that officers were never there: in October 1779 Major Hoyes inquired if a Lieutenant Colonel and three other officers confined at Chambly might be permitted to walk in the Barrack yard.

On August 3 Powell wrote that Lieutenant Hockings had been sent to Chambly to investigate the possibility of sending more prisoners from
Montreal to Chambly and that he had reported that there were already thirty-four there and that there was room for only another fourteen.127 Records show, however, that the number of prisoners reached as high as 73 in December 1760.128 After the change of guard escape continued to be a problem. In August 1779 an escape by 27 prisoners was prevented by a warning from seven of the other prisoners.129 In June 1780 two more men succeeded in escaping.130

In January 1781 Robert Mathews, Deputy Adjutant General, wrote to Twiss that "His Excellency purposes, as soon as the roads will permit, to have the prisoners removed from Chambly".131 And after October 1781 there were very few prisoners detained at the fort.132

After October 1782 the 29th Regiment was the principal one at Chambly but records show that the number of soldiers declined so that during the last year of the Revolutionary War there were in the neighbourhood of only 100 people, soldiers and others, at Chambly.133 Chambly had been in a vital position during the first two years of the war, but after the failure of Burgoyne's campaign in 1777 it was no longer near the centre of any action.
Return of His Majesty's Garrison of Chambly made Prisoners by the Rebels 17th October, 1775.

**Royal Fusileers:**
- 1 Major
- 1 Captain
- 4 Lieutenants
- 1 Surgeon
- 5 Sergeants
- 3 Drummers and Fifers
- 62 Rank and File

**Royal Artillery:**
- 1 Capt. Lieutenant
- 1 Corporal
- 3 Matrosses

**Officers Taken:**
- Major Stopford
- Captain Brice
- Lt. Harrison
- Lt. Shuttleworth
- Lt. Hamer
- Lt. Barrington
- Surgeon Huddleston
- Captain Lieutenant Godwin
Footnotes:

3. P.A.C., Q Series, vol. 11, p. 204-5.
7. P.A.C., Q Series, Vol. 11, p. 224, Carleton to Dartmouth, August 11, 1775.
10. P.A.C., MG 23, B 7, "Journal of the Most Remarkable Events which happened in Canada between the months of July, 1775 and June, 1776", and an account from the Quebec Gazette, quoted in A History of the Organization... Time, Vol. 2, p. 82.


23. Ibid., p. 1133.


26. See Appendix A.


33. Ibid., p. 1066.

34. Ibid., p. 1132.

35. Meyer, Brantz (ed.): Journal of Charles Carroll during his visit to Canada in 1776, as one of the Commissioners from Congress, Baltimore, 1976, p. 95.


38. P.A.C., 4 Series, Vol. 11, p. 270.


42. P.A.C., War Office 1, Vol. 11, p. 32, Carleton to Barrington, May 21, 1777.


45. Ibid., p. 228.


56. Ibid, p. 74.

57. Ibid, p. 75.


60. P.A.C., Haldimand Collection, B. 83, p. 13.

61. Ibid, p. 16.


66. Baxter, James P. (ed.): *The British Invasion from the North, the Campaign of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne With the Journal of Lieut. William Digby*, Albany, 1887, p. 120.


68. Stone, *op. cit.*, p. 54.


74. P.A.C., Haldimand Coll., B. 83, p. 35.


76. Haldimand Coll., B. 83, p. 41, General Order, August 30, 1776.

77. Haldimand Coll., B. 39, p. 112.


82. Atkinson, *op. cit.* p. 139.


84. P.A.C., Q Series, Vol. 13, p. 250.


93. i.e., Haldimand Coll., B. 157, p. 3, 1 April 1779; B. 156, p. 217, Oct. 1, 1780; B. 157, p. 111, 1 Jan. 1783.


95. i.e., Haldimand Coll., B. 156, p. 177, Feb. 10, 1780; p. 211, Sept. 1, 1780; p. 243, Oct. 1, 1780; p. 253, Dec. 1, 1780; p. 287-8, Nov. 1, 1781; p. 293-4, Jan. 1, 1782; p. 505-6, 1 June, 1782; p. 315, 1 Nov. 1782; p. 339-40, 1 Aug. 1783.

96. Ibid.

97. Haldimand Collection, B. 154, p. 209.

98. See note 95.


107. Ibid., p. 322.


110. Haldimand Coll., B. 33, p. 86.

111. See Haldimand Coll., B. 193 & 195, Monthly Return of the number and denomination of people victual'd.

112. Ibid.

114. Ibid., p. 40 and B. 133, p. 113.
116. See Note 111.
117. Haldimand Coll., B. 133, p. 89, Powell to Haldimand, April 9, 1779.
118. Haldimand Coll., B. 80, p. 128.
120. Haldimand Coll., B. 133, p. 94.
121. Ibid., p. 111.
122. Ibid., p. 113.
130. Ibid., p. 190.
132. Haldimand Coll., B. 193, pp. 118, 122, 125, 128.
133. See Note 111.
Port Chambly During the War of 1812

by Margaret Duffett
Chambly during the War of 1812

For several months preceding the American declaration of war in June 1812 preparations had been underway in the British North American colonies for that eventuality. The most immediate effect on Fort Chambly was the establishment there of the headquarters of the Canadian Voltigeurs. Chambly had been occupied by two corps of infantry volunteers (500 men) and a detachment of artillery. Now, in April, 1812 Governor Sir George Prevost authorized the formation of a Provincial Corps of Light Infantry, the Canadian Voltigeurs, under Captain Charles-Michel de Salaberry. Recruitment began immediately; desertion, however, was soon a problem. In an attempt to curtail this Salaberry, on May 12, suggested to the Military Secretary that the men at Montreal should be moved to Chambly where they could be kept together and presumably better supervised. "Fort Chambly can accommodate 156 men for the moment and it might be made to contain nearly as many more at least during the summer; but from what I hear....the men would be very badly of [sic] in winter. However, if you can but get us together we shall try to make the most of it". A return of troops in the Montreal district on May 18, 1812 shows that there were 275 officers and men of the Canadian Voltigeurs, 16 of the Royal Artillery and one Hospital Mate, at Chambly.

De Salaberry found conditions at Chambly somewhat less than ideal. He wrote on June 18 that he had a "great difficulty in quartering the men... The camp equipage was very deficient and is in a measure still so. The Barrack furniture is very incomplete. We have no hospital, no surgery. We want authority from you to hire a house to put in the Taylors and Authority to hire a house to secure the Regimental Baggage. I do not know where to put the officers, no lodgings can be found for them. The tents are very small and of a very inferior quality."
Chambly was not, however, considered to be in a strategic position. On May 18 Prevost sent an account of the military situation of the British North American Provinces to the Earl of Liverpool. He considered that in the event of war, Montreal "would become the first object of attack" and that its security depended upon an "impenetrable line" being maintained from La Prairie to Chambly. But Chambly itself was "unimportant" except "as a post of support to St. John's, and a place of assemblage for the militia and a depot for their arms and ammunition." It was occupied at the time "by about 300 Voltigeurs, and a Detachment of Artillery having two Field Guns."  

Troops at Chambly

On June 16 the Voltigeurs who had been raised in Montreal and who were encamped on the Crown Land at Chambly, refused to obey orders to parade. The disturbance was put down and an investigation held into complaints that the men had not been receiving their full allowance of bread and pork. By the 22nd, de Salaberry reported that all the men were quiet and that the Court of Enquiry had been held.

According to a letter written by one John Yule in 1876 the troops were camped "under canvass all over the "Common" and up the Mill Dam the ditches round the tents being up to a few years ago quite visible. The Stone Store near the Grist Mill was occupied by troops and every available shanty by officers and men."  

Besides the Canadian Voltigeurs who were stationed at Chambly, there were there during the summer and fall of 1812 companies of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, the First Regiment of Foot (The Royal Scots) and the 8th (or King's) Regiment. A return for November 1812 shows that there were at Chambly 982 officers and men of the Royal Artillery, the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion, the 1st, 8th, 100th, 103rd and 104th Regiments of Foot and the Canadian Fencibles. By December 21 the detachment of the 100th had departed as had the one Lieutenant of the 104th Foot.
In May 1813 Major General de Rottenburg, commander of the forces in Lower Canada, ordered the formation of "Two Light Infantry Battalions by directing the Flank Companies of Battalions of Embodied Militia to march with the least possible delay to Chambly to be incorporated...". Major General Stovin was directed shortly afterward "to proceed to Chambly as his Headquarters to visit the advanced line of outposts...[and] to make such arrangements [as] will most rapidly facilitate the organization and discipline of the two light Flank Battalions". Major General Sir Roger Sheaffe visited Chambly in July to inspect the second battalion of the Embodied Militia and found that great progress had been made and that there was "now existing in the Corps a general desire for improvement."

The principal troops at Chambly during the summer of 1813 seem to have been detachments of the Royal Engineers, the Frontier Light Infantry, the 103rd Regiment, the Royal Artillery, the De Meuron Regiment and the Canadian Fencible Regiment. Desertion seems to have been a particular problem judging from the number of Court Martials reported. Several of those tried were from the 103rd Regiment and it appears that De Meuron's Regiment was brought in to take its place. In any case a return of troops at Chambly (Major General Stovin commanding) indicates that there were there on September 15, 1813, 6 General Staff, 86 of the Royal Artillery Drivers, one Lieutenant of the Royal Engineers, 88 of the 19th Light Dragoons, 1099 of De Meuron's Regiment, 319 of the Second Battalion of Embodied Militia, plus a number of women and children. A number of these were moved from Chambly to the south when invasion of the Richelieu was threatened by an American Force under Major General Wade Hampton. This danger was eliminated for 1813 when Hampton moved northeast and was defeated at Chateauguay on October 26. The barrack master at Chambly on September 26 wrote of the confusion at the post when the 19th Light Dragoons left in the middle...
of the night and the Sedentary Militia pushed their way into the barracks and removed what they could of the Dragoons' equipment. On October 9, 1813, the Battalion of Lieutenant Colonel de Rouville was ordered to occupy Chambly.

In mid-November the left wing of the De Meuron Regiment was sent to Chambly to relieve the Militia there. At the same time, detachments of the Royal Artillery and the 19th Light Dragoons were ordered to the post. A report on the state of the divisions under the command of Major General Rottenburg on January 23, 1814 shows that there were at Chambly, 641 officers and men under the command of Major Wouchope. On February 15 there were a Staff Surgeon, two Hospital Mates, 64 of the 19th Light Dragoons, 73 of the Royal Artillery, 554 of the De Meuron Regiment, 20 Detachment, along with 2 servants, 55 women and 69 children.

During the summer of 1814, there was a considerable build-up at Chambly before the Plattsburgh expedition in September. General Rottenburg himself set up headquarters at Chambly for a time, although he found living quarters in the town. On June 10, a General Order was issued by Major General Baynes that "The Headquarters of the Army Serving in the North American Provinces will be moved to Chambly on Sunday the 19th instant." Prevost appears to have come to Chambly at that time and remained there until headquarters were moved to Montreal on July 1. It is not clear why headquarters were established at Chambly at this particular time; the only correspondence which concerned itself during that brief period with Chambly seems to be an order that the troops were to bathe only before 5.00 A.M. on Sundays, and before Drill Time on other days, "It having been represented by the Chief Medical Officer...that sickness begins to increase amongst the Troops supposed to be occasioned by bathing (sic) during the heat of the day."
On June 24, 1814, Lieutenant Colonel De Meuron was ordered to march with the Grenadier Company, staff and band of De Meuron's Regiment to Chambly to establish headquarters of the Regiment there. Chambly was also headquarters for the 3rd Battalion of Embodied Militia. At Chambly Camp on July 7 there were detachments of 125 of the Royal Artillery, 2 of the Royal Artillery Marine and 89 of the Royal Artillery Drivers. In the fort there were three gunners of the Royal Artillery. On August 1 the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers was sent to Chambly. On August 7 the 1st Brigade under Major General Robinson was ordered to Chambly via the Richelieu; this brigade included 2,495 all ranks. The brigade included the 88th Regiment (400 of whom arrived at Chambly on August 2), the 3/27th, 39th and 76th. It is uncertain exactly how many officers and men were at Chambly in August 1814; Joseph Bouchette writing in 1832 said that throughout the war "there was always a considerable force encamped on the plain near it which in the last mentioned year exceeded 6000 men." 

Construction

A Substantial amount of building took place at Chambly during the war to accommodate the large number of troops there. During the fall of 1812 there were constructed stables for 50 horses, a Gun Shed and a Bake House, probably numbers 7, 4 and 3 on map #6. In April one Lieutenant Yule of the Royal Engineers was sent to supervise the construction of building for the Royal Engineers Field Train Department. By May 1814 the stone Barrack (No. 14) for 889 men had been completed as well as two cookhouses for the barrack. Repairs were made to the armoury and magazine inside the fort and a guardhouse (No. 10) built outside. A Royal Artillery Barrack for 80 men (No. 6), officers quarters, (No. 8 or 10), a cavalry barrack for 240 men (No. 32) were completed. Foundations had been laid for more
A Bakehouse was constructed. The building was not, however, sufficient to take care of all the officers' needs in the summer of 1814 and some houses were hired in town. General de Rottenburg for one rented a house in town while he was at Chambly during the summer. The Commissary General wrote to Freer, the Military Secretary, in April 1814 to complain that the present arrangement whereby the Commissariat at Chambly was located in a house in town also occupied by several other persons was not satisfactory and that a suitable office and house should be provided at the Post. By August a commissariat building was under construction.

Armament

There does not seem to have been a large supply of Ordnance at Chambly during the war of 1812. A return for December 1812 lists three light brass 6 pounders, 4 light brass three pounders and one 5½ Howitzer. In September 1813, a return of Field Ordnance lists 2 brass six pounders at Chambly. In January 1814 there were 5 brass light six pounders, one unserviceable 9 pounder and one 5½ brass Howitzer. Chambly appears rather to have been a supply depot for small arms, accoutrements and ammunition. Returns of small arms for Chambly throughout the war show a substantial amount of ammunition and about 1000 to 1300 muskets, of which about 500 were for the use of the militia.

During the War of 1812, Chambly's position on the Richelieu was not the strategic one it had been in previous wars. Nevertheless it was important as a supply depot for the area and as a camp during the build-up before the campaign of 1814 at Plattsburgh.
FOOTNOTES


2. F.A.C., RG 8, C Series, Vol. 796, p.84

3. C. Series, Vol. 1707, p.18


15. C Series, Vol. 1203½H, p.16

16. C Series, Vol. 703, p. 113


32. Ibid.
41. Probably numbers 28 and 29.
44. C Series, Vol. 553, p. 89.


50. i.e. C Series, Vol. 1707, p. 22, July 1812;
   C 1707, p. 166, April 1813; C 1708, p. 73, Sept. 1813;
   C 387, p. 50, and p. 164½, November 1813.
Fort Chambly and the Rebellions of 1637-38 by David Lee
The Rebellions of 1837-1838 in Lower Canada were the result of political troubles aggravated by racial and economic factors. In 1836 the elected Legislative Assembly (lower house) adjourned without voting funds for the administration by the Executive Council (cabinet) of the Province appointed because the British Government would not satisfy their demands that the Legislative Council (upper house) also be made elective. The elected assembly consisted mainly of lawyers, doctors and habitants under the leadership of the lawyer Louis-Joseph Papineau. Although mainly French there were many English-speaking Canadians among Papineau's followers. The appointed Council was supported mainly by the merchants and landholders of the Province and, although mainly English, there were some French Canadians in the group.

Papineau's party had the support of Mackenzie's Reformers in Upper Canada and of several prominent British parliamentarians. After an investigating commission sent from Britain failed to gain a reconciliation the newspapers of Papineau's party called for a boycott of imported goods in order to dry up import duties as a source of revenue for the Executive Council. By thus stalling the governmental process the reformers hoped that the Colonial Office would award the Province with Responsible Government (an Executive Council responsible to the Assembly); with an elective upper house; with Assembly control over all revenue and over the administration and settlement of public lands. The Colonial Office would not grant these reforms and its attempt to mollify racial tensions by appointing more French Canadians to positions in the Civil Service and Judiciary did not alleviate matters much. As the prospect of reform grew dimmer extremists of both races gained in influence and violence threatened to break out especially in the Montreal and Richelieu Valley areas.
The Richelieu Valley was a centre of dissension because the political situation there was aggravated by severe crop-failures. At St.-Ours, in May 1837, about 25 miles below Chambly, a public meeting of 1200 people declared its intent to promote smuggling with the United States (to assist the boycott); the meeting also declared its friendship. During the next month similar meetings threatening a renunciation of allegiance to Britain were held in the area including one in the County of Chambly on June 4 (at Longueuil, the county seat) addressed by the M.P.P. Louis-Michel Viger. The Governor dissolved the 1837 session of the Legislature after the Assembly again refused to vote funds and all hope was lost. In October, at St.-Charles on the Richelieu about 40 miles below Chambly, 5000 people gathered to hear Papineau advise against violence and promote the economic boycott; his English lieutenant, Dr. Wolfdred Nelson, however, interrupted to claim that the time had come "to melt our spoons into bullets". The Bishop of Montreal urged the people to remain loyal to the established government but in Chambly some parishioners walked out of the church when the Bishop's message was read. After a Montreal street fight between members of the two groups Governor Gosford tried to arrest Papineau and some of his friends but they fled to the Richelieu. Violence began 16 November on the Chambly-Longueuil road when two rebels arrested in St.-Jean were rescued by their friends.

The next day Lieut.-Colonel George A. Wetherall, commanding the second battalion of the 1st (Royal) Regiment, was sent to Fort Chambly to strengthen the garrison there. He took with him four companies of the Royals, a party of the Royal Artillery under Captain Glasgow (and 2 brass six-pounders) and about 20 Montreal Volunteer Cavalrymen under Captain David. Wetherall's expedition reinforced the company of Royals he had already sent to Fort Chambly to fix up the barracks.
It seems quite likely that there was no garrison at Chambly between 1830 and 1837. And it is quite likely that the fort was not used except perhaps for stores and for a prison for seven rebels whom Wetherall arrested en route to Chambly. It is likely, then, that Wetherall's expedition was accommodated outside the fort in either the stone barracks or the cavalry barracks for both structures were reported to be in good condition and the fort "delapidated" in 1834.

Gosford planned to have some of the garrison pacify the area by marching down river to meet near St.-Denis another force coming up from Sorel. It was at St.-Denis and St.-Charles that the reformers (now rebels to the Crown) had gathered men and arms. The rebels held firm at St.-Denis when the force from Sorel under Colonel Gore attacked on 22 November and several on both sides were killed. The poorly equipped rebel force, however, now melted away and lost heart now that Papineau and other leaders had fled to the United States. When Lieut.-Colonel Wetherall heard of Gore's failure he sent back to Chambly for more men and then went on to capture St.-Denis and crush rebellion in the area.

In 1838 Lord Durham led his famous investigating commission to Canada and his Report eventually resulted in the reformers gaining most of what they had worked for. The same year Nelson returned and collected another force downriver at Napierville on November 1838 but after another bloody battle it too was dispersed. Peace and order were maintained in the Chambly area throughout 1838, however, probably just by the presence of a permanent garrison there.
LOUIS-MICHEL VIGER:

Born Montréal 28 September 1785; died 1855; son of Louis Viger, blacksmith and Marie-Agnès Papineau (aunt of Louis-Joseph Papineau). He joined the second battalion Montréal militia in 1812 as an ensign and was promoted to captain January 1814. He was elected Member of the Provincial Assembly in 1830 for the County of Chambly (his cousin Louis-Joseph Papineau had represented the County 1808-1814) and served until 1838. A leader in the Rebellion (he spoke at Longueuil and St.-Charles) but did not see much action for he was arrested on 20 November and charged with high treason. He received a pardon in 1839 and continued in politics, later serving as receiver-general (March 1848 to November 1849) in the Baldwin-Lafontaine ministry.
NOTES:

1. Extremists of the so-called loyalist group occasionally urged the use of violence to prevent reform. Montreal Gazette, 12 Dec. 1835.

2. The Montreal Vindicator, 6 June 1837.


4. Ibid., p. 194.

5. The Quebec Mercury, 22 November 1837.

6. C 587, 23 October 1837; Wetherall to Gosford, 6 November 1837, P.A.C., Q 239, part one, p. 67; return of troops, 9 November 1837, Q.240, part one, p. 79; P.A.C., C 587, 17 November 1837, p. 163.


8. Idem.


After Fort Chambly was abandoned in the 1850s it became the property of the Canadian Government but no measures were taken to preserve it. The first official action taken to preserve the site occurred after a visit by the Governor General the Marquis of Lorne, the Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec and other dignitaries in 1881. The group had been invited to Chambly by Mr. J-O. Dion after attending the ceremonies unveiling Philippe Hébert’s statue of Salaberry nearby. As a result of their enthusiasm the Federal Government authorized the commencement of works of preservation at the fort in 1882. Dion was put in charge of the fort and so began his service in the capacity of caretaker, guide, museologist and propagandist which lasted until his death in 1916. He was succeeded by L-J-N. Blanchet who became the first Superintendent when the Department of Militia and Defence turned the property over to the Department of the Interior for use as a park, 1 April 1921 (P.C. No. 46, 10 January 1921)